a liability for one hundred and twenty-five dollars and no more, while the plaintiff contended that it was liable for double that amount under the following clause of the policy: "If such injuries are sustained while riding as a passenger in any passen ger conveyance using steam, cable, or electricity, as a motive power, the amount to be paid shall be double the sum above specified." The only question presented is, whether the company is liable under the double indemnity clause above quoted. The plaintiff was injured while attempting to alight from a moving streetcar using electricity as a motive power. It is conceded that the injury to the plaintiff was effected though such "external, violent, and accidental means" as to render the defendant liable under the terms of the policy, but it is denied that it was sustained "while riding as a passenger in" a passenger conveyance, and therefore liability for double indemnity under the clause above quoted has not arisen. We do not think this contention is sound. "A person may be said to be traveling in a carriage while alighting therefrom, until he has completely disconnected himself and alighted": 2 May on Insurance, sec. 524. See also Northrup v. Railway Passenger Assur. Co., 43 N. Y. 516; 3 Am. Rep. 724. There being nothing in the policy requiring a different construction to be placed upon the words, it is reasonable to hold that the insured was protected against all injuries caused by accidental means from the moment that he entered the conveyance until he had alighted therefrom. During this entire period he was riding as a passenger in the conveyance. This 66 interpretation is required by the rule that requires words to be given their usual and ordinary meaning. The defendant is liable for the double indemnity notwithstanding there was a clause in the policy providing that "this insurance does not cover entering, or trying to enter, or leaving a moving conveyance using steam as a motive power (except cable and electric streetcars)." This clause is not dealing with the amount to be paid, but is an enumeration of cases in which there would be no liability, and injuries received on electric street-cars in the manner that plaintiff was hurt are expressly excepted from its operation. Judgment reversed. All the justices concurring. RAILROADS-PASSENGERS-WHO ARE The question as to who are passengers on railroads, and when they become such, is AM. ST. REP., VOL. 1.X V.-19 the subject of the monographic note to Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. O'Keefe, 61 Am. St. Rep. 75-104. One ceases to be a passenger on a street-car when he steps from the car to the street: Creamer v. West End Street Ry. Co., 156 Mass. 320; 32 Am. St. Rep. 456. GILSTRAP v. SMITH. [101 GEORGIA, 120.] SURETYSHIP-RELEASE.-The maker of a note is not entitled to credit thereon of a sum paid to the payee by a surety on the note in consideration of his release as such surety. SURETYSHIP.-HOLDER OF NOTES MAY COMPOUND WITH THE SURETY thereon without releasing the principal. J. W. H. Underwood and H. H. Dean, for the plaintiffs. J. B. Estes, for the defendant. 121 SIMMONS, C. J. We think that the judge did not err in granting a nonsuit. J. C. Martin was surety on the notes. Blackwell, his administrator, proposed to pay Smith, the holder, one hundred dollars to be released from his obligation as surety. Smith accepted the money and released Blackwell. The principals claimed that the sum so paid should be placed as a credit on the notes. We think that the payment shoud not inure to the benefit of the principals. It was not made to satisfy the debt, but was designed only to secure the release of the surety. He was willing to pay that much to be released from his liability on the notes, and the one hundred dollars paid was given in consideration of such release. It was not paid for the benefit of the principals, and they cannot compel the holder to place it as a credit on the notes. The holder of a note may compound with the surety thereon without releasing the principal: Civ. Code, sec. 2970; 2 Brandt on Suretyship and Guaranty, 484; Peer v. Kean, 14 Mich. 354. Judgment affirmed. All the justices concurring. SURETYSHIP-RELEASE OF SURETY.—Part payment will not discharge the surety, even where it is agreed that such part payment will have that effect. Where a party is bound to pay a certain sum, there is no consideration in contemplation of law for a promise that a less sum will be received in satisfaction: Oberndorf v. Union Bank, 31 Md. 126; 1 Am. Rep. 31. For various things which will effect the release of a surety, see extended notes to Lindeman v. Rosenfield, 33 Am. Rep. 85, 86; Okie v. Spencer, 30 Am. Dec. 257, 258; and monographic note to Fassnacht v. Emsing-Gagen Co., 63 Am. St. Rep. 327-338. PARKER V. SALMONS. [101 GEORGIA, 160.] ADVERSE POSSESSION BY PARENT AGAINST CHILD.— Possession of land acquired by a father under a conveyance made to his infant child, and delivered to him, can never be the foundation of, nor ripen into, a prescriptive title in his favor. ADVERSE POSSESSION BY PARENT AGAINST CHILD.Possession of land acquired by a father, under a conveyance to his infant child, delivered to him, and continued long after such child reaches majority, does not ripen into a title by prescription in his favor, without any conveyance to him, or holding other than by virtue of his original entry. ADVERSE POSSESSION BY PARENT AGAINST CHILD.— Possession of land acquired by a father under a conveyance to his infant child, delivered to him, and continued long after such child attains majority, under a concealment from the grantee of the existence of such conveyance, together with the exercise of rights of ownership by renting to the grantee a portion of the land while the latter has no knowledge of his title, does not sustain a claim of title by prescription so as to enable the father or his representative to recover, against the grantee, possession taken by the latter after acquiring knowledge of the existence of his title under such conveyance. DEEDS-DELIVERY-EVIDENCE OF.-Delivery to, and possession by, a father of a deed conveying to his infant child a tract of land, tend to prove delivery of the deed to such infant, although it does not purport on its face to have been delivered. DEEDS-DELIVERY-EVIDENCE OF.-A deed duly recorded is admissible in evidence without further proof, not only to show that it was signed, but that it was also delivered. DEEDS.