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county, it is no defense that such judgment was rendered on a void claim. (Bear v. Board of Co. Commrs., 711.)

31. JUDGMENTS AGAINST COUNTIES OR CITIZENS-CONCLUSIVENESS.—A judgment against a county or its legal representatives is a matter of general interest to all of its citizens, and is binding upon them, although they are not made parties thereto, unless it is impeached for fraud or mistake. (Bear v. Board of Co. Commrs., 711.)

32. JUDGMENT AGAINST PRINCIPAL EFFECT OF AS AGAINST SURETIES.-Sureties upon a probate bond are, in the absence of fraud or collusion, concluded by the decree of a proper court rendered upon an accounting of their principal. (Meyer v. Barth, 124.)

33. JUDGMENT-CONFESSION OF IN ONE STATE UPON POWER OF ATTORNEY EXECUTED IN ANOTHER.-A note dated and executed in Illinois and purporting to waive the benefit of the exemption laws of that state, and to authorize any attorney in any court of record to appear for the maker and to confess judgment without process in favor of the holder of such note for such amount as may appear to be unpaid thereon, authorizes the confession of judgment in another state by any attorney thereof. (Pirie v. Stern, 103.)

34. A JUDGMENT CONFESSED BY A MARRIED WOMAN is presumptively valid. (Stahr v. Brewer, 883.)

35. JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION-ATTORNEY'S FEES IN.— Where a note authorizes the confession of judgment thereon by any attorney, including ten per cent attorneys' fee, a judgment so confessed including such fees is not void, where it is not shown that the attorneys' fees were unreasonably large or were a mere cloak for a fraudulent transfer of property without consideration. (Pirle v. Stern, 103.)

See Executions, 2, 3; Husband and Wife, 8-10; Intent, 1, 2.

JUDICIAL NOTICE

See Evidence.

JUDICIAL SALES.

1. JUDICIAL SALES-JURISDICTION.-In a proceeding to sell land for assets under order of court, the court has all the power necessary to accomplish its purpose; and, when relief can be given in the pending action, it must be done by motion in the cause, and not by an independent action. (Marsh v. Nimocks, 715.)

2. JUDICIAL SALE-ACTION AGAINST DEFAULTING BIDDER.--An independent action cannot be maintained against a defaulting bidder at a judicial sale to recover the amount of his bid, nor against one who has raised such bid at a sale for deficiency between the original bid and the bid approved on a resale, unless final judgment has been rendered in the action in which the sale was made. The remedy is by motion in the original action. (Marsh v. Nimocks, 715.)

3. JUDICIAL SALES-RESALE-PRACTICE.-If a judicial sale has been set aside and a resale ordered on an advanced bid, the resale should be started on such bid; and, in default of other bidders, the party making such advanced bid should be declared the purchaser. Upon the failure of such bidder to comply with his purchase, a motion should be made in that action for him to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against him. (Marsh v. Nimocks, 715.)

JURISDICTION.

See Appeal, 13, 14.

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.

See Pleading, 7; Process, 3.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.-Lessees of water power and a
dam, who have another dam lower down the stream, have no other
or greater rights in respect to the accumulation of water, or lower-
ing the level of the water, than their lessor possesses. (Smith v.
Youmans, 30.)

See Crops; Duress.

LARCENY-SWARM

LARCENY.

OF BEES-TRESPASSER.-A tres-
passer who finds a bee tree on another's land, and, without the lat-
ter's permission, chops it down and hives the bees in a gum not
owned by himself, has no interest in them which is the subject of
larceny. (State v. Repp, 463.)

LAW OF THE CASE.

See Appeal, 22.

LAW PARTNERSHIP.

See Attorney and Client, 1-3.

LEASE.

See Assignment, 3; Homestead, 2; Landlord and Tenant.

LEGACIES.

1. LEGACIES-EFFECT OF INOPERATIVE BEQUEST.-If a
bequest is inoperative, the property affected by it passes to the resi-
duary estate. (Moran v. Moran, 443.)

2. LEGACIES - UPHOLDING OF BEQUESTS FOR A LAW-
FUL PURPOSE.-A bequest for a known, lawful purpose, should,
where the power of execution is prescribed and available, never fail
for want of a name or a legal classification, unless it is in obedience
to a positive rule of law. (Moran v. Moran, 443.)

LIBEL.

1. LIBEL-LANGUAGE LIBELOUS PER SE-DAMAGES-
PRESUMPTION.—If defamatory language is libelous per se, the law
presumes general damages as a natural and probable consequence.
(Tracy v. Hacket, 398.)

2. LIBEL.-A TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE directed and sent to
a clergyman stating that "the citizens of Wisconsin demonstrated
you are an unscrupulous liar," is libelous per se. (Monson v. La-
throp, 54.)

