tical art, may be-knows from what quarter, from what region of inquiry or of art, he shall see it receive its next aid. As little does he know to what necessity of human nature, to what difficulty of human reason, he himself, if the faculty of discovery have fallen to him, or even the chance, without the faculty, shall next bring relief. -The curious artist who learnt to bend the lines of sight on their way into the eye, and the Philosopher who traced with his rod,* and he who unravelled the mazes of the sky, were guiding,―could they foreknow it—on the paths of every sea, the Ships of Commerce and of War. The Philologist has given Hippocrates to the Physician, to the Mathematician, Euclid and Archimedes, to the Theologian he has delivered the volume of his highest Science, to the lowly believer, of his morals and his faith.-One man in his laboratory holds a gauze of wire over a burning lamp, and observes that the flame will not pass through. His observation, cast into another mind, turns into a talisman for the safeguard of human lives.-Some arts, some sciences, have in themselves a necessary universality:-as he who fused an ore, ministered the strength and skill of every hand-as he who wrote the articulations of the voice, prepared glory, durability, self-diffusing, self-augmenting might, to all the modes of action, to all the deeds in all the undertakings, of the restless, undeterred, unsatisfied, all-aspiring, allenterprising spirit of men.-The investigator of the problems of NUMBER and EXTENSION, and of the yet more abstruse relations which these embody, can he labour and not for a thousand inquirers, of whose specific researches he has no understanding?—He treats universal elements, and what he finds of them, must be of scarce narrower application. Thought is the germ of thoughts. The act is the father of acts to be. We may comprehend in some degree the past which we traversed, not the future of which we left the seeds beneath our feet.

There are then links of connexion strict and solid, among the several

parts of knowledge: there is a real strong bond of co-operation between its variously-employed followers.— And this, in truth, to an extent not easily limited. The living strive for one another, and for the ages to come. The dead have striven for those that now are. The imaginary community of which we spoke binds together, no less, successive generations, and divided ages. We call OURS all that is yet unperished of the past genius of mankind:-And the canvass and the gorgeous wall, starting into life in colours of the Italian sun, the eloquence "since mute" that thundered in "free Rome," and the " builder's skill” that “ was known"" to Greece," and "the light chisel" that "brush'd" her " Parian stone," bring to us the consciousness of THE RACE WHICH WE ARE, kindle our thoughts with the recollection of what WE HAVE DONE, of what we HAVE BEEN, raise instead of depressing us, and seem to require of us now, for our right in them, no more than that we should understand, not that we should imitate them,-while we pursue with strenuous endeavour and elated hearts, the different toils of the same mind, of which our destiny opens the way before us. They warn us indeed of the spirit which we bear. They remind us what faculties we have to unfold in what liberty of power we should walk: with what fires we are made to burn. If we decline,-if we vail the eyes of intellect,-if we stoop the majesty of our nature, if we grovel in desire, they reproach our sordid degeneracy. But the proud monuments of old time challenging our admiration, impose no domineering restriction on our march of mind. They give no law. They point us to seek impulse, regulation, direction within ourselves. They call upon us not to revive arts, but to maintain power, What we have to do we must learn from our own time, and the voices that speak within us. Only let us take care that the soul which has descended to us do not in our bosoms expire.

There is great philosophical wisdom in that high and eloquent passage of the Roman poet,-who, putting into

Describent radio.

THOUGHTS OX 8

retion to believe, that,

ALL attempts into encyclopedi clude an essentia is advanced by in devoting themse of inquiry. But paration, not o facts of every Sc credibly multip cach, in which value are recor and true reasoni Very numerous. sician, a Lawye Antiquary,-of taphysician, of so speak?) of I excepting disab in his own pursu cy of his time. need to give to same devoted la the same exclusi other hands it i As knowledge is mere amount of vision of minds f comes more and m condition, of attai vidual mind, of fa to the separate Seier Meanwhile we say Mind is extending its have a feeling as if eve manner partook of the the dominion achieved, ev do not suppose him to be ath cted by the results, or en the knowledge, of what is disco done. All are confederated, win secute, or support, or love the la of intellect, in the great warfare knowledge: bent to overcome, by th power of thought, evil, physical or moral, in our condition: burning with more splendid desires, with the ambition of if in intellect that is possible even unfruitful glory, of conquests, is which no use is foreseen beyond the pleasure and exultation of success. It is the consciousness of our common case, that gives us sympathy and parpation with what is gained in fields of speculation on which we have never sea fove: that may enable a moral philosopher in England to rejoice, that a chemist 42 & peal, an ant st

lorence by decreting & principle. by

the success of inquiry, but will admit that our understanding has obtained the truths it has perseveringly sought. The question will then remain whether the opinion just now urged, in respect to the acquisition of knowledge, that it is best, and only effectually, made, by limiting, almost by singling to the mind, the objects of attainment, by confining the direction —not the reach of its progress,-(we have gone farther, but this is not here necessary to be insisted on, in alleging the principle that should guide this restraint) is or is not grounded.

