St. 1905, p. 353. Section 7 of said act provides: "All contracts for the construction of sidewalks as hereinbefore provided, when the expense thereof shall exceed $500, shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder in the following manner: Notice shall be given by said officer or board designated in said ordinance, to take charge of the construction and supervision of said sidewalk, by advertisement in some newspaper of general circulation in said city, village or town, that bids will be received for the construction of such sidewalk in accordance with the ordinance therefor. Such notice shall state the time of opening said bids, not more than ten nor less than five days thereafter. If no newspaper be published in said city, village or town, then four such notices shall be posted in the vicinity of the proposed sidewalk. All proposals or bids offered shall be accompanied by cash or a check payable to the order of the officer or board having charge of the improvement, and certified by a responsible bank, for an amount which shall not be less than ten percentum of the aggregate of the proposal. All contracts shall be approved by the officer or the president or presiding officer of the board having the supervision of the construction of said sidewalk." The Appellee contends that the foregoing section of the statute has no application to the case at bar, for the reason that there was a separate contract executed between the city and the contractors for the sidewalk in front of each lot. Four contracts are introduced in evidence. All of them were made on the same day, between the same parties, and related to the construction, under the ordinance, of a part of the sidewalk in question. The contracts are identical in every respect, except that each concerns the construction of a sidewalk in front of a different lot. four contracts, when read together, constitute a contract to construct 258.06 lineal feet of sidewalk, 14 feet wide, in front of the four lots belonging to appellants, at 141⁄2 cents per square foot. No reason is suggested and no explanation is attempted by appellee, for splitting up this improvement into four separate contracts. The reason for the course pursued is apparent. It is manifestly a mere shift for the purpose of evading section 7 of the sidewalk statute. If the method pursued by the city is sustained, section 7 of this statute will be rendered nugatory. If the sidewalk in front of each lot is to be regarded as a separate and distinct improvement, it would probably never happen that the cost of constructing a sidewalk in front of a single lot would exceed $500. Under appellee's contention, a sidewalk extending the entire length of a street may be constructed at a cost of many thousand dollars and a private contract entered into for the entire work. The only thing necessary to evade the statute is to execute a duplicate contract for that portion of the walk in front of each lot. Kerfoot v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 229, 63 N. E. 101, and Nelson v. City of Chicago, 196 Ill. 390, 63 N. E. 738, are cases which, upon principle, are much like the case at bar. The two cases above referred to involve the validity of certain ordinances of the city of Chicago passed for the improvement of Archer avenue. Section 11 of the local improvement act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, c. 24, § 517) provides that upon the presentation of an ordinance for a local improvement, the estimated cost of which exceeds $100,000, such ordinance shall be referred to the proper committee and published at least one week before any action shall be taken thereon by the council. The cost of the proposed improvement of Archer avenue was estimated at upwards of $200,000. In order to avoid delay and the publication of the ordinance, the city council passed three ordinances, splitting up the improvement into three sections. The cost under each, as estimated, was less than $100,000. The ordinances were all identical, except that each one related to a different section of the proposed improvement of Archer avenue. These ordinances were held invalid because there was a clear attempt to evade a statute in relation to publication, which was passed to protect property owners. In our view the case at bar is an equally clear attempt, by other means, to evade the provision of a statute passed by the Legislature for the same purpose as the one involved in the cases above cited. If the course pursued by the city in awarding these contracts is sustained, the same method may be resorted to by boards of local improvement and drainage commissioners, and thus nullify similar provisions of law found in the statutes relating to the manner of letting contracts by these bodies. The only case cited and relied on by appellee to sustain the right to split up this improvement into as many contracts as there are lots fronting thereon is the case of Pierson v. People, 204 Ill. 456, 68 N. E. 383. A careful examination of that case will show that it is not an authority which gives support to the position assumed by appellee. In that case objections were filed by the property owner to the rendering of judgment for a tax levied to pay for a sidewalk. The ordinance provided for the construction of five sidewalks in different parts of the city of Spring Valley. One of the objections was that the city was bound to construct the entire line of sidewalk upon each street before levying a tax upon any particular lot. On the hearing the objector offered to prove that the city had not constructed all the sidewalks ordered by the ordinance. On objection by the city the court excluded this evidence, and this ruling was assigned as error. In disposing of this question, this court, on pages 466 and 467 of 204 Ill., and on page 388 of 68 N. E., said: "If the cost is levied pro rata upon the several lots or parcels of land touching upon the