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to those faculties of thought and feel- much self-reflexion, much self-reliing, which are made to him the ever ance.-Borh seem to require an aptinew subjects of fresh knowledge, of tude of ability, Both also an aptitude unexhausted discovery—and which of desire, or attachment, for the partiare more than the sacred well of Me- cular subject of their application. mory, the living fountains of his song? Both advance and improve, in part
That process of the accumulation by their own effort and purpose: in and perfecting of knowledge which, if BOTH in part their progress is spontawe could behold it as it advances in neous and unconscious. Nature carthe mind of imagination and feeling, rying on her original work, unfolding would appear to us, as some beautiful the powers she gave, and converting growth takes place, though in forms into the nourishment of their strength less interesting, in every mind which and growth, the materials their own collects and frames its own—that is, activity has provided. in every mind which ever possesses
We observed a little while since that real-knowledge. The original, ele- it was one inclination of error in the mentary impressions of numberless age, to conceive and reason of knowallied and corresponding objects are ledge as if it consisted solely in the inendlessly multiplied and diversified, telligence of relations. If it did, it the same impressions from the same might be more quickly learnt. For objects are stamped deep and indelible that intelligence is a swift act of the by an endless repetition. Nor is only understanding and needs to be but litremembrance richly stored, which is tle repeated to be confirmed. Besides, ever but one part, and perhaps not it would be more easily imparted. For the most important, certainly not the relations, for the most part, are defimost difficult, of the mind's work in nite, and admit of being distinctly exits composition of knowledge ; but, posed by one mind to another. But whatever the matter may be on which one object of our last observations has it is employed, it trains to observation been to represent that one part, the the faculties of observation, to thought slowest perhaps, if not the most diffithe faculties of thought, which it in- cult, and often difficult, of our inteldlustriously and incessantly exercises. lectual progress is the acquisition of The eye is quickened to see. Reflec- the original impressions, among which tion becomes more prompt, more just, the relations* subsist, the familiar inmore acute, more extended. The last timate acquainting of the mind with discovery suggests the next. What the matter in which they are discernwas understood yesterday, explains ed. We come slowly to know the multhe new difficulty of to-day. The dif- tiplicity of objects, interminably variference between the mind of genius, ed in themselves, which our intelliand that powerful in knowledge, is gence would infold. We come slowly not altogether so great perhaps, as we to understand, to fix, and to acquire are sometimes inclined to imagine. the power of recalling, as distinct subBoth are necessarily endowed with jects of conception, the affection of our
There is great difficulty and risk in the use of this, as indeed of any, exceedingly abstract and metaphysical term, in inquiry not rigorously metaphysical. The philosopher has learnt that in the composition of the idea of every object we know, to the simplest, ideas of relation are involved : that these objects themselves appear, such as to our formed senses they do appear, only by force of many such ideas of relation, on the instant supplied to them by our intellect. Yet it is not possible in any discourse of a more general nature, to speak of such objects, and of our idea of them, according to this true knowledge. They must then be spoken of, -as in the ordinary language of men they are,--as they appear to us, not as they are known to us. The various objects which the world supplies, appear, each, one and entire. They appear to be shown to the simple, natural sense, what they are to the instructed sense. We must speak of them as if the complex resulting impression, which they at present make, were the same with, or not essentially different from, their simple original impression. We can refer in no wise to those first inseparable ideas of relation which are included in the idea and knowledge of the objects themselves ; but must begin to speak of relation with the objects given, as if the secondary relations, which connect the objects with one another, were indeed the first, which our understanding had known. The danger of using such terms is that of inconsistency in using them sometimes more, sometimes less rigorously, or of ambiguity from being understood as having done so. We fear the text explains this.
mind and of our senses, produced in We said further that it was a part intercourse with them. The ultimate- of common error to conceive of knowly abstracted relation, or combination ledge as something limited and alof relations, which gives, or is given ready completed in the world : and we in, the term of Science, is quickly ex- believe that this error, improbable as pressed and learnt: but the multitude it must appear to every one who is enof forms from which the abstraction gaged in the real investigation of any is made, is without number : and the part of Science, and who sees with knowledge itself subsists not merely daily astonishment and perplexity how in this ultimate term, but in great part much of what he aims to find, still also in the power of the mind froin it lies before him undiscovered, is yet a to return again upon the forms, repro- very prevalent one. It is the error of ducing thein in itself.
