county, it is no defense that such judgment was rendered on a void claim. (Bear v. Board of Co. Commrs., 711.) 31. JUDGMENTS AGAINST COUNTIES OR CITIZENS-CONCLUSIVENESS.—A judgment against a county or its legal representatives is a matter of general interest to all of its citizens, and is binding upon them, although they are not made parties thereto, unless it is impeached for fraud or mistake. (Bear v. Board of Co. Commrs., 711.) 32. JUDGMENT AGAINST PRINCIPAL EFFECT OF AS AGAINST SURETIES.-Sureties upon a probate bond are, in the absence of fraud or collusion, concluded by the decree of a proper court rendered upon an accounting of their principal. (Meyer v. Barth, 124.) 33. JUDGMENT-CONFESSION OF IN ONE STATE UPON POWER OF ATTORNEY EXECUTED IN ANOTHER.-A note dated and executed in Illinois and purporting to waive the benefit of the exemption laws of that state, and to authorize any attorney in any court of record to appear for the maker and to confess judgment without process in favor of the holder of such note for such amount as may appear to be unpaid thereon, authorizes the confession of judgment in another state by any attorney thereof. (Pirie v. Stern, 103.) 34. A JUDGMENT CONFESSED BY A MARRIED WOMAN is presumptively valid. (Stahr v. Brewer, 883.) 35. JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION-ATTORNEY'S FEES IN.— Where a note authorizes the confession of judgment thereon by any attorney, including ten per cent attorneys' fee, a judgment so confessed including such fees is not void, where it is not shown that the attorneys' fees were unreasonably large or were a mere cloak for a fraudulent transfer of property without consideration. (Pirle v. Stern, 103.) See Executions, 2, 3; Husband and Wife, 8-10; Intent, 1, 2. JUDICIAL NOTICE See Evidence. JUDICIAL SALES. 1. JUDICIAL SALES-JURISDICTION.-In a proceeding to sell land for assets under order of court, the court has all the power necessary to accomplish its purpose; and, when relief can be given in the pending action, it must be done by motion in the cause, and not by an independent action. (Marsh v. Nimocks, 715.) 2. JUDICIAL SALE-ACTION AGAINST DEFAULTING BIDDER.--An independent action cannot be maintained against a defaulting bidder at a judicial sale to recover the amount of his bid, nor against one who has raised such bid at a sale for deficiency between the original bid and the bid approved on a resale, unless final judgment has been rendered in the action in which the sale was made. The remedy is by motion in the original action. (Marsh v. Nimocks, 715.) 3. JUDICIAL SALES-RESALE-PRACTICE.-If a judicial sale has been set aside and a resale ordered on an advanced bid, the resale should be started on such bid; and, in default of other bidders, the party making such advanced bid should be declared the purchaser. Upon the failure of such bidder to comply with his purchase, a motion should be made in that action for him to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against him. (Marsh v. Nimocks, 715.) JURISDICTION. See Appeal, 13, 14. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. See Pleading, 7; Process, 3. LANDLORD AND TENANT. LANDLORD AND TENANT.-Lessees of water power and a See Crops; Duress. LARCENY-SWARM LARCENY. OF BEES-TRESPASSER.-A tres- LAW OF THE CASE. See Appeal, 22. LAW PARTNERSHIP. See Attorney and Client, 1-3. LEASE. See Assignment, 3; Homestead, 2; Landlord and Tenant. LEGACIES. 1. LEGACIES-EFFECT OF INOPERATIVE BEQUEST.-If a 2. LEGACIES - UPHOLDING OF BEQUESTS FOR A LAW- LIBEL. 1. LIBEL-LANGUAGE LIBELOUS PER SE-DAMAGES- 2. LIBEL.-A TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE directed and sent to 3. LIBEL.-THE PUBLICATION OF A LIBEL MAY BE THE 4. LIBEL-TELEGRAM - PUBLICATION.-The writing of a 5. LIBEL EVIDENCE- PLAINTIFF'S CHARACTER.-The prove, in mitigation of damages, that the plaintiff's general char- 6. LIBEL. THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES, in a civil action for 7. LIBEL-CHARGE OF FELONY.-DAMAGES may be recov 9. LIBEL REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE TO LIENS. 1. LIEN OR PREFERENCE OUT OF PROCEEDS OF PROP- 2. LIEN ON STOLEN MONEYS.-One whose moneys have been LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS. 1. