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grantees were guilty of collusion in the matter for the purpose of
preventing information of the transfer from reaching the wife of
the grantor, and to permit him, in the mean time, to continue to ex-
ercise exclusive dominion and control over the property. (Smith v.
Smith, 251.)

5. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES - HUSBAND'S POWER
TO DISPOSE OF HIS PROPERTY-FRAUD UPON RIGHTS OF
WIFE.-If a husband makes a mere colorable disposition of his
property, for the purpose of defeating the rights of his wife as his
heir, and manifests an intention of reserving to himself the exclu-
sive dominion and control of the property, and the reservation to
himself of the right to use and enjoy it during his lifetime, the
transaction is a fraud on the rights of the wife and will be set aside.
(Smith v. Smith, 251.)

6. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES - HUSBAND'S POWER
TO DISPOSE OF HIS PROPERTY-FRAUD UPON RIGHTS OF
WIFE.-A husband has power to dispose absolutely of his prop-
erty during his life, independently of the concurrence, and ex-
onerated from the claim, of his wife, if the transaction is not merely
colorable, and is not attended with circumstances indicative of
fraud upon the rights of the wife. If the disposition of the husband
is bona fide, and no right is reserved to him, though made to defeat
the right of the wife, it will be good against her. (Smith v. Smith,
251.)

7. MARRIED WOMAN-ESTOPPEL TO DENY PURPOSE
FOR WHICH MONEY WAS LOANED.-Where, for the purpose of
inducing a loan, to be secured by a mortgage on land held by a hus-
band and wife by the entireties, they make an affidavit to the effect
that the moneys to be borrowed are to be used in part to pay off an
encumbrance on such land, and the balance to purchase other lands,
to be held by them in the same manner, she is estopped, in an ac-
tion to foreclose the mortgage, from insisting that the moneys were
borrowed for the use of her husband, and that no part thereof had
been received by her or used in the improvement of her separate es-
tate, where the lender of the money relied upon her affidavit and had
no notice that any of the statements thereof was untrue. (Magel v.
Milligan, 382.)

8. A JUDGMENT AGAINST A MARRIED WOMAN cannot be
stricken off for defect not appearing on the record. (Stahr v.
Brewer, 883.)

9. A MARRIED WOMAN SEEKING TO AVOID A JUDGMENT
by confession must show not only the fact of her marriage, but also
all other circumstances necessary to relieve her from liability.
(Stahr v. Brewer, 883.)

10. JUDGMENT-MARRIED WOMAN'S LIABILITY UPON.-
Where a married woman seeks to be relieved from a judgment.
against her upon a judgment note signed by her, upon the ground
that she was not liable thereon, and there is evidence tending to
prove that her husband conducted business in her name without
any knowledge on her part of the details, and that she gave her
name willingly to all his transactions whenever requested by him,
and that the note in question was made to secure a debt due to the
plaintiff, the question of her liability should be submitted to the
jury, and the court is not justified in determining that she is not
answerable. (Stahr v. Brewer, 883.)

11. CRIMINAL LAW-FAILURE TO SUPPORT WIFE-FI-
NANCIAL MEANS OF WIFE.-The fact that a wife has financial
means does not relieve her husband from his statutory duty of sup-
porting her, especially where no claim is made that such means
were obtained from him. Hence, evidence that she had such means

prior to the commencement of a prosecution under such a statute is
wholly immaterial. (People v. People, 245.)

See Appeal, 15, 21; Bonds; Homestead, 2, 3; Information, & 4; Judg.
ment, 21; Witnesses, 1.

INDICTMENT.

See Mayhem, 24.

INFANTS.

See Deeds, 1.

INFORMATION.

1. INFORMATION.-IN CHARGING AN OFFENSE, it is suffi-
cient to allege the facts constituting it, and is not necessary to aver
facts to show affirmatively that the person charged is one who can
be prosecuted for such offense. (Poole v. People, 245.)

2.

INFORMATION-FORM-AMBIGUITY.-Although an infor-
mation may be successfully attacked, at the proper time, by a mo-
tion on account of form, or ambiguity, it is too late to raise that
question after trial. (Poole v. People, 245.)

SUPPORT

3. INFORMATION — FAILURE ΤΟ
WIFE-
CHARGING THE OFFENSE-TIME.-An information was filed
with a justice of the peace, on January 18, 1897, charging a party
with failure to support his wife, and carelessly alleged the time of
the offense as "on or about the nineteenth day of September, and
continuously since, A. D. 1897"; but from the language employed,
charging the time when the offense was committed, it was held to
be fairly inferable that it was at a date prior to the time when
the information was filed with the justice. (Poole v. People, 245.)

4.

INFORMATION-FAILURE TO SUPPORT WIFE-CHARG-
ING THE OFFENSE.-The statutory offense of the fallure of a
husband to support his wife consists of the husband's willful ne-
glect to provide reasonable support and maintenance for his wife,
and it is not necessary to allege in the information that the defend-
ant is a resident of the state, where nonresidents are excepted from
the operation of the statute. It is not necessary to negative excep-
tions, and if the defendant is a nonresident, that is a matter of
defense. (Poole v. People, 245.)

