the party has a freehold interest. All he has, is, a right to participate. in the benefits of the charity so long as he conforms to its statutes and ordinances. Though that may be in point of law an appointment for life, there is no appointment to any particular set of rooms. decision, therefore, of the revising barrister cannot be sustained. Decision reversed.(a)

(a) See Heath, app., Haynes, resp., 3 C. B. N. S. 389 (E. C. L. R. vol. 91).

The

*Borough of DEVONPORT.

[*95

JAMES WEBB CURTIS, Appellant; WALTER SEYMOUR BLIGHT, Respondent. Nov. 19.

An objector is bound in his notice to describe himself as of his true place of abode; and, if he has at the time of signing the notice bonâ fide tico places of abode, he may state either. For two years prior to February, 1861, A. resided in the house of his mother at 25 C. Street, it having been verbally agreed between them that he should occupy the house as tenant at will, paying no rent, and that she should live with him. Much of the furniture in the house belonged to A. In February, 1861, A. removed with his wife to 94 F. Street, where he continued down to the time of the revision to carry on the business of a licensed victualler; and it was necessary for the conduct of the business that he and his wife should live and sleep at 94 F. Street, and they did in fact live and sleep there from February, 1861, downwards without any interruption, save that they slept at C. Street one night, and that C. himself slept there ten nights; but they were both living and sleeping at 94 F. Street on the 23d of August when A. signed a notice of objection. A. had done nothing to prevent him from returning to live in C. Street, and he intended to return to live there whenever it should suit his convenience :

Held, that the revising barrister was warranted in finding that in point of fact C. Street was not the true place of abode of A., and that the notice of objection was consequently insufficient. A notice of objection is not vitiated by the address of the objector being added by a third person by his direction.

AT a Court held for the revision of the list of voters for the parish of Stoke Damerel, in the borough of Devonport, James Webb Curtis objected to the names of Walter Seymour Blight and several other persons being retained on the borough list.

The notices of objection both to the overseers and to the party purported to be signed thus,-"James Webb Curtis, of 25, Clowance Street, on the list of voters for the parish of Stoke Damerel." The total number of cases affected by these notices was two hundred and two.

The notices, which were in all other respects good, were impeached on two grounds,-first, that the place of abode of the objector had been inserted after the objector had signed the notices,-secondly, that the objector's place of abode was not properly stated in the notices.

The facts were as follows:-It is the practice of the overseers of the parish of Stoke Damerel, in making out the list of voters, to divide it into six wards, being the wards into which the parish is divided for municipal purposes. The name of the objector (the *appellant) appeared twice on the list,-first, in St. Aubyn Ward (which is the second ward in order), his name stood thus,

[*96

Curtis, James Webb.

94, Fore Street.

House.

House.

25, Clowance Street. 94, Fore Street.

Secondly, in Clowance Ward (which is the fourth ward in order), his name stood thus,—

Curtis, James Webb.

25, Clowance Street.

House.

25, Clowance Street.

Throughout the list, whenever the voter's qualification is supposed to consist of two houses occupied in succession, the words "in succession" are not inserted, but the word "house" is inserted twice in the third column, and the description of the two houses is inserted in the fourth column in the order of their occupation.

The notices, which were in the ordinary printed form, were prepared in the office of a solicitor, and were properly filled in with the name of the person objected to, the date, and the like, before the objector signed them; but a blank was left for the objector's signature and place of abode. The appellant signed all the notices with his own hand on the 23d of August, 1861, but he did not add any place of abode: but immediately after he had signed them, the words "25 Clowance Street" were written after his signature by the clerks who had previously filled in the other written parts. In some cases, this was done in his presence; in all cases, on the same day. The appellant gave no directions for the insertion of any particular place of abode: but he knew that as fast as he signed the clerks added the description "25, Clowance Street" as his place of abode.

*It was contended that the notices were bad because the

*97] place of abode was added after the appellant had signed, and

without any express direction from him.

The revising barrister was of opinion that this did not invalidate the notices and he decided, that, inasmuch as the addition was known to and sanctioned by the objector, the notices were in this respect good.