line of the sidewalk, according to their values, frontage, or superficial area, the entire sidewalk must be constructed before the apportionment can be made or the tax levied. If the cost of the sidewalk is to be apportioned upon the lots, a certified bill of costs cannot be made before the sidewalk is completed. Craig v. People, 193 Ill. 199, 61 N. E. 1072. Where the cost of making a sidewalk in front of a lot is levied upon such lot, the reason for the rule does not exist, and the rule does not apply. In such case each lot is independent of every other. The ordinance in this case provided for the construction of five different lines of sidewalk on different streets of the city, and the general ordinance provided that all sidewalks should be constructed by special taxation of the lot, lots, or parcels of land touching upon the line where the sidewalk should be ordered, by levying upon each lot or parcel of land in front of and adjoining such sidewalk the total cost of that portion of such sidewalk in front of or adjoining such lot or parcel of land. Apparently appellant would not be interested in the construction of sidewalks on other streets not adjacent to her property, except as citizens generally would be interested in such improvement. The offered evidence did not tend to show that the sidewalk as built in front of her property did not make a continuous line from one street to another, connecting with other sidewalks, or that there was any oppression or unreasonable discrimination against her. She did not offer to prove that her lots alone were selected for building the walks, and that her property did not receive all the substantial benefits of the improvement. There was no error in rejecting the evidence." The language in the above case which appellee insists is applicable to the case at bar is found in the sentence: "In such case each lot is independent of every other." We have quoted all that this court said on the question there being considered, in order to show that the sentence relied on by appellee has no reference to the question involved in the case now in hand. The question there before the court was whether it was competent for a lot owner to prove that sidewalks had not been constructed in other parts of the city as a reason why a judgment should not be rendered for the tax levied upon his lot for a sidewalk which had in fact been constructed in accordance with the ordinance. It was ruled that such evidence was incompetent; that each lot was independent of every other lot; that is, each lot must bear the burden of paying for the sidewalk constructed in front of it, regardless of whether other sidewalks on other streets ordered by the same ordinance had been completed. That it was not intended to hold that each lot was independent of every other lot, in the sense that a city could pass an ordinance requiring one lot owner in a block to build a sidewalk in front of his lot and relieve other lots in the same block similarly situated, is shown by the two concluding sentences in the quotation above made from the opinion. Another reason why the case relied on by appellee can have no application to the construction of section 7 of the sidewalk act is that the decision referred to was rendered at the October term, 1903, and section 7 of the sidewalk act was not passed until 1905. Since the objection pointed out is an incurable defect in these proceedings, it is unnecessary to consider other objections. The judgment of the county court of Vermilion county is reversed and the cause remanded to that court, with directions to sustain the objection herein discussed, and to refuse judgment for the whole amount of tax involved. Reversed and remanded, with directions. (232 Ill. 594) KOCH v. STREUTER. (Supreme Court of Illinois. Feb. 20, 1908.) 1. DEEDS "CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT." Conditions subsequent are provisions in a deed giving the grantor, by express words or necessary implication, the right to re-enter and repossess the premises upon the violation of the condition. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 16, Deeds, § 489. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, pp. 1402-1405; vol. 8, p. 7610.] 2. SAME "CONDITIONS PRECEDENT." Conditions precedent in a deed are those which prevent the vesting of title until the condition is complied with. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 16, Deeds, § 487. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, pp. 1400-1402; vol. 8, p. 7610.] 3. SAME CREATION OF CONDITIONS INTENT. No particular form of words is essential to create a condition, but it is essential that the intention to create it shall be clearly shown by some words. [Ed. Note.-For cases in vol. 16, Deeds, §§ 409, 470 point, see Cent. Dig. 4. SAME. If from the language employed in a deed it is doubtful whether the clause creates a condition or a covenant, it will be construed a covenant. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 16, Deeds, § 471.] 5. SAME. The rule that where clauses are susceptible of different constructions that construction will be adopted which is most favorable to the grantee obtains in case of doubt as to whether the clause creates a condition or a covenant. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 16, Deeds, § 471.] 6. SAME. An important consideration in determining whether a clause is a condition subsequent or something else is the presence or absence of a re-entry clause by the grantor or his heirs, or of forfeiture of the estate for breach of condition. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 16, Deeds, § 489.] 7. SAME "CONDITION SUBSEQUENT." A deed by heirs at law conveying land "upon condition that the grantee assumes and pays all debts and obligations owing by said D. deceased, with necessary costs of administration of estate," is not a condition subsequent. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 16, Deeds, § 489.] 8. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-TITLE OF Vendor -WAIVER OF OBJECTION. Where defendant sought to justify his refusal to perform the contract on the ground that plaintiff did not furnish an abstract of title showing a good merchantable title in him, and he specifically objected to a certain clause in a deed in plaintiff's chain of title, he will not be held to have waived the objection because he gave the wrong reason for it, where such clause in fact created a trust in favor of a third person. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 48, Vendor and Purchaser, § 269.] 9. TRUSTS-CREATION-ASSENT OF BENEFICI ARY. Where a conveyance is made of real estate on condition that the grantee shall pay a specified sum of money to a third person, or pay the debts of the grantor or some third person, the acceptance of the conveyance by the grantee with such clause creates a covenant on the part of the grantee to discharge the obligation imposed, and creates the relation of trustee and cestui que trust, without any act or assent on the part of the latter. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 47, Trusts, §§ 57, 58.] 10. SAME TERMINATION-SALE BY TRUSTEE. Where a trust in favor of a third person was expressed in a deed, it follows the land into the hands of subsequent purchasers. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 47, Trusts, § 273.] 11. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-TITLE OF VENDOR. A deed in plaintiff's chain of title executed by the heirs of a former owner created an express trust in favor of the creditors of their ancestor. This deed was made in October, 1901. Plaintiff's abstract was tendered to defendant in February, 1905. Held, that it could not be said as a matter of law that the creditors of said decedent would be barred by laches or by lapse of time, and there being no showing in the abstract submitted there with that there were no debts against such estate, or that, if there were any, they had been paid, the only showing being that the estate had been settled and the administrators discharged, defendant was not required to accept the title. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 48, Vendor and Purchaser, § 244.] 12. PUBLIC LANDS-GRANTS TO STATE-INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS-SELECTION. Under Act Cong. March 2, 1827, c. 51, 4 Stat. 234, aiding the state of Illinois in opening a canal, and granting to the state a quantity of land equal to one-half of five sections in width on each side of said canal, reserving each alternate section to the United States, to be selected by the Commissioner of the Land Office under the direction of the President, title to any particular section could not vest in the state until selection as provided in such act. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 41, Public Lands, § 223.] have been properly selected and designated so as to vest title in the state. 14. VENDOR AND PURCHASER TITLE OF VENDOR. Where the abstract of the vendor's title showed an ancient deed from the trustees of the Illinois and Michigan Canal, reciting that the lands conveyed were "part of the lands granted by the United States by Act March 2, 1827, c. 51, 4 Stat. 234, to aid the state in opening the canal to connect the waters of the Illinois River with those of Lake Michigan," but there was nothing to show that the lands had been properly selected and designated so as to vest title in the state, the vendee had reasonable grounds for refusing to accept the title. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 48, Vendor and Purchaser, § 244.] 15. SAME-TAX TITLE. Where an abstract showed two tax deeds in the vendor's chain of title, but did not show any judgment, precept, or affidavit upon which said tax deeds were based, and there was no proof of possession and payment of taxes under said deeds as color of title which could support a claim of title by limitation, the vendee had grounds for objecting to the abstract in this regard. 16. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACT. A court of equity will not decree specific performance of a contract for an exchange of farms, where it appeared that defendant's farm was worth $25,000 and plaintiff's farm was worth but little, if anything, above the incumbrance upon it, which incumbrance defendant assumed. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. 'Dig. vol. 44, Specific Performance, §§ 140-152.] 17. CONTRACTS DENCE. --- VALIDITY FRAUD - Evi On a cross-bill to cancel a contract as a cloud on title, on the ground that its execution was procured by fraud, evidence considered, and held not so clearly preponderating as to require a reversal of the decree refusing the relief. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 11, Contracts, § 451.] Appeal from Circuit Court, Morgan County; O. P. Thompson, Judge. Action by George Koch against Henry Streuter. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Welty, Sterling & Whitmore, for appellant. Worthington & Reeve, for respondent. VICKERS, J. This is a bill in equity filed by George Koch against Henry Streuter for the reformation and specific performance of a contract for the exchange of farms. Upon a hearing before the circuit court of Morgan county the bill was dismissed for want of equity. From this decree Koch appeals to this court. Streuter has assigned cross-errors upon the decree of the court dismissing his cross-bill, which he filed for the purpose of obtaining a rescission and cancellation of the alleged contract. By the contract between the parties appellant agreed to convey to the appellee 341 acres of land located in La Salle county, on the Illinois river, and appellee agreed to convey to appellant a fruit farm consisting of 1991⁄2 acres, located near West Salem, in Edwards county. Each of the parties agreed to furnish an