If it is just, the very conceived ground of intellectual utility disappears. And this mis-judgment, as we must suppose it to be, of utility, this endeavour to effect an important improvement to the mind against the very principles on which its improvement depends, is what indeed strikes us as the prominent character and unconquerable fault of the undertaking. -We will make yet another remark. It will seem an extraordinary suggestion to hazard, in respect to a work of so great attempt and labourTANTE MOLIS-imagined, moved, and executed by men of distinguished ability, highest in their day, and yet high in literary and scientific reputation, but we cannot resist a persuasion, that there was implied in the very ground and first conception of it, not only a negligence of reflexion, but -what we almost hesitate to say-an illusion of thought. A want of understanding we cannot suppose, but a want of regarding and of duly appreciating the effective, practical connexions of the Sciences, appears to us to have prepared the way for a misconception, a singular one indeed under the circumstances,-of THEIR IMAGINARY CONJUNCTION, before spoken of by us, in the idealized and eneral mind of the species, as if this st needs be found somewhere, emand real. We shall seem, we ress fancy too far, and to after illusion: yet

tellect may, in different minds, explore, were left still in some way imperfect, or did not yet truly exist, until it were materially constructed.

Of other views which might enter into the composition of that memorable work, of the elements of thought in the minds of its Authors, of opinions held and diffused by them, we have not now to speak. We are considering it merely in the light,—in which, as a new project in literature it offered itself to the world,-of A SCIENTIFIC METHOD. As such, it appeared to us an illustration not a little striking and important of error, as we must conceive it to be, prevailing more or less in these latter days, in respect to the real nature of knowledge, and its relation to the mind which entertains it.

This error, we should more properly say these errors include a conception of knowledge which may perhaps be expressed by saying, that it is viewed, or reasoned of, as if it consisted solely in the perception of relations: Secondly, a conception of it, as being a species (of definite possession to the mind, not a power of thought, necessarily indefinite:-as something, thirdly, in itself limited, and already completed:-In the fourth place, a fallacious idea of the participation of any one in the light and progress of his age as requiring, and consisting in, the knowledge by him of what is known to his age:-Fifthly, to go no further, misconceptions, to which we have more than once adverted, of the unity of knowledge.

Our Knowledge-it is manifest to every one who has ever in the least degree reflected upon his own,-however it may become at last condensed and summed up to our mind, is ga

an almost infinite number

drawn from, or coments innumerable and That impressions has knowledge? They on him from the enses on the world. ed that has not from the face of m the joy and brought some haustible meal and sense, materials of ded some some depth,

the mouth of the imagined ancestor of his countrymen the prophecy of their greatness, by him apostrophizes, and exhorts them, abandoning to other nations other modes of glory, to attach themselves to that which was allotted peculiarly to be their own. There is a division of genius to nations, as to individuals and each will most excel, will do more for itself, for its own renown, and for mankind, by following the light of this inward determi

nation.

If Italy painted, if France brightened the manners of civilized men, if Germany thinks, if Britain acts, if Spain could have cherished the soul of romance, if India could have preserved to the world's late day the mysterious sublimity of its early dreams, are not these all distinct gains, are they not separate forms of power, enjoyed, possessed by Man,-and would he not,-might he but know them together continued to him,-feel himself rich and strong in these diversities of his talents, of his cultivation, in this various developement of his natural welfare?

In nations, and in individual minds, one principle appears to hold. We owe much to one another, undoubtedly guidance and urgency, as well as restraint. But to every one his chief source of impulsion, motive in conduct, direction and incitation in genius, is given in himself. He will effect most by relying upon this: by withholding himself from courses of moral, of intellectual exertion, which belong to others, and applying his force of desire, his full effort, to those which are properly his own, opening of themselves, and yielding way to his natural aspirations. The energy of power will be greatest, when it is the eflux from an original nature. The sum of power, of advancement then, to the world must be greatest, when every one disregarding the avocation of others, or looking to it for incitement only not for example, well distinguishing generous rivalry from depressing imitation, pursues with his entire strength of means, of ability and of will,- -no higher, no nearer, no imperious consideration interposing and prohibiting, that path of labour, for utility, for honour, for conscious achievement, and for mere indulgence in delight, to which his means, his ability, and his will call him.

There seems reason to believe, that, for utmost intellectual advancement, nations and single minds should pursue their own cultivation, accomplish their own power, the extent of every species of knowledge in one case, the nature of the human mind in both, so requiring. Contrary opinions, of later time, appear to be in some degree, and as we must think, injuriously prevalent. They have shewn themselves variously: a little in Literature. Of one such manifestation of them we would say a few words.

