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not been guilty of a violation of any rule of the school. (Board of
Education v. Purse, 312.)

2.

SCHOOLS-EXCLUSION OF CHILD FOR MISCONDUCT
OF PARENT.-The board of education, either in the absence of a
rule, or in furtherance of a prescribed rule, has the right to ex-
clude from a public school under its control any child whose par-
ent, whether father or mother, in the schoolroom or its vicinity, in
the presence of such child and other pupils, conducts himself or
herself in such manner that his or her acts are calculated to pro-
duce disorder in the school and break down and déstroy its dis-
cipline, although the child thus excluded has not violated any rule
of the school. (Board of Education v. Purse, 312.)

SEDUCTION.

SEDUCTION-WILLINGNESS TO MARRY AS A DE-
FENSE.-One who, under promise of marriage, seduces an unmar-
ried woman of previous chaste character, is not entitled to be ac-
quitted of his crime on proving his willingness to marry her at all
times prior to the filing of the information or indictment against
him. She is not compelled to condone his offense by marrying him,
though if she did so, he would be freed from the penalty of the law.
(People v. Hough, 201.)

SELF-COUPLERS.

See Railroad Companies, 7, 8.

SERVITUDE.

See Highways, 2.

SHELLEY'S CASE

See Wills, 4.

SHERIFFS.

SHERIFF-EXPIRATION OF TERM.-When a sheriff, by
virtue of his office, acts as administrator of a decedent, his right to
so act terminates with his term of office, and if in his official ca-
pacity he has brought an action of replevin, his successor in office
may be substituted in his place as plaintiff. (Cox v. Martin, 601.)

SHIPPING.

FOR

1. SHIPPING-LIEN
FREIGHT-JURISDICTION.-A
shipowner, as a common carrier, has a particular and specific lien
at common law for his freight upon the goods carried, which he may
enforce in a state court. (Warehouse etc. Supply Co. v. Galvin, 57.)

2. SHIPPING-REPLEVIN-LIEN FOR FREIGHT-JURIS-
DICTION.-Replevin by the owner, and consignee of goods shipped,
by water, to recover possession thereof from the owner of the ship
who claims a lien thereon growing out of the contract of carriage,
is an action to enforce a common-law remedy, and not a proceeding
in admiralty, and may be prosecuted in the state courts. (Ware-
house etc. Supply Co. v. Galvin, 57.)

See Admiralty.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A CONTRACT TO SUP-
PLY NATURAL GAS may be decreed by a court of equity. (Cone-
naugh Gas Co. v. Jackson Farm Gas Co., 865.)

See Contracts, 14.

SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS.

See Trusts, 7.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

See Contracts; Wills, 2.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

See Limitations of Actions.

STATUTE.

1. STATUTES - OPERATION OF MUST BE PROSPECTIVE.-Where there is a statute imposing a succession tax enacted before the death of the decedent and another enacted afterward, the former controls. (State v. Switzler, 653.)

2. STATUTES ADOPTED FROM ANOTHER STATE-CONSTRUCTION.-In adopting a statute of a sister state, it is taken with the construction theretofore put upon it by the courts of that state, but this rule does not apply to a construction put upon the statute by the courts of that state since its adoption in this state. (Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Lewin, 215.)

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CLASS LEGISLATION.-LAWS UNDERTAKING TO REGULATE BUSINESS must, in all their requirements, operate equally upon all engaged in such business, in order to be valid. (State v. Gardner, 785.)

4.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CLASS LEGISLATION.-A statute is unconstitutional and void if it operates unequally, in that it imposes the burden of an examination and license fee upon certain persons, and exempts others of the same class pursuing the same business under similar circumstances. (State v. Gardner, 785.) 5.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CLASS LEGISLATION.-A statute which imposes special restrictions or burdens, or grants special privileges to persons engaged in the same business under similar circumstances, cannot have a uniform operation and is void, because it is in contravention of the equal right guaranteed to all in the enforcement of laws and in the enjoyment of liberty and of an equal right in the acquisition and possession of property. (State v. Gardner, 785.)

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CLASS LEGISLATION-REGULATION OF PLUMBING.-A statute requiring all who engage in the business of plumbing, whether master, or employing plumber, or journeyman, to first pass an examination as to fitness and procure a license, but providing that in case of a firm, or corporation, the examination and licensing of any one member of such firm, or the manager of the corporation, shall satisfy the requirements of the act, thus permitting all members of a firm or corporaton to pursue the business when only one member or the manager has procured such license, is unconstitutional and void, as not operating equally upon all of a class pursuing the same business under similar circumstances. (State v. Gardner, 785.)