beginners who iinagine that in their ilWe observed that it was an error to lustrious leaders, the lights of Science, conceive of knowledge as a sort of de- Science itself has found its consummafinite possession to the mind, not as a tion. Only the Sage knows, that he POWER OF THOUGHT, necessarily in- also is a beginner. It is the error perdefinite:-and this perhaps is in some haps of all but reflecting minds, how degree illustrated by what we have well soever they may understand the since said. Did it consist merely in fallacy with respect to the subject of the perception of relations, and espe, their own efforts, with respect to that cially of those ultimately abstracted of other men's. Who but the scholar relations of which Science constructs is aware that the Greek tongue is not its severely defined propositions, we yet known to us? Who but the mamight conceive of it in one sense at thematician, of the darkness and rid least, as a definite and fixed possession. dles, that lie about the very grounds Inasmuch as in that case, we could al- of his lucid, undeceiving, demonways with certainty recall our know- strated Science ?-Who but the Poet, ledge. For the strictly defined and how young, perhaps, the poetry of his abstract intellectual forms, once acqui- country yet is? - We look beyond our red, are recalled readily and certainly own minds. We see that we have not But our knowledge in two respects de- reached the term. We cannot look parts from this character. In the first beyond the minds of those who implace, as those original impressions measurably transcend us. We have have for the most part been accompa- found that within our own circle we nied more or less with affections of follow a receding circumference. We feeling in their first reception, and know not that it is the same with other what is intellectual in such impres- men. We have not the means to know sions is not perfectly recalled, unless it: and besides our judgment is dazthe feeling in some degree return with zled and overcome. The art in which them : but the power of reproducing, we have no skill appears to us all-acor recalling, feeling is necessarily a complished. The knowledge for which variable one. In the second place, as we have no measure, has to our eye almost every application of knowledge, reached its bounds. The works of which is one important part of its the human intellect bewilder, fatigue strength or power, requires invention, us, with their variety, their number, or a variation from its pust forms, or their splendour; and our own admithose in which it hitherto subsists in ration, our own inability, become the mind, to take in the given case: grounds to us of believing in their but invention is a variable power. By perfection. a variable power must be understood We have already said something one which, under unfavourable cir- touching the supposition, that the cumstances, languishes, and is unable PARTICIPATION of every one in the to yield even its customary results, advancement and acquired lights of his but, under favourable circumstances, time, stood in his actual POSSESSION is capable of rising to exertion, and of the attainments of his time: and yielding results, hitherto unexperien would add a few words still. One ced. It must further be understood, way in which a man derives advanwhat is very important to be here re tage from the improvement in the „marked, as one capable, in the same midst of which he lives, is, of course, mind, out of means already possessed, in his own pursuit whatever that may of progressive indefinite improvement. be, which has received its own im
provement with others, and from them. spoken of appear to proceed generally Another is, though to what extent this upon one original error. It seems to may generally be of importance may have been overlooked by those who be questioned,-in some particular in- entertain them, that the mind itself stances it is of unlimited importance, which receives knowledge is no me-by acquaintance with particular chanical recipient, but a living printruths which have become commonly ciple and power, a sentient intelligence. diffused. Another, and this is always Its knowledge affects it with pleasure of consequence, is by a participation, and pain, partakes in its growth, unconscious and unsought, in the spi. changes as itself changes, is desired rit of the age. But what is now de- and rejected, is rapid and comprehenscribed, seems of this kind, benefit sive when it is eager and strong, slow enough. And no very urgent reason and partial, when it is averse and can be shewn, that a man, because faint. Were this duly conceived, it such and such branches of knowledge would be conceived also, that this mind have happened to be productive in his is not exactly, in all cases to be urged days, under the cultivation of others, and required to understand and to should, having no other inducement, know, that the spirit of thought must apply himself to be instructed in what awake in it, that whatever compulsion they have learnt.
of acting it may be necessary to subOf misconceptions of the unity of ject it to, it demands to be left much knowledge we have already spoken. also, to its own movement and choice, It has, and this should have been said, that its intellectual attainments must in all probability, a profound unity, share the individuality of its charac. from oneness of design in the subject ter, that from all these causes, and for of our knowledge: which we presume utility, research, exact, and hence miunavoidably, however imperfectly it nute, and profound, though limited may be permitted us to trace it. 'We in its subjects, rather than multifasee it more and more, the more we rious acquisition, is to be wished: know. There appears to be a unity in that knowledge, of the first kind, is it, also, from oneness in the nature of possible nearly to every one ;-of the the intellect to which it is manifested. fast,--in most instances, is only a And there are obvious connexions, as usurpation of the name. we have said, between its different These several observations, not unparts, one assisting and throwing light connected, we hone, though, we are upon another.