abstract showing a good and mer chantable title to his land. Appellant contends that this clause in the contract does not express the agreement as the same was made, his contention being that as to 2.87 acres he was not to furnish an abstract showing a merchantable title. Appellant's contention in this respect is the ground upon which he seeks the reformation of the contract. The relief sought is resisted by appellee on the ground that appellant did not furnish an abstract showing a good and merchantable title to the La Salle county land, and on the further ground that the contract is unfair, inequitable, and was procured through fraud and misrepresentation by appellant. Appellee's fruit farm in Edwards county is a very valuable property, worth about $25,000. The La Salle county farm is shown by the weight of the evidence to be worth from $12 to $15 per acre. It is incumbered by a mortgage for $8,500. By the agreement appellee was to exchange the fruit farm in Edwards county for the La Salle county farm, assume the mortgage indebtedness, and pay the appellant $250. Some of the objections to the abstract of title furnished by appellant will be first noticed. It is to be remembered, however, that appellant's title is not in issue in this case, and any conclusion we may reach upon the question whether the abstract furnished complies with the contract is not a determination of appellant's title to the land. First. One objection pointed out to the abstract of title is that; in a deed from Thirza D. Rogers and others (and all heirs at law of Roswell Dow) to Theresa E. Dow, there is a condition which is not shown to have been complied with. The language of the deed is: "Upon condition that grantee assumes and pays all debts, claims, and obligations owing by said Roswell Dow, deceased, with necessary costs of administration of estate." Conditions are either precedent or subsequent. Conditions subsequent are provisioned in a deed giving the grantor, by express words or necessary implication, the right to re-enter and repossess the premises upon the violation of the condition. Such conditions operate on estates already vested, while conditions precedent intervene and prevent the vesting until the condition is complied with. It is often a matter of difficulty to determine whether a certain provision annexed to a grant of real property is such a condition as that a breach of it confers the right of entry on the grantor or his heirs, or whether such provision is a covenant, restriction, limitation, or trust imposed on the property, affecting the estate in a different way from that in which a true condition affects it. On page 121 of Preston's edition of Sheppard's Touchstone it is said: "Conditions annexed to estates are sometimes so placed and confounded amongst covenants, sometimes so ambiguously drawn, and at all times have in their drawing (when deeds, etc., are prepared by unskillful persons) so much affinity with limitations, that it is hard to discern and distinguish them." Time has not removed or much lessened these difficulties. Indeed, the change in the meaning of technical words wrought by modern construction, the more varied uses to which lands may be put, and the ever-increasing number of expressions employed to make contracts conform to the wants of our complex commercial situation, have tended rather to increase the difficulties during the 21⁄2 centuries that have elapsed since the clause quoted from the Touchstone was written. No particular form of words is absolutely essential to create a condition, but it is essential that the intention to create it shall be clearly shown by some words. If, from the language employed, it is doubtful whether the clause is a condition or a covenant it will be construed a covenant. The rule that where clauses are susceptible of different constructions that construction will be adopted which is most favorable to the grantee obtains here. One of the most important considerations in determining whether a clause is a condition subsequent or something else is the presence or absence of a "re-entry clause" by the grantor or his heirs, or of forfeiture of the estate for a breach of the condition. In Post v. Weil, 115 N. Y. 361, 22 N. E. 145, 5 L. R. A. 422, 12 Am. St. Rep. 809, Weil having agreed to purchase land refused to complete the purchase, for the reason that by a former deed, through which the present vendor derived title, the property was subject to the operation of a condition subsequent. The action was brought to compel the specific performance of the contract. The clause relied on in defense was as follows: "Provided, always, and these presents are upon this express condition that the said premises shall not, nor shall any part thereof, or any building or buildings thereon erected or to be erected, be hereafter used or occupied as a tavern or public house of any kind." The court, in deciding that this language was a covenant and not a condition subsequent, pointed out the absence of any clause in the deed giving the grantor or his heirs the right to re-enter for conditions broken, in the following language: "If we can construe this clause as an obligation to abstain from doing the thing described, which, by acceptance of the deed, became binding upon the grantee as an agreement, enforceable in behalf of any interest entitled to invoke its protection, I think we are in conscience bound to give that construction, and thereby place ourselves in accord with that inclination of the law which regards with disfavor conditions involving forfeiture of estates. In this connection it may be noted that there is no clause in the deed giving the right to re-enter for conditions broken. The presence of a re-entry clause might make certain that which in its absence is left open to construction." In Board of Education v. Trustees, 63 Ill. 204, this court said: "In the construction of deeds, courts will always