ley, 68 Iowa, 647; Ennis v. Ennis, 92 Iowa, 107; Waldron v. Waldron, 85 Cal. 251-257. A continual succession of petty annoyances, complaints, fault-finding, and disparagement of his common sense, taste, and judgment do not constitute extreme cruelty to a husband authorizing him to obtain a divorce: Johnson v. Johnson, 49 Mich. 639. And this is true although the conduct of the wife injuriously affects the husband's health, where such conduct is not intended to inflict harm: Freeborn v. Freeborn, 168 Mass. 50. Unkind treatment, threats of personal violence, abusive language and opprobrious epithets, without personal violence, or injury to the health of the complainant, do not constitute such cruelty as authorizes a divorce: Vignos v. Vignos, 15 Ill. 186; Shell v. Shell, 2 Sneed, 716; Hill v. Hill, 2 Mass. 150. Abusive language by a husband, accompanied by his act of placing his hand on his wife's shoulder and requesting her to leave the room, is not legal cruelty: Donald v. Donald, 21 Fla. 571. And the fact that a husband has been imprudent, unreasonable, or jealous, without any malignant desire to annoy or harass his wife, is not necessarily cruelty: Boon v. Boon, 12 Or. 437.

Excessive Intercourse, or Refusal of Intercourse.-Gross abuse of marital rights in requiring the complaining spouse to submit to excessive sexual intercourse, resulting in injury or suffering, or when it may give rise to a reasonable apprehension that such a result will follow, may constitute legal cruelty and justify the complaining party in obtaining a divorce: Moores v. Moores, 16 N. J. Eq. 275, 279; Melvin v. Melvin, 58 N. H. 569; 42 Am. Rep. 605; Grant v. Grant, 53 Minn. 181. Excessive sexual intercourse demanded and persisted in by a husband in a rash, rough, and unreasonable manner, when he knows that the condition of his wife is such that it will inflict suffering and injury upon her, and that she cannot properly and safely accede to his wishes, renders him guilty of such intolerable cruelty as entitles her to a divorce: Mayhew v. Mayhew, 61 Conn. 233; 29 Am. St. Rep. 195. And this is especially true if from any reason she is in ill-health or in a delicate condition mentally or physically: English v. English, 27 N. J. Eq. 579; Walsh v. Walsh, 61 Mich, 554. It has been held, however, that the compulsory participation by a wife in excessive sexual intercourse does not amount to cruelty, unless the persistence of the husband is against her will, he knowing that her bodily health will suffer therefrom: Youngs v. Youngs, 33 Ill. App. 223; affirmed on other grounds, 130 Ill. 230; 17 Am. St. Rep. 313. The mere refusal of a husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is not cruel or inhuman treatment, provided that no mental or bodily injury and no impairment of her health results from such refusal: Schoessow v. Schoessow, 83 Wis. 553. And the utter denial of a wife to have sexual intercourse with her husband is not cruel or abusive treatment entitling the husband to a divorce: Cowles v. Cowles, 112 Mass. 298. Where a husband conveys to his wife his homestead and homestead furniture, constituting the bulk of his property, after which she refuses to cohabit with him, though allowing him to keep a room in the house, but finally driving him therefrom, she is

guilty of extreme cruelty which entitles him to a divorce: Menzer v. Menzer, 83 Mich. 319; 21 Am. St. Rep. 605.

Charges of Adultery or Unchastity.-The rule is well settled that If either a husband or a wife falsely accuses the other of adultery, such accusation is cruel and inhuman treatment within the meaning of the divorce laws: Smith v. Smith, 8 Or. 100. Under the rule that to obtain a divorce on the ground of inhuman treatment there need be no act of violence, such charges of infidelity, made maliciously and without probable cause, are sufficient to sustain the action, the only requirement being that such charges must be made falsely and maliciously: Kennedy v. Kennedy, 60 How. Pr. 151. Thus it has been maintained in numerous cases that one or many malicious and groundless charges of adultery, made by a husband against his wife, may constitute cruel and inhuman treatment within the meaning of the divorce law: Wagner v. Wagner, 36 Minn. 239; Powelson v. Powelson, 22 Cal. 358; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 30 Kan. 712; 46 Am. Rep. 108; Palmer v. Palmer, 45 Mich. 150; 40 Am. Rep. 461; Lee v. Lee, 3 Wash. 236; Coble v. Coble, 2 Jones Eq. 392; Pinkard v. Pinkard, 14 Tex. 356; 65 Am. Dec. 129; Graft v. Graft, 76 Ind. 136; McMahan v. McMahan, 9 Or. 525; Williams v. Williams, 67 Tex. 198; Jones v. Jones, 60 Tex. 451; Eggerth v. Eggerth, 15 Or. 626; Herberger v. Herberger, 16 Or. 327; Bahn v. Bahn, 62 Tex. 518; 50 Am. Rep. 539; Kennedy v. Kennedy, 73 N. Y. 369; Clinton v. Clinton, 60 Mo. App. 296; Holyoke v. Holyoke. 78 Me. 404; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 53 Iowa, 511; 36 Am. Rep. 240; Lyle v. Lyle, 86 Tenn. 372; Cooper v. Cooper, 78 Mich. 316; Mason v. Mason 131 Pa. St. 161; Doolittle v. Doolittle, 78 Iowa, 691. Extreme and protracted suffering may be produced primarily operating upon the mind alone by false charges of adultery maliciously made by a husband against his wife, and the injury to health thus caused, rendering the continuance of the marriage relation burdensome and intolerable, constitutes extreme cruelty: Ward v. Ward, 103 Ill. 477; Powelson v. Powelson, 22 Cal. 358. It is not necessary that such false charges should be uttered in public to constitute them cruelty. It is sufficient if they are addressed to the other spouse in the presence of a third person, or spoken to other persons in the absence of the party affected thereby: Cass v. Cass, 34 La. Ann. 611; Jones v. Jones, 60 Tex. 451; Crow v. Crow, 29 Or. 392; Graft v. Graft, 76 Ind. 136.