-DELIVERY of a decd executed in behalf of an infant for the consideration of love and affection, to a witness of the deed for the benefit of such infant, is a delivery to the infant. DEEDS - DESCRIPTION – EVIDENCE.-Although the description of land contained in a deed thereof is inaccurate in some details, yet if, when aided by competent extrinsic evidence and taken in connection with other deeds conveying other parcels of the same tract, the property intended to be conveyed can be sufficiently identified, it cannot be said, as matter of law, that the deed is so wanting, vague, and uncertain in description as to be void and inadmissible as evidence of title. W. L. Hodges and A. G. McCurry, for the plaintiff. J. H. Skelton and O. C. Brown, for the defendants. 161 LITTLE, J. The action which is the foundation of this case was in the form of an equitable petition, seeking to enjoin the defendants from building on a tract of land in controversy, from cutting or felling the timber thereon, from cultivating the land, from interfering in any manner with the petitioner in the management and cultivation of the land, and from interference with the possession and ownership of the plaintiff. The action was treated by the parties and the court. below as involving the title to the premises in dispute. The evidence was conflicting on many points raised, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. A motion for a new trial was overruled by the court, and the refusal to grant such new trial on the grounds assigned in the motion is the alleged error of which complaint is made. It is not controverted that in 1845 one Jonathan Bailey 162 owned a tract of land containing about two hundred and sixty acres, known as the Robert Swilling tract, situated at that time in Franklin, now Hart county. In the record reference is made to three deeds which were in evidence, and which, if valid, conveyed the title to the Swilling tract out of Jonathan Bailey. One of these deeds, dated the 20th of December, 1845, conveys to James Reed a described tract of land containing seventyeight acres, a part of the Swilling tract. The evidence further tends to show that at the date of this conveyance, the grantee, who was the son in law of the grantor, was living on said seventy-eight acre tract of land, and had so lived for some time previous to that date. The second of the deeds is dated the tenth day of December, 1845, and conveys to four persons, named Harris, whom the description shows to be minor grandchildren of the grantor, another part of said tract containing one hundred and sixteen acres. The third conveyance is from Jonathan Bailey to Sarah Reed, his granddaughter, dated also in December, 1845. It purports to convey sixty-six acres, for the consideration of natural love and affection. The property conveyed therein is designated as "balance of the Robert Swilling tract of land," et cetera. The deed further designates this particular tract as lying southwest from said James Reed; and it is not contested that, if this latter paper is valid as a deed, all of the Swilling tract is disposed of by these three conveyances. Only the deed last described is in question. The original was not produced at the trial. It appears that this deed was signed and sealed by Jonathan Bailey and "tested" by A. H. Black and Littleton Vincent. It does not purport on its face to have been delivered, but it appears that on the fifteenth day of December, 1845, it was probated in the usual form by one of the witnesses, Littleton Vincent, before H. F. Chandler, justice of the peace, and after such probate, it was on the same day recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court of Franklin county. There is evidence in the record tending to show that the original deed from Jonathan Bailey to Sarah Reed was in the possession of James Reed, her father, during his lifetime. At the time this paper purports to have been executed, the grantee, who was the daughter of James Reed, was of the age of three or four years; and it appears 163 that James Reed went into possession of the land soon after the execution of the deed, and remained so in possession to the time of his death in 1894. Soon after he died, the defendants entered upon the land and were proceeding to build a house and prepare a portion of it for cul tivation when these proceedings were instituted by the executor of James Reed. 1. The plaintiff in error bases his right to have granted the relief for which he prays on a prescriptive title in his testator. The record does not show any conveyance made by anyone at any time to James Reed to the land in dispute. It tends, however, to show that within a short time after the execution of the deed from the grandfather to the infant daughter of the testator, James Reed entered into possession; and in the absence of any conveyance to himself, and having custody of the deed to his infant daughter, the possession so acquired must be treated to have been under the conveyance to his daughter, in which case he would hold the land, not in his own right, but in the right of the daughter: Dodd v. McCraw, 8 Ark. 83; 46 Am. Dec. 301. Taking the testimony of the witness who saw the original deed in the father's possession to be true, it is manifest that he entered under that conveyance. Having so entered, such possession, while it continued, could never be the foundation of a prescriptive title. In order for possession to ripen into a title, it must be in the right of the possessor, and not of another: Civ. Code, sec. 3584. 2. But the plaintiff in error contends that this possession continued, not only during the infancy of the daughter, but for more than twenty years after she had attained her majority. This is not material, in ascertaining whether the testator had acquired the title by possession. Having entered, not in his own right, but in the right of another, and the possession thus obtained continuing, lapse of time would not ripen it into a title, there being no evidence of any conveyance to him, nor of any holding other than by virtue of his original entry. It is further contended on the part of the plaintiff in error, that subsequently to the arrival at age of the daughter, the testator manifested by his acts that he claimed, as against her, possession of this land in his own right; that he continued so to 164 manifest his right of possession against her for a period of more than twenty years; and that, notwithstanding his original |