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such final division was over made in the case at bar.
conclusion to so finally divide was subject to such change and
modification as the trial court might make, prior to the time of
the entry of the judgment thereon. We have concluded, how.
ever, to reduce the permanent alimony from fifty dollars per
month to twenty-five dollars per month.

By the Court. That part of the judgment of the circuit court so allowing fifty dollars per month is reversed and modified so as only to allow twenty-five dollars per month, but the judgment in all other respects is affirmed; the taxable costs of this court to be paid by the defendant.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE—DECREE DIVIDING HUSBAND'S PROPERTY-WHEN FINAL.-A judgment is not final unless it is complete and definite in its nature, and a valid and subsisting obligation: Dow v. Blake, 148 Ill. 76; 39 Am. St. Rep. 156, and note; monographic note to Williams v. Field, 60 Am. Dec. 427. A judgment is final when it allows a gross sum to a wife in a divorce suit, as a final distribution of the husband's estate between the parties: Dow. v. Blake, 148 Ill. 76; 39 Am. St. Rep. 156; but where, in an action for divorce the bonds of matrimony are ordered dissolved, but the court reserved its decision on the questions of the division of the common property, and the custody of the child, the judgment is not final: See monographic note to Williams v. Field, 60 Am. Dec. 438.

Cruelty as a Ground for Divorce.

Cruelty, within the meaning of the divorce law, may be defined to be any conduct of one of the married parties which furnishes reasonable apprehension that the continuance of the cohabitation will be attended with bodily harm to the other. When actual violence has been exercised by one married person toward the other, it is well settled that such violence, to authorize a divorce, must be attended with danger to life, limb, or health, or be such as to cause reasonable apprehension of future danger. To this effect the authorities are numerous and uniform, as the following citations will show: Morris v. Morris. 14 Cal. 76: 73 Am Dec. 615, and extended note 619-631; Poor v. Poor, 8 N. H. 307; 29 Am. Dec. 664, and note 674, 679; Latham v. Latham, 30 Gratt. 307; Myers v. Myers, 83 Va. 806; Perry v. Perry, 2 Paige, 501; Carlisle v. Carlisle, 99 Iowa, 247; Mayler v. Mayler, 11 Ala. 620; Hughes v. Hughes, 19 Ala. 307; King v. King, 28 Ala. 315; Thornberry v. Thornberry, 2 J. J. Marsh. 322; Waldron v. Waldron, 85 Cal. 251; Shaw v. Shaw, 17 Conn. 190; Williams v. Williams, 23 Fla. 324; Odom v. Odom, 36 Ga. 286; Caruthers v. Caruthers, 13 Iowa, 266; Cole v. Çole. 23 Iowa, 433; Gilbertson v. Gilbertson, 78 Iowa, 755; Potter v. Potter, 75 Iowa, 211; Bailey v. Bailey, 97 Mass. 373; Close v. Close, 24 N. J. Eq. 338; 25 N. J. Eq. 526; Kenley v.

REFERENCE TO MONOGRAPHIC NOTES.

Cruelty as ground for divorce: 29 Am. Dec. 674-697; 73 Am. Dec. 619-631; 40 Am. Rep. 403-105.

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Kenley, 2 How. (Miss.) 751; Ford v. Ford, 104 Mass. 198; Hughes v. Hughes, 44 Ala. 698; Beall v. Beall, 80 Ky. 675; Nogees v. Nogees, 7 Tex. 538; 58 Am. Dec. 78; Jones v. Jones, 62 N. H. 463; Ratts v. Ratts, 11 Ill. App. 366; Ruckman v. Ruckman, 58 How. Pr. 278.

A late definition is that cruelty, whether inflicted by personal violence, or by ill-treatment operating primarily upon the mind, is limited to such treatment and conduct as produce bodily harm or illhealth, or furnish reasonable apprehension that further cohabitation would endanger the life or physical health of the complaining party: Waldron v. Waldron, 85 Cal. 251.