It is cruelty for a husband to falsely accuse his wife of being infected with a venereal disease: McMahan v. McMahan, 9 Or. 525; or to persist in charging her with incest without cause and continually keeping a watch upon her: Smith v. Smith. 40 N. J. Eq. 566. And it is extreme cruelty to a wife for her husband to persistently and openly consort with, and express his preference for, loose and lewd females: McClung v. McClung, 40 Mich. 493; Holmes v. Holmes, 50 La. Ann. 000; Penningroth v. Penningroth, 72 Mo. App. 329.

It is extreme cruelty warranting a divorce for a wife publicly and falsely to accuse her husband of adultery: Kelly v. Kelly, 18 Nev. 49; 51 Am. Rep. 733. But for the mere charge of adultery made by a wife against her husband, though repeated and ground

less, to constitute extreme or legal cruelty it must be clearly shown that the making of such charge has caused, or may produce, mental suffering or anguish beyond the ordinary effect likely to be produced, and resulting in injury to his health. Otherwise the divorce must be denied: McAlister v. McAlister, 71 Tex. 695. The same court which maintains this rule has, however, repeatedly held that a single deliberate act of the husband in falsely and publicly charging his wife with being a prostitute or with adultery or unchastity may be cause for granting her a divorce: Jones v. Jones, 60 Tex. 457; Bahn v. Bahn, 62 Tex. 518; 50 Am. Rep. 539. It is extreme cruelty justifying divorce for a wife to send anonymous letters to her husband's clerk and to the newspapers, falsely charging her husband with criminal intimacy with such clerk's wife: Carpenter v. Carpenter, 30 Kan. 712; 46 Am. Rep. 108. The same result follows when a wife causelessly humiliates her husband, and endangers his means of subsistence by habitually, persistently, and publicly accusing him of infamous conduct in violation of his marriage obligations, and by applying vile and opprobrious epithets to him and dogging him and setting others to spy out his movements, until, by inordinate and indecent exhibitions of jealousy and the criminal indulgence of unworthy and unfounded suspicions, she has practically destroyed the decencies and purposes of the marriage relation: Whitmore v. Whitmore, 49 Mich. 417.

Privity of a wife with a conspiracy to induce her husband to commit adultery or to place himself in equivocal relations with a woman not his wife, so as to bring an action for divorce upon the evidence so obtained, constitutes cruelty sufficient to sustain his action for divorce: Uhlmann v. Uhlmann, 17 Abb. N. C. 236.

To support a charge of extreme cruelty in an action for divorce when words alone are relied upon as constituting such cruelty, it must appear that the words were uttered without justifiable cause and for the purpose of inflicting pain. When they are uttered merely as a complaint against apparent misconduct, as the result of natural feelings excited by misconduct, they are insufficient to constitute legal cruelty: Masterman v. Masterman, 58 Kan. 748. While the use of language by a husband imputing unchastity to his wife may, under certain circumstances, amount to legal cruelty for which a divorce may be granted, yet when such language is used under circumstances which clearly justify the truth of the charge, and are brought about by the apparent conduct of a guilty wife, it is not cruelty justifying divorce: Coulthard v. Coulthard, 91 Iowa, 742. Thus if, in an action by a wife for divorce against her husband on the ground of his cruelty in publicly accusing her of unchastity and infidelity, it appears that his conduct and charges were stimulated by jealousy and by her apparent misconduct with other men, such charges will not amount to cruelty, especially when it is not shown that her life or health has been endangered or impaired by such conduct on his part: Evans v. Evans. 82 Iowa, 462; Blurock v. Blurock, 4 Wash. 495; McKee v. McKee, 77 Iowa, 404; Gilbertson v. Gilbertson, 78 Iowa, 755.

