REASONS OF THE DISSENTIENT LORDS AGAINST THE SEPTENNIAL ACT. I. BECAUSE we conceive that frequent and new Parliaments are required by the fundamental constitution of the kingdom, and the practice thereof for many ages (which manifestly appears by our records) is a sufficient evidence and proof of this constitution. II. Because it is agreed that the House of Commons must be chosen by the people, and when so chosen they are truly the representatives of the people, which they cannot be so properly said to be when continued for a longer time than that for which they were chosen; for, after that time, they are chosen by the Parliament and not by the people, who are thereby deprived of the only remedy which they have against those who either do not understand or through corruption do wilfully betray the trust reposed in them; which remedy is to chuse better men in their places. III. Because the reasons given for this bill, we conceive, were not sufficient to induce us to pass it, in subversion of so essential a part of our constitution. I. For as to the argument, That this will encourage the Princes and States of Europe to enter into alliances with us, we have not heard any one minister assert that any one Prince or State has asked, or so much as insinuated, that they wished such an alteration. Nor is it reasonable to imagine it, for it cannot be expected that any Prince or State can rely upon a people to defend their liberties and interests, who shall be thought to have given up so great a part of their own; nor can it be prudent for them to wish such an experiment to be made, after the experience that Europe has had of the great things this nation has done for them under the constitution which is to be altered by this bill. But, on the other hand, they may be deterred from entering into measures with us, when they shall be informed, by the preamble of this bill, that the popish faction is so dangerous as that it may be destructive to the peace and security of the Government, and may apprehend from this bill that the Government is so weak as to want so extraordinary a provision for its safety; which seems to imply that the gentlemen of Britain are not to be trusted or relied upon, and that the good affections of the people are restrained to so small a number as that of which the present House of Commons consists. 2. We conceive that this bill is so far from preventing expenses and corruptions that it will rather increase them; for the longer a Parliament is to last, the more valuable to be purchased is a station in it, and greater also is the danger of corrupting the members of it; for if ever there should be a ministry who shall want a Parliament to screen them from the just resentment of the people, or from a discovery of their ill-practices to the King, who cannot otherwise, or so truly be informed of them as by a free Parliament, it is so much the interest of such a ministry to influence the elections (which, by their authority and the disposal of the publick money, they of all others have the best means of doing), that 'tis to be feared they will be tempted, and not fail to make use of them; and even when the members are chosen, they have a greater opportunity of inducing very many to comply with them than they could have if not only the sessions of Parliament, but the Parliament itself, were reduced to the ancient and primitive constitution and practice of frequent and new Parliaments; for as a good ministry will neither practice nor need corruption, so it cannot be any Lord's intention to provide for the security of a bad one. IV. We conceive that whatever reasons may induce the Lords to pass this bill to continue this Parliament for seven years, will at least be as strong, and may by the conduct of the ministry be made much stronger before the end of seven years, for continuing it still longer, and even to perpetuate it; which would be an express and absolute subversion of the third estate of the realm. Poulet, Strafford, Northampton, Fr. Roffen. INDEX. Alexander, Colonel, amendment in favour of Septennial Act, 163 Annual Parliaments, 11, 38, 55, 115, 133, 143, 152, 153, 155, Beckford, Lord Mayor, 121 Bill of Rights, 64; Society of Supporters of, 139 Septennial. See Septennial Act Bills, Triennial. See under Triennial Bishops, their votes on popular questions, 51, 71, 91 Bolingbroke, 109, 110 Bowyer, member for Southwark, on short Parliaments, 63 Bright, Mr. John, on duration of Parliament, 162 Bromley's bill for repeal of Septennial Act, 104 Brougham supports repeal of Septennial Act, 152 Buckingham, George Villiers, first Duke of, 27; second Duke of, 53 John Sheffield, Duke of, 90 Burke opposes short Parliaments, 122, 149 Burnet on the Triennial Act of 1694, 66, 78 Campbell-Bannerman, Mr., votes for quinquennial Parliaments, 163 Carew's Annual Parliament Bill, 114 Carleton, Sir D., on Kings and Parliaments, 28 |