When in the middle of the last century the chief men of letters and science in France applied themselves to unite in one work, all parts, however apparently divided from each other, of human knowledge, they believed, we must naturally think, that they were at once advancing Science itself, and conferring important individual benefit on all those, to whom they should bring, thus in one gift as it were, the collected and digested result of the manifold and long labours of Intellect.

Yet in one respect their plan should seem scarcely to have been well devised for advancing Science, since the close limits to which it unavoidably confined the numerous subjects it included, must in no slight degree have both restrained and embarrassed original inquiry. And in what other way they might hope to attain such an end, excepting in as much as to diffuseScience is to advance it, is not easy to see :excepting, in other words, as such an end might be attained by the benefit tendered by their design to the individual mind.

Now THIS could not consist in anything that was to be gained to the exposition of Science, itself labouring under-what alone necessarily distinguished it-the very disadvantage we have just adverted to, of a forced compression.-The benefit intended could consist only in the UNIVERSALITY of the Science offered, in placing the whole mass of what was KNOWN, within the survey and under the power, before the sight and in the very grasp, if it might be so thought, of the single Mind.

We will draw no reasoning from the uncertainties, which in many places cloud our knowledge, making the name of Science with us, in some instances, more suitable to the intention than to

the success of inquiry, but will admit that our understanding has obtained the truths it has perseveringly sought. The question will then remain whether the opinion just now urged, in respect to the acquisition of knowledge, that it is best, and only effectually, made, by limiting, almost by singling to the mind, the objects of attainment, by confining the direction -not the reach of its progress,-(we have gone farther, but this is not here necessary to be insisted on, in alleging the principle that should guide this restraint) is or is not grounded.

If it is just, the very conceived ground of intellectual utility disappears. And this mis-judgment, as we must suppose it to be, of utility, this endeavour to effect an important improvement to the mind against the very principles on which its improvement depends, is what indeed strikes us as the prominent character and unconquerable fault of the undertaking. -We will make yet another remark. It will seem an extraordinary suggestion to hazard, in respect to a work of so great attempt and labourTANTÆ MOLIS—imagined, moved, and executed by men of distinguished ability, highest in their day, and yet high in literary and scientific reputation, but we cannot resist a persuasion, that there was implied in the very ground and first conception of it, not only a negligence of reflexion, but -what we almost hesitate to say-an illusion of thought. A want of understanding—we cannot suppose, but a want of regarding and of duly appreciating the effective, practical connexions of the Sciences, appears to us to have prepared the way for a misconception,a singular one indeed under the circumstances,-of THEIR IMAGINARY CONJUNCTION, before spoken of by us, in the idealized and general mind of the species, as if this must needs be found somewhere, embodied and real. We shall seem, we fear, to press fancy too far, and to hunt, ourselves, after illusion: yet know not how to avoid the belief which forces itself upon us, that, in the original IDEA of this work, we distinguish the traces, or shall we rather say discover the reflexion, of a not very philosophical, not very metaphysical, impression, as if that CIRCLE of the Sciences, which has been much spoken of, and which perhaps the human in

tellect may, in different minds, explore, were left still in some way imperfect, or did not yet truly exist, until it were materially constructed.

Of other views which might enter into the composition of that memorable work, of the elements of thought in the minds of its Authors, of opinions held and diffused by them, we have not now to speak. We are considering it merely in the light,-in which, as a new project in literature it offered itself to the world,-of A SCIENTIFIC METHOD. As such, it appeared to us an illustration not a little striking and important of error, as we must conceive it to be, prevailing more or less in these latter days, in respect to the real nature of knowledge, and its relation to the mind which entertains it.

This error, we should more properly say these errors include a conception of knowledge which may perlaps be expressed by saying, that it is viewed, or reasoned of, as if it consisted solely in the perception of relations:Secondly, a conception of it, as being a species of definite possession to the mind, not a power of thought, necessarily indefinite:-as something, thirdly, in itself limited, and already completed:-In the fourth place, a fallacious idea of the participation of any one in the light and progress of his age as requiring, and consisting in, the knowledge by him of what is known to his age-Fifthly, to go no further, misconceptions, to which we have more than once adverted, of the unity. of knowledge.

Our Knowledge—it is manifest to every one who has ever in the least degree reflected upon his own,-however it may become at last condensed and summed up to our mind, is gathered by an almost infinite number of its acts, and drawn from, or compounded of, elements innumerable and endless. From what impressions has a poet gathered his knowledge? They have flowed in upon him from the first opening of his senses on the world. What day has he lived that has not from earth and sky, from the face of men, from books, from the joy and sorrow of his own heart, brought some contribution to that inexhaustible memory of all things of soul and sense, in which he finds the materials of verse?-that has not added some strength, some tenderness, some depth,