of a book, and of the fitness and adequacy of the author, but also a condensed summary of the information or views of the reviewer himself on the subject of the work. In many cases, a rapid glance at the informa tion already in existence, might precede the account of the addition the author had made to it, with a glance equally rapid at the points still untouched, and the views still untaken.

The Edinburgh Review confined itself to an attempt to supply the latter desideratum. The readers of it are put in full possession of what the Reviewer knows or thinks on any particular subject; but they are left generally in utter ignorance of what the author of the work, the title of which is prefixed to the Reviewer's dissertation, has performed, and the manner in which he has executed his task. On the ability, opinions, and information of the Reviewer, the readers may safely and easily pronounce a judg ment; but of the work, except its bare title, they, not unfrequently, are unable to gain the least knowledge.

The other Quarterly Reviews have followed nearly the same plan and ob ject; so that, as far as they are concerned, and have acted upon the critical literature of the age, this is essentially changed in its character and results. That the proprietors of these Reviews we allude to the Edinburgh, Quarterly, and Westminster chiefly have acted wisely and beneficially for themselves, the very great sale of these publications proves beyond a doubt: that the effect has been equally beneficial to the critical literature of the country, we are by no means disposed to admit. In some respects, it has certainly been of disservice: by driving out of existence, or very greatly limiting the circulation, influence, and authority, of the old Reviews, it has, in a great measure, dried up the source -often polluted, indeed-from which the public drew their acquaintance with the literature of the day. And in many of those cases, in which the Quarterly Reviewers give an opinion on the merits of a work--this opinion, though neither illustrated nor supported by extracts, acquires more than its fair and just weight with the public, by the very circumstance which has rendered these Quarterly Reviews popular-the talent in essay-writing which they display, and the severity in which they indulge.

We do not enter at all into the political purposes for which the three Quarterly Reviews to which we allude were established; the doctrines they support on political questions; nor the talents or consistency with which they support them: still less do we endeavour to dive into the motives by which the writers are actuated, or the objects which they have in view. These things we leave to others-and others have been, and will be, found extremely well disposed, and not less able, to do these things. Our business with these Reviews is of a different nature: we regard them solely as respects their action on the intellect and literature of the country. Their influence on the critical literature, we have endeavoured to shew, has been, on the whole, prejudicial. Of the two grand objects which, as we stated above, a Reviewer ought to have in view, they have exalted one considerably, but they have, at the same time, proportionally depressed the other. We are made acquainted with the talents and acquirements of the Reviewer, but those of the author are not exhibited.

As a collection of essays, therefore, they ought to be regarded and judged, both as relates to their respective me→ rits individually, and as they bear on the intellect and literature of the coun try. The influence they possess on political topics is undoubtedly that by which they are most distinguished: and perhaps from this feature in them being so very prominent and attractive, their influence and effect in other respects have not been so much attended to, and so carefully watched and examined, as they cught to have been.

The soundness of their opinions, the conclusiveness of their reasoning, or the correctness of their tastes, as they are exhibited in those articles which really enter on the merits of a work, it is not our intention to examine, except in those instances where they go into a formal dissertation : where erroneous opinions, weak and inconclusive reasoning, and bad taste, are more the grounds of censure of any particular work-we shall leave that work to be defended by the author, who, in his defence, must necessarily expose the weakness of the foundation on which the censures of his work are built.

What then, it may be asked, is our object in the series of papers to which this is an introduction? We avoid the

political articles of the Reviews-we leave authors to defend themselves there are even other things which we are resolved not to do:—we shall shun all articles on political economy, all the geographical articles, and all learned articles. But it will be shorter and more satisfactorý to declare at once what we intend to do.

Throughout this paper we have dwelt strongly, almost exclusively, on the connexion between periodical literature and the intellect of the country; the latter cannot advance in strength and influence over the condition and the happiness of the community; it cannot be raised to that standard to which it is capable of reaching, while the reasoning powers are weak, and the taste is bad. Principles founded on a clear and comprehensive view of the nature of man, and of the circumstances by which he is surrounded and acted upon-deductions from these principles, such as they will support against all attacks these are the grand elements of an exalted and improved intellect: but in connexion with these, man must be regarded and studied as a creature of feeling, sentiment, and passion; as possessed of a heart as well as a head. Formerly, in the philosophy of man, the head alone was studied: he was regarded as made up entirely of intellect; lately, the other extreme seems to have been the almost exclusive point in which he is viewed and studied. Till man, however, in both these characters, is the object and study of those who wish to guide him to his real good, little progress can be made in his improvement: ignorance of, or inattention to the workings of his heart, will render the most perfect knowledge of his head of little avail; and he who endeavours to guide him to his good solely by acting on his heart, will also be disappointed in the result.

As the progress of mankind, however, naturally depresses the power and influence of his feelings, and by the same process, and at the same time, exalts and strengthens him as a reflective and reasoning being, it is of more consequence to attend to him in this latter character, than in the former. If he is put in possession of sound principles of reasoning, and taught to use them properly, his progress in knowledge and happiness will be more steady and regular, and retarded by fewer obstacles and difficulties, than

if it were attempted to lead him forward principally by his feelings.

The same may be observed, with regard to the acquisition of a correct and pure taste. It may, indeed, be produced and nourished simply by the perusal of works of a high standard; but, if so produced and nourished, it is apt to partake too much of mere feeling, to be too much under the authority of example, and it can scarcely escape being contaminated by some elements of weakness and error. Whereas, if the mind is prepared for the perusal of such works by an insight into the principles of taste, the progress will be more steady and regular, and the object in view will be obtained in its highest purity, and placed on its firmest and securest basis.

In the selection, therefore, of articles from the three principal Quarterly Reviews, for examination, we shall be guided by two rules: In the first place, we shall select those which, undertaking to form the opinions or the taste of the public, admit of and require an examination into the principles on which these ought to be founded. The more elementary and general the principles of our opinions and our reasoning, the more comprehensive they must be in their application and utility; the less likely are our opinions, when traced to such principles, to be inconsistent with each other, or to contain within them any weakness; and the more will our intellect be sharpened and strengthened in our inquiries after truth. Few are aware of the strange mixture of truth and error in their opinions, and of the inconsistencies they support or admit, till they have traced them to their first principles, and tried by this test all that education, habit, authority, and circumstances, have led them to believe. Such articles, therefore, as admit of this mode of investigaton, will possess one source of claim to our attention and notice.

Such as also bear on some practical point will have even a stronger claim to preference; for practical truths, as they are of most utility in life, so they also will be found most conducive to the sharpening and strengthening of intellect. Acting on a principle has a wonderful effect in detecting its weak parts, in rendering it more simple and general, as well as in invigorating the mind.

Our object, in short, is to guard the