It was then contended that the notices were bad because 25 Clowance Street was not the appellant's place of abode. Upon this point the facts were as follows:

For about two years before February, 1861, the appellant occupied and lived in 25, Clowance Street. The house belonged to his mother, but much of the furniture belonged to him; and it had been verbally agreed between the appellant and his mother that he should occupy the house as her tenant at will, paying no rent, and that she should live with him. In February, 1861, the appellant (who until Christmas, 1860, had been a clerk in a solicitor's office) removed to 94. Fore Street; and there the appellant carried on the business of a licensed victualler until the time of holding this Court, the 12th of October, 1861. During all this time, the appellant had no other occupation; and it was necessary for the conduct of the business that he and his wife should live and sleep at 94, Fore Street.

They did live and sleep there from February, 1861, until the 12th

of October, 1861, without any interruption, save this, that the appellant and his wife slept at 25, Clowance Street, one night, and that the appellant himself slept there ten nights. The appellant and his wife were living at and slept at 94, Fore Street, on the 23d of August, 1861. The appellant, however, continued the occupation of 25, Clowance Street, and he did nothing to prevent him from returning to live there, and he intended to return and live there *whenever it should suit his convenience: and about the 1st of October, 1861, [*98 he entered into an arrangement (which has not yet been carried into effect) to discontinue the business carried on at 94, Fore Street, and give up the occupation of the premises.

After the appellant removed to 94, Fore Street, his mother had no other permanent home than 25, Clowance Street; and she occasionally resided there: and, whilst she so resided, the appellant kept a woman servant to attend on her: but, between February and October, the mother frequently lived elsewhere, sometimes with the appellant at 94, Fore Street, sometimes with a daughter at Kingsbridge, which is fifteen miles from Devonport: and, during the mother's absence from 25, Clowance Street, no servant was kept; so that it frequently happened that the house, 25, Clowance Street, was left for two or three weeks at a time without any one living in it: and no servant was kept there during the months of July, August, and September.

Upon these facts, it was contended by the respondents, that 94, Fore Street, and not 25, Clowance Street, was, on the 23d of August, 1861, the appellant's true place of abode; that he could not for this purpose have two places of abode; and that the notices were therefore bad.

It was contended by the appellant,-first, that the place of abode was rightly stated, inasmuch as 25 Clowance Street was the place of abode stated in the list of voters for Clowance Ward,-secondly, that the appellant had two places of abode, i. e. 25, Clowance Street, his permanent home, and 94, Fore Street, his temporary residence.

The revising barrister was of opinion that the appellant was required to state his true place of abode at the time when he signed the notices; that, if he really had two bonâ fide places of abode, he might state either: but he thought it was not sufficient to [*99 prove a mere legal residence at 25, Clowance Street: and he was of opinion, that, under the circumstances above stated, 25 Clowance. Street had for the time ceased to be the appellant's place of abode, and that 94 Fore Street was for the time his only true place of abode. The revis ng barrister, therefore, decided that the notices were bad, and retained on the list the names of the persons objected to: but he offered to allow them to prove their respective qualifications, which some of them did; but the respondents whose names were set forth in the schedule annexed to the case (one hundred and sixteen in number) failed or declined to do so.

The whole of the cases depending upon the same decision were consolidated.

If the Court should be of opinion that the notices of objection were invalid for either of the reasons insisted on by the respondents, the register was to remain without amendment; but, if the Court should be of opinion that the appellant was properly described as of 25 Clow

ance Street, and that the notices were not invalid by reason of the addition of the place of abode after the appellant had signed them, the names of the persons set forth in the schedule were to be expunged from the register.

Lush, Q. C. (with whom was Bullar), for the appellant.-The conclusion arrived at by the revising barrister was wrong. It is only by the form (Sched. B. No. 10) referred to in s. 17 of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, that the objector is required to state in the notice of objection his place of abode; and that requirement is satisfied here. The objector is described on the list of voters as of 25, Clowance Street; and no person could be misled: and, although during the month of *100] August, when the notice was signed and forwarded, he was actually residing at 94, Fore Street, and his description as of that place would have been a correct description, still, being in the occupation. of the other place also, he might well be described as of that place. There is nothing to prevent a man having two residences either of which he may occupy at his pleasure. All that the statute requires, is, that there shall be such a description of the person objecting as to insure his identification: and one place of abode is sufficient for that purpose. It has been held, under the County Court Act, that a man having two bonâ fide and permanent places of abode, may avail himself of either to bring himself within the concurrent jurisdiction clause: see Macdougall v. Paterson, 11 C. B. 755 (E. C. L. R. vol. 73); Butler v. Ablewhite, 7 C. B. N. S. 640 (E. C. L. R. vol. 97). As to the other point, the circumstance of the place of abode having been added by a third person after the signature of the objector had been put to the notices, clearly did not vitiate the document.

