deal less harshly with women, for it has been held that outbreaks of passion and violence on the part of an intoxicated wife do not constitute such cruel treatment as will justify a divorce: Shutt v. Shutt, 71 Md. 193; 17 Am. St. Rep. 519.

Single Act of Violence.-Courts are generally loathe to consider one act of violence by one of the married parties toward the other as constituting such cruelty as will justify a decree for divorce. A large number of cases hold that one act of force or violence by one spouse, preceded or followed by deliberate insult or abuse, even though committed wantonly and without provocation, is not sufficient to constitute extreme cruelty: Fritz v. Fritz, 138 Ill. 436; 32 Am. St. Rep. 156; Vignos v. Vignos, 15 Ill. 186; De La Hay v. De La Hay, 21 Ill. 252; Embree v. Embree, 53 Ill. 394; Shorediche v. Shorediche, 115 Ill. 102; Hoshall v. Hoshall, 51 Md. 72; 34 Am. Rep. 298; Hardie v. Hardie, 162 Pa. St. 227; Cutler v. Cutler, 2 Brewst. 511; Youngs v. Youngs, 130 Ill. 230; 17 Am. St. Rep. 313; Finley v. Finley, 9 Dana, 52; 33 Am. Dec. 528; Joyner v. Joyner, 6 Jones Eq. 322; 82 Am, Dec. 421. A mere act of violence where there is no apprehension of its repetition, and which is the result of rashness rather than malignity, does not furnish ground for divorce on the ground of cruelty: Reed v. Reed, 4 Nev. 395.

A single act of cruelty or indignity, or of coarse and ungallant conduct on the part of a husband, although such act amounts to a technical assault, does not constitute sufficient ground for a divorce at the suit of his wife: Nye's Appeal, 126 Pa. St. 341; 12 Am. St. Rep. 873. The law does not permit a divorce for any single act of violence or abuse, however vulgar, rude, harsh, or unchivalrous, but it requires proof of such a course of conduct or continued illtreatment as renders the complainant's condition intolerable and life burdensome: Richards v. Richards, 37 Pa. St. 225. Mere angry or abusive words, menaces, or indignities do not constitute cruelty. There must be extreme and repeated cruelty, which must consist in physical violence, and a single act of violence does not of itself constitute ground for divorce. There must be acts or threats which may raise a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm: Fizette v. Fizette, 146 Ill. 328.

It is proper, in deciding whether one act of cruelty on the part of a husband toward his wife is sufficient to entitle her to a divorce, to take into consideration the age, habits, and mode of life of the parties: Lauber v. Mast, 15 La. Ann. 593; Huilker v. Huilker, 64 Tex. 1.

Although a single act of violence, standing alone, is not sufficient ground for divorce, the question to be determined is, whether the act was committed under such circumstances as to furnish reasonable apprehension that the continuance of the cohabitation will be attended with further personal injury: Cook v. Cook, 11 N. J. Eq. 195. Under some circumstances, and when such apprehension has ground for its existence, a single whipping or beating of a wife by her husband, although she provokes the assault, is extreme cruelty: Albert v. Albert, 5 Mont. 577; 51 Am. Rep. 86; Beyer v. Beyer, 50 Wis. 254; 36 Am. Rep. 848; Poor v. Poor, 8 N. H. 307; 29 Am. Dec.

664. A husband who, after working his pregnant wife in the field, and requiring her to do as much work as himself, violently seizes her, and cursing her, drives her and her baby away from home, is guilty of legal cruelty entitling her to a divorce, although no other act of violence is shown: Huilker v. Huilker, 64 Tex. 1. While a single act of violence by one spouse toward the other is seldom ground for divorce on the ground of cruelty, two such acts always furnish ground for divorce, whether they are inflicted within a short or long period of time, especially when they are of such a nature as to give ground for the inference that they may be repeated and render life, limb, or health precarious and dangerous: Campbell v. Campbell, 27 Ill. App. 309; Sharp v. Sharp, 16 Ill. App. 348; Farnham v. Farnham, 73 Ill. 497; Sharp v. Sharp, 116 Ill. 509. Two assaults by a husband upon his wife, although of not a very ag gravated nature, followed by violent and abusive language and indecent epithets, and conduct terrifying to her and their children, is cruelty for which she may have a divorce: Day v. Day, 56 N. H. 316; Farnham v. Farnham, 73 Ill. 497.

