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8. EXECUTION SALES-DEFICIENCY ON RESALE-RIGHT OF SHERIFF TO RECOVER.-If a sheriff legally sells personalty under execution, and, upon the refusal of the purchaser to comply with the terms of sale, the property is resold at his risk and brings a lower price, the sheriff may recover from him, in addition to the deficiency, any absolutely necessary and proper expense attendant upon the keeping and storing of the property pending its readvertisement and sale. (Barnes v. Bluthenthal, 339.)

9. EXEMPTION OF WAGES from execution does not prevent their being sold for the payment of poll taxes. (White v. Martin, 616.)

10. EXEMPTIONS-HEAD OF A FAMILY.-One who has living with him an ablebodied adult son, capable of maintaining and supporting himself, is not, on that account, entitled to exemption as the head of a family. (Cox v. Martin, 604.)

11. EXEMPTIONS-PURCHASE MONEY LIEN-RIGHT OF ASSIGNEE.-Under a statute providing that property mentioned is not exempt from attachment issued in an action for the purchase price thereof, or from execution issued upon any judgment rendered therein, an assignment of a note given for the purchase price of such property operates as an assignment of the right to collect it, and the assignee has the same right to sue and levy on the property that the vendor had. (Langevin v. Bloom, 546.)

12.

EXECUTIONS-EXEMPTIONS—“AGED PERSON."-A man sixty-six years of age, though "hale and hearty," is entitled to an exemption of his property from levy and sale under execution, under a constitutional provision allowing this right to "every aged or infirm person." (Allen v. Pearce, 306.)

See Taxes, 12.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR-MISCONDUCT OF, DURING A TRIAL.-Though the defendant is an administrator or executor, his misconduct at a trial in attempting to suborn witnesses or to corrupt jurors may be proved in evidence against him. (McHugh v. McHugh, 849.)

See Contracts, 18, 19; Liens, 1.

EXEMPTIONS.

See Executions; Homestead.

EXTRADITION.

1. EXTRADITION-REVOCATION OF WARRANT.-The governor of a state may effectively revoke his extradition warrant for 'the surrender of an alleged fugitive from justice at any time before he is taken out of the state. (State v. Toole, 553.)

2.

EXTRADITION-REVOCATION OF WARRANT-CONCLUSIVENESS.-If the governor of a state has revoked his warrant for the surrender of an alleged fugitive from justice, no inquiry can be made in a proceeding on habeas corpus on behalf of such fugitive as to the ground of such revocation, and the prisoner must, therefore, be discharged. (State v. Toole, 553.)

FOREIGN INSURANCE COMPANIES.
See Attachment, 8, 9.

FORGERY.

See Banks and Banking, 3.

FRAUD.

Bee Contracts, 17; Judgment, 18; Release, 2

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.

1. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.-A DEED ABSOLUTE ON
ITS FACE, but intended as mere security for a debt, is fraudulent
and void as against the creditors of the grantor. (Bernhardt v.
Brown, 725.)

2. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-EVIDENCE.-If a deed
absolute on its face is claimed to be fraudulent as being intended
merely as security for a debt of the grantor, an unrecorded deed of
defeasance to the land and bonds secured thereby are competent as
evidence tending to show the nature of the transaction, without
proof of their execution. (Bernhardt v. Brown, 725.)

See Husband and Wife, 3-6.

FREE SCHOLARSHIP.
See Taxes, 5.

GAME LAWS.

GAME LAWS-KEEPING GAME KILLED IN THE OPEN
SEASON AFTER THE END THEREOF.-A statute making it a
misdemeanor for any person to have in his possession any game
birds or animals, or any flesh, pieces or parts thereof, during the
season when the catching or killing thereof is prohibited, applies to
such birds or animals, or any part thereof, though killed within the
open season. (Haggerty v. St. Louis Ice etc. Co., 647.)

See Contracts. 16.

GARNISHMENT.

See Attachment.

GIFTS.

See Charities, 9; Deeds, 6, 7.

GUARDIAN AND WARD.

1. A GUARDIAN LOANING THE MONEYS OF HIS WARDS,
and taking notes and mortgages therefor in his own name, thereby
unnecessarily and willfully mingles the trust property with his own,
and becomes liable for its safety in all events, and is not, in his
accounts, entitled to be credited with the amounts so loaned. (Mat-
ter of Bane, 197.)

2. GUARDIAN AND WARD-BOND WHERE THERE IS NO
ORDER OF APPOINTMENT.-A bond given by a person as the
guardian of a minor, by which he obtains possession of the prop-
erty of his supposed ward, is valid and enforceable, though it ap-
pears that no formal order was ever made appointing him such
guardian. (Hazelton v. Douglas, 122.)