But any argument much afraid, moaa irregular, and less drawn, or rather unargued impression supported and foilowed out than they resulting from such ideas of an inhe- should have been, will perhaps have in rent unity in knowledge, that there some measure explained to the reader fore its different parts should neces the objection we set out with making sarily subsist together in one mind, to the attempts to reduce knowledge seems altogether ungrounded and fal- into encyclopedic forms. The attempt lacious. We have thought we saw to exhibit all Science IN ONE BODY, reason to suppose, as we have already the attempt to exhibit all Science to explained, that such an impression ONE MIND, which are the two forms was derived, in some degree, from a of the attempt to encyclopedize knowconfused imagination of individuality leilge, include the fallacies of supposin that mind of the race, which is only ing--that knowledge or science is the ideal assemblage of its innumera- bounded and already completed, whereble individual minds.
as in truth it is boundless and must These various misconceptions, as we remain for ever incomplete,-that it suppose them to be, would, if they may be effectually communicated, such could be admitted, be reasons for en as it now exists, in results, independ. deavouring to inculcate, and crowd in, ently of the particulars from which much diversified knowledge, upon those results are drawn,—that it is a every individual mind. If they are total sum, not a growing power,--that errors, and the contrary views we have to the mind-(this should have been endeavoured to state be just, there said before)—which rteeives its exuwill then be reason for a cautious and berant treasures, they are useful as very different proceeding in this re absolute wealth, as an absolute light, spect. The erroneous views we have whereas they are useful in great part
by the agency they exert upon itself, them by their original constitution ;
We ar nd les all the Thare in
reada makin wledge ttempi BODI nice TO forms knot uppo
I little thought such wish to prove,
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His sleeping lids I prest-
Farewell ! farewell, my dearest !
His youthful temples round;
The last exulting sound-
Farewell! farewell, my dearest !
When thou, poor orphan child'
My widow'd grief beguiled-
Farewell ! farewell, my dearest !
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMIST.
Essay II.- Part II. Does Political Economy, as taught in the worles of the most celebrated author's on that subject, deserve the appellation of a Practical Science; or, do they not treat practical questions in the same vague, unsatisfactory, and contradictory manner, as they do its first principles and theoretical doctrines ?
Ita Philosophi, quia nihil munimenti habent, mutuis se vulneribus extinguant, et ipsa tota Philosophia suis se armis consumat ac finiat. At enim sola Physice labat ? Quid illa moralis ? Num aliqua firmitate subnixa est ? Videamus, an Philosophi in hac saltem parte consentiant, quæ ad vitæ statum pertinet.
LACTAntius, Epitomc Divin. Institut. In the first part of this Essay we what is its nature, and wherein it conpassed in review the various and dis sists. cordant opinions entertained by the Some writers maintain, that money most celebrated writers on Political is a mere abstract idea-that, in fact, Economy, respecting some of its ele- having no positive and corporeal exmentary and most important doctrines. istence, it cannot be depreciated nor Our object, it will be recollected, was acted upon by any circumstances; and not to examine these opinions, and to that, therefore, though gold and silver determine their truth or unsoundness, coin, being in fact commodities, may except so far as this might be neces alter in value, yet the real currency of sary, in order to prove our position, a country, being an ideal and abstract that a person, anxious to enter on the thing, cannot positively undergo any study of this science, would be stopt, alteration in value. This theory of even at the threshold of it, by vague money was entertained by several of and shifting meanings attached to those who wrote on the alleged deprewords,—by conflicting authority,—byciation of the currency, at the comloose and inconclusive reasoning, -and mencement of this century, and who, by finding what was advanced, fre on it, rested their main argument to quently contradicted by facts and ex prove, that the currency of the counperience.
try neither was, in fact, nor could posThe first part of this Essay was con sibly be, depreciated. fined to the definition of the most com Other writers, and among them the mon terms employed in Political Eco celebrated Montesquieu, do not go nomy, and to its theoretical doctrines : quite so far ; they maintain, however, in this second part, we shall extend that money is an ideal and arbitrary our examination to some of the most sign of value, which may exist under important and most frequently dis the form of gold and silver coin, or cussed practical questions, on which, under any form that government if on any topic connected with this chooses to give it: that its value and science, it might have been expected utility, as a circulating medium, rest that Political Economists would have entirely on the will of government, and agreed.
not at all on the real and exchangeSome kind of circulating medium able value of the article of which it is has existed in almost all countries from constituted. On this theory, though the earliest ages; the facts relating to most probably without ever having it must therefore be numerous; and entertained it, all the governinents of the causes from which it derives its Europe acted, more or less, for a long value, its operation, and effects, and period. every other circumstance connected It did not give way till it was atwith, or relating to it, must have ex tacked, and its unsoundness as a theory, hibited themselves repeatedly, under as well as its mischievous tendency as every variety of appearance and modi. a practical guide, were exposed by fication. Do Political Economists give Locke in England, by Dutot in France, us any precise, full, and consistent in and by several writers on this part of formation, either on the theory of mo Political Economy in Italy, among ney, or the practical questions regards whom may be classed Beccaria. ing it?
Still, however, there are advocates The first difficulty on the subject is for this theory of money, who mainto know what is meant by money, tain that the value of it depends upon