Cruelty Without Violence.-The great majority of the cases hold that actual violence on the part of one spouse toward the other is not necessary to constitute legal cruelty. Any conduct on the part of one which furnishes reasonable apprehension that the continuance of the cohabitation would be attended with bodily harm to the other is cruelty authorizing divorce: Smedley v. Smedley, 30 Ala. 714; Freeman v. Freeman, 31 Wis. 235; Morris v. Morris, 14 Cal. 76; 73 Am. Dec. 615; Sylvis v. Sylvis, 11 Colo. 319; Graecen v. Graecen, 2 N. J. Eq. 459; Black v. Black, 30 N. J. Eq. 215. An attempt to injure the person of a wife is not necessary to constitute inhuman treatment authorizing a divorce. Acts which endanger her life by destroying her health and peace of mind constitute legal cruelty: Caruthers v. Caruthers, 13 Iowa, 266; Beebe v. Beebe, 10 Iowa, 133; Cole v. Cole, 23 Iowa, 433. There may be extreme cruelty without the slightest violence. If it appears probable that the life of one of the parties will be rendered miserable by any character of misconduct on the part of the other, although no personal violence is apprehended, a divorce should be decreed: Reed v. Reed, 4 Nev. 395. There may be cases in which a husband, without violence, actual or threatened, may make the marriage state impossible to be endured. There may be angry words, coarse and abusive language, humiliating insults, and annoyances in all the forms that malice can suggest, which may as effectually endanger life or health as personal violence, and which must afford ground for divorce on the plea of cruelty; but that which merely wounds the feelings, without being accompanied by bodily injury or actual menace, is not legal cruelty: Latham v. Latham, 30 Gratt. 307; Myers v. Myers, 83 Va. 806. Profane, obscene, and insulting language habitually indulged toward a person of sensitive nature and refined feelings may amount to legal cruelty: Briggs v. Briggs, 20 Mich. 34. But this generally would be more readily recognized when used by the husband to the wife, than when by the wife to

the husband: Bennett v. Bennett, 24 Mich. 482; Goodman v. Goodman, 26 Mich. 417.

Mental anguish, wounded feelings, constantly aggravated by repeated insults and neglect, are as bad as actual bruises of the person, and that which produces the one is not more cruel than that which produces the other: Glass v. Wynn, 76 Ga. 319. Cruelty may be extreme without blows, and arises where the life of the complainant has been menaced. and where there has been harsh treatment and neglect tending to show that cohabitation will be attended with danger to health: Harratt v. Harratt, 7 N. H. 196; 26 Am. Dec. 730; Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 21 Colo. 16. Abuse, without personal violence, which causes mental suffering and thus produces ill-health, rendering cohabitation physically unsafe, is legal cruelty and ground for divorce: Jones v. Jones, 62 N. H. 463; Marks v. Marks, 02 Minn. 212; Sylvis v. Sylvis, 11 Colo. 319.

Under a statute authorizing divorce for treatment injuring health or endangering reason, any conduct by one of the spouses affecting the other physically or mentally is cruel treatment, without regard to the intent of such behavior: Robinson v. Robinson, 66 N. H. 600; 49 Am. St. Rep. 662. Indignities offered by a husband to the person of his wife, such as to render her condition intolerable and life burdensome, and thereby force her to withdraw from his house and home, constitute cruel and barbarous treatment, though they do not endanger her life: Melvin v. Melvin, 130 Pa. St. 6. The indignities to the person mentioned in the statute as the cause for divorce need not consist of personal violence. They may be unmerited reproach, rudeness, contempt, studied neglect, open insult, and many other things habitually and systematically pursued rendering life intolerable. Nor is it necessary that the complaining party be entirely blameless: Haley v. Haley, 44 Ark. 429.

The following rule accurately states the law as it exists at the present time: "At the common law, to authorize a court to proceed to a separation on the grounds of cruelty, there must have been either actual violence committed, which endangered life, limb, or health, or there must have been a reasonable apprehension of such violence. The element of mental suffering, distress, or injury, unaccompanied by violence or an apprehension of violence, was entirely excluded. The doctrine is now established that, without physical violence, acts or conduct which, operating upon the mind, and through the mind upon the physical system, produce bodily hurt, may constitute cause for divorce." Such conduct operating through the mental faculties must produce injury to the physical system or bodily hurt in fact, or at least give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such result. It must operate upon the husband or wife while living in the marriage relation in the proper discharge of the duties of that relation and without fault on the part of the party complaining. Such conduct must render cohabitation intolerable, and destroy the concord, harmony, and affections of the parties for each other, and render unsafe the actual existence of the marital relations: Beach v. Beach, 4 Oklahoma, 359. A systematic and long-continued course of ill-treatment, without violence, may