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS—ACCRUAL OF RIGHT OF AC- 2. BURDEN OF PROOF.-STATUTE OF LIMITATION plead- 3. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 4. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 5. LIMITATIONS.-Part payment of a promissory note before the person making such payment and as to joint obligors with him. (Maddox v. Duncan, 678.) 6. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-MAKER AND INDORSER.Part payment of a promissory note by a maker cannot prevent the statute of limitations from running in favor of the indorser, though by the statutes of the state the maker and indorser may be sued jointly. (Maddox v. Duncan, 678.) See Mortgage, 16. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE. 1. MARRIAGE CONTRACTED BY RESIDENTS OF ONE STATE GOING INTO ANOTHER TO AVOID THE LAWS OF THE FORMER.-If the statutes of a state declare that a decree an. nulling or dissolving a marriage shall terminate it as to both par ties, except that neither shall be capable of contracting marriage with a third person until the suit has been heard on appeal, or the time for such appeal has expired, a marriage between a party to such decree and a third person resident of the state, contracted in another state, to which they went for the purpose of solemnizing their marriage, is void in the state of their domicile. (McLennan v. McLennan, 835.) 2. MARRIAGE-EVIDENCE-MUTUAL CONSENT.-The relationship of husband and wife is established by evidence showing that prior to a certain date, the parties lived together, in good faith, as husband and wife, though one of them was under a disability, but that immediately prior to that date the disability was removed, and that subsequent to that date they lived together, in good faith, as husband and wife. (Poole v. People, 245.) 3. MARRIAGE-VOID CONTRACT OF, BY REASON OF DISABILITY-STATUS OF PARTIES AFTER REMOVAL OF DISABILITY.-Although a man and woman desire marriage, and do what they can to render their union matrimonial, the marriage contract is void if one of them is under a disability, but if they live together as husband and wife after such disability is removed, they are, in law, husband and wife, from the time of such removal, where the law requires only mutual consent to make the parties husband and wife. (Poole v. People, 245.) 4. PRACTICE.-ISSUES OF FACT DO NOT EXIST IN A SUIT FOR A DIVORCE when there has been no answer, though the code provides that no divorce can be entered upon the default of the defendant, but the court must, in all cases, require proof of the facts alleged before granting relief. Such an issue arises only when a material averment of fact is made by one party and controverted by another. (Foley v. Foley, 147.) 5. DIVORCE-CRUEL AND INHUMAN TREATMENT.-Evidence that husband and wife have lived in the same house, and eaten at the same table food prepared by her, without his speaking to her except in anger, for three months at a time, is sufficient to establish cruel and inhuman treatment on his part and to justify the court in granting her a divorce. (Reinhard v. Reinhard, 66.) 6. DIVORCE-CRUEL AND INHUMAN TREATMENT.-Personal violence, whether actual or threatened, or even gross and abusive language, is not absolutely essential to constitute cruel and inhuman treatment warranting the granting of a divorce to the injured party. (Reinhard v. Reinhard, 66.) 7. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-FINAL DIVISION OF PROPERTY-The conclusion of the court in divorce proceedings to make a final division of the property of a husband upon proper proof is subject to change and modification prior to the entry of judg ment, and is not a final division within the meaning of a statule 1. See Wills, 6. MARRIED WOMEN. See Husband and Wife; Judgment, 84 MARSHALING SECURITIES. MASTER AND SERVANT. MASTER AND SERVANT.—A master is liable for the willful 2. COLORED PERSON-REFUSAL OF A WAITER IN A 8. MASTER AND SERVANT-PROMISE TO REMOVE PERIL 4. MASTER AND SERVANT-INCOMPETENT SERVANT.- 5. MASTER AND SERVANT-RETENTION OF INCOMPE 6. MASTER AND SERVANT-INCOMPETENT SERVANT- ACTS OF FOR WHICH MASTER IS ANSWERABLE TO A FEL- |