7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PEDDLERS.-A statute which permits a manufacturer, farmer, or nurseryman to peddle his wares, either by himself, or his employé, without a license, but which prohibits a purchaser from such manufacturer, farmer or nurseryman from peddling the goods purchased on his own account, without a license, makes an improper classification and an arbitrary distinction, and is unconstitutional and void. (State v. Wagener, 565.)

8. STATUTE-REPEAL OF-EFFECT ON RESTORING A COMMON-LAW RULE OR REMEDY.-Where a statute or rule of

common law is repealed or modified, and the repealing or modifying
act is afterward expressly or impliedly repealed by an act which
manifests no intention that the statute or common-law rule repealed
or modified shall continue repealed or modified, the repeal of the re-
pealing or modifying act revives the act or common-law rule so re-
pealed or modified. (Baum v. Thoms, 368.)

See Eminent Domain, 1; Interstate Commerce; Police Power.

STREETS.

See Dedication; Ejectment, 1; Highways, 14; Municipal Corpora-
tions, 5-7, 19-21, 23.

SUBROGATION.

GARNISHMENT-SUBROGATION BY REASON OF.-One

who obtains judgment against a ward and garnishes his guardian
becomes subrogated to the claims of the ward against the guardian
to the amount of such judgment. (Hazelton v. Douglas, 122.)

SUCCESSION TAX.

See Statutes, 1; Taxes, 8-11.

SURETYSHIP.

1. SURETYSHIP-RELEASE.-The maker of a note is not en-
titled to credit thereon of a sum paid to the payee by a surety on
the note in consideration of his release as such surety. (Gilstrap
v. Smith, 290.)

2.

SURETYSHIP.-HOLDER OF NOTES MAY COMPOUND
WITH THE SURETY thereon without releasing the principal.
(Gilstrap v. Smith, 290.)

See Contracts, 13; Judgment, 32; Limitations of Actions, 3, 4.

SURFACE WATERS.

See Municipal Corporations, 24-25.

TAXES.

1. TAXES POWER OF STATE TO LEVY.-A state has an un-
questionable right to tax all subjects within its jurisdiction, and
this right may, in the discretion of the legislature, be exercised
over all property coming temporarily within the state, whether
for trade, business or convenience, unless such exercise of power
conflicts with some constitutional limitation. (Hall v. American
Refrigerator etc. Co., 223.)

2. TAXES PERSONAL PROPERTY.-Personal property may,
for the purpose of taxation, be separated from its owner, and he
may be taxed, on its account, wherever it is, though it may not be
at the place of his domicile. (Hall v. American Refrigerator etc.
Co., 223.)

3. A TAX CAN BE LEVIED FOR A PUBLIC PURPOSE ONLY,
and never for private objects or purposes. (State v. Switzler, 653.)
4. TAXES-WHEN DEEMED TO BE FOR A PUBLIC PUR-
POSE-USAGE.-In deciding whether a tax has been levied for a
public purpose, courts must be governed mainly by the course and
usage of the government, the objects for which taxes have been
customarily and by long course of legislation levied, as distinguished
from objects which, by like usage, are left to private inclination,
interest, or liberality. (State v. Switzler, 653.)

5. TAXES TO PROVIDE FOR FREE SCHOLARSHIPS.—A
statute imposing a succession tax and providing that the proceeds

thereof shall be appropriated for establishing and maintaining free
scholarships in the state university, that the persons admitted to
such scholarship shall pass a written examination, and be dependent
upon their own exertions, and financially unable to obtain their edu
cation, and that there shall be paid to them in monthly installments
while attending the university the sum provided by the scholarship
for defraying expenses of attendance, provides for a tax for a pri-
vate purpose, and is therefore unconstitutional and void. (State v.
Switzler, 653.)

6. TAXES-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-TAXATION OF IN-
STRUMENTALITIES.-A state cannot interfere with interstate
commerce by the imposition of a tax for the privilege of transact-
ing such commerce, but it does have a right to tax, at their full
value, all the instrumentalities, within the state, used for such
commerce. (Hall v. American Refrigerator etc. Co., 223.)

7. TAXES - INTERSTATE COMMERCE - REFRIGERATOR-
CARS-TAXATION OF.-Refrigerator-cars, used for the transpor-
tation of perishable freight, from time to time, within a state, by a
railroad company, which hires the cars from a foreign corpora-
tion, and pays for their use according to mileage, in the same way
that railroad companies hire and pay for freight-cars on connecting
lines of railroad, may be lawfully taxed by the state, though such
cars are used for interstate commerce, and the assessment may be
based upon the average number of such cars in use, during the
year, in the state. (Hall v. American Refrigerator etc. Co., 223.)

