not been guilty of a violation of any rule of the school. (Board of Education v. Purse, 312.)
SCHOOLS-EXCLUSION OF CHILD FOR MISCONDUCT OF PARENT.-The board of education, either in the absence of a rule, or in furtherance of a prescribed rule, has the right to ex- clude from a public school under its control any child whose par- ent, whether father or mother, in the schoolroom or its vicinity, in the presence of such child and other pupils, conducts himself or herself in such manner that his or her acts are calculated to pro- duce disorder in the school and break down and déstroy its dis- cipline, although the child thus excluded has not violated any rule of the school. (Board of Education v. Purse, 312.)
SEDUCTION-WILLINGNESS TO MARRY AS A DE- FENSE.-One who, under promise of marriage, seduces an unmar- ried woman of previous chaste character, is not entitled to be ac- quitted of his crime on proving his willingness to marry her at all times prior to the filing of the information or indictment against him. She is not compelled to condone his offense by marrying him, though if she did so, he would be freed from the penalty of the law. (People v. Hough, 201.)
SELF-COUPLERS.
See Railroad Companies, 7, 8.
SERVITUDE.
See Highways, 2.
SHELLEY'S CASE
See Wills, 4.
SHERIFF-EXPIRATION OF TERM.-When a sheriff, by virtue of his office, acts as administrator of a decedent, his right to so act terminates with his term of office, and if in his official ca- pacity he has brought an action of replevin, his successor in office may be substituted in his place as plaintiff. (Cox v. Martin, 601.)
1. SHIPPING-LIEN FREIGHT-JURISDICTION.-A shipowner, as a common carrier, has a particular and specific lien at common law for his freight upon the goods carried, which he may enforce in a state court. (Warehouse etc. Supply Co. v. Galvin, 57.)
2. SHIPPING-REPLEVIN-LIEN FOR FREIGHT-JURIS- DICTION.-Replevin by the owner, and consignee of goods shipped, by water, to recover possession thereof from the owner of the ship who claims a lien thereon growing out of the contract of carriage, is an action to enforce a common-law remedy, and not a proceeding in admiralty, and may be prosecuted in the state courts. (Ware- house etc. Supply Co. v. Galvin, 57.)
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A CONTRACT TO SUP- PLY NATURAL GAS may be decreed by a court of equity. (Cone- naugh Gas Co. v. Jackson Farm Gas Co., 865.)
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS.
See Trusts, 7.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
See Contracts; Wills, 2.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
See Limitations of Actions.
1. STATUTES - OPERATION OF MUST BE PROSPECTIVE.-Where there is a statute imposing a succession tax enacted before the death of the decedent and another enacted afterward, the former controls. (State v. Switzler, 653.)
2. STATUTES ADOPTED FROM ANOTHER STATE-CONSTRUCTION.-In adopting a statute of a sister state, it is taken with the construction theretofore put upon it by the courts of that state, but this rule does not apply to a construction put upon the statute by the courts of that state since its adoption in this state. (Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Lewin, 215.)
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CLASS LEGISLATION.-LAWS UNDERTAKING TO REGULATE BUSINESS must, in all their requirements, operate equally upon all engaged in such business, in order to be valid. (State v. Gardner, 785.)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CLASS LEGISLATION.-A statute is unconstitutional and void if it operates unequally, in that it imposes the burden of an examination and license fee upon certain persons, and exempts others of the same class pursuing the same business under similar circumstances. (State v. Gardner, 785.) 5.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CLASS LEGISLATION.-A statute which imposes special restrictions or burdens, or grants special privileges to persons engaged in the same business under similar circumstances, cannot have a uniform operation and is void, because it is in contravention of the equal right guaranteed to all in the enforcement of laws and in the enjoyment of liberty and of an equal right in the acquisition and possession of property. (State v. Gardner, 785.)
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CLASS LEGISLATION-REGULATION OF PLUMBING.-A statute requiring all who engage in the business of plumbing, whether master, or employing plumber, or journeyman, to first pass an examination as to fitness and procure a license, but providing that in case of a firm, or corporation, the examination and licensing of any one member of such firm, or the manager of the corporation, shall satisfy the requirements of the act, thus permitting all members of a firm or corporaton to pursue the business when only one member or the manager has procured such license, is unconstitutional and void, as not operating equally upon all of a class pursuing the same business under similar circumstances. (State v. Gardner, 785.)