See Subrogation.

HABEAS CORPUS.
See Extradition, 2.

HEAD OF FAMILY.

See Executions, 10,

HEIRS.

ESTATES OF DECEDENTS.-WHERE AN ACTION IS
BROUGHT BY HEIRS to recover a debt due their ancestor, they
must allege and prove that the debts of the ancestor have been paid,
or the estate settled, or that no letters of administration have been
granted. (Magel v. Milligan, 382.)

See Adoption, 2, 3.

HIGHWAYS.

1. HIGHWAYS-PLACE OF INJURY-STREET.-One injured
in a street is injured in a public highway. (Frankfort v. Coleman,
412.)

2.

STREETS-ADDITIONAL SERVITUDE IN.-The use of a
public street for a telephone line is a servitude within the contem-
plated uses of such street. Hence it does not impose an additional
burden for which an owner of abutting property is entitled to be
compensated. (Magee v. Overshiner, 358.)

3. STREETS.-A TOWN PLAT IS NOT CONCLUSIVE that
there is a strip of land, as there represented, between a street, and
the shore of a lake. The dimensions of the several lots as they ap-
pear on the plat must yield to the actual condition of things as they
exist, and be determined by the practical location and construction
of the plat upon the ground. (Madison v. Mayers, 127.)

4. STREETS-ACTUAL LOCATION OF, CONTROLS.-In the
absence of original monuments which can be ascertained, the loca-
tion and occupancy of a street as indicated by old buildings and
fences, and by its use for many years, must control as a practical
location of the street, and is a practical construction of the plat
thereof. The lands included in the street as thus used must be re-
garded as dedicated to the public use. (Madison v. Mayers, 127.)

5. HIGHWAY-CREATION OF. BY USER.-If a highway has
been used by the public for more than twenty years, it becomes a
lawfully existing highway, and the right of the public to use it be-
comes fixed. (Frankfort v. Coleman, 412.)

6. STREETS.-MERE NONUSER of a part of a street cannot
operate as a surrender or abandonment of any part of it for the pur-
pose of a public street. (Madison v. Mayers, 127.)

See Eminent Domain, 3.

HOLDER FÖR VALUE.

See Negotiable Instruments, 2.

HOMESTEAD.

1. HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION.-The rule of marshalling se
curities does not apply to homestead exemptions. A mortgagee of
real property, part of which is a homestead, will not be permitted
nor required to resort to the homestead alone for the satisfaction of
his lien. (Koen v. Brill, 633.)

HOMESTEADS-LEASE

2.
OF BY HEAD OF FAMILY,
WHEN VOID.-After a homestead has been set apart out of the
lands of a husband for the benefit of his wife and minor children,
a lease executed by him alone, during the continuance of the home-
stead, purporting to convey to third parties all rights to the timber
on such land for turpentine and other purposes, and also all his
right, title and interest in the sawmill timber thereon, to be cut by
the lessees or their assigns, within a certain period, is void. (Prit
chett v. Davis, 298.)

3. HOMESTEAD.-The dedication as a public street of lands which are subject to a homestead cannot, as against a wife, result from the acts or agreement of her husband. (San Francisco v. Grote, 155.)

4.

HOMESTEADS-EVIDENCE.-The original homestead papers are primary evidence of the setting apart and valuation of the homestead. The record of such papers is only secondary evidence. (Pritchett v. Davis, 298.)

5. HOMESTEAD.-AN INJUNCTION WILL ISSUE against the sale of a homestead under execution where it is so encumbered that no benefit can accrue therefrom to the creditor. (Koen v. Brill, 633.) ́ 6. HOMESTEADS - INJUNCTION. - BENEFICIARIES in a homestead have such an interest in the use and enjoyment of the property as enables them directly to maintain a suit for an injunction to protect it against an illegal invasion. (Pritchett v. Davis, 298.)

HOMICIDE.

1. HOMICIDE-JUSTIFICATION.-A homicide committed in self-defense, or in defense of habitation, property, or person, against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony on either, is justifiable homicide. (Powell v. State, 277.)

2.

HOMICIDE-PROOF OF CHARACTER.-Except when special facts may have been shown to have existed in a particular case, evidence of character, conduct, or utterances of the deceased is not admissible in trials for homicide. (Powell v. State, 277.)

3. HOMICIDE-PROOF OF CHARACTER.-In a trial for homicide, where the plea of self-defense is set up, evidence of the character of the deceased for violence must be confined to evidence of his general character and reputation, and this cannot be established by proof of specific acts. (Powell v. State, 277.)