Cruel and barbarous treatment by one party rendering the condition of the complaining party intolerable or his or her life burdensome is a ground for divorce, although such treatment may not have endangered life: Barnsdall v. Barnsdall, 171 Pa. St. 625.

To entitle one of the parties to divorce on the ground of cruelty, the acts complained of must be of such a nature as to justify a belief that the continuance of cohabitation will be dangerous to life and health: Vanduzer v. Vanduzer, 70 Iowa, 614. Cruel and inhuman treatment, authorizing a divorce, or which will permit the injured party to say that further cohabitation will be unsafe or improper, must be actual personal violence, committed with danger to life, limb, or health, or there must be a reasonable apprehension of personal violence, arising from menaces or threats creating a reasonable fear of bodily harm. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, or even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty: De Meli v. De Meli, 67 How. Pr. 20; Waldron v. Waldron, 85 Cal. 251; Poor v. Poor, 8 N. H. 307; 29 Am. Dec. 664; Kenley v. Kenley, 2 How. (Miss.) 751.

It is generally held that cruelty, as a foundation for divorce, must be unmerited and unprovoked: Poor v. Poor, 8 N. H. 307; 29 Am. Dec. 664; and in some jurisdictions, although they are in the small minority, it is maintained that there must be acts of personal and actual violence to justify the granting of a divorce on the ground of cruelty. Thus in. Moyler v. Moyler, 11 Ala. 620, it was held that to constitute legal cruelty authorizing a divorce, there must be actual violence committed, attended with danger to life, limb. or health, or there must be a reasonable apprehension of such violence. To the same effect are Hughes v. Hughes, 19 Ala. 307; Close v. Close, 24 N. J. Eq. 338; 25 N. J. Eq. 526; Ford v. Ford, 104 Mass. 198; Hughes v. Hughes, 44 Ala. 698; Jones v. Jones, 66 Pa. St. 494; Fizette v. Fizette, 146 Ill. 328.

The cases which maintain this rule also assert that vulgar, obscene, and harsh language, with epithets suited to deeply wound the feelings and excite the passions, but not accompanied with any act or menace indicating violence to the person, does not constitute legal cruelty: Shaw v. Shaw.17 Conn. 189; Close v. Close, 24 N. J. Eq. 338; Ruckman v. Ruckman, 58 How. Pr. 278; Folmar v. Folmar, 69 Ala. 84.

What acts of a spouse constitute cruelty authorizing a divorce cannot be described with precision, and each case must be deter

mined according to its own peculiar circumstances, by the court or jury, always keeping in view the intelligence, apparent refinement, and delicacy of sentiment of the complaining party: Fleming v. Fleming, 95 Cal. 430; 29 Am. St. Rep. 124; Williams v. Williams, 23 Fla. 324; Jones v. Jones, 62 N. H. 463.

In an action for divorce for treatment injuring health and endangering reason, the question whether a husband or wife has been treated by the other so as to seriously injure health or endanger reason is one of pure fact. It cannot be declared as a matter of law that any particular "treatment" may not have that effect: Robinson v. Robinson, 66 N. H. 600; 49 Am. St. Rep. 632. Cruelty, where it does not affect life, limb, or health, is frequently a relative term, whose meaning must be determined by the particular circumstances of each case. Between persons of education, refinement, and delicacy, the slightest blow in anger might be cruelty, while between persons of a different character and walk in life, it might not mar to any great extent their conjugal relations nor materially interfere with their happiness: David v. David, 27 Ala, 222.

