was given to military courts to prosecute and subject for, as said in Coleman v. Tennessee, punish them, as follows: 97 U. S. 509, 514 (24 J.. Ed. 1118): "With the known hostility of the American people to any interference by the military with the regular administration of justice in the civil courts, no such intention should be ascribed to Congress in the absence of clear and direct language to that effect.” Certainly, it cannot be assumed that the mere existence of a state of war begot of necessity the military power asserted, since in 1775 were, as we have seen, in the very the Articles of War, originally adopted midst of the War for Independence, modified in 1776 to make certain the preservation of the civil power. [2] But the contention relied upon is directly based upon the words, "except in time of war," as qualifying the duty of the military officers to respond to the demand by state authority for the surrender of military offenders against the state criminal laws, article 92, expressed in the form of a negative pregnant, of authority to courts *386 And, finally, the duty to respond to the demand of the state authorities for the sur-imposed by article 74, and the grant in render of military offenders against the state criminal laws was re-enacted as it had prevailed from the beginning, subject, however, to express regulations to govern in case of conflict between state and federal authority, and again subject to the qualification, "except in time of war," as first expressed in the revision of 1874; the article being as follows: “Art. 74. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities. When any person subject to military law, except one who is held by the military authorities to answer, or who is awaiting trial or result of trial, or who is undergoing sentence for a crime or offense punishable under these articles, is accused of a crime or offense committed within the geographical limits of the states of the Union and the District of Columbia, and punishable by the laws of the land, the commanding officer is required, except in time of war, upon application duly made, to use his utmost endeavor to deliver over such accused *385 person to the civil authorities, or to aid the officers of justice in apprehending and securing him, in order that he may be brought to trial. Any commanding officer who upon such application refuses or willfully neglects, except in time of war, to deliver over such accused persons to the civil authorities or to aid the officers of justice in apprehending and securing him shall be dismissed from the service or suffer such other punishment as a court-martial may direct." 39 Stat. 662. [1] Comprehensively considering these provisions, it is apparent that they contain no direct and clear expression of a purpose on the part of Congress, conceding for the sake of the argument that authority existed under the Constitution to do so, to bring about, as the mere result of a declaration of war, the complete destruction of state authority and the extraordinary extension of military power upon which the argument rests. This lone might be sufficient to dispose of the martial to try capital crimes when committed by an officer or soldier within the geographical limits of the United States and the District of Columbia in time of war. Both these provisions took their origin in terms of that act as re-expressed in the rethe act of 1863 and were drawn from the vision of 1874. By its very terms, however, the act of 1863 was wholly foreign to the destruction of state and the enlargement of military power here relied upon. It is true, indeed, that by the act authority was for the first time given, as pointed out in the Coleman Case, 97 U. S. 502, 514, 24 L. Ed. 1118, to courts-martial or military commissions to deal with capital and other serious crimes punishable under the state law. But the act did not purport to increase the general powers of courts-martial by defining new crimes, or by bringing enumerated offenses within the category of military crimes as defined from the beginning, as we have already pointed out, but, simply contemplated endowing the military authorities with power, not to supplant, but to enforce, the state law. As