late in a policy of fire insurance for the care and supervision of skilled workmen necessarily employed in running the insured estab lishment during the customary working season, and to make his lia- bility dependent upon the fulfillment thereof. (Dover Glass etc. Co. V. American Fire Ins. Co., 264.)
24. INSURANCE-HOUSE LET FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES.— A policy of insurance on a house leased by the owner to a lewd woman, with knowledge on his part that it is to be used by her for the purposes of prostitution, is not void so as to defeat a recovery in case of loss in the absence of any stipulation in the policy un- der which the immoral use of the house vacates the contract. such case, the contract of insurance does not grow out of, nor is it connected with, the immoral and illegal use of the house; and, it is clearly disconnected from the contract of rental for such use. (Phenix Ins. Co. v. Clay, 307.)
25. INSURANCE - FIRE TRANSFER OF POLICY-LOSS AFTER ADDITIONAL PREMIUM IS DEMANDED AND PAID- LIABILITY.-If an insurance company demands an additional premium, where an existing policy of fire insurance is about to be transferred on account of a change in the ownership of the prop- erty, and such additional premium is paid to the agent, who for- wards the policy, by mail, to the company for the purpose of having it indorse thereon its consent to such transfer, the company is ans- werable where the property is destroyed by fire on the following day before such indorsement is made. (Medearis v. Anchor Mut. Life Ins. Co., 428.)
26. INSURANCE-FIRE ESTOPPEL-PROVISIONS IN POL- ICY AGAINST TRANSFER OF TITLE AND WAIVER OF CONDITIONS BY AGENT.-If the ownership of insured property is changed and the insurer agrees to consent to an assignment of the policy, and to indorse such consent thereon for an advanced rate, which the agent secures and transmits to the company, with the policy, according to his instructions, the company is estopped from taking advantage of provisions in the policy which render it void in case the legal title to the property is changed, and which prohibit an agent from waiving any of the conditions of the policy. (Medearis v. Anchor Mut. Life Ins. Co., 428.)
27. INSURANCE-LIFE-INSURABLE INTEREST.-A polley of life insurance payable to one who has no interest in the life of the insured is valid and enforceable when the policy is taken out in good faith and the premium paid thereon by the insured. (Albert v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 693.)
28. INSURANCE-WRONGFUL CANCELLATION OF LIFE POLICY-REMEDY WHERE RISK HAS NOT ATTACHED.-If a policy of life insurance has been wrongfully canceled by the insurer, and the risk has not attached, all the premiums must be returned, and an action will lie for their recovery. (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCormick, 392.)
INSURANCE-WRONGFUL CANCELLATION OF LIFE POLICY-REMEDY WHERE RISK HAS ATTACHED.-If a policy of life insurance has been wrongfully canceled by the insurer, the insured may obtain a reinstatement thereof, or maintain an action for damages, but he cannot maintain an action for the premiums paid where the risk has attached and the company has assumed lia- bility in case of loss. (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCormick, 392.)
30. INSURANCE-WRONGFUL CANCELLATION OF LIFE POLICY-REMEDY WHERE RISK HAS ATTACHED.-If a policy of life insurance has been duly issued, and is wrongfully canceled by the insurer, after the risk has attached, the insurer may sue for
damages and recover the present cash surrender value of the policy, or he may tender the premiums as they become due, and recover the full amount of the policy on the death of the insured, or he may proceed in equity, and have a decree sustaining and declaring valid the contract of insurance. (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCor- mick, 392.)
31. INSURANCE.-A MISREPRESENTATION or untrue state- ment in an application for life insurance, if made in good faith, does not, under the statutes of Pennsylvania, avoid the policy, un- less it relates to some matter material to the risk. (March v. Metro- politan Life Ins. Co., 887.
32. INSURANCE-LIFE-MISREPRESENTATIONS.-If, in an application for life insurance, false answers are given respecting matters material to the risk, the trial judge should direct a verdict in favor of the defendant. (March v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 887.)
33. INSURANCE MATERIALITY OF REPRESENTATION- WHEN A QUESTION OF LAW.-When a statement or representa- tion contained in an application for life insurance relates to the ap- plicant being insured in any other company or to his having made an application for insurance and been rejected, or as to particulars of his having had ailments, such statement or representation must be adjudged material to the risk as a matter of law, and its ma- teriality should not be submitted to the jury for decision. (March v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 887.)
34. INSURANCE — LIFE - ANSWERS IN APPLICATION WHEN DEEMED FALSE.-If, in answer to the question whether he has ever spit blood, the applicant answers, "No," his answer must be deemed false if he has had an expectoration amounting to a hemorrhage. (March v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 887.)
35. LIFE INSURANCE.-IF AN APPLICANT WAS AFFLICT- ED WITH AN OCCULT AILMENT, unknown to her, her failure to communicate it cannot be regarded as a fraud upon the insurance company. (March v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 887.)
36. INSURANCE-LIFE.-Where an applicant for insurance is asked whether he is afflicted with consumption and answers, "No," his answer must be regarded as material and false if he is affected with that disease, if the circumstances show that the insured could not have been ignorant of the presence of the disease. (March v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 887.)