AM. ST. REP., VOL. LXV.-6

When the cruelty complained of consists of accusations of infidelity or other violations of marital relations made by a wife against her husband, though they may not have been true, yet if they were not made maliciously or through hatred or spite, but in good faith, with reasonable cause for believing them true, and for the purpose of inducing her husband to abandon his supposed course of wrongdoing and to return to a proper observation of his marital relations, they do not constitute cruelty justifying divorce: Beach v. Beach, 4 Oklahoma, 359; Ashton va Ashton, 48 La. Ann. 1194; Penningroth v. Penningroth, 72 Mo. App. 329. It is decided in Beach v. Beach, 4 Oklahoma, 359, that charges of adultery, or unchastity to constitute legal cruelty, must operate upon the husband or wife while living as husband and wife and prior to their separation, and we think this is the better rule, although it is denied in Smith v. Smith, 8 Or. 100.

The Communication of Venereal Disease by a husband to his wife or by a wife to her husband is extreme cruelty warranting a divorce for the injured and innocent party, provided such disease is knowingly and willfully communicated: Anonymous, 17 Abb. N. C. 231; Canfield v. Canfield, 34 Mich. 519; Cook v. Cook, 32 N. J. Eq. 475; Morehouse v. Morehouse, 70 Conn. 420. Thus, where a husband, who has had the same venereal disease twice before marriage, and soon after marriage consorts with a lewd woman while his physical condition is such as to render it extremely probable that he was thus again affected, and upon having intercourse with his wife he communicates such venereal disease to her, he is guilty of extreme cruelty: Cook v. Cook, 32 N. J. Eq. 475. And if a husband, who is aware that he has an infectious venereal disease, solicits and has sexual intercourse with his wife, who is ignorant of his condition, and who thereby contracts the disease and suffers from it for months, until he, still having such disease, solicits such intercourse and is refused, and then attempts to have intercourse by force, whereupon she becomes seriously and dangerously ill, he is guilty of intolerable cruelty warranting a divorce: Morehouse v. Morehouse, 70 Conn. 420.

Violence by Insane Spouse not Cruelty.-Cruel, violent, or inhuman treatment of a wife by her husband or of a husband by his wife while insane, and as a result of such insanity, does not entitle the party thereby made to suffer to a divorce on the ground of cruelty: Tiffany v. Tiffany, 84 Iowa, 122; Wertz v. Wertz, 43 Iowa, 534; Youngs v. Youngs, 130 Ill. 230; 17 Am. St. Rep. 313; Cohn v. Cohn, 85 Cal. 108.

Miscellaneous.-Adultery by one of the parties to a marriage, while it may constitute extreme cruelty in a popular sense, does not in a legal sense constitute such cruelty: Haskell v. Haskell, 54 Cal. 262; Cline v. Cline, 10 Or. 474; Miller v. Miller, 78 N. C. 102. The fact that a wife has seen her husband have carnal knowledge of a cow is such cruel and inhuman treatment on his part, endangering her life and health, as to justify the wife in obtaining a divorce on the ground of cruelty: Prather v. Prather, 99 Iowa, 393. The habitual use of opiates, rendering the user callous, reckless,

untruthful, and stupid, causing physical prostration, and destroying all the objects of the marital relation, while causing the other spouse's condition to be intolerable, is such an indignity as to constitute cruelty and justify divorce on that ground: Dawson v. Dawson, 23 Mo. App. 169,

GUETZKOW BROTHERS COMPANY V. BREESE.

[96 WISCONSIN, 591.]

DURESS OF GOODS.-A lessee who, in compliance with the terms of his lease, has taken out insurance policies, covering the lessor's interests in the property, as well as his own, and who is in a position where he must obtain insurance money at once to enable him to go on with his business and fulfill outstanding contracts or suffer great loss, and who pays to the lessor under protest a sum which he does not owe. to induce such lessor to join in executing proofs of loss and in indorsing drafts without which the lessee cannot obtain his insurance money, the policy being payable to both of the parties as their interests shall appear, may recover the amount so paid on the ground that it was paid under duress.

CONTRACTS.-AN AGREEMENT TO INSURE machinery and buildings on the leased premises for a certain sum, payable to the lessor as his interest shall appear, is satisfied by procuring insurance on the buildings and machinery for more than the sum required, although the machinery belongs to the lessee, the lessor having a lien thereon for unpaid rent. In case of loss to the building, the lessor can recover only the amount for which it is insured, though that is less than its full value.

Winkler, Flanders, Smith, Bottum & Vilas and H. K. Gibson, for the appellants.

N. S. Murphey, for the respondent.

697 WINSLOW, J. We entertain no doubt that under the facts found by the circuit court there was a case of duress of 508 goods. The case was this: The plaintiff could not obtain the insurance money due it unless the defendants joined in executing the proofs of loss and in indorsing the drafts. The defendants refused to do these things unless the plaintiff would pay them $666.74, which it did not owe. The plaintiff was in a position where it must obtain its insurance money at once in order to go on with its business and fulfill valuable outstanding contracts, or it would suffer great loss. Under these circumstances, it submitted under protest to the unjust demand in order to obtain its own money from the insurance company. This makes a case of legal duress of goods: Vyne v. Glenn, 41 Mich. 112; Corkle v. Maxwell. 3 Blatchf. 413; Scholey v. Mumford, 60 N. Y. 498; Cobb v. Charter, 32 Conn. 358; 87 Am. Dec. 178.