Kinglake, Serjt. (with whom was Lopez), for the respondent.—The first objection was founded upon Toms, app., Cuming, resp., 8 Scott N. R. 910, 7 M. & G. 88 (E. C. L. R. vol. 49), 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 200, where it was held that the signature to the notice,—and, as it is submitted, the whole signature, including the address,-must be the personal act of the objector, and cannot be deputed to a third party. The other, however, is the material point. As to that, the contention on the other side is, that a mere constructive legal occupation is enough to constitute a place of abode. It is clear from the statements in the case that this person was not residing at 25, Clowance Street, at the time he signed the notices. The statute requires his abiding place,

not his place of residence; though it may well be questioned *101] whether 25, Clowance Street was for any purpose the residence of the objector. He resided with his wife at 94, Fore Street, where he carried on his business, and where, as the case states, it was necessary for the conduct of the business that he and his wife should live and sleep. This question was argued at considerable length in a case of Knowles, app., Brooking, resp., 2 C. B. 226 (E. C. L. R. vol. 52), 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 461, where it was held by Tindal, C. J., and Erle, J., dissentiente Maule, J.,-that the true place of abode must be stated in the notice. Erle, J., there says,-2 C. B. 536,-"I cannot discover any good effect from requiring the place of abode as described in the list, instead of the true place. If communication is contemplated, the true place is the best. If the name occurs only once, the identity is clear, without referring to place. If the name occurs twice,

the objector is identified at the revision, which is as early as can be useful, if no communication is intended. If pretended objectors are to be guarded against, there would be no security from requiring the place to be transcribed." The question again came before the court in Melbourne, app., Greenfield, resp., 7 C. B. N. S. 1 (E. C. L. R. vol. 97), where it was held that the "place of abode" of the objector under the 7th section (it being the case of a county vote) of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, means that which is his actual place of abode at the time of signing the notice, and not that described in the register. Erle, C. J., there says: "I am at a loss to see how it can be said that the legislature meant by the words 'place of abode' either the place of abode described in the register, or the true place of abode, at the option of the party. I think that, it having been decided in Knowles, app., Brooking, resp., that the insertion in the notice of the present place of abode of the objector is a compliance with the act, I should be conflicting with that decision if I held that the insertion [*102 of the past place of abode would also be a compliance with the act. It would be giving an unreasonable construction to the statute to hold that the objector has the option of using either his present or his late place of abode. At all events, that being a matter which has been decided on great deliberation, I adhere to it." And the other members of the Court unanimously agreed that Knowles, app., Brooking, resp., was decisive of the question. [BYLES, J.-You assume that a man cannot have two places of abode. Suppose a man has two residences, at each of which he passes six months of the year, has he no place of abode ?] For the purposes of this act, his place of abode would be the place at which he actually resided at the time of signing the notice. In Whithorn, app., Thomas, resp., 8 Scott, N. R. 783, 7 M. & G. 1 (E. C. L. R. vol. 49), 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 125, A., a freeman of the borough of T., resided with his wife and family and carried on his business of wine merchant at G., more than seven miles from T.: he paid 9d. a week for the use of a bedroom and a dark closet in the house of a friend at T., keeping the key of the closet, in which he deposited wine samples: he slept in the bedroom twelve times in the six months next before the 31st of July: and it was held that he did not reside in T. for six months before the 31st of July, within the meaning of the 2 W. 4, c. 45, s. 27. In Kerr v. Haynes, 29 Law J., Q. B. 70, three years before action brought the plaintiff hired a house at Margate, and from that time had his wife, family, and servants permanently established there, he and his family occupying that house as their dwelling and home. He at the same time carried on business as a law-stationer in London, and occupied three houses there. He was in the habit of passing three or four days of each week in London, occupying two rooms in one of the houses, which rooms had [*103 been fitted up for his residence while staying in town. He always absented himself from London and resided with his family at Margate whenever his business would allow. In the winter and early spring he was usually in London four days in each week; during the rest of the year he was usually in Margate three and occasionally four days in the week. On the day upon which the action was brought he was in London: but, when the writ was issued, he was on his way to Margate. At the trial, the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff C. B. N. S., VOL. XI.-6