Mistake, what. Mistako of fact. penheim, 26 Beav., 594; Bergen vs. Udall, 31 Barb., 9: Taylor vs. Taylor, 8 How. [U. S.], 183; Baker vs. Bradley, 7 De G., M. & G., 597; see Broun vs. Kennedy, 9 Jur. [N. S.], 1163; Davies vs. Davies, id., 1002); and the same rule applies to any one standing in the relation of a parent (Archer vs. Hudson, 7 Beav., 551), as an uncle with whom his niece lived for a number of years (id.), or an elder sister who had a great ascendancy over the mind of the grantor (Harvey vs. Mount, 8 Beav., 439). So a deed from a lady to a clergyman whom she believed to be inspired, was set aside (Nottidge vs. Prince, 2 Giff.. 216). Where agents, appointed by the Comptroller to investigate the condition of an insurance company which had applied to him, pursuant to statute, for leave to do business. after they had made their report, and had in fact no further power, insisted upon the payment of $300 as fecs, threatening to revoke their report if the fees were not paid, it was held that the money paid under such a threat might be recovered back (Am. Ex. Fire Ins. Co. vs. Britton, 8 Bosw., 148; see Steele vs. Williams, 8 Exch., 625; Dew vs. Parsons, 2 B. & Ald., 562; Morgan vs. Palmer, 2 B. & C., 729). This is all that is necessary. Nothing more than a perverted use of the power of the party need be shown. Note to Subd. 2.-Longmate vs. Ledger. 6 Jur. [N. S.], 481; Blackford vs. Christian, 1 Knapp, 77; see Tracy vs. Sacket, 1 Ohio St., 58; Rippy vs. Grant, 4 Ired. Eq., 443; Whiteburn vs. Hines, 1 Munf., 557; Dunn vs. Chambers, 4 Barb., 376. Note to Subd. 3.-Breck vs. Cole, 4 Sandf., 88; Bowes vs. Heaps, 3 Ves. & B., 119; Wood vs. Abrey, 3 Madd., 423; Gould vs. Okeden, 4 Bro. P. C., 198; see Cockshot vs. Bennet, 2 T. R., 763; Bernardiston vs. Lingood, 2 Atk., 133; Thornhill vs. Evans, id., 330; Walmsley vs. Booth, id., 28, 29; Berney vs. Pitt, 2 Vern., 14; Nott vs. Hill, id., 27; Wiseman vs. Beake, id., 121; Roche vs. O'Brien, 1 Ball & B., 337, 359; Bromley vs. Smith, 26 Beav., 664; 5 Jur. (N. S.), 837; Lamplugh vs. Cox, Dick, 411; Heron vs. Heron, 2 Atk., 160. These cases seem to support this view. They are generally classed under the head of fraud (see Story Eq. Jur., Secs. 331-337); but the principle on which they depend is not a mere question of fraud. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 760. SEC. 1576. Mistake may be either of fact or law. SEC. 1577. As to mistake of fact there is no question. Mistake of law has been often declared to be no ground for relief at law or in equity (see Champlin vs. Laytin, 13 Wend., 417 ; Storrs vs. Parker, 6 Johns. Ch., 166; Lyon vs. Richmond. 2 id., 61; Kent vs. Manchester, 29 Barb., 595; Story, Eq. Jur., Secs. 111-139). But the contrary view has been taken by Judges of high authority (see Champlin vs. Laytin, 18 Wend., 422; Many vs. Beekman Iron Co., 9 Paige, 188; Stone vs. Godfrey, 5 De G., M. & G., 90; Broughton vs. Hutt, 3 De G. & J., 501; Evants vs. Strode, 11 Ohio, 480. See, also, Wheeler vs. Smith, 9 How. [U. S.], 55). The Commissioners think that the latter cases are better considered. No doubt relief upon this ground must be granted with extreme caution, and in only a limited class of cases: but this by no means proves that such relief should never be granted. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 761. Mistake of fact is a mistake, not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part of the person mak ing the mistake, and consisting in 1. An unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact past or present, material to the contract; or, 2. Belief in the present existence of a thing material to the contract, which does not exist, or in the past existence of such a thing, which has not existed. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 762. of law. SEC. 1578. Mistake of law constitutes a mistake, Mistake within the meaning of this article, only when it arises from 1. A misapprehension of the law by all parties, all supposing that they knew and understood it, and all making substantially the same mistake as to the law; or, 2. A misapprehension of the law by one party, of which the others are aware at the time of contracting, but which they do not rectify. Note to Subd. 1.-Many vs. Beekman Iron Co., 9 Paige, 188; Hall vs. Reed, 2 Barb. Ch., 501; see Pitcher vs. Turin Plank Road Co., 10 Barb., 436; Wake vs. Harrop, 6 H. & N., 768. Note to Subd. 2.-In Cooke vs. Nathan (16 Barb., 342), it was held that a misrepresentation of the law by one party, upon which the other ignorantly relied, was a fraud. It seems to follow that a transaction such as is described in the text should be relieved against, as a mistake, if not as a fraud. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 763. SEC. 1579. Mistake of foreign laws is a mistake of Mistake of fact. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 764. foreign laws. of consent. SEC. 1580. Consent is not mutual, unless the parties Mutuality all agree upon the same thing in the same sense. But in certain cases defined by the chapter on Interpretation, they are to be deemed so to agree without regard to the fact. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 765. tion of con sent. SEC. 1581. Consent can be communicated with effect, Communicaonly by some act or omission of the party contracting, by which he intends to communicate it, or which necessarily tends to such communication. This is intended to exclude the possible case of a declaration of consent made to a person having no interest in the contract, and communicated by him to the other party without authority. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 766. Mode of cominuni. cating ac SEC. 1582. If a proposal prescribes any conditions concerning the communication of its acceptance, the pro- proposal. ceptance of When com. munication deemed complete. Acceptance by perform ance of conditions. Acceptance must be absolute. Revocation of proposal. Revocation, how made. poser is not bound unless they are conformed to; but in other cases any reasonable and usual mode may be adopted. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 767. SEC 1583. Consent is deemed to be fully communicated between the parties as soon as the party accepting a proposal has put his acceptance in the course of transmission to the proposer, in conformity to the last section. This section is intended to recognize the rule that consent is complete as soon as a letter of acceptance is put into the Post-office. SEC. 1584. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 768. Performance of the conditions of a proposal, or the acceptance of the consideration offered with a proposal, is an acceptance of the proposal. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 769. SEC. 1585. An acceptance must be absolute and ur.qualified, or must include in itself an acceptance of that character, which the proposer can separate from the rest, and which will conclude the person accepting. A quali fied acceptance is a new proposal. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 770. SEC. 1586. A proposal may be revoked at any time before its acceptance is communicated to the proposer, but not afterwards. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 771. SEC. 1587. A proposal is revoked 1. By the communication of notice of revocation by the proposer to the other party, in the manner prescribed by Secs. 1581 and 1583, before his acceptance has been communicated to the former. 2 By the lapse of the time prescribed in such proposal for its acceptance, or if no time is so prescribed, the lapse of a reasonable time without communication of the ac ceptance. 3. By the failure of the acceptor to fulfil a condition precedent to acceptance; or, 4. By the death or insanity of the proposer. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 772. SEC. 1539. A contract which is voidable solely for want Ratification of due consent, may be ratified by a subsequent consent. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 773. SEC. 1589. A voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations arising from it, so far as the facts are known, or ought to be known, to the person accepting. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 774; Bennett vs. Judson, 21 N. Y., 238. of contract, void for want of consent. CHAPTER IV. OBJECT OF A CONTRACT. SECTION 1595. Object, what. 1596. Requisities of object. 1597. Impossibility, what. 1598. When contract wholly void. 1599. When contract partially void. SEC. 1595. The object of a contract is the thing which Object,what, it is agreed, on the part of the party receiving the con sideration, to do or not to do. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 775; Martin vs. McCormick, 8 N. Y., 335. of object. SEC. 1596. The object of a contract must be lawful Requisites when the contract is made, and possible and ascertainable by the time the contract is to be performed. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 776. NOTE. For a definition of the word "lawful," see Chap. SEC. 1597. Everything is deemed possible, except that Impossibilwhich is impossible in the nature of things. Impossibility is to be determined, not by the means or ability of the party, but by the nature of things (Code La., 1885, 2028; see McNeill vs. Reed, 9 Bing., 68; Beebe vs. Johnson, 19 Wend., 500; Harmony vs. Bingham, 12 N. Y., 99; Warfield vs. Watkins, 30 Barb., 395; Tufnell vs. Constable, 7 Ad. & El., 798). Thus a promise to procure the assent of a third person to any lawful and proper act is valid (Lloyd vs. Crispe, 5 Taunt., 249; McNeill vs. Reed, 9 Bing., 68). N. Y. C. C., Sec. 777. SEC. 1598. Where a contract has but a single object, and such object is unlawful, whether in whole or in part, ity, what. When convoid. tract wholly When con tract par or wholly impossible of performance, or so vaguely expressed as to be wholly unascertainable, the entire contract is void. SEC. 1599. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 778. Where a contract has several distinct ob tially void. jects, of which one at least is lawful, and one at least is unlawful in whole or in part, the contract is void as to the latter and valid as to the rest. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 779. Good consideration, what How far le. gal or moral a good consideration. CHAPTER V. CONSIDERATION. SECTION 1605. Good consideration, what. 1606. How far legal or moral obligation is a good consideration. 1607. Consideration lawful. 1608. Effect of its illegality. 1609. Consideration executed or executory. 1610. Executory consideration. 1611. How ascertained. 1612. Effect of impossibility of ascertaining consideration. SEC. 1605. Any benefit conferred, or agreed to be conferred, upon the promiser, by any other person, to which the promiser is not lawfully entitled; or any prejudice suffered, or agreed to be suffered, by such person, other than such as he is at the time of consent lawfully bound to suffer, as an inducement to the promiser, is a good consideration for a promise. N. Y. C. C., Sec. 780. SEC. 1606. An existing legal obligation resting upon obligation is the promiser, or a moral obligation originating in some benefit conferred upon the promiser, or prejudice suffered by the promisee, is also a good consideration for a promise, to an extent corresponding with the extent of the obligation, but no further or otherwise. The common law does not recognize moral obligations, except in a few cases, as sufficient to sustain a promise (Nash vs. Russell, 5 Barb., 556; Geer vs. Archer, 2 Barb., 420; Watkins vs. Halstead, 2 Sandf., 311; Ehle vs. Judson, 24 Wend., 97; Smith vs. Ware, 13 Johns., 257; Beaumont vs. Reeve, 8 Q. B., 483; Eastwood vs. Kenyon, 11 Ad. & El., 438. But see, to the contrary, Doty vs. Brown, 14 Johns., 381; Lee vs. Muggeridge, 5 Taunt., 36). The |