observed by Winthrop, in his work on Military Law (2d Ed.) p. 1033, it was intended to provide, through the military authorities, means of enforcing and punishing crimes against the state law committed by persons in the military service where as the result of the existence of martial law or of milltary operations, the courts of the state were not open and military power was therefore needed to enforce the state law. And it was doubtless this purpose indicated by the text, to which we have already called attention, which caused the court in the Coleman Case to say that that statute had no application to territory where "the civil courts were open (40 Sup.Ct.) and in the undisturbed exercise of their juris- | of 1863, and which were within the purview diction." 97 U. S. 515, 24 L. Ed. 1118. As in 1866 it was settled in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. Ed. 281, that a state of war, in the absence of some occasion for the declaration of martial law or conditions consequent on military operations, gave no power to the military authorities where the civil courts were open and capable of per *387 *forming their duties, to disregard their authority or frustrate the exercise by them of their normal and legitimate jurisdiction, it is indeed open to grave doubt whether it was the purpose of Congress, by the words "ex cept in time of war," or the cognate words which were used with reference to the jurisdiction conferred in capital cases, to do more than to recognize the right of the military authorities, in time of war, within the areas affected by military operations or where martial law was controlling, or where civil authority was either totally suspended or obstructed, to deal with the crimes specified-a doubt which, if solved against the assumption of general military power, would demonstrate, not only the jurisdiction of the state courts in this case, but the entire absence of jurisdiction in the military tribunals. And this doubt becomes additionally serious when the revision of 1874 is considered, since in that revision the act of 1863 was in terms reenacted and the words "except in time of war," appearing for the first time in article 59 of that revision, could have been alone intended to qualify the time of war with which the act dealt; that is, a condition resulting from a state of war which prevented or interfered with the discharge of their duties by the civil courts. Into the investigation of the subject of whether it was intended by the provision "except in time of war," contained in the Articles of 1916, to do more than meet the conditions exacted by the actual exigencies of war like those contemplated by the act of military authority, as pointed out in Re Milligan, we do not feel called upon to enter. We say this because even though it be conceded that the purpose of Congress by the Articles of 1916, departing from everything which had gone before, was to give to military courts, as the mere result of a state of war, the power to punish as military offenses the crimes specified when committed by those in the military service, such admis *388 sion is *here negligible because, in that view, the regulations relied upon would do no more than extend the military authority, because of the state of war, to the punishment, as military crimes, of acts criminal under the state law, without the slightest indication of purpose to exclude the jurisdiction of state courts to deal with such acts as offenses against the state law. And this conclusion harmonizes with the principles of interpretation applied to the Articles of War previous to 1916 (Drury v. Lewis, 200 U. S. 1, 26 Sup. Ct. 229, 50 L. Ed. 343; Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333, 27 Sup. Ct. 749, 51 L. Ed. 1048, 11 Ann. Cas. 640; Franklin v. United States, 216 U. S. 559, 30 Sup. Ct. 434, 54 L. Ed. C15; Steiner's Case, 6 Op. Atty. Gen. 413, and is, moreover, in accord with the decided cases which have considered the contention of exclusive power in the military courts as resulting from the Articles of 1916 which we have here considered. People v. Denman (Cal.) 177 Pac. 461; Funk v. State, 208 S. W. 509; United States v. Hirsch (D. C.) 254 Fed. 109. It follows, therefore, that the contention as to the enlargement of military power, as the mere result of a state of war, and the consequent complete destruction of state authority, are without merit and that the court was right in so deciding and hence its judgment must be and it is Affirmed. (251 U. S. 567) MEMORANDUM DECISIONS No. 223. Jose Lopez GARCIA, appellant, v. Orval P. TOWNSHEND, commanding officer, Camp Las Casas. Jan. 30, 1920. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico. Mr. Francis H. Dexter, of San Juan, P. R., for appellant. Dismissed with costs, on motion of counsel for the appellant. (252 U. S. 570) No. 111. The UNION PACIFIC COAL COMPANY, petitioner, v. Mark A. SKINNER, Collector of Internal Revenue. March 22, 1920. On writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. For opinion below, see Skinner v. Union Pac. Coal Co., 249 Fed. 152, 161 C. C. A. 204. Mr. Henry W. Clark, of Aspen, Colo., for petitioner. PER CURIAM. Affirmed with costs upon the authority of Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339, 38 Sup. Ct. 543, 62 L. Ed. 1149, and cause remanded to the District Court of the United States for the District of Colorado. (252 U. S. 571) No. 227. McCAY ENGINEERING COMPANY, appellant, v. The UNITED STATES. March 22, 1920. Appeal from the Court of Claims. For opinion below, see 53 Ct. Cl. 642 George A. King, of Washington, D. C., for appellant. The Attorney General for the United States. PER CURIAM. Affirmed by an equally divided Court. Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS took no part in the decision of this case. (252 U. S. 571) No. 241. The KANSAS CITY BOLT & NUT COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. KANSAS CITY LIGHT & POWER COMPANY. March 22, 1920. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri. For opinion below, see 275 Mo. 529, 204 S. W. 1074. Mr. Rees Turpin, of Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff in error. PER CURIAM. Affirmed upon the authority of Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corporation, 248 U. S. 372, 39 Sup. Ct. 117, 63 L. Ed. 309. (252 U. S. 571) No. 257. NEW ORLEANS LAND COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. Willis J. ROUSSELL, Administrator, etc., et al. March 22, 1920. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. For opinion below, see Roussel v. New Orleans Land Co., 143 La. 1058, 79 South. 860. Mr. Charles Louque, of New Orleans, La., for plaintiff in error. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of section 237 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156), as amended by the act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (Comp. St. § 1214). (252 U. S. 572) No. 261. Edward C. MASON, as he is Trustee in Bankruptcy, etc., plaintiff in error, v. Thomas J. SHANNON et al. March 22, 1920. In Error to the Superior Court of the State of Massachusetts. Mr. Moses Williams, of Boston, Mass., for plaintiff in error. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of section 237 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156), as amended by the act of SepSt. § 1214). tember 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (Comp. (252 U. S. 581) No. 716. E. J. FRAZIER, petitioner, v. The STATE OF OREGON. March 22, 1920. For opinions below, see 180 Pac. 520, 184 Pac. 848. Messrs. Enos S. Stockbridge, of Baltimore, Md., Wm. P. Lord, of Portland, Or., and James K. Weatherford, of Albany, Or., for petitioner. Mr. George M. Brown, Atty. Gen., Mr. L. L. Ray, Dist. Atty., of Eugene, Or., and Mr. Arthur Clarke, Dist. Atty., of Corvallis, Or., of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State for the State of Oregon. Petition for a writ of Oregon denied. (252 U. S. 581) No. 723. Alfred J. KEPPELMANN et al., Executors and Trustees, etc., petitioners, v. A. Mitchell PALMER, as Alien Property Custodi108 Atl. 432. Mr. Edward M. Colie, of Newark, an. March 22, 1920. For opinion below, see N. J., for petitioners. Mr. Thomas J. Spellacy, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Leonard B. Zeisler, of Chicago, Ill., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Chancery of the State of New Jersey denied. (252 U. S. 582) No. 724. Carl GOEPEL et