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consideration, of blood or marriage, but a deed for a consideration other than blood, that is, a valuable consideration, is a purchase. (Brown v. Whaley, 793.)

7.

DEEDS-WHETHER OF GIFT OR PURCHASE.-A deed of real estate from a father and mother to their daughter, "in consideration of our love and affection for our daughter, and in consideration of the faithful obedience and faithful services to us of our said daughter, and in further consideration of one dollar to us in hand paid by our said daughter," is not a deed of gift, but a purchase, and the title acquired under such deed is by purchase. (Brown v. Whaley, 793.)

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8. DEEDS OF CORPORATION-DEFECTIVE ACKNOWLEDGMENT.-An acknowledgment of the deed of a corporation made by individuals instead of by its officers is fatally defective and its registration is void. A subsequent reacknowledgment and reregistration of the deed, after the accrual of another title and after action brought to maintain such title, can have no effect. (Bernhardt . Brown, 725.)

9. EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT A DEED WAS INTENDED AS A MORTGAGE.-Where a deed purports to be absolute, a trial court is justified in requiring clear proof that it was intended as a mortgage. (Falk v. Wittram, 184.)

See Trusts, 10.

DEFINITIONS.

"Aged or infirm person." (Allen v. Pearce, 306.) Criminal contempt. (State v. Circuit Court, 90.)

Insurance. (Dover Glass etc. Co. v. American Fire Ins. Co., 204.) "Malicious abuse of process." (Docter v. Reidel, 40.)

"Mayhem and maim." (State v. Johnson, 769.)

"Original package." (McGregor v. Cone, 522.)

Succession tax. (State v. Switzler, 653.)

Warehouseman. (Tradesmen's Nat. Bank v. Kent Mfg. Co., 876.)

DEPOSITIONS.

See Appeal, 8.

DESCENT.

See Adoption, 2, 8.

DEVISE.

DEVISE TRUST-EFFECT OF RELINQUISHMENT OF DEVISE AND FAILURE OF TRUST.-If an absolute devisee relinquishes all claims under the will, except such as may come from a trust thereunder, the devise must fail if no trust is shown, and the property becomes a part of the residuary estate, to be disposed of as if no devise of it had been attempted. (Moran v. Moran, 443.)

See Charities, 7-9; Estates.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
See Contempt, 8.

DURESS.

DURESS OF GOODS.-A lessee who, in compliance with the terms of his lease, has taken out insurance policies, covering the lessor's interests in the property, as well as his own, and who is in a position where he must obtain insurance money at once to enable him to go on with his business and fulfill outstanding contracts or AM. ST. REP., VOL. LX V.-59

suffer great loss, and who pays to the lessor under protest a sum which he does not owe, to induce such lessor to join in executing proofs of loss and in indorsing drafts without which the lessee cannot obtain his insurance money, the policy being payable to both of the parties as their interests shall appear, may recover the amount so paid on the ground that it was paid under duress. (Guetzkow Bros. Co. v. Breese, 83.)

EASEMENT.

See Waters, 2.

EJECTMENT.

1. EJECTMENT MAY BE MAINTAINED BY A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION to recover possession of a street dedicated to a public use, whether it or the adjacent proprietor owns the fee. (San Fra acisco v. Grote, 155.)

2. EJECTMENT.-RENTS AND PROFITS for a period prior to the commencement of an action of ejectment can be recovered only when it is shown that the defendant had knowledge of the plaintiff's claim. (Clarkson v. Hatton, 635.)

3. EJECTMENT-BURDEN OF PROOF.-If the land in dispute in ejectment is within the boundary of plaintiff's deed, and the defendant claims under exceptions to such deed, the burden of proof is upon him to bring himself within such exceptions. (Bernhardt v. Brown, 725.)

4.

EJECTMENT.-EVIDENCE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION for a period less than prescribed time is not a circumstance to go to the jury as tending to show title in an action of ejectment. (Bernhardt v. Brown, 725.)

5. EJECTMENT-PAYMENT OF TAXES AS EVIDENCE OF TITLE.-In an action of ejectment, mere evidence of the payment of taxes is not proof of title in the payor, when he has not connected himself with any outstanding title, or shown adverse possession for the time required. (Bernhardt v. Brown, 725.)

EMINENT DOMAIN.

1. EMINENT DOMAIN.-THE RIGHT TO TAKE LANDS ALREADY APPROPRIATED TO ONE PUBLIC USE for the purpose of appropriating them to another exists only when there is a statute clearly conferring such authority. A statute authorizing the laying out of a public highway does not justify taking therefor lands previously devoted to some other public use. (Little Nestucca Road Co. v. Tillamook Co., 802.)

2. EMINENT DOMAIN. THE TAKING OF LAND ALREADY DEVOTED TO ONE PUBLIC USE and appropriating it to another may be authorized by the legislature, but the authority must be conferred by express terms or arise from necessary implication. (Little Nestucca Road Co. v. Tillamook Co., 802.)

