and most comprehensive sense. Thus, the 38th section enacts, that, "from and after the commencement of this Act, the local board and their lessees may from time to time demand and take from any person occupying or using any shop, stall, stand, bench, or ground-space in any market-place for the time being under the management of the local board and used as a general market, such tolls as the local board or their lessees from time to time appoint, not exceeding the several tolls specified in schedule A. to the Act annexed." So, s. 39 speaks of "tolls" for every wagon or cart brought into the market-place, or for pitching any commodities in the market,-s. 40, for cattle or live stock,-s. 41, for any wagon or cart brought into the hay and straw market, s. 42, for weighing and measuring commodities brought to the market-place,-s. 43, for the use of the machines for weighing carts,—s. 45, for slaughtering cattle in any slaughter-house belonging to the board, s. 46, for the occupation of any shop, stall, bench, compartment, or space of ground. And s. 47 enacts that "the several tolls respectively may be demanded and taken by the officers of the local board and of their lessees respectively." The 13th section of the general Act must apply to all these sums, which are called "tolls" in the local Act, as they are called in common parlance *646] *throughout the kingdom. And this is evidently consonant

to the intention of the local Act, the object of which was to compel parties to come into the market-place and so free the streets of the town from obstruction. The case of The Llandaff and Canton District Market Company, app., Lyndon, resp., 8 C. B. N. S. 515 (E. C. L. R. vol. 98), has no bearing upon the present. The question there was, what was a dwelling-house or a sale therein. The question here depends entirely upon the construction of the local Act and the 13th section of the general Act incorporated therewith. [ERLE, C. J.— Where is the definition of "the prescribed limits?"] In the 3d section of the local Act, which enacts " 'that this Act shall for all purposes be in force and have effect within the municipal borough of Wolverhampton."

Ryder, for the respondent.(a)-The main question is, whether the local board or their lessees are entitled to a "toll" on fruit *647] and fish sold elsewhere than in the market-place or in the dwelling-house or shop of the seller. These claims, which are in restraint of the common-law right of buying and selling, and impose a burthen upon the subject, should be construed with strictness. In Warrington v. Furbor, 8 East 242, 245, Lord Ellenborough says: "I think that where the subject is to be charged with a duty, the cases in

(a) The points marked for argument on the part of the respondent were as follows:"I. That the market-tolls authorized by the Local Board of Health Act, called The Wolverhampton Improvement Act, 1853, are not leviable on stalls and places occupied for the sale of goods outside the general market, and within the jurisdiction of the board:

"2. That such tolls are not leviable on persons carrying or exposing for sale fruit, vegetables, and fish, in streets and places outside the general market, and within the jurisdiction of the board:

"3. That such tolls are payments for the occupation of ground space and certain superficial square feet of land, and are not tolls to be levied on the articles sold:

"4. That, from time immemorial, a custom has existed for persons to sell fruit, vegetables, and fish in the streets and places within the jurisdiction of the board, and that the said custom is still in existence, and has not been destroyed by the Wolverhampton Improvement Act, 1853."

which it is to attach ought to be fairly marked out; and we should give a liberal construction to words of exception, confining the operation of the duty." Again, in Gildart v. Gladstone, 11 East 675, 685, -where the question was as to the right of the Liverpool Dock Company to exact certain tonnage-dues,-the same learned Judge says: "If the words would fairly admit of different meanings, it would be right to adopt that which would be most favourable to the interest of the public, and most against that of the Company; because the Company in bargaining with the public ought to take care to express distinctly what payments they were to receive; and because the public ought not to be charged unless it be clear that it was so intended." In Denn d. Manifold v. Diamond, 4 B. & C. 243 (E. C. L. R. vol. 10), 6 D. & R. 328 (E. C. L. R. vol. 16), Bayley, J., says: "It is a wellsettled rule of law that every charge upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language." Again, Best, C. J., in Looker v. Halcombe, 4 Bingh. 183 (E. C. L. R. vol. 13), 12 J. B. Moore 410 (E. C. L. R. vol. 22), says: "An Act of Parliament which abridges the liberty of the subject ought to receive the strictest construction; nothing should be holden to come under its operation that is not expressly within the letter and spirit of the Act." Tindal, C. J., uses very similar language in Parker v. The Great Western Railway Company, 7 Scott N. R. 835, 870, 7 M. & G. 253, 288 (E. C. L. R. vol. 49). The result of the cases upon the subject is thus summed up in Dwarris on Statutes 646,-"It is a well-settled rule of law, that every [*648 charge upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language. Acts of Parliament which impose a duty upon the public will be critically construed with reference to the particular language in which they are expressed. When there is any ambiguity found, the construction must be in favour of the public; because it is a general rule, that, where the public are to be charged with a burden, the intention of the legislature to impose that burden must be explicitly and distinctly shown." Then, as to the construction of the clauses in the local Act. The 38th section points to payments to be made in respect of space occupied within the market-place. [WILLIAMS, J.-Two questions are presented for our consideration,-what is the meaning of "the prescribed limits,"-and what is the meaning of "tolls" by the special Act authorized to be taken in the market? To entitle the appellant to succeed, he must make out that "prescribed limits" means the space comprised within the borough of Wolverhampton, and also that the word "tolls" in s. 13 of the general Act is applicable to all sums to be paid for stalls or standing in the marketplace.] The 2d section of the general Act enacts that "the word 'prescribed' used in this Act in reference to any matter herein stated, shall be construed to refer to such matter as the same shall be prescribed or provided for in the special Act, and the sentence in which such word occurs shall be construed as if, instead of the word 'prescribed,' the expression 'prescribed for that purpose in the special Act' had been used." For the meaning of "prescribed limits" we must have recourse to the local Act: and the natural place to look for it there would be the clause giving the local board general power to levy tolls, viz., s. 38, and that is expressly confined to the marketplace. The definition of "tolls" is only to be found in schedule A. in the local Act; and that extends only to payments [*649