4. HOMICIDE EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER.-If, on a trial for homicide, the character of the deceased for peace or violence is in issue, the testimony of a witness to the general character of the deceased cannot be confined to evidence of what is generally said in reference thereto. It is competent to show by a witness who has lived in the same community with the deceased, that he knows the estimation in which he was held by the people, and that he has never heard the character of such person questioned. Such evidence authorizes the inference that such character was good. (Powell v. State, 277.)

5. HOMICIDE – DECLARATIONS OF ACCUSED AS EVIDENCE.-On a trial for murder, where self-defense is set up, declarations of present pain made by the accused soon after the killing. and alleged by him to have been caused by an attack made by the deceased at the time of the killing, are admissible in evidence to be considered by the jury along with the other facts in the case. (Powell v. State, 277.)

6. MURDER-DECLARATIONS AS EVIDENCE-INSTRUCTIONS.-A declaration made by one charged with murder admitting the homicide, but disavowing any criminal responsibility therefor, though admissible in evidence as an admission of a fact, is not a confession of guilt, and does not authorize instructions on the law of confessions. (Powell v. State, 277.)

7. CRIMINAL LAW-INSTRUCTIONS.-If, on a murder trial, the court undertakes to instruct the jury as to the various forms in which their verdict may be written, and in so doing states what would be proper forms for all findings, from that of murder without recommendation down to involuntary manslaughter in the com

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mission of a lawful act, he should not fail to state what the form
of verdict should be in case of acquittal, but failure to do so is not
ground for a new trial, when it appears that the court distinctly
charged the jury that, in a certain view of the evidence, they should
acquit the accused, and when it is manifest, from finding him guilty
of the highest offense charged, that the omission in question could
have done him no injury. (Kearney v. State, 344.)

8. HOMICIDE-INSTRUCTIONS.-If, on a trial for murder, the
accused pleads self-defense, and the court, after instructing the jury
as to all grades of homicide, in conclusion instructs the jury to "look
to all the facts and circumstances surrounding and connected with
the case; if you find that the defendant and deceased had a dif-
ficulty, look to all the facts and circumstances surrounding and
connected with it; see whether or not it was necessary for the de
fendant to take the life of the deceased in order to save his own
life. Before he would be justified and you would be authorized
to find him guilty of no offense, you must believe from the evi-
dence that it was necessary for him to take the life of the de-
ceased in order to save his own life," such instruction is erroneous
in that it excludes from the consideration of the jury the question
whether the accused killed the deceased to prevent a felony being
committed on his person. (Powell v. State, 277.)

9. EVIDENCE-DYING DECLARATIONS.-The declaration of
a person after he was shot that, in his opinion, the shooting was
accidental, is not admissible in evidence as a dying declaration in
favor of the party accused of his murder by such shooting. (Kear-
ney v. State, 344.)

See Trial, 2.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. HUSBAND AND WIFE HOLDING BY THE ENTIRETIES-
MORTGAGES GIVEN BY.-There is a presumption, where lands are
held by the entireties, and the joint note and mortgage of the hus-
band and wife are given to secure a loan, that they are principals
and equally responsible, and satisfactory evidence should be given
in favor of the wife where she claims to be a surety only. (Magel v.
Milligan, 382.)

2. HUSBAND AND WIFE-TENANTS BY ENTIRETIES-AC-
TION FOR DAMAGES-PARTIES PLAINTIFF.-If a husband, en-
gaged in business, is in possession of a storeroom and stock of gen-
eral merchandise, which are injured by an explosion of natural gas,
he may recover damages therefor without joining his wife in the ac-
tion, whether the title to the real estate is in himself, or in himself
and his wife, as tenants by entireties. (Sheridan Gas etc. Co. v.
Pearson, 402.)

3. MARRIED WOMAN-CONVEYANCE ON THE EVE OF
MARRIAGE TO DEFEAT RIGHTS OF.-A secret voluntary con-
veyance, made by a man on the eve of his marriage, operates as a
fraud upon his wife, and will not be permitted to defeat her of her
dower or other interest in the lands conveyed thereby, where he has
represented to her that he is the owner of such lands as an induce-
ment to the marriage. (Bookout v. Bookout, 350.)

CONVEYANCES - HUSBAND'S FRAUD
4. FRAUDULENT
UPON RIGHTS OF HIS WIFE.-If a married man conveys his
property to his children, but retains control of the property and
withholds the deeds from record for the period of four years after
their execution, and his wife has no knowledge thereof until after
the grantor's death, the fact that all the deeds were thus withheld
leads very strongly to the conclusion that it was done as the result
of an understanding between the grantor and grantees, and that the

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