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PEDDLERS.-A statute which permits a manufacturer, farmer, or nurseryman to peddle his wares, either by himself, or his employé, without a license, but which prohibits a purchaser from such manufacturer, farmer or nurseryman from peddling the goods purchased on his own account, without a license, makes an improper classification and an arbitrary distinction, and is unconstitutional and void. (State v. Wagener, 565.)
8. STATUTE-REPEAL OF-EFFECT ON RESTORING A COMMON-LAW RULE OR REMEDY.-Where a statute or rule of
common law is repealed or modified, and the repealing or modifying act is afterward expressly or impliedly repealed by an act which manifests no intention that the statute or common-law rule repealed or modified shall continue repealed or modified, the repeal of the re- pealing or modifying act revives the act or common-law rule so re- pealed or modified. (Baum v. Thoms, 368.)
See Eminent Domain, 1; Interstate Commerce; Police Power.
See Dedication; Ejectment, 1; Highways, 14; Municipal Corpora- tions, 5-7, 19-21, 23.
GARNISHMENT-SUBROGATION BY REASON OF.-One
who obtains judgment against a ward and garnishes his guardian becomes subrogated to the claims of the ward against the guardian to the amount of such judgment. (Hazelton v. Douglas, 122.)
SUCCESSION TAX.
See Statutes, 1; Taxes, 8-11.
1. SURETYSHIP-RELEASE.-The maker of a note is not en- titled to credit thereon of a sum paid to the payee by a surety on the note in consideration of his release as such surety. (Gilstrap v. Smith, 290.)
SURETYSHIP.-HOLDER OF NOTES MAY COMPOUND WITH THE SURETY thereon without releasing the principal. (Gilstrap v. Smith, 290.)
See Contracts, 13; Judgment, 32; Limitations of Actions, 3, 4.
SURFACE WATERS.
See Municipal Corporations, 24-25.
1. TAXES POWER OF STATE TO LEVY.-A state has an un- questionable right to tax all subjects within its jurisdiction, and this right may, in the discretion of the legislature, be exercised over all property coming temporarily within the state, whether for trade, business or convenience, unless such exercise of power conflicts with some constitutional limitation. (Hall v. American Refrigerator etc. Co., 223.)
2. TAXES PERSONAL PROPERTY.-Personal property may, for the purpose of taxation, be separated from its owner, and he may be taxed, on its account, wherever it is, though it may not be at the place of his domicile. (Hall v. American Refrigerator etc. Co., 223.)
3. A TAX CAN BE LEVIED FOR A PUBLIC PURPOSE ONLY, and never for private objects or purposes. (State v. Switzler, 653.) 4. TAXES-WHEN DEEMED TO BE FOR A PUBLIC PUR- POSE-USAGE.-In deciding whether a tax has been levied for a public purpose, courts must be governed mainly by the course and usage of the government, the objects for which taxes have been customarily and by long course of legislation levied, as distinguished from objects which, by like usage, are left to private inclination, interest, or liberality. (State v. Switzler, 653.)
5. TAXES TO PROVIDE FOR FREE SCHOLARSHIPS.—A statute imposing a succession tax and providing that the proceeds
thereof shall be appropriated for establishing and maintaining free scholarships in the state university, that the persons admitted to such scholarship shall pass a written examination, and be dependent upon their own exertions, and financially unable to obtain their edu cation, and that there shall be paid to them in monthly installments while attending the university the sum provided by the scholarship for defraying expenses of attendance, provides for a tax for a pri- vate purpose, and is therefore unconstitutional and void. (State v. Switzler, 653.)
6. TAXES-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-TAXATION OF IN- STRUMENTALITIES.-A state cannot interfere with interstate commerce by the imposition of a tax for the privilege of transact- ing such commerce, but it does have a right to tax, at their full value, all the instrumentalities, within the state, used for such commerce. (Hall v. American Refrigerator etc. Co., 223.)
7. TAXES - INTERSTATE COMMERCE - REFRIGERATOR- CARS-TAXATION OF.-Refrigerator-cars, used for the transpor- tation of perishable freight, from time to time, within a state, by a railroad company, which hires the cars from a foreign corpora- tion, and pays for their use according to mileage, in the same way that railroad companies hire and pay for freight-cars on connecting lines of railroad, may be lawfully taxed by the state, though such cars are used for interstate commerce, and the assessment may be based upon the average number of such cars in use, during the year, in the state. (Hall v. American Refrigerator etc. Co., 223.)
