STATEMENT OF POINTS DECIDED DURING THE YEAR ENDING NOVEMBER 30, 1891.

Proctor & Gamble r. The Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad Company, The Pittsburg, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railway Company, and The Pennsylvania Railroad Company.

Proctor & Gamble v. The Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company, The Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company, and The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company.

Proctor & Gamble v. Orland Smith and H. C. Yergason, Receivers of The Cincinnati, Washington and Baltimore Railroad Company, and The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company.

A petition or motion for rehearing can not be granted on mere allegation of error in the findings of fact, and such a petition or motion must be supported by proof showing, prima facie at least, that there was such error. The affidavits in this case fail to make such showing.

The New York Board of Trade and Transportation, The Commercial Exchange of Philadelphia and The San Francisco Chamber of Commerce v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, The Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railway Company, The Pittsburg, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railway Company, The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, The Michigan Central Railroad Company, The Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company, The Chicago and Grand Trunk Railway Company, The New York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company, The Chicago and Atlantic Railway Company, The New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio Railroad Company, The New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company, The West Shore Railroad Company, The Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company, The Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada, The Wabash Railroad Company, The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, The Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, The Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, The Boston and Maine Railroad Company, The Louisville, New Orleans and Texas Railway Company, The St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Company, The Southern Pacific Company, The Union Pacific Railway Company, The Northern Pacific Railroad Company, The Canadian Pacific Railway Company, The Texas and Pacific Railway Company, The Illinois Central Railroad Company, The Lehigh Valley Railroad Company.

The act to regulate commerce specifically provides for the regulation of the transportation of foreign merchandise when brought from a foreign port of shipment to a port of entry of the United States and transported from such port of entry to a place within the United States upon a through bill of lading, or when transported from a foreign port to a port of entry of a foreign country

adjacent to the United States and transported from such port of entry to a place of destination within the United States upon a through bill of lading.

2. The regulation thus provided is such as regulates the rates, charges, -facilities afforded, and treatment of the foreign merchandise from the port of entry in either instance, as the case may be, to the place of destination of the merchandise within the United States, but it is not a regulation that extends to the control of rates made upon such foreign merchandise in the foreign port of shipment for its carriage to the port of entry of the United States or to the port of entry in a foreign country adjacent to the United States.

3. With respect to that part of the carriage of such foreign merchandise between the ports of entry and the place of destination in the United States, the rule of the statute is that it is entitled to no preference in rates, charges, facilities afforded, and treatment over domestic merchandise or other merchandise when these are a like kind of traffic transported from such ports of entry to such places of destination, but as to that service stands upon the same basis of equality with domestic merchandise or other freight as to rates, charges, facilities afforded, and treatment, and must be carried upon this part of its journey under the inland tariffs of the carriers established for the transportation of domestic merchandise or other freights, and under the same rules governing their carriage, as to weight, bulk, value, expenses of carriage, and all such other circumstances and conditions as enter into the making of just and reasonable rates and of avoiding unlawful prejudice and unjust discriminations, such as is provided by the

statute.

4. The circumstances and conditions surrounding the making of the rates upon such foreign merchandise in the foreign port of shipment have had their weight and operation in its foreign carriage to the port of entry and in the charges made and facilities afforded for that service, but after such foreign merchandise has been brought within the United States on its way to destination in the United States it encounters other circumstances and conditions that are controlling in this part of its carriage, namely, the laws of the United States made for the regulation of its rates and carriage.

5. The publication of such inland joint tariffs for the transportation of such foreign merchandise under the statute and of advances and reductions should be made at the port of entry and also at the point of destination of freight in the United States by posting the same in a public place at the depot of the carrier where the freight is received in the port of entry and where it is delivered at the place of destination in the United States.

6. The term "a like kind of traffic," as it occurs in section 2 of the act to regulate commerce, and as used in this report and opinion, does not mean traffic that is identical, but it means traffic that is of "a like kind" with other freight in the elements of a fair. and just classification for the purpose of arriving at a just and reasonable rate and a rate that will avoid unjust discrimination and unlawful preference.

7. Commodity class rates described and discussed.

8. The power of interstate carriers to make commodity class rates and special class rates to meet the circumstances and conditions of traffic along their lines recognized and defined.

Coxe Brothers & Company v. The Lehigh Valley Railroad Company. 1. Classification of freight.-Freight classification is deemed by the railroads convenient and essential to any practical system of rate making, and is so recognized though not enjoined by the act to regulate commerce.