3. LIBEL.-THE PUBLICATION OF A LIBEL MAY BE THE
JOINT ACT of two or more persons, who may be sued either jointly
or separately, at the election of the plaintiff. (Monson v. Lathrop,
54.)

4. LIBEL-TELEGRAM - PUBLICATION.-The writing of a
libelous telegraphic message and the delivery of it to the telegraph
company for transmission constitute a publication thereof. (Mon-
son v. Lathrop, 54.)

5. LIBEL EVIDENCE- PLAINTIFF'S CHARACTER.-The
defendant may, under the general denial in a civil action for libel,

prove, in mitigation of damages, that the plaintiff's general char-
acter is bad. (Tracy v. Hacket, 398.)

6. LIBEL. THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES, in a civil action for
libel, is peculiarly within the province of the jury. (Tracy V.
Hacket, 398.)

7. LIBEL-CHARGE OF FELONY.-DAMAGES may be recov
ered in a civil action for libel, which contains a charge of felony,
without any allegation of special damages. (Tracy v. Hacket, 398.)
8. LIBEL-EXEMPLARY DAMAGES cannot be allowed in a
civil action for libel where the wrong is of such a nature that the
defendant would be liable to a criminal prosecution therefor. Com-
pensatory damages only are allowable in such a case. (Tracy v.
Hacket, 398.)

9. LIBEL REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE TO
ASSESS NOMINAL DAMAGES.-Although the plaintiff, in a civil
action for libel, is entitled to a verdict for nominal damages for an
invasion of his legal right by a defamatory publication, imputing a
crime to him, and which has not been justified, yet a failure of the
jury to award him nominal damages is not sufficient ground for re-
versing a judgment for the defendant, as the case is not one in
with a permanent right is affected. (Tracy v. Hacket, 398.)

LIENS.

1. LIEN OR PREFERENCE OUT OF PROCEEDS OF PROP-
ERTY.-Necessary expenses incurred in caring for property, since
they are for the common benefit of all, may be recovered as a
privileged claim when made by a party in interest. Hence, if crops
to be grown on a farm are conveyed by deed of trust, after which
the grantor dies, either his administrator or the trustee properly
making advances for the cultivation of the crop is entitled to be
indemnified therefrom for the amount of such advances. (Cox v.
Martin, 604.)

2. LIEN ON STOLEN MONEYS.-One whose moneys have been
stolen and have been deposited by thieves with a third person, to
secure him against loss for becoming surety on their appearance
bond, has no lien on such moneys which may be enforced by garnish-
ment. (Holker v. Hennessey, 642.)

LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS.

1. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS—ACCRUAL OF RIGHT OF AC-
TION.-If judgment is recovered against a stockholder in a national
bank for an assessment under the individual liability imposed by the
"national banking act" the stockholder's right of action against the
directors of the bank through whose negligence he purchased the
stock assessed, does not accrue with the payment of such judgment.
(Houston v. Thornton, 699.)

2. BURDEN OF PROOF.-STATUTE OF LIMITATION plead-
ed as a defense casts the burden of proof upon the plaintiff to show
that his action was commenced within the time limited by such stat-
ute. (Houston v. Thornton, 699.)

3.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
A partial payment of a debt by the principal does not suspend the
running of the statute of limitations in favor of the surety. (Mo
zingo v. Ross, 387.)

4. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
THE ABSENCE FROM THE STATE of the principal debtor does
not suspend the running of the statute of limitations in favor of his
surety. (Mozingo v. Ross, 387.)

5. LIMITATIONS.-Part payment of a promissory note before
the statute of limitations attaches takes it out of the statute as to

the person making such payment and as to joint obligors with him. (Maddox v. Duncan, 678.)

6. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-MAKER AND INDORSER.Part payment of a promissory note by a maker cannot prevent the statute of limitations from running in favor of the indorser, though by the statutes of the state the maker and indorser may be sued jointly. (Maddox v. Duncan, 678.)

See Mortgage, 16.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.

1. MARRIAGE CONTRACTED BY RESIDENTS OF ONE STATE GOING INTO ANOTHER TO AVOID THE LAWS OF THE FORMER.-If the statutes of a state declare that a decree an. nulling or dissolving a marriage shall terminate it as to both par ties, except that neither shall be capable of contracting marriage with a third person until the suit has been heard on appeal, or the time for such appeal has expired, a marriage between a party to such decree and a third person resident of the state, contracted in another state, to which they went for the purpose of solemnizing their marriage, is void in the state of their domicile. (McLennan v. McLennan, 835.)

2. MARRIAGE-EVIDENCE-MUTUAL CONSENT.-The relationship of husband and wife is established by evidence showing that prior to a certain date, the parties lived together, in good faith, as husband and wife, though one of them was under a disability, but that immediately prior to that date the disability was removed, and that subsequent to that date they lived together, in good faith, as husband and wife. (Poole v. People, 245.)