al., partners, etc., petitioners, v. A. Mitchell PALMER, as Alien Property Custodian. March 22, 1920. Messrs. Philadelphia, Pa., for petitioners. Petition for Martin V. Bergen and Ruby R. Vale, both of a writ of certiorari to the Court of Chancery of the State of New Jersey denied. (252 U. S. 582) No. 735. Louis De F. MUNGER, petitioner, v. FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY; and No. 736. Louis De F. MUNGER, petitioner, v. The B. F. GOODRICH COMPANY. March 22, 1920. For opinion below, see 261 Fed. 921. Mr. William A. Redding, of New York City, for petitioner. Messrs. Charles Neave and William G. McKnight, both of Bos (40 Sup.Ct.) (252 U. S. 582) No. 757. EMPIRE FUEL COMPANY, petitioner, v. J. E. LYONS. March 22, 1920. For opinion below, see 257 Fed. 890, 169 C. C. A. 40. Messrs. Arthur S. Dayton, of Philippi, W. Va., Melvin G. Sperry, of Clarksburg, W. Va., and Frank E. Wood, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for petitioner. Mr. Murray Seasongood, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. (252 U. S. 583) er, V. ATCHISON, TOPEKA & No. 784. The SANTA FÉ RAILWAY COMPANY, petitionINDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF STATE OF ILLINOIS (Maria Kiley, Administratrix, etc.). March 22, 1920. For opinion below, see 290 Ill. 590, 125 N. E. 380. Messrs. Gardiner Lathrop, Homer W. Davis, and Sloane Turgeon, all of Chicago, Ill., for petitioner. Mr. Leo L Donahoe, of Chicago, Ill. (Mr. Francis E. Croakin, of Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois denied. (252 U. S. 590) No. 347. NATIONAL SURETY COMPANY, appellant, v. The UNITED STATES of America for the use of AMERICAN SHEET METAL WORKS et al. March 29, 1920. Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. For opinion below, see 256 Fed. 77, 167 C. C. A. 319. Mr. William B. Grant, of New Orleans, La., for appellant. Dismissed with costs, and mandate granted, on motion of counsel for the appellant. (252 U. S. 583) No. 479. The HOUSTON & TEXAS CEN- (252 U. S. 583) No. 745. Antonio Cisneros CHAPA, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. March 29, 1920. For opinion below, see 261 Fed. 775. Messrs. Chambers, Watson & Wilson, of San Antonio, Tex., for petitioner. Mr. Robert P. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mr. Harry S. Ridgely, of Washington, D. C., for the United States. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. (252 U. S. 584) CENTRAL No. 760. The ELEVATOR COMPANY OF BALTIMORE CITY, petitioner, v. NAAM LOOZE VENNOOT SCHAP, etc. March 29, 1920. For opinion below, see 261 Fed. 269. Messrs. Frederick D. McKenney, of Washington, D. C., and Shirley Carter, of Baltimore, Md., for petitioner. Messrs. Charles R. Hickox, of New York City, Stuart S. Janney, of Baltimore, Md., and John M. Woolsey, of New York City, for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. No. 762. The CENTRAL ELEVATOR COMPANY OF BALTIMORE CITY, petitioner, v. Edwin DYASON, master of THE Steamship WELBECK HALL, etc. March 29. 1920. For opinion below, see 261 Fed. 274. Messrs. Frederick D. McKenney, of Washington. D. C., and Shirley Carter, of Baltimore, Md., for petitioner. Mr. James K. Symmers, of New York City, for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. 1 4252 U. S. 584) No. 405. Franklin K. LANE, Secretary of the Interior, et al., plaintiffs in error, v. The UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Allen L. NEWTON. March 30, 1920. See, also, 48 App. D. C. 547. Messrs. Charles A. Towne, of New York City, and Duane E. Fox, of Washington, D. C., for appellants. Messrs. C. Edward Wright and Charles D. Mahaffie, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee. Mr. Solic No. 763. The PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, petitioner, v. Edwin DYASON, master of THE steamship WELBECK HALL, etc. March 29, 1920. For opinion bedow, see 261 Fed. 274. Messrs. Frederick D. McKenney, of Washington, D. C., and Shirley Carter, of Baltimore, Md., for petitioner. Mr. James K. Symmers, of New York City, for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari toitor General King, of Atlanta, Ga., for Lane and the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. (252 U. S. 584) others. John Barton Payne, present Secretary of the Interior, substituted as the party appellee in No. 65 and as one of the parties plaintiffs in error in No. 405, in the place of No. 766. V. F. MILLER, petitioner, v. The Franklin K. Lane, former Secretary of the Interior, on motion of Mr. Solicitor General King UNITED STATES of America. March 29, in that behalf. 