37. LIFE INSURANCE-APPLICATION IS PRESUMPTIVELY CORRECT.-Where certain questions and answers thereto appear in an application for a life insurance, and such answers are shown to be false, it is error for the court to instruct the jury that such "nswers are a fraud upon the company. "if those questions were asked." (March v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 887.)
38. INSURANCE-LIFE-FALSE ANSWER MADE BY BENE- I'ICIARY.-If an application for insurance upon the life of a wife is signed by her husband and contains an absolutely false answer, the insurance being payable to him, he cannot recover on the ground that the wife did not sign the application and therefore was not guilty of misrepresentation. (March v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 887.)
39. INSURANCE - LIFE-DEDUCTION OF UNPAID PRE- MIUM.-Under a life insurance policy, the premium on which is payable annually in advance, of which only one quarterly install- ment has been paid at the time of the death of the insured, the in- urer is entitled to have the amount of premium remaining due for AM. ST. REP., VOL. LXV.-60
the current year deducted from the amount of the policy, before paying it. (Albert v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 693.)
40. INSURANCE AGAINST ACCIDENT-CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY.-Under an accident insurance policy for a specified sum, containing a condition that if "injuries are sustained while riding as a passenger in any passenger conveyance using steam, cable or electricity as a motive power, the amount to be paid shall be double the sum above specified," the insurer is liable under such double indemnity to an insured person who is injured while attempting to alight from a moving street-car using electricity as a motive power. In such case, the insured is a passenger until hej has completely disconnected himself and alighted from such car, (King v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 288.)
41. INSURANCE AGAINST ACCIDENT-TOTAL DISABILITY. Under a policy insuring against loss of time suffered through accidental injuries "wholly and continuously disabling the insured from transacting any and every kind of business pertaining to his occupation" of merchant, he may recover if accidentally thrown from his bicycle, thereby dislocating the thumb of his right hand, breaking loose some of his teeth, and so injuring or jarring his head and neck as to affect his spine and nerves to such an extent as to produce severe nervous prostration, rendering him wholly and continuously disabled from transacting any and every kind of business pertaining to his occupation. (Lobdill v. Laboring Men's Mut. Aid Assn., 542.)
42. INSURANCE AGAINST ACCIDENT-TOTAL DISABILITY. Under a policy insuring against loss of time effected through accidental injuries "wholly and continuously disabling the insured. from transacting any and every kind of business pertaining to his occupation," whole or total disability does not mean absolute physi cal inability to transact every kind of business pertaining to the occupation of the insured. It is sufficient if his injuries are of such character that common care and prudence require him to desist from the transaction of any such business so long as it is reasonably necessary to effect a cure. Inability to transact some kinds or branches of his business does not constitute total disability within the meaning of the policy, if he is able to transact other kinds or branches of his business. (Lobdill v. Laboring Men's Mut. Aid. Assn., 542.)
43. INSURANCE AGAINST ACCIDENT-TOTAL DISABILITY. Under a policy insuring against loss of time effected by accidental injuries, "wholly and continuously disabling the insured from transacting any and every kind of business pertaining to his occupation," ability to occasionally perform some single and trivial act connected with some kind of business pertaining to his occupation does not render his disability partial instead of total, provided he is unable, substantially, or to some material extent, to transact any kind of business pertaining to such occupation. The frequency and nature of the acts done are ordinarily for the consideration of the jury in determining whether the insured is totally disabled within the meaning of the policy. (Lobdill v. Laboring Men's Mut. Aid Assn, 542.)
44. INSURANCE-ACCIDENT-INTENTIONAL INJURY.—If a policy of accident insurance provides that the insurer shall not be liable for "intentional injury inflicted by the insured or any other person," there can be no recovery when injury to the insured is intentional as to the person inflicting it, though accidental as to the insured, in that he does not expect or anticipate it. (Butero v. Travelers' Accident Ins. Co., 61.)
45. INSURANCE-ACCIDENT-EVIDENCE- INTENTIONAL INJURY.-Under an accident insurance policy providing that the in- surer shall not be liable for intentional injury inflicted by the insured or any other person, evidence that the insured was killed by a pistol shot on a dark, stormy night while at work with a companion in a lighted shed, that the shot which killed him was followed by two others, each of which inflicted a mortal wound, and that one of the shots was fired so near him as to discolor his clothing with powder, is sufficient to establish the fact that he was intentionally murdered, by one who knew him, and no recovery can be had under the policy in such case. (Butero v. Travelers' Accident Ins. Co., 61.)
INSURANCE-ACCIDENT-EVIDENCE.-If a policy of acci- dent insurance provides that the insurer shall not be liable for in- jury intentionally inflicted by the insured or any other person, the insured cannot recover if the evidence of intentional injury pre- ponderates against the presumption of accident. (Butero v. Trav- elers' Accident Ins. Co., 61.)
47. BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS-LEGISLATIVE POWERS -DELEGATION OF.-The supreme lodge of a beneficial associa- tion, such as the Knights of Pythias, cannot delegate to a sub- ordinate managing committee the legislative power vested by the charter in the supreme lodge alone. Hence, a by-law or regulation adopted by such committee undertaking to forfeit a member's rights in the event of his suicide is inoperative. (Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Stein, 589.)
48. BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS.-THE CHARTER OF A BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION is as much a part of the contract of insurance made by it as if written therein. (Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Stein, 589.)
49. BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS.-A CONDITION ADOPTED BY A BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION AFTER issuing a certificate of insurance cannot affect rights of the holder of such certificate. (Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Stein, 589.)
50. BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS-CHANGE IN BENEFI- CIARY.-The right of a person designated as beneficiary in a cer- tificate of membership depends on his continuance as such until the death of the member. Before that time the member may change the beneficiary, and thereby defeat his rights. (Carson v. Vicks- burg Bank, 596.)
51. BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS-CERTIFICATE IS PAYA- BLE ONLY TO BENEFICIARIES PROVIDED BY THE CHAR- TER OF THE ASSOCIATION.-If the charter of a beneficial asso- ciation provides that an applicant for membership shall designate some person related to, or dependent upon, him for support, to whom the benefit shall be paid, that the amount of the benefit shall be held sacred as a legacy for the persons so named, and shall under no circumstances be appropriated to the payment of debts of the deceased member, and that if none of the designated beneficiaries shall be alive on the decease of the member, the benefit shall be paid to his heirs, and if there are none, the liability of the associa- tion shall cease and determine, a certificate cannot be pledged as collateral security for the payment of the member's debts, and if he causes his certificate to be surrendered, and designates a new beneficiary for the purposes of having him apply the proceeds to the payment of such debts, he will hold the proceeds of the certifi- cate as a trustee for the widow and children of the deceased mem- ber. (Carson v. Vicksburg Bank, 596.)
52. A BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION BY THE PAYMENT INTO COURT of the proceeds of a certificate of membership waives the
objection that a change in the beneficiary did not comply with the rules of the order; and no other person can urge the objection which the association has thus waived. (Hall v. Allen, 601.)
53. BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS-CHANGE IN BENEFICI. ARY-WANT OF CONFORMITY TO THE LAWS OF THE ASSOCIATION, WHEN EXCUSED.-If the holder of a benefit certificate intends to change the beneficiary in accordance with the laws of the association, and does all he can toward that end, but does not comply with all of the requirements because of his physical inability and his not having the certificate in his possession, a change is thereby accomplished. The mode of changing beneficiaries pointed out by the laws of the association is not exclusive, at least, when it waives want of conformity to its laws. (Hall v. Allen, 601.) 54. BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS-CONDITIONS IN APPLICATIONS FOR, AND IN A CERTIFICATE OF, INSURANCE, WHEN NOT BINDING.-If a member of a beneficial association is entitled to a certificate insuring his life, and a committee of the association, without authority, enacts a by-law imposing a condition against suicide, and he, in his application, assents to this condition, and the certificate purports to be subject thereto, he is not bound by the condition, because it was imposed without authority. (Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Stein, 589.)
55. INSURANCE-NOTICE OF ASSESSMENT BY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY SUFFICIENCY OF.-A mutual insurance company, organized under a statute which expressly prohibits such companies from receiving premiums or making dividends, is not required to give the notice called for by a statute which provides that, in every instance, where a fire insurance company takes a note for the "premium" of any policy, such company shall not declare the policy forfeited or suspended for nonpayment of the note, without first giving a prescribed notice; and the failure of a mutual company to give such a notice is not material in an action on its policy. (Bee man v. Farmers' Pioneer Mut. Ins. Assn., 424.)
56. INSURANCE-ESTOPPEL OF MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY BY MAKING A SECOND ASSESSMENT.-If a person has insured his property for five years, in a mutual insurance company, and part of it is destroyed by fire, but the insured has the right at any time, within the life of the policy on its face, to pay delinquent assessments and restore the policy, there is no estoppel against the company, when suit is brought upon the policy, by reason of a second assessment made after a prior one has become delinquent, and before it is paid, for it is the right, if not the duty, of the association to make it. (Beeman v. Farmers' Pioneer Mut. Ins. Assn., 424.)
57. INSURANCE — ESTOPPEL OF MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY BY SECOND ASSESSMENT, OR ACCEPTANCE OF PAYMENTS.-If a person insures his property in a mutual insurance company, the laws of the association and the policy providing that if the insured fails to pay his assessment within a time specified, after receiving notice thereof, his insurance shall be null and void until such assessments are paid, neither the making of a second assessment after a former one has become delinquent, nor the acceptance of a payment of both assessments after a loss has occurred, will estop the company from denying its liability on the policy by reason of the failure of the insured to pay the prior assessment within the prescribed time. (Beeman v. Farmers' Pioneer Mut. Ins. Co., 424.)
58. INSURANCE ESTOPPEL OF MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY BY ACCEPTING DELINQUENT AND OVERDUE ASSESSMENTS.-If a person has insured his property for five
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