2. Same. When classification is used as a device to effect unjust discrimination or as a means of violating other provisions of the statute, the act requires the Commission to so revise and correct such classification and arrangement as to correct the abuse. 3. Lower rates for longer hauls.-Besides terminal expenses and other aggregate charges not dependent upon the distance freight is moved, there are other conditions which justify a lower proportionate charge for longer distances.

4. Through carriage over connecting lines.-Through transportation over connecting lines is favored by the statute, and the rate over such through lines is correctly adjusted upon the distance through, and not upon the shorter distances over, the several lines. 5. Same.-Two roads by agreement carried bituminous coal from the Snow Shoe region in Pennsylvania to Perth Amboy, N. J., a distance of about 300 miles, at a higher aggregate, but lower proportionate, rate than was charged by one road on anthracite for the distance over its line, the distance over such line being about 150 miles. Held, That this was no undue preference in favor of the bituminous coal traffic, and subjected anthracite traffic to no unreasonable disadvantage, except as the anthracite charges might be excessive.

6. Practicable regulation.-A railroad company carrying coal as interstate traffic is the owner of the capital stock of a coal company, which, under its charter holds lands, mines, buys and sells coal, and ships over the lines of said railroad company. Held, Where such conditions result in violations of the act to regulate commerce, the only regulation practicable is the enforcement of the provision of the act requiring rates to be reasonable.

7. Group rates.-It is often impracticable to establish different rates on the same commodity from practically the same locality to the same market, and the owners of mines in the Lehigh anthracite region are subjected to no unreasonable disadvantage from the present grouping of mines based on more than actual distance when shipping east and less than actual distance when shipping west. 8. Unreasonable rates.-A railroad company had in force for a period of more than two years next before the act to regulate commerce took effect a scale of charges on anthracite coal considerably lower than its present rates, which are higher on coal than on iron ore, pig iron, and other low grade freight, and also higher than the charges of said road on general freight, the expense of carrying which is much greater than the expense on coal. Held, That such higher rates on coal are unreasonable.

9. Commission to determine rates.-The act to regulate commerce declares every unreasonable charge unlawful, requires the Commission to enforce its provisions and confers the power, and imposes on the Commission the duty, of determining what are reasonable rates, as well as what are unreasonable.

10. Reasonable rates.-A railroad company by putting in force a rate of charges furnishes evidence that the rate is profitable, which is

more convincing when such rate is long maintained; and where a carrier put in force and maintained for nearly two years, immediately after the act to regulate commerce took effect, a scale of charges largely in excess of that maintained for two years next before the act, and the lower rates were sufficient to meet all the obligations of the road, including income on investment. Held, The higher rate should be reduced.

The Boston Fruit and Produce Exchange v. The New York and New England Railroad Company, The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, The Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, and The Lehigh Valley Railroad Company.

1. The words "common control, management or arrangement," as found in the first section of the act to regulate commerce, defined and applied to the special facts of the case.

2. Section 7 of the act may properly be considered in construing the general jurisdictional clause of the first section.

3. Contracts and tariffs filed with the commission under section 6 of the act may be considered, although not specifically introduced in evidence on the hearing.

4. The Boston Fruit and Produce Exchange is a mercantile society, such as is described in the thirteenth section of the act, and as such has the right to maintain a proceeding like the present, without showing special damage to itself.

5. Elements that will be considered in fixing the rates for the transportation of perishable fruit, under special circumstances, discussed and applied to the facts found.

6. The gist of the present complaint is that the rate on peaches from the Delaware district to Boston is unreasonably high and oppressive, and, the fact being so found, a reduction is ordered.

Hamilton & Brown v. The Chattanooga, Rome and Columbus Railroad Company, The Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, and The Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway Company.

1. The rates on freight from interstate points to Kramer, Georgia, via The Chattanooga, Rome and Columbus Railroad, are made by taking the through rate to recognized "basing points," and adding thereto that local rate which will give the lowest combination. This method of determining a rate criticised, and, as applied to such traffic to Kramer, operates as an unjust discrimination against that locality.

2 All the carriers participating in the traffic, the rates for which were questioned in this proceeding, were not made parties, and the case, while showing that the through rates were discriminatory and unjust, failed to disclose sufficient facts upon which an accurate decision could be based, and accordingly it was held that the carriers who were parties to the proceeding be required to adjust their respective tariffs so as to avoid discrimination against Kramer, and that the carriers who were not parties be summoned to appear and show cause why a like order be not issued as to the business in which they participate, unless their tariffs are voluntarily adjusted so as to avoid the discrimination complained

of.