3.

EMINENT DOMAIN.-PROPERTY ALREADY DEVOTED TO ONE PUBLIC USE cannot be taken for another without first making compensation to the persons interested in the previous public use. Hence, lands used as a public toll road cannot be taken for public highways free from such tolls, unless the owners of the toll road are compensated for moneys expended by them in acquiring the right of way and in making improvements. (Little Nestucca Road Co. v. Tillamook Co., 802.)

4. PLEADING ANTICIPATING DEFENSES.-Ordinarily, a plaintiff need not in his complaint anticipate or negative a possible

defense. Hence, where plaintiff seeks to enjoin the taking of his
property for a public use he need not aver that he has not received
compensation for such taking. (Little Nestucca Road Co. v. Tilla-
mook Co., 802.)

EQUITABLE CONVERSION.

See Wills, 5.

EQUITY.

1. EQUITY JURISDICTION MAY BE SUSTAINED upon the
ground that it affords the most convenient remedy. (Conemaugh
Gas Co. v. Jackson Farm Gas Co., 865.)

2.

PRACTICE-EQUITABLE DEFENSES.-The mere sugges-
tion of an accounting or of an equitable defense is not sufficient to
oust a court of law of jurisdiction. The defendant must go farther,
and state some specific ground for invoking the jurisdiction of
equity. (Willis v. Barron, 672.)

3. EQUITY.-PARTIES IN PARI DELICTO are not entitled to
relief in equity. The court must refuse to aid either, and must leave
them where by their illegal acts they have placed themselves.
(Markley v. Mineral City, 776.)

4. EQUITY-MISTAKE-REFORMATION OF CONTRACT—
WHEN NOT JUSTIFIED.-A mistake as to the construction or
legal effect of a written agreement between two parties does not
justify its reformation unless the mistake is mutual. A mistake
by one of the parties, unaccompanied by any fraud of the other is
not enough. (Williams v. Hamilton, 475.)

5. EQUITY-MISTAKE AND FRAUD-REFORMATION OF
CONTRACT-WHEN JUSTIFIED.-If one of two parties to a con-
tract is illiterate and relies upon the other, to the latter's knowl-
edge, to embody their oral agreement in a written contract, the
former may have the contract reformed so as to conform to their
understanding, where it was read over to him before it was exe-
cuted, and he called attention to a certain omission, but was as-
sured by the other party that the contract covered everything
agreed upon, which was not true. (Williams v. Hamilton, 475.)

6. EQUITY-MISTAKE AND FRAUD-REFORMATION OF
CONTRACT-WHEN JUSTIFIED.-A mistake of law by one of
two parties to a written agreement, if accompanied by fraud of the
other party, may, under certain circumstances, authorize a reforma-
tion of the contract. (Williams v. Hamilton, 475.)

7. EQUITY-REFORMATION OF CONTRACT-RATIFICA-
TION.-A party to a written agreement cannot ratify it, after its
execution, without knowing and understanding its contents.
Hence, he is not precluded from obtaining a reformation thereof,
on the ground that he ratifies it after its execution, where there is
no showing of any such knowledge. (Williams v. Hamilton, 475.)
See Judgment, 22-25; Municipal Corporations, 4; Specific Perform-
ance; Trusts, 8.
ESTATES.

DEVISE TO A PERSON NAMED, AND HIS "HEIRS."
CREATES ONLY A LIFE ESTATE, WHEN-INTENTION OF
TESTATOR.-If land is devised to one "to hold the same during
the term of his natural life," and to have the use, rents, and profits
of it during such time, but with a provision that he shall have no
power to convey or dispose of the same for a period longer than
his life, and that, at his death, it shall descend to his heirs, the
clear intention of the testator is to create a life estate only, and the

Jact that he is presumed to have intended a devise of all his interest
in the property, and that the heirs of the devisee cannot be definitely
known until his death, does not create in him a larger estate than
the testator intended him to have. (Westcott v. Binford, 530.)

See Appeal, 9; Partition, 2.

ESTOPPEL.

ESTOPPEL TO ASSERT SUPERIOR TITLE.-If parties
claim title from a common source, and the assertion of such title by
the defendant is adjudged invalid, he is estopped, in a subsequent
action involving the title to the same land, to assert a superior title
in some one else with whom he does not connect himself. (Bern-
hardt v. Brown, 725.)

See Building and Loan Associations, 1, 2; Corporations, 5; Husband
and Wife, 7; Insurance, 26, 56-58; Municipal Corporations, 25.

EVIDENCE.

1. EVIDENCE JUDICIAL NOTICE-POWER OF NOTARY IN
ANOTHER STATE TO ADMINISTER OATHS.-Whether a notary
public in another state has power to take affidavits is a matter of
which the courts of this state cannot take judicial notice. (Teutonia
Loan etc. Co. v. Turrell, 419.)

2. EVIDENCE-JUDICIAL NOTICE AS TO PLEADINGS
WITHDRAWN.-A court will take judicial notice that pleadings
withdrawn were held insufficient on demurrer, as the matter is
one of record. (Hoyt v. Beach, 461.)