constitute cruelty. Thus, ill-treatment by a husband, long-continued, and consisting of continual scolding and fault-finding, the use of unkind language, and of many other little acts, if studied and malicious, and the wife is sensitive, may be cruel and inhuman treatment, if it has a serious effect upon her health, or causes her great mental suffering, but to be ground for divorce the effect on her must be of a serious character: Marks v. Marks, 56 Minn. 464; 45 Am. St. Rep. 466; Marks v. Marks, 62 Minn. 212; Jelineau v. Jelineau, 2 Desaus. 45; Kinsey v. Kinsey, 90 Va. 16; Sheffield v. Sheffield, 3 Tex. 79; Thomas v. Thomas, 2 Cold. 123. Persistently harsh, cruel, abusive, and inhuman treatment is legal cruelty for which a divorce may be granted, especially when such conduct is occasionally characterized by acts of personal violence: Johns v. Johns, 57 Miss. 530; Payne v. Payne, 4 Humph. 499; Sackrider v. Sackrider, 60 Iowa, 397; Douglass v. Douglass, 81 Iowa, 258; Kinsey v. Kinsey, 90 Va. 16. Any continued ill-treatment by a husband, calculated to affect the mind of his wife, so as to endanger her health, or which involves by natural consequences a permanently injurious and prejudicial effect on her health, perilous to life, is sufficient to constitute cruel and inhuman treatment: Aitchison v. Aitchison, 99 Iowa, 93. A husband who, since the commencement of his married life, has continually been in the habit of grossly abusing his wife during her pregnancy, and of applying to her and to members of her family and relatives vile, profane, and obscene language, is guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment: Wolffe v. Wolffe, 102 Cal. 433-436. The studied and continued application of offensive and unendurable epithets by a husband to his wife, which are calculated to degrade her, and are used in the presence of the members of her family, is cause for divorce: Dunlap v. Dunlap, 49 La. Ann. 1696. A neglectful, ill-tempered, and drunken husband, who subjects his wife to a course of most abusive treatment, and repeatedly threatens to kill her, and manifests a purpose to execute his threats, is guilty of cruelty and indignities to the wife entitling her to divorce: Mason v. Mason, 131 Pa. St. 161. It is extreme cruelty for a husband to wantonly neglect his wife in her critical illness and to address her at such times in harsh and brutal language: Hoyt v. Hoyt, 56 Mich. 50. If a wife, against her husband's objection, goes to her parents' home to be confined, and her husband, who at first refuses, but finally goes to see her subsequent to her confinement, informs her that if she does not return before the next week he will "advertise" her desertion, charges her with incest with her father, and claims that her child is by her father, and upon her failure to so return, does "advertise" her as deserting him, is guilty of extreme cruelty warranting a divorce: Palmer v. Palmer, 45 Mich, 150; 40 Am. Rep. 461. It is extreme cruelty to expel a wife and young stepdaughter and make their separation a condition of taking back the wife: Friend v. Friend, 53 Mich. 543; 51 Am. Rep. 161. When a husband, though able, neglects to care for and support his wife, bestows opprobrious epithets upon her, subjects her to personal indignities, and allows his sons to ill-treat her in his presence without rebuke, he is guilty

of cruelty, although she is not wholly blameless: Hacker v. Hacker, 90 Wis. 325. Where a husband, during ten months of the first year of his married life, is in the habit of cursing his wife, using vile and indecent names toward her in the presence of her children, flogging one of them, frequently threatening to drive them away, and finally driving his wife from the house, telling her that he could live with her no longer, he is guilty of cruel treatment warranting her in obtaining a divorce: Whitacre v. Whitacre, 64 Mich. 232.

A husband who forces his wife to do more work than she is capable of performing in her state of delicate health, thus compelling her to leave him, is guilty of extreme cruelty: De Zwaan v. De Zwaan, 91 Mich. 279.

The practice of Christian Science as a doctor, by a wife, who believes it to be her duty, is cruelty as against a husband who is abnormally sensitive: Robinson v. Robinson, 66 N. H. 600; 49 Am. St. Rep. 632.

A husband who, disregarding his wife's protests, continues to keep at the family domicile other persons for whose support he is not liable, and who habitually treat her with disrespect, apply coarse and degrading epithets to her, and so conduct themselves toward her as to justify a reasonable apprehension of danger to her person from their violence, while she is entirely blameless, must be held to have adopted such conduct of the third parties mentioned as his own, which renders him guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment, justifying a divorce for the wife: Hall v. Hall, 9 Or. 452.

Divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty will be denied where there is no actual bodily violence, unless the treatment, abuse, neglect, or bad conduct is such as impairs the health, or renders cohabitation intolerable or unsafe, or unless there are threats of ill-treatment of such flagrant kind as to cause reasonable and abiding apprehension of bodily violence, so as to render it impracticable to discharge marital duties. Habitual indulgence of a violent and ungovernable temper is not ground for divorce, unless such indulgence has the effect of rendering the life of the complainant oppressive and an intolerable burden, and makes it impracticable to discharge marital duties. Occasional outbursts of passion, petulance, readiness to anger, frequent and unreasonable complaints made in a loud voiced, boisterous manner, and well calculated to render the relations between the parties unpleasant and disagreeable and unhappy, do not furnish grounds for divorce, unless they really affect the health of the complaining party: Palmer v. Palmer, 26 Fla. 215. It has often been held that mere rudeness of manners or language, petulance, austerity of temper, occasional sallies of passion, or any conduct which simply wounds the sensibilities or feelings, and causes grief and domestic unhappiness, if not accompanied by personal violence or threats thereof, do not constitute legal cruelty warranting divorce: Gleason v. Gleason, 16 Neb. 15; Maben v. Maben, 72 Iowa, 658; Wood v. Wood, 80 Ala. 254; Poor v. Poor, 8 N. H. 307; 29 Am. Dec. 664; Turbitt v. Tur bitt, 21 Ill. 438; Minde v. Minde, 65 Mich. 633; Whaley v. Wha