3. MARRIAGE-VOID CONTRACT OF, BY REASON OF DISABILITY-STATUS OF PARTIES AFTER REMOVAL OF DISABILITY.-Although a man and woman desire marriage, and do what they can to render their union matrimonial, the marriage contract is void if one of them is under a disability, but if they live together as husband and wife after such disability is removed, they are, in law, husband and wife, from the time of such removal, where the law requires only mutual consent to make the parties husband and wife. (Poole v. People, 245.)

4. PRACTICE.-ISSUES OF FACT DO NOT EXIST IN A SUIT FOR A DIVORCE when there has been no answer, though the code provides that no divorce can be entered upon the default of the defendant, but the court must, in all cases, require proof of the facts alleged before granting relief. Such an issue arises only when a material averment of fact is made by one party and controverted by another. (Foley v. Foley, 147.)

5. DIVORCE-CRUEL AND INHUMAN TREATMENT.-Evidence that husband and wife have lived in the same house, and eaten at the same table food prepared by her, without his speaking to her except in anger, for three months at a time, is sufficient to establish cruel and inhuman treatment on his part and to justify the court in granting her a divorce. (Reinhard v. Reinhard, 66.)

6. DIVORCE-CRUEL AND INHUMAN TREATMENT.-Personal violence, whether actual or threatened, or even gross and abusive language, is not absolutely essential to constitute cruel and inhuman treatment warranting the granting of a divorce to the injured party. (Reinhard v. Reinhard, 66.)

7. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-FINAL DIVISION OF PROPERTY-The conclusion of the court in divorce proceedings to make a final division of the property of a husband upon proper proof is subject to change and modification prior to the entry of judg

ment, and is not a final division within the meaning of a statule
providing that when the estate of the husband is finally divided in
such case, no other provision can thereafter be made for the wife.
(Reinhard v. Reinhard, 66.)

1.

See Wills, 6.

MARRIED WOMEN.

See Husband and Wife; Judgment, 84

MARSHALING SECURITIES.
See Homestead, 1.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

MASTER AND SERVANT.—A master is liable for the willful
and wrongful act of his servant directly within the scope of his em-
ployment, though not sanctioned nor ratified by the master. (Bryan
v. Adler, 99.)

2. COLORED PERSON-REFUSAL OF A WAITER IN A
RESTAURANT TO SERVE-LIABILITY OF MASTER.-Under
the statutes of Wisconsin, declaring all persons to be entitled to the
full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations and privileges of
inns, restaurants, saloons, eating-houses, and other places of ac-
commodation and amusement, and that every person violating such
statute shall be liable to the person aggrieved in a sum specified
as damages, with costs, the keeper of a restaurant wherein the
waiters refused to serve a colored man with food is liable to him,
though the action of the waiters was not sanctioned nor ratified by
their employer. (Bryan v. Adler, 99.)

8. MASTER AND SERVANT-PROMISE TO REMOVE PERIL
-WHEN SERVANT MAY RELY THEREON.-If a danger is dis-
closed by a servant to his master, which the latter promises to re-
move, the servant is not to be deemed to assume the risk of continu-
ing in the employment, unless the danger is so great, constant, and
immediate that no person of ordinary prudence would ordinarily
subject himself to it for the limited time necessary for the master,
with reasonable diligence, to remove it. (Maitland v. Gilbert Paper
Co., 137.)

4. MASTER AND SERVANT-INCOMPETENT SERVANT.-
A MASTER IS NOT NECESSARILY LIABLE to one employé for
injury resulting from the incompetency of another. If the master
uses ordinary care in respect to employing competent servants,
having regard to the character of the particular service and the con-
sequences that may probably result from the incompetency of such
servant, and an incompetent servant is nevertheless employed, a
resulting injury to a fellow-servant cannot be legally chargeable
to the master. (Maitland v. Gilbert Paper Co., 137.)

5. MASTER AND SERVANT-RETENTION OF INCOMPE
TENT SERVANT-LIABILITY FOR.-Though a master, after be-
ing notified of the incompetency of an employé, retains him in his
employment, and from such incompetency an accident results, caus-
ing personal injury to a fellow employé, the latter cannot recover
of the common master, unless he ought reasonably to have appre-
hended that the retention of the incompetent employé would, or
might, probably, imperil the personal safety of his coemployés.
(Maitland v. Gilbert Paper Co., 137.)

6. MASTER AND SERVANT-INCOMPETENT

SERVANT-

ACTS OF FOR WHICH MASTER IS ANSWERABLE TO A FEL-
LOW-SERVANT.-One employed as a fireman and having capacity
to do the acts required of him as such may, nevertheless, be re-

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