incline to interpret the language as a covenant rather than a condition." In Star Brewery Co. v. Primas, 163 Ill. 652, on page 658, 45 N. E. 145, on page 147, this court said: "There is nothing in the language of the deed under consideration to indicate that it is a deed upon condition precedent or subsequent. The words 'upon condition' are not used. There is no provision for re-entry in case of a breach of the covenant. Such a provision usually indicates an intent to create a condition subsequent. Kew v. Trainor, 150 Ill. 150, 37 N. E. 223. Conditions, especially conditions subsequent, are not favored in law, because they tend to defeat estates, and courts are inclined to construe clauses in deeds as covenants rather than conditions"-citing Gallaher v. Herbert, 117 Ill. 160, 7 N. E. 511.. We are of the opinion that the clause in the deed under consideration is not a condition subsequent. This is the only objection pointed out or insisted upon by appellee to this particular deed. There is, however, an objection to this item in the abstract of title which we deem it our duty to point out. Appellee seeks to justify his refusal to perform this contract partly on the ground that appellant did not furnish an abstract of title showing a good merchantable title in him. He specifically objects to the clause already referred to in the deed to Theresa Dow. This objection raises the legal question whether the abstract, in this particular, shows a compliance with the contract. Having made the objection and called our attention to the clause in the deed which is relied on as showing a failure to comply with the contract, appellee should not be held to have waived the objection because he gave the wrong reason for it. We have already attempted to show that the clause objected to is not a condition subsequent. We think, however, that this clause creates an express trust in favor of the creditors of Roswell Dow, binding upon the grantee and all subsequent purchasers with notice. The authorities seem to be unanimous that where a conveyance is made of real estate upon condition that the grantee shall pay a specified sum of money to a third person, or pay the debts of the grantor or of some third person, the acceptance of the conveyance by the grantee with such clause in the deed creates a covenant on the part of the grantee to discharge the obligation imposed, and creates the relation of trustee and cestui que trust between the grantee and the persons for whose benefit the payment is to be made, without any act or assent on the part of the beneficiary. Underhill on Trusts and Trustees, p. 38, and cases there cited; Tiffany & Bullard on Law of Trusts and Trustees, pp. 94, 95. Mrs. Dow, in accepting this conveyance, received the title impressed with a trust. This trust being expressed in a deed found in the chain of title followed the land into the hands of subsequent grantees. This deed was made in October, 1901. This ab stract was tendered to appellee on the 27th or 28th of February, 1905, less than four years after the deed was executed. It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that creditors of Roswell Dow would be barred by limitation or laches by the lapse of time. There is no showing in the abstract or exhibits submitted therewith that there were no debts against Roswell Dow's estate, or that, if there were any, they had been paid. The only showing is that the estate of Roswell Dow had been settled and the administratrix discharged. This might well be, and still the debts of the estate remain in part or wholly unpaid. Appellee was not required to accept a title under his contract unless it was free from doubt. We see no reason why, if there were creditors of Roswell Dow's estate, they might not maintain a bill to subject this land to the payment of such debts. Under such circumstances appellee was not required to accept the title. 3 Pomeroy's Eq. p. 1405, and cases there cited; Snyder v. Spaulding, 57 Ill. 480; Hoyt v. Tuxbury, 70 Ill. 331; Close v. Stuyvesant, 132 Ill. 607, 24 N. E. 868, 3 L. R. A. 161; Lancaster v. Roberts, 144 Ill. 213, 33 N. E. 27. Second. It does not appear from the abstract furnished by appellant that any patent was ever issued by the United States government to any one for any part of these lands. The abstract shows that the trustees of the Illinois and Michigan canal executed deeds to all or a substantial portion of the lands in question in the year 1859. The abstract purports to trace the title from the trustees of the Illinois and Michigan canal to appellant. It is contended on behalf of appellee that a deed from the canal commissioners, without any showing that the lands conveyed were a part of the lands granted by the general government to aid in the construction of a canal, is not sufficient evidence of title. . Said By an act of Congress passed March 30, 1822, c. 14, 3 Stat. 659, the state of Illinois was authorized to survey and mark through the public land of the United States the route of the canal connecting the Illinois river with the southern bend of Lake Michigan. act granted the state of Illinois 90 feet on each side of the canal, subject to certain conditions in said act specified. The act of 1822 reserved every section of land through which the canal should pass from future sale until thereafter directed by law, and the state of Illinois was authorized to use any materials on the public lands adjacent to said canal that might be necessary for its construction. By a subsequent act passed March 2, 1827, c. 51, 4 Stat. 234, for the purpose of aiding the state of Illinois in opening a canal to unite the waters of the Illinois river with those of Lake Michigan, the United States granted to the state of Illinois a quantity of land equal to one-half of five sections in width on each side of said canal, reserving each alternate section to the United States, to be selected by the Commissioner of the |