Instances of Cruelty by Actual Violence.-Where a husband has been guilty, or there is reasonable ground to apprehend that he will be guilty, of any actual violence which will endanger the safety or health of his wife, or where he has inflicted upon her any physical injury, accompanied by such persistent exhibition of ill-feeling and opprobrious epithets as will endanger her health, or render her life one of such extreme discomfort and wretchedness as to incapacitate her to discharge the duties of a wife, he is guilty of cruelty en. titling her to a divorce: Close v. Close, 25 N. J. Eq. 526. But a divorce will not be granted for cruelty, if it appears that the com plaining party has willfully provoked the violence or misconduct complained of, unless such violence greatly exceeds the provocation: Reed v. Reed, 4 Nev. 395; Knight v. Knight, 31 Iowa, 451; Poor v. Poor, 8 N. H. 307; 29 Am. Dec. 664; Skinner v. Skinner, 5 Wis. 449; Von Glahn v. Von Glahn, 46 Ill. 134; Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 460; Lalande v. Jore, 5 La. Ann. 32; Hitchins v. Hitchins, 140 Ill. 326; Masterman v. Masterman, 58 Kan. 748; Owen v. Owens, 90 Iowa, 365.

Where a wife applies to her husband opprobrious names, and throws a fryingpan at him and a dishcloth in his face under provocation, she is not guilty of inhuman treatment: Peavey v. Peavey, 76 Iowa, 443. Slight acts of violence by a wife toward her husband are not cruelty unless he is able to show that he is unable to protect himself by proper exercise of his marital powers: Auraud v. Auraud, 157 Ill. 321; Hitchins v. Hitchins, 140 Ill. 326. But violent and outrageous conduct on the part of a wife, toward her husband, rendering the proper discharge of the duties of married life impossible, is cruelty on her part: Lynch v. Lynch, 33 Md. 328. Thus, where a wife breaks the glass doors of her husband's store, strikes him, and interferes with his customers, breaks dishes and throw them downstairs, throws hot water on the hired girl, and when her stepsons complain of their dinner, throws slop on the table, she is guilty of legal cruelty: Heilbron v. Heilbron, 158 Pa.

St. 297; 38 Am. St. Rep. 845. Violence committed during a quarrel, in which a husband suffers as much as his wife, is not such cruelty as will justify a divorce against him: Soper v. Soper, 29 Mich. 305. Irritability of temper on the part of a husband, producing ungov ernable passion, and occasionally ending in acts of personal violence rendering cohabitation unsafe, is a peril from which his wife is entitled to protection, although she may not be wholly blameless. When the passions of a husband are shown to be so much beyond his own control that it is inconsistent with the personal safety of his wife to continue in his society, it is immaterial from what provocaton such violence may have originated: King v. King, 28 Ala. 315. While a wife will not be granted a divorce on the alleged cruel treatment and excessively vicious conduct of her husband when she has been guilty of equally cruel treatment toward him, yet no abusive or reproachful words of a wife justifies her husband in assaulting and beating her. Hence the latter conduct is cruelty, no matter what the aggravation: Hawkins v. Hawkins, 65 Md. 104. If the husband, on more than one occasion, inflicts violence upon the person of his wife, so that the marks thereof remain, he is guilty of cruelty authorizing divorce, which is not excused by the fact that she has a bad temper and scolds him: Eidenmuller v. Eidenmuller, 37 Cal. 364. Although the wife has been peevish, quarrelsome, and needlessly meddlesome in her husband's business and other affairs, and has provoked much of the abuse heaped upon her by her husband, yet such conduct is no excuse for the husband in repeatedly beating and abusing her, and his conduct in such case is cruel and inhuman treatment: Schichtl v. Schichtl, 88 Iowa, 210.

Threats by a husband to chastise his wife, boasts of having done so, bruises found upon her person inflicted by him, an offer by her to return and live with him if he would agree not to whip her, and a declination on his part, are the infliction of such indignities to her as to render her condition intolerable, her life burdensome, and to entitle her to a divorce: Taylor v. Taylor, 76 N. C. 433.