to be made in respect of shops, stalls, stands, and ground space occupied in the market: there is nothing in any of the schedules imposing a toll in the market on specific articles, as there is in the Llandaff and Canton District Markets Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict. c. cv.

Welsby, in reply.-The words "prescribed limits" in the 13th section of the general Act must refer to some place outside the markethouse or market-place, otherwise the exception of the party's "own dwelling-place or shop," would be insensible. [ERLE, C. J.-The "prescribed limits" must be the boundaries of the borough of Wolverhampton. Then, it is clear that somebody is to be prevented from selling except in the market-place. The prohibition in s. 13 can only be in respect of articles brought there to be sold. In The Mayor of Macclesfield v. Pedley, 4 B. & Ad. 397 (E. C. L. R. vol. 24), 1 Nev. & M. 708 (E. C. L. R. vol. 28), a claim by immemorial custom to exclude all persons from selling marketable commodities on the marketday, except in the market-place, was held to be valid in law. [WILLIAMS, J.-The only power given by s. 38 of the local Act is, to tax the stalls or space; there is no power to levy a toll upon the articles sold or exposed for sale. Now, to render himself liable to the penalty imposed by s. 13 of the general Act, the respondent must have sold an article which is charged with a market-toll.] An article in respect of which a toll is authorized by the local Act to be taken from the seller. [ERLE. C. J.-The person who has a stall in the market pays the same toll whether he brings anything there or not,-rent for the space.] The general Act has a series of clauses relating to toll. The

37th section, which inflicts a penalty upon "every person who *650] *shall demand or receive a greater toll than that authorized to be taken under the provisions of this or the special Act," must be applicable to every sum by the local Act authorized to be taken. [WILLIAMS, J.-In strictness market-toll is a sum of money paid by the buyer of the goods: Comyns's Digest, Toll (A.)] The tolls here imposed do not mean toll in that sense; all these payments are charged upon and payable by the seller. The intention of the Act of Parliament is plain, viz., to compel all persons dealing in marketable articles, otherwise than in their own shops, to come to the market.

ERLE, C. J.-I am of opinion that our judgment must be in favour of the respondent. The complaint against him is, that he (not being a licensed hawker) exposed for sale within the limits of the borough of Wolverhampton, and not in his own dwelling-place or shop, fruit and fish, in respect of which tolls are authorized to be taken in the market there: and the complaint is made under the 13th section of The Markets and Fairs Clauses Act, 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 14), which enacts, that, "after the market-place is open for public use, every person other than a licensed hawker who shall sell or expose for sale in any place within the prescribed limits, except in his own dwellingplace or shop, any articles in' respect of which tolls are by the special Act authorized to be taken in the market, shall for every such offence be liable to a penalty not exceeding 40s." In my judgment, the respondent is not brought within the essential part of that section. The market was open; the respondent is not a licensed hawker; and it is clear that "the prescribed limits" means the boundaries of the borough; and it is also clear that the respondent sold from house to