8. A SUCCESSION TAX-WHAT IS NOT.-A tax levied on the whole estate of a decedent is not a succession tax, but a tax directly upon property, and to be sustainable, must be uniform. (State v. Switzler, 653.)
9. A SUCCESSION TAX IS AN EXCISE OR DUTY UPON the right of a person or corporation to receive property by devise or inheritance from another. It is a burden on each person claiming succession, measured by the value of his interest and collectible out of his interest only. (State v. Switzler, 653.)
10. A SUCCESSION OR COLLATERAL INHERITANCE TAX is subject to the rule that taxes can be levied only for a public purpose. (State v. Switzler, 653.)
11. A SUCCESSION TAX MUST BE UNIFORM as to persons of the same class. One person cannot be charged a greater percentage on his legacy than another person in the same class, because the amount of his legacy is greater than that of the latter. A statute imposing a charge of five per cent for legacies of ten thousand dol- lars, and where legacies are above that sum, five per cent on the first ten thousand dollars, and twelve and a half per cent on the balance, is therefore void for want of uniformity. (State v. Switz- ler, 653.)
12. TAXES-EXCESSIVE LEVY AND SALE FOR.-An exces- sive levy of an execution on land and the sale thereof for the nonpayment of taxes is void at the option of the owner. (William- son v. White, 302.)
See Ejectment, 5; Executions, 9; Mortgage, 3, 4.
TELEGRAM.
See Libel, 2, 3.
A TELEPHONE SYSTEM MAY BE OWNED AND CON- DUCTED by an individual as well as by a corporation or association. (Magee v. Overshiner, 358.)
AM. ST. REP., VOL. LXV.-62
See Actions, 2; Evidence, 6.
TOWN PLAT.
See Highways, 3.
1. TRIAL-DISCRETION IN REOPENING CASE.-The ques- tion of reopening a case at any stage of the proceedings, to let in additional testimony, is largely in the discretion of the trial court, which cannot be reviewed on appeal unless a gross abuse of such discretion is shown. (Powell v. State, 277.)
2. TRIAL-DISCRETION OF COURT.-On a trial for murder, the court may properly inquire whether the pistol with which the homicide is alleged to have been committed has been formally of- fered in evidence or not, in order to satisfy his own mind on that point. (Kearney v. State, 344.)
3. WITNESSES-RIGHT OF COURT TO CAUTION.—It is prop- er for the trial judge, when he observes that a witness is embar- rassed or hesitates while testifying, to caution him not to become excited and to think over what he is about to say. (Kearney v. State, 344.)
4. TRIAL-PRESENCE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER.-The trial court need not require the official reporter to remain in attendance until the termination of the trial in order that, in case of disputes between counsel as to what the evidence is, a party may not be "deprived of the privilege of referring to the official report of the case to refresh the recollection of the jury." (Kearney v. State, 344.)
5. TRIAL-IMPROPER CONDUCT OF COUNSEL-WAIVER. If on a criminal trial the prosecuting attorney makes an improper statement unknown to the trial judge, or indulges in improper argu- ment promptly stopped by such judge of his own motion, and no ruling on such conduct is requested on the part of the accused at any time, it is too late after verdict to urge such conduct as ground for a new trial. (Kearney v. State, 344.)
1. CY PRES.-The doctrine of cy pres as it existed in Eng- land and has been applied in some of the states of the American Union, whereby trust provisions are administered and executed as near to the presumed intention of the founder as may be, is not recognized as a part of the judicial power in the state of Wis- consin. (McHugh v. McCole, 106.)
2. TRUSTS-WHEN NOT SUSTAINABLE.-To valid testamentary trust there must be a definite beneficiary, either named or capable of being ascertained within the rules of law ap- plicable to such cases. The absence of a definite beneficiary is, as a general rule, a fatal objection to any attempt to create a valid trust. (McHugh v. McCole, 106.)
3. A TRUST NOT CAPABLE OF ENFORCEMENT BY A COURT cannot be sustained on the ground that the trustee has accepted it and will carry it out according to what he understands to be the wishes of the donor. (McHugh v. McCole, 106.)
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