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Actual personal violence, though not very great, nor such as, standing alone, would warrant a divorce, if accompanied by inhuman, coarse, and brutal treatment toward a wife, entitle her to a divorce: Thomas v. Thomas, 20 N. J. Eq. 97. Violence and ill-treatment of a child by the father, intended to cause the mother grief, and resulting in aggravating her illness, and accompanied with offensive and unreasonable epithets, calculated to degrade her, cause for divorce: Dunlap v. Dunlap, 49 La. Ann. 1696. Striking a wife in the face, choking her, and pulling her hair by her husband support a charge of cruelty: Turner v. Turner, 44 Ala. 437. Blows of any nature inflicted on a wife by her husband injuring her health or her body are cruelty: Armant v. Armant, 4 La. Ann. 137. But mere blows do not constitute cruelty if they do not inflict injury or give rise to apprehension of danger to life, limb, or health, and cause but slight unhappiness: Nogees v. Nogees, 7 Tex. 538; 58 Am. Dec. 78. If the conduct of a husband toward his wife is habitually cold, indifferent, rude, harsh, vuigar,

obscene, and profane, and she is seen shortly after being with him, in tears, with bruises on the face, lips and side of a serious character, and he admits that such bruises were administered by him, but claims that they were given in play and not in anger, he is guilty of legal cruelty justifying a divorce: Goodrich v. Goodrich, 44 Ala. 670. If a husband beats and kicks his wife without provocation while she is nursing her infant, and afterward threatens to repeat the assault and chases her out of his house with a switch, threatening to split her open, and keeps up such a course of conduct through a series of years, she is entitled to a divorce on the ground of his cruelty: Myers v. Myers, 83 Va. 806. Coarse and abusive language and epithets often repeated by a husband to his wife, coupled with personal violence and bodily harm inflicted by him upon her, with threats of taking her life, amount to extreme cruelty on his part: Freeman v. Freeman, 31 Wis. 235.

Violence Committed During Intoxication is not excused by reason of the drunkenness, and if continued constitutes cruelty. Thus, if a husband was habitually intoxicated, and when drunk was quarrelsome, turbulent, and dangerous; used profane language toward his wife, threatened to inflict personal violence upon her; endeav ored to execute his threats by chasing her through the house and yard attempting to strike her with a chair, and on one occasion inflicting personal violence upon her, he is guilty of legal cruelty suflicient to entitle her to a divorce: Hughes v. Hughes, 19 Ala. 307. To the same effect: Allen v. Allen, 31 Mo. 479; Crichton v. Crichton, 73 Wis. 59; Wachholz v. Wachholz, 75 Wis. 377; Lee v. Lee, 3 Wash. 236.

Although a wife is not of the most refined character, and not always truly ladylike in her behavior, and at times when in anger is guilty of profanity, and has not remonstrated with her husband as she ought or rebuked him for using liquor to excess, yet this is no excuse for his violence toward her, and abuse of her during his drunken moods, which are habitual, such treatment by him is cruelty: Berryman v. Berryman, 59 Mich. 605. And if a drunken husband curses his wife and drives her from their house, and by demonstrations of violence causes her to leave the bedside of a dying child and scek safety and protection several miles distant, she is entitled to a divorce on the ground of his cruelty: Scoggins v. Scoggins, 85 N. C. 347. Where a husband's long-continued cruel treatment of his wife, caused by his voluntary and habitual intoxication, is such as to render her existence miserable, and to actually endanger her life, such treatment is extreme cruelty on his part: McVickar v. McVickar, 46 N. J. Eq. 490; 19 Am. St. Rep. 422. A divorce for cruel and inhuman treatment, and personal indignities rendering life burdensome, should be granted when it is shown that the husband was frequently intoxicated and was quarrelsome and violent, at one time kicking out a door-panel, and at another, while violently cursing his wife, shooting off a pistol several times, and that he was in the habit, without provocation. of using vile and offensive language to her. Such treatment is cruelty on his part: Ryan v. Ryan, 30 Or. 226. The law seems to

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