house, and not in his own dwelling-place or *shop. But then [*651 the article sold must be an article upon which toll is authorized by the special Act to be taken in the market. Is fish an article in respect of which a toll is authorized by the special Act to be taken? I am of opinion that it is not. The main reliance on the part of the appellant was placed on the 38th section of the local Act, which provides, "that from and after the commencement of this Act, the local board and their lessees may from time to time demand and take from any person occupying or using any shop, stall, stand, bench, or ground space in any market-place for the time being under the management of the local board, and used as a general market, such tolls as the local board or their lessees from time to time appoint, not exceeding the several tolls specified in the schedule (A) to this Act annexed." Does schedule A. authorize the levying of any toll in respect of fish? It imposes a toll or rent upon the occupier of every shop or stall for the sale of fish, &c., or of any ground space. It is clear, therefore, upon the construction of that section and of the schedule, that the toll is imposed on the space occupied in the marketplace, and not upon the article brought there and sold. The occupiers are to be subject to the charge whether there is anything bought or sold there or not. Persons coming there and using the property of the local board are to pay for the accommodation. I am the more convinced that that is the meaning of the statute, because I find seve ral sections and several schedules following s. 38, in all of which toll is similarly imposed in respect of the occupation of space in the market-place: see ss. 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, and the schedules they respectively refer to, in all of which the toll is in like manner fixed upon the occupier of the space. And this is not done improvidently or inadvertently; because a distinction is made in s. 44 and schedule G. *in the case of fairs, where the toll is imposed upon the article exposed for sale. The provisions for the show of wild beasts, [*652 &c., indicate that the fairs were contemplated to extend far beyond the limits of the market-place. It seems to me that the whole statute is by this construction rendered consistent. It will compel all persons holding stalls in the thoroughfares to go into the market-place, and at the same time protect the interests of the poorer portion of the community, who might be seriously incommoded if a great variety of perishable commodities could not be carried for sale from house to house. And I do not think this construction will seriously damage the interests of the local board or their lessees. I quite agree with the authorities relied upon by Mr. Ryder to show that a burthen is only to be imposed upon the subject by clear and express words. The rest of the Court concurring, Appeal dismissed. (a) (a) And see Wiltshire, app., Baker, resp., antè, p. 237, and Wiltshire, app., Willett, resp., antè, p. 240.

C. B. N. S., VOL. XI.-25

*653]

ents.

*THE GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellants; The Town Council of MAIDENHEAD, RespondJan. 27.

By the 92d section of the Municipal Corporation Act, 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 76, the council of the borough were authorized to impose a watch-rate on all property in the borough, situate within 200 yards of any street or continuous line of houses. By the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 28, s. 1, the council are authorized, if they think fit, to cause the whole of the borough to be watched, and to order that the whole borough shall be assessed to a watch-rate. Such an order having been made by the council of the borough of M. :-Held, that all property within the said borough, though situate more than 200 yards from any street or continuous line of houses, was liable to be rated; and that there was nothing in the subsequent Act of 3 & 4 Vict. c. 28, to limit that liability.

THIS was a case stated for the opinion of the Court, under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, by James Daniel Morling Pearce, one of Her Majesty's justices of the peace for the borough of Maidenhead, in the county of Berks, acting in and for the said borough:-

On the 1st of February, 1858, the Great Western Railway Company, by Mr. H. Edmunds, appeared before the above-named justice and William Lock, Esq., another justice of the said borough (since deceased), to answer the complaint of Ephraim Davey, Town Clerk of the said borough, for non-payment of a watch-rate made for the said borough on the 28th of November, 1856, and which was assessed on the property of the Great Western Railway Company to the amount of 541. 7s., upon a value of 21747.

The borough of Maidenhead consists of parts of the two parishes of Cookham and Bray. Each of the said parishes is partly within and partly without the borough. The parts of the said parishes within the borough differ from each other in extent. The borough maintains its own police. The whole of the borough is regularly watched by day and night: and, on the 28th of November, 1856, the town council made a watch-rate at 6d. in the pound under the provisions of the 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 76, the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 28, and the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 28.

The appellants are the Great Western Railway Company; and a part of their line of railway runs through that part of the parish of Bray which is situate in the said borough; and the Town Council rated the appellants, in common with the other owners and occupiers of hereditaments in the borough, to the above-mentioned watch-rate. *The said rate was duly allowed by two of Her Majesty's *654] justices of the peace in and for the said borough, and was published by affixing notices of the same on or near the doors of all the churches and chapels in the borough, the parish church at Bray and Cookham, and on the outer door of the town hall.

The rate or assessment in question was headed as follows:

"An assessment for carrying into effect the purposes of an Act of Parliament made and passed in the 5th and 6th years of the reign of King William the 4th, intituled 'An Act to provide for the regulation of municipal corporations in England and Wales,' and a certain other Act of Parliament made and passed in the 2d and 3d years of the reign of Queen Victoria, intituled 'An Act for more effectually assessing and levying watch-rates in certain boroughs,' and a certain other Act of Parliament made and passed in the 3d and 4th years of the reign of Queen Victoria, intituled 'An Act to explain and amend an Act of the 2d and 3d years of her present majesty, for more equally