3. STATUTES OF OTHER STATES-JUDICIAL NOTICE.-
The respective states of the United States are foreign to each
ether so far as taking judicial notice of what the statutory laws of
those states are is concerned. (Meyers v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 579.)

4. STATUTES OF OTHER STATES-PROOF OF.-The statute
law of another state is a fact that must be proved like any other
fact, and, in the absence of such proof, the court must presume
that the common law is in force in such other state. (Meyers v.
Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 579.)

STATES-PLEADING

AND

5. STATUTES OF OTHER
PROOF OF.-Foreign statutory laws are usually regarded as mat-
ters of fact, and are required to be pleaded as well as proved if
they constitute the foundation of the claim of defense. (Meyers v.
Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 579.)

6. ACTIONS-TORTS-PRESUMPTION AS TO STATUTE.-If
a wrong is one for which the right of action is purely statutory, no
presumption arises that such statute is in force outside of the state
which enacted it. (Meyers v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 579.)

7. EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTION FROM SUPPRESSION OR
ATTEMPT TO CORRUPT.-Though the defendant has not testified,
evidence may be received showing that at a former trial of the same
cause he attempted to procure a witness to testify falsely, and also
sought to have a third person corrupt the jurors. This is but an ap-
plication of the rule that a spoliation of papers and a destruction or
withholding of evidence which a party ought to produce gives rise
to a presumption unfavorable to him, as his conduct may properly
be attributed to his supposed knowledge that the truth would operate
against him. (McHugh v. McHugh, 849.)

8. EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECT upon one of plaintiff's eyes
of an injury inflicted directly upon the other is admissible. (Mait-
land v. Gilbert Paper Co., 137.)

9. EVIDENCE-PROOF OF CONTENTS OF WRITING BY PAROL.-If the fact that a witness has knowledge of the existence of an insurance policy is relevant as affecting her credibility, it may be inquired into, and she may be allowed to state the amount of such policy if she knows it, as a substantive fact independent of the policy. (Kearney v. State, 344.)

10. EVIDENCE-CONFESSIONS.-A LETTER GIVEN BY A PRISONER to the sheriff, to be delivered to a third person, but retained by the sheriff, is admissible in evidence against the writer, if it contains statements amounting to admissions of his guilt. (Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 852.)

11. EVIDENCE-ARTIFICE IN OBTAINING CONFESSIONS DOES NOT RENDER THEM INADMISSIBLE.-Hence if a person accused of murder requests an interview with a girl charged with complicity with him, and, on such interview being granted, two deputy sheriffs are concealed so as to hear what was said, their tes timony and that of the girl is admissible. (Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 852.)

See Contracts, 1, 2, 5; Corporations, 7; Deeds, 4, 9; Fraudulent Conveyances, 2; Homestead, 4; Homicide, 1-6, 9; Insurance, 61, 62, 65-67; Marriage and Divorce, 2; Trusts, 8, 9.

1.

EXECUTIONS.

EXECUTIONS.-AN EXCESSIVE SEIZURE under execu tion of a defendant's property is a fraud upon his rights and void; and a sale by parcels does not cure it, when it appears that the seizure of anyone of the parcels would have been in itself an excessive levy. (Williamson v. White, 302.)

STATUTE. — A

2. EXECUTIONS - DIRECTORY statutory requirement that the date of the docketing of judgment shall be stated in the execution issued thereon, is directory merely. (Bernhardt v. Brown, 725.)

Sale

3. EXECUTION SALES - DOCKETING JUDGMENT. under an execution levied on realty carries a good title, though the judgment under which the execution issues is not docketed, or the lien of the docketing has expired. (Bernhardt v. Brown, 725.)

4. EXECUTIONS-COLLATERAL ATTACK.-Proceedings under a voidable execution cannot be collaterally attacked. (Bernhardt v. Brown, 725.)

5. EXECUTIONS.-CLERICAL ERRORS contained in an execution which do not invalidate any other part of it cannot be complained of by strangers to it. (Bernhardt v. Brown, 725.)

6. EXECUTION SALES AND SHERIFF'S DEED-REFORMATION OF.-If one parcel of land is intended to be conveyed to a judgment debtor, but another is actually conveyed to him, and he takes and holds possession of that intended to be conveyed, a levy and sale under execution describing the property according to the conveyance is void, and cannot be perfected, assisted, or reformed in equity. (Burrows v. Parker, 812.)

7. EXECUTION SALES-APPLICATION OF PURCHASER TO BE PUT IN POSSESSION-PARTIES BOUND BY PROCEEDING. If, when a purchaser of real estate at execution sale applies to the court for an order requiring the sheriff to put him in possession thereof, one who claims to be the owner of the property appears at the hearing and presents written objections to the granting of such order, he is not, unless actually made a party to such proceeding, bound by any judgment rendered therein. (Williamson v. White, 302.)

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