8. A SUCCESSION TAX-WHAT IS NOT.-A tax levied on the
whole estate of a decedent is not a succession tax, but a tax directly
upon property, and to be sustainable, must be uniform. (State v.
Switzler, 653.)

9. A SUCCESSION TAX IS AN EXCISE OR DUTY UPON the
right of a person or corporation to receive property by devise or
inheritance from another. It is a burden on each person claiming
succession, measured by the value of his interest and collectible out
of his interest only. (State v. Switzler, 653.)

10. A SUCCESSION OR COLLATERAL INHERITANCE TAX is
subject to the rule that taxes can be levied only for a public purpose.
(State v. Switzler, 653.)

11. A SUCCESSION TAX MUST BE UNIFORM as to persons of
the same class. One person cannot be charged a greater percentage
on his legacy than another person in the same class, because the
amount of his legacy is greater than that of the latter. A statute
imposing a charge of five per cent for legacies of ten thousand dol-
lars, and where legacies are above that sum, five per cent on the
first ten thousand dollars, and twelve and a half per cent on the
balance, is therefore void for want of uniformity. (State v. Switz-
ler, 653.)

12. TAXES-EXCESSIVE LEVY AND SALE FOR.-An exces-
sive levy of an execution on land and the sale thereof for the
nonpayment of taxes is void at the option of the owner. (William-
son v. White, 302.)

See Ejectment, 5; Executions, 9; Mortgage, 3, 4.

TELEGRAM.

See Libel, 2, 3.

TELEPHONE COMPANIES.

A TELEPHONE SYSTEM MAY BE OWNED AND CON-
DUCTED by an individual as well as by a corporation or association.
(Magee v. Overshiner, 358.)

See Highways, 2.

AM. ST. REP., VOL. LXV.-62

TIME.

See Trusts, 14.

TORTS.

See Actions, 2; Evidence, 6.

TOWN PLAT.

See Highways, 3.

TRIAL.

1. TRIAL-DISCRETION IN REOPENING CASE.-The ques-
tion of reopening a case at any stage of the proceedings, to let in
additional testimony, is largely in the discretion of the trial court,
which cannot be reviewed on appeal unless a gross abuse of such
discretion is shown. (Powell v. State, 277.)

2. TRIAL-DISCRETION OF COURT.-On a trial for murder,
the court may properly inquire whether the pistol with which the
homicide is alleged to have been committed has been formally of-
fered in evidence or not, in order to satisfy his own mind on that
point. (Kearney v. State, 344.)

3. WITNESSES-RIGHT OF COURT TO CAUTION.—It is prop-
er for the trial judge, when he observes that a witness is embar-
rassed or hesitates while testifying, to caution him not to become
excited and to think over what he is about to say. (Kearney v.
State, 344.)

4. TRIAL-PRESENCE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER.-The trial
court need not require the official reporter to remain in attendance
until the termination of the trial in order that, in case of disputes
between counsel as to what the evidence is, a party may not be
"deprived of the privilege of referring to the official report of the
case to refresh the recollection of the jury." (Kearney v. State,
344.)

5. TRIAL-IMPROPER CONDUCT OF COUNSEL-WAIVER.
If on a criminal trial the prosecuting attorney makes an improper
statement unknown to the trial judge, or indulges in improper argu-
ment promptly stopped by such judge of his own motion, and no
ruling on such conduct is requested on the part of the accused at
any time, it is too late after verdict to urge such conduct as ground
for a new trial. (Kearney v. State, 344.)

TRUSTS.

1. CY PRES.-The doctrine of cy pres as it existed in Eng-
land and has been applied in some of the states of the American
Union, whereby trust provisions are administered and executed
as near to the presumed intention of the founder as may be, is
not recognized as a part of the judicial power in the state of Wis-
consin. (McHugh v. McCole, 106.)

constitute a

2. TRUSTS-WHEN NOT SUSTAINABLE.-To
valid testamentary trust there must be a definite beneficiary, either
named or capable of being ascertained within the rules of law ap-
plicable to such cases. The absence of a definite beneficiary is, as
a general rule, a fatal objection to any attempt to create a valid
trust. (McHugh v. McCole, 106.)

3. A TRUST NOT CAPABLE OF ENFORCEMENT BY A
COURT cannot be sustained on the ground that the trustee has
accepted it and will carry it out according to what he understands
to be the wishes of the donor. (McHugh v. McCole, 106.)

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