INJUNCTIONS.

See Dedication, 3; Eminent Domain, 4; Homestead, 5, &

INSANE PERSONS.

See Judgment, 21; Witnesses, 1.

INSOLVENCY.

See Banks and Banking, 10.

INSTRUCTIONS.

1. INSTRUCTIONS-BY COLLATING FACTS.-It is proper for
the court to collate the facts and to state the rule of law applicable.
(Medearis v. Anchor Mut. Life Ins. Co., 428.)

2. INSTRUCTIONS WHEN FAILURE TO GIVE, IS NOT RE-
VERSIBLE ERROR.-If there is no reversible error in the instruc-
tions given, there can be no reversal for a failure to give additional
instructions not requested. (Tracy v. Hacket, 398.)

See Homicide, 6-8.

INSURANCE.

1. INSURANCE-DEFINITION.-An insurance in relation to property is a contract whereby the insurer becomes bound, for a definite consideration, to indemnify the insured against loss or damage to certain property named in the policy by reason of certain perils to which it may be exposed. (Dover Glass etc. Co. v. American Fire Ins. Co., 264.)

3.

2. INSURANCE-RIGHTS OF PARTIES, HOW FIXED.-A policy of insurance, and the conditions therein, fix the relations between the parties thereto and furnish the measure of their respective rights and liabilities. Courts cannot go outside of such agreement of the parties to determine their mutual or reciprocal obligations. (Dover Glass etc. Co. v. American Fire Ins. Co., 264.) INSURANCE-CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT.-The statute of North Carolina provides that "all contracts of insurance, the application for which is taken within the state, shall be deemed to have been made within the state, and subject to the laws thereof." Hence a policy of insurance issued by a foreign company upon an application made in that state is governed by such statute, no mat ter what the form of the contract may be. (Horton v. Home Ins. Co., 717.)

4. INSURANCE-CONDITIONS.-It is competent for an insurer to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which he will take a proposed risk, provided they are not illegal nor contrary to public policy, and the acceptance of such conditions imposes upon the insured the duty of a substantial compliance therewith, and any neglect thereof in any material respect, unless waived or condoned, relieves the insurer from liability in case of loss, whether it can be traced to such neglect or not. (Dover Glass etc. Co. v. American Fire Ins. Co., 264.)

5.

INSURANCE.-CONDITIONS OR CLAUSES inserted in a contract of insurance which induce caution as to the conduct of either party in respect to the subject matter thereof, are not repugnant to public policy, because anything that stimulates diligence and good faith between the contracting parties is highly promotive of the general as well as the individual good. (Dover Glass etc. Co. v. American Fire Ins. Co., 264.)

6.

INSURANCE.-CONDITIONS OF FORFEITURE contained in an insurance policy are not favored, and these and like conditions are always construed strictly, so that a party claiming a forfeiture by reason of a violation thereof is not permitted to deprive the other party of the benefits of the right of indemnity for which he contracted if there is any doubt or uncertainty as to the terms of such conditions, the extent of their application, or the acts which constitute the alleged breach. (Dover Glass etc. Co. v. American Fire Ins. Co., 264.)

7.

INSURANCE.-CONDITIONS OF AVOIDANCE contained in an insurance policy. may be waived either by express agreement of the parties or necessary implication arising from their acts after notice of the breach. (Dover Glass etc. Co. v. American Fire Ins. Co., 264.)

8. INSURANCE-WAIVER OF CONDITIONS.-The violations of any of the conditions in a policy of insurance may be waived by the insurer, and a waiver may be implied from the acts and conduct of the insurer after knowledge that such conditions have been broken. (Horton v. Home Ins. Co., 717.)

9. INSURANCE-WAIVER OF CONDITIONS.-If an insurer, knowing the facts, does that which is inconsistent with an inten.

tion to insist upon a strict compliance with the conditions precedent
of the contract of insurance, he must be treated as having waived
their performance, and the insured may recover without proving
performance, even though the policy provides that none of its con-
ditions shall be waived except by written agreement. (Horton v.
Home Ins. Co., 717.)

10. INSURANCE-WAIVER OF CONDITIONS.-If an insurer,
with knowledge that conditions have been broken, giving him the
right to cancel a policy of insurance, fails to notify the insured
within a reasonable time of his intention to cancel the policy, and
fails to return the unearned premium as required by the policy, this
must be taken as evidence showing a waiver of the breach of such
conditions. (Horton v. Home Ins. Co., 717.)

11. INSURANCE CONDITIONS—WAIVER BY AGENT.-Con-
ditions in a policy of insurance working a forfeiture are matters of
contract and not of limitation, and may be waived by the insurer.
Such waiver may be presumed from the acts of the local agent.
(Horton v. Home Ins. Co., 717.)

12. INSURANCE-MISREPRESENTATIONS.-Under the stat-
utes of North Carolina, statements contained in any application for
a policy of insurance, or in the policy itself, are representations and
not warranties; and, if misrepresentations are made, they do not
vitiate the policy, unless they materially contribute to the loss or
fraudulently evade the payment of an increased premium. (Albert
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 693.)