1920. For opinion below, see 261 Fed. 914. Messrs. Chambers, Watson & Wilson, Ed. Haltom, and Samuel Belden, all of San Antonio, Tex., for petitioner. Mr. Robert P. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Harry S. Ridgely, of Washington, D. C., for the United States. Pe tition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. (252 U. S. 585) No. 27, Original. The STATE OF OKLAHOMA, complainant, v. The STATE OF TEXAS. April 13, 1920. See, also, 252 U. S. 372, 40 Sup. Ct. 353, 64 L. Ed. Frederic A. Delano, Esq., of Chicago, Ill., is appointed Receiver, vice Jacob M. Dickinson, declined, on giving bond in the sum of $100,000. No. 773. FRANCE & CANADA STEAMSHIP CORPORATION, petitioner, v. Konrad (252 U. S. 590) No. 209. Louis C. TIFFANY, Sole SurvivSTORGARD. March 29, 1920. For opinion below, see 263 Fed. 545. Mr. Bertrand L. Petti-ing Executor, etc., appellant, v. The UNITED grew, of New York City, for petitioner. Mr. STATES. April 19, 1920. Appeal from the Silas B. Axtell, of New York City, for reFor opinion below, see 53 Ct. Cl. 640. Messrs. Simon Lyon and R. B. spondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for H. Lyon, both of Washington, D. C. for appel the Second Circuit denied. (252 U. S. 585) Court of Claims. lant. Mr. Solicitor General King, for the United States. Reversed, upon confession of error, and cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with law, and mandate No. 774. SOUTHWESTERN GAS & ELEC-| granted, on motion of Mr. Solicitor General TRIC COMPANY, petitioner, v. The CITY | King for the appellee. OF SHREVEPORT. March 29, 1920. opinion below, see 261 Fed. 771. Messrs. Max Pam and Harry B. Hurd, both of Chicago, Ill., for petitioner. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. (252 U. S. 585) For (252 U. S. 574) No. 233. The UNITED STATES, appellant, v. WAYNE COUNTY, KENTUCKY. April 19, 1920. Appeal from the Court of Claims. For opinion below, see 53 Ct. Cl. 417. The Attorney General, for appellant. PER CURIAM. Affirmed upon the authority of (1) United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, States v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333, 339, 30 Sup. 329, 37 Sup. Ct. 380, 61 L. Ed. 746; United Ct. 527, 54 L. Ed. 787, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 385. 19 Ann. Cas. 680; United States v. Grizzard, 219 U. S. 180, 185, 31 Sup. Ct. 162, 55 L. Ed. No. 778. Alec ERICKSON, petitioner, v. JOHN A. ROEBLING'S SONS COMPANY OF NEW YORK. March 29, 1920. For opinion below, see John A. Roebling's Sons Co. of New York v. Erickson, 261 Fed. 986. Mr. Silas B. Axtell, of New York City, for petitioner. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sec-165, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1135; (2) St. Louis v. ond Circuit denied. (252 U. S. 585) No. 787. Karl SANDGREN et al., petitioners, v. ULSTER STEAMSHIP COMPANY (Limited), owner and claimant, etc. March 29, 1920. For opinion below, see 262 Fed. 751. Mr. W. J. Waguespack, of New Orleans, La., for petitioners. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92, 101, 13 Sup. Ct. 485, 37 L. Ed. 380; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Richmond, 224 U. S. 160, 169, 32 Sup. Ct. 449, 56 L. Ed. 710, and see Stockton v. Baltimore & New York R. Co., 32 Fed. 9; (3) Farrell v. O'Brien, 199 U. S. 89, 100, 25 Sup. Ct. 727, 50 L. Ed. 101; Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U. S. 71, 79, 29 Sup. Ct. 580, 53 L. Ed. 914; Brolan v. United States, 236 U. S. 216, 218, 35 Sup. Ct. 285, 59 L. Ed. 544; Sugarman v. United States, 249 U. S. 182, 184, 39 Sup. Ct. 191, 63 L. Ed. 550. No. 65. Franklin SHAW et al., appellants, v. Franklin K. LANE, Secretary of the Interior; and (252 U. S. 575) No. 263. B. T. BACKUS, plaintiff in error, v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY. April 19, 1920. In error to the |