that the expression of the statute, "corporations organized by authority of any laws of Congress" includes corporations created under a territorial law. The reason of such a conclusion is so much stronger than any basis for a contrary one, that it may be regarded as imperative, and, if so, the rule of strict construction has little weight, or rather it may be said that the rule requires this conclusion rather than a contrary one.

This, however, has not disposed of the question as to the status of corporations which had been chartered between the going into effect of the joint resolution of annexation and the inception of the Territory of Hawaii.

Counsel for the defendant cites in support of his contention that such corporations were not within the act of January 26, 1907, the case of Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197,-generally known as the Mankichi Case; also the cases of Peacock & Co. v. Republic of Hawaii, 12 Haw. 27, Republic of Hawaii v. Edwards, Id. 55, and Ex parte Ah Oi, 13 Id. 534, and argues that under the joint resolution of annexation the provision that "the municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands not enacted for the fulfilment of the treaties so extinguished and not inconsistent with this joint resolution nor contrary to the Constitution of the United States nor to any existing treaty of the United States, shall remain in force until the Congress of the United States shall otherwise determine," was unnecessary, as the continuance of such municipal legislation would have been a matter of course without any enactment on that point, and that therefore the Hawaiian statute providing for corporations, remaining in force, did not owe its authority to Congress; and he also makes a distinction between the expression of the joint resolution and that of the organic act in which the former uses the words "remain in force" and the latter the words "continue in force."

I am unable to recognize the distinction contended for between these expressions. Remain is an intransitive verb and continue is both transitive and intransitive, and in its latter use it is a synonym of remain.

Besides the reference in the joint resolution of annexation providing that the municipal legislation referred to "shall remain in force," I find the following provision: "until Congress shall provide for the government of such islands, all the civil, judicial and military powers exercised by the officers of the existing government in said islands shall be vested in such person or persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct; and the President shall have the power to remove said officers and fill the vacancies so occasioned." On August 12, 1898, at Honolulu the joint resolution was confirmed by the President of the Republic of Hawaii, and the sovereignty of the Hawaiian Islands surrendered to the United States. Whereupon, the United States, by its representative, announced that in the exercise of the powers conferred on him by the joint resolution, the President directs that the “civil, judicial and military powers in question shall be exercised by the officers of the Republic of Hawaii as it existed just prior to the transfer of sovereignty, subject to his power to remove such officers and to fill vacancies," and that such officers should at once take an oath of allegiance to the United States.

In view of these provisions and public and official acts and announcements, can the defendant maintain his contention? The surrender of sovereignty was complete, and the government of the Hawaiian Islands was placed by Congress, for the time being, in the hands of the President of the United States. Not only did he have the power to appoint and remove the civil, judicial and military officers, but also to direct the manner in which they should exercise their official powers. Among these powers was the power to incorporate companies for certain distinct purposes and to issue charters to them. This power, after the surrender of Hawaiian sovereignty to the United States, was in an official appointed by the President of the United States, and the manner of the exercise of this power was in the control of the President of the United States, who received his powers in the matter through an act of Congress, i. e., the

joint resolution. Does it not therefore follow that all Hawaiian corporations chartered between the confirmation of the joint resolution and the inception of the Territory were organized by authority of a law of Congress? I think it does, and that therefore such corporations are within the law forbidding corporations so organized from contributing money "in connection with any election to any political office."

It does not appear that joint stock companies, which are incorporated independently of official consent, and do not require charters emanating from any authority for their existence are within the act, and forbidden to make the money contributions referred to.

The second count of the information alleges that the defendant made "a money contribution in connection with an election at which a representative in Congress is to be voted for, to-wit, in connection with an election within the Territory of Hawaii for a delegate to represent the said Territory of Hawaii in the Sixty-first Congress of the United States of America."

The contention of the defendant in support of the demurrer as to this count is that inasmuch as the law describes the offense as a money contribution by a corporation at an election in which a representative in Congress is to be voted for, there is no violation of the law in a contribution in connection with an election at which a delegate in Congress is to be voted for, the law being silent in regard to such latter election.

The prosecution urges that the Constitution in its provisions. in regard to Congress makes no use of the word delegate in dealing with elections for members of Congress but uses only the words senators and representatives (Art. 1, sec. 4), and says in its brief, on page 13, "surely it was contemplated that perhaps such an act as that of March 3, 1817 (3 Stat. L., chap. XLII, p. 363), and subsequent acts relative to delegates, might come before Congress" in that "at the time of its adoption Congress of course had in mind that at some time in the future it would become necessary in some manner or other to govern the Territories."

As a matter of fact, the first ordinance providing for the government of the Northwest Territory was enacted July 13, 1787 (R. S. U. S., p. 15, 1 Stat. L., 50), two months before the enactment of the Constitution, and such ordinance provided for the election of a delegate to Congress. So it may be taken for granted that when the Constitution was enacted the members of the Constitutional Convention were fully apprised of such feature of territorial government. Thereafter, from time to time, amendments were made to the act of 1787 by which the manner of election of delegates was changed from election by the upper and lower houses of the legislatures of the territories to an election by the same voters as were electors of representatives. The fact that the Constitutional Convention made provision in the Constitution for senators and representatives as members of Congress (Art. 1, secs. 2 and 3), is evidence that these were deemed to be constitutional matters and not matters of general legislation; and the further fact that the Constitution gave to Congress the power to "make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States" (Art. 4, sec. 3), is evidence of their view that the matter of dealing with the territories, providing for their government and representation in Congress by delegates, were subjects belonging to the legislative department of the government, such legislation having already been initiated by the act of 1787, already referred to. And this arrangement fully accounts for the fact that in the Constitution there is no reference to delegates where reference is made to senators and representatives.

The case of Doty v. Strong, 1 Pinn. (Wis.) 84, 88, is cited in the plaintiff's brief as authority for the contention that the words of the act "Representatives in Congress" include delegates in their meaning. The court in this case referred most briefly to this point and decided that the provisions of the sixth section of the first article of the Constitution, giving to senators and representatives in Congress the privilege from arrest during their attendance at the sessions and in going to or re

turning from the same, applies to a delegate on the ground that he is a member of the House of Representatives and entitled to the same constitutional privileges as senators and representatives. Certainly by analogy he should have such privileges; whether he is entitled to them by virtue of the Constitution I have much doubt.

The provisions of chapter 8 of the Revised Statutes on contested elections, cited by counsel for the prosecution as an instance in which the word representative was used by Congress as including delegates, has little significance in relation to this point. The first section of this chapter (section 105) begins with the words "Whenever any person intends to contest the election of any member of the House of Representatives,” etc. This raises the question as to what constitutes a member of such House. If a delegate is a member, then this phrase quoted has no significance on the question as to whether the word representative includes delegate, because if a delegate is a member of the House of Representatives then he is fully included by the words "any member of the House of Representatives." In the case of Doty v. Strong, supra, the court decides that a delegate is a member of the House of Representatives.

There is some conflict in the statute in referring to the status of delegates as to such membership, but I deem such conflict to have little significance but to be attributed more to thoughtlessness in drafting bills than to any consideration of their status. On general principles, in spite of the common use in the statutes of the words "members and delegates," I think it stands to reason that a delegate is a member of the House of Representatives, although not a full member. He is elected to such position by the same electors as elect the representatives, he is allowed the same salary as the representatives and the same mileage, he has a scat in the House with the right to join in the discussion of matters before the House, acts on the committees, and, so far as I am aware, has all the powers of representatives with the one exception that he is without a vote. There is no doubt in my mind but that he is a member of the House