13. INSURANCE-DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY.-It is not
necessary in insuring property that its locality be fixed by such
technical, legal descriptions as are ordinarily employed in convey-
ances of real property. It is not material, therefore, in an action to
recover on a policy insuring a dwelling-house and personal property
therein against loss by fire that the block in which the dwelling was
situated was described in the policy as being in Harlington addition
to Mt. Tabor, whereas there is no such addition, and the property
was in Harlem addition to East Portland. (Baker v. State Ins. Co.,
807.)

14. INSURANCE-BREACH OF WARRANTY OF THE TITLE
OF THE ASSURED.-One in possession of real property under a
contract of purchase entitling him to remain in possession, and to a
conveyance of the title upon completing payment therefor in certain
installments, is to be deemed the owner for the purpose of a policy
of insurance, and is justified, in his answers in his application, in
stating that he is the sole and undisputed owner of the property,
and that the title is in his name. (Baker v. State Ins. Co., 807.)

15. INSURANCE-FRAUD IN ANSWER RESPECTING THE
VALUE OF PROPERTY:-An answer respecting the value of the
land and buildings upon which insurance is sought will not be re-
garded as fraudulent unless so far at variance with the truth that
a fraudulent purpose must be presumed. All that is required is the
honest judgment or opinion of the applicant upon the subject.
(Baker v. State Ins. Co., 807.)

16. INSURANCE-CONDITIONS AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES.
Conditions in a fire insurance policy prohibiting encumbrances and
levies without the consent of the insurer, and declaring the policy
to be void in case of a breach thereof, apply only to voluntary liens
and levies, and not to involuntary encumbrances; such as tax liens
and judgments procured in invitum. The violation of such condi-
tions does not render the policy absolutely void, but voidable only

at the election of the insurer. (Dover Glass etc. Co. v. American
Fire Ins. Co., 264.)

17. INSURANCE CONDITIONS AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES
AND LEVIES-BREACH OF.-Under conditions in a policy of fire
insurance prohibiting encumbrances and levies on the insured prop-
erty without the consent of the insurer, and declaring the policy to
be void in case of a breach thereof, the act of the insured in giving
mortgages, confessing judgments, and suffering levies of execution
against the insured property without the consent or waiver of the
insurer, constitutes a breach of such conditions and avoids the pol-
icy at the election of the insurer. (Dover Glass etc. Co. v. American
Fire Ins. Co., 264.)

18. INSURANCE.-CONDITIONS PROHIBITING ENCUM-
BRANCES AND LEVIES upon insured property without the con-
sent of the insurer, inserted in the policy and declaring it to be void
in case of a breach thereof, are not only legal and conformable to
public policy, but also reasonable and proper. (Dover Glass etc. Co.
v. American Fire Ins. Co., 264.)

19. INSURANCE ENCUMBRANCES-CONDITIONS AGAINST
-WHEN NOT ENFORCEABLE.-If an insurance company issues
a policy of insurance without requiring any application be
cause its agent thinks he knows the condition of the property, and
the policy contains a condition rendering it void if the property is
encumbered, but the insured does not read the policy nor know of
the condition until after a loss has occurred, the condition must be
deemed waived. (Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 611.)

20. INSURANCE-FIRE-CONDITIONS-WAIVER.-Under con.
ditions in a policy of life insurance providing that it should be void
if, with the knowledge of the insured, foreclosure proceedings be
commenced or notice given of sale of any property covered by the
policy by virtue of any mortgage or trust deed, and also that if the
policy should be canceled or become void the unearned portion of
the premium paid should be returned, the insurer is liable for a loss,
although the property insured is advertised for sale under a trust
deed before the fire and loss, provided the insured has no notice
or knowledge of such advertised sale, except such as is obtained
from reading the advertisement before the fire, which advertisement
the agent of the insurer has also seen, and the policy has not been
canceled nor any part of the unearned premium returned to the in-
sured prior to the fire. (Horton v. Home Ins. Co., 717.)
21.
PROHIBITING CESSATION
OF OPERATION OF INSURED PROPERTY.-A condition in a fire
insurance policy forbidding the cessation of the operation of the
insured establishment, without the consent of the insurer, and pro-
viding for the care and supervision of the workmen, and also pro-
viding that a breach of such condition shall avoid the policy, is
broken, and the insurance terminated, when the business is discon-
tinued and the operation of the establishment has ceased without
the consent of the insurer, although watchmen are provided and
kept in the establishment continually until the fire and loss occur.
(Dover Glass etc. Co. v. American Fire Ins. Co., 264.)

INSURANCE-CONDITION

INSURANCE-CONDITION

22.
COMPELLING OPERATION
OF INSURED ESTABLISHMENT.-A condition in a policy of fire
insurance forbidding the cessation of the operation of the insured
establishment without the consent of the insured, is valid, reason-
able and proper. (Dover Glass etc. Co. v. American Fire Ins. Co.,
264.)

23. INSURANCE CONDITIONS CONCERNING WORKMEN
IN INSURED ESTABLISHMENT.-An insurer has a right to stipu-

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