ey loaned and interest at 7 per cent. per annum, and that it contained no usury. The objections to the master's report, after being overruled, were refiled as exceptions in the circuit court. Upon a hearing, the exceptions were overruled and a decree was entered by the court in accordance with the recommendations of the master. From that decree plaintiff in error prayed an appeal to the Appellate Court for the Third District. The decree of the circuit court was there affirmed, and James E. brings the record to this court by a writ of error.

Dickinson & Lee and Redmon & Hogan, for plaintiff in error. C. E. Schroll, for defendant in error.

SCOTT, J. (after stating the facts as above). The master found that there was usury in the contract, and that the principal of the promissory note, assigned by plaintiff in error to his brother, was not greater than the usurious accumulations of the interest with which defendant in error had been charged up to the time that note was given. It is here insisted that this finding is clearly against the evidence. We have examined the proof taken as the same is set out in the abstract, and are entirely satisfied with the finding of the master upon this question.

It is next contended that, where usurious interest has been paid, it cannot be recovered. This is not the rule where, as in this case, the promissory note containing the usury has been assigned, before maturity, to an innocent purchaser and the defense of usury thereby cut off, and where the maker has been compelled to pay the note to the assignee.

In Woodworth v. Huntoon, 40 Ill. 131, 89 Am. Dec. 340, it was held that, where a promissory note is given upon usurious consideration and passes into the hands of a bona fide purchaser without notice of the defense and is by him collected, the payment by the maker to the assignee will be regarded as compulsory, and not voluntary, and equity will require the original payee to pay to the maker the usurious interest included in the note. In the case of House v. Davis, 60 Ill. 367, promissory notes containing usury had been assigned before maturity and by the assignee reduced to judgment against the maker, who then filed a bill against the original payee and the assignee, charging that the assignee had notice of the usury at the time the notes were transferred to him, and seeking an injunction to prevent the collection of the usury. In the circuit court it was held that the proof did not sustain the charge that the assignee had notice of the usury when he acquired the notes, and for that reason the bill was dismissed as to him, and thereafter that court rendered a decree requiring that the original payee of the notes bring into court the amount of the usury and that the maker of the notes bring into court the balance of the judgment, by a day named, for the purpose of satisfy

ing the debt to the assignee. The original payee appealed to this court, where the decree of the lower court was reversed for the reason that the case made by the evidence was not that stated by the bill, and for the further reason that the court required the payment of money for the satisfaction of the judgment of the assignee after the latter had been dismissed, and when no control could be exercised over him by the court. It was said, however, that the bill should be amended to correspond with the facts, when the maker of the notes should be permitted to bring the amount of the judgment, and interest thereon, into court for the benefit of the assignee, and then he (the maker) would be entitled to recover the usury from the payee. It follows that the judgment of the Appellate Court is correct, and it will accordingly be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(231 III. 209) PEOPLE ex rel. CORRELL, County Collector, v. CLEVELAND, C., C. & ST. L. R. CO. (Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 17, 1907.) 1. COUNTIES-TAXATION-PURPOSE OF LEVY

DESIGNATION.

Under Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, p. 1662, c. 120, § 121, providing that county boards shall annually determine the amount of all taxes to be raised for county purposes, and state the amount for each purpose separately, the fact that some of the purposes and the amounts thereof are properly stated does not authorize the inclusion in the tax levy of a general item such as a tax for "general fund." 2. SAME.

While it is not necessary that each purpose for which a tax is levied be minutely described, it is the duty of the county authorities to specify the various purposes of the tax levy with reasonable certainty; and to state that $5,000 of the tax levy is made to produce a "general fund" is not sufficient.

3. TOWNS-TAXES-LEVY.

Under the statutes a levy for town taxes must specify in detail the several purposes for which the tax is levied, and the designation of a tax for "contingent expenses,' for "general expenses," or for "general and contingent fund" is not sufficiently definite, and renders the levies illegal.

Appeal from Crawford County Court; J. C. Maxwell, Judge.

Application by Arthur A. Correll, as county collector, for a judgment and order of sale for taxes against the property of the Cloveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company. From a judgment and order of sale, the railroad appeals. Reversed.

C. S. Conger and Callahan, Jones & Lowe, for appellant. W. H. Stead, Atty. Gen., and William A. Thompson, State's Atty., for the People.

HAND, C. J. This was an application to the June term, 1907, of the county court of Crawford county, by Arthur A. Correll, as county collector, against the property of the appellant, the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago

& St. Louis Railway Company, for a judgment and order of sale for certain taxes extended by the county clerk of said county for the year 1906. The railway company appeared and filed objections to the rendition of judgment and order of sale against its property for the following taxes: County tax, $141.21; town tax of the town of Robinson, $41.71; village tax of the village of Hutsonville, $38.99; village tax of the village of Flat Rock, $39.82. The county court overruled said objections, and rendered judgment and order of sale against the appellant's property, and it has prosecuted this appeal.

The record shows a levy by the county board of Crawford county of $20,000 for county purposes, as follows: Pauper fund, $5,000; | circuit court, $3,000; county court, $2,000; | courthouse, $1,000; county infirmary, $1,000; stationery, $1,000; county board, $1,000; county jail, $500; births and deaths, $500; general fund, $5,000. The appellant contends the last item of said tax levy, viz., "general fund, $5,000," is not sufficiently specific under the requirements of section 121 of chapter 120 of the Revised Statutes (Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, p. 1662), entitled, "Revenue," which section, after providing that the county boards of the respective counties of the state shall annually, at their September session, determine the amount of all taxes to be raised for county purposes, requires that, when taxes are to be raised for several purposes, "the amount for each purpose shall be stated separately." The question covered by this objection was considered by this court in Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Co. v. People, 213 Ill. 197, 72 N. E. 774, Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. People, 213 Ill. 458, 72 N. E. 1105, Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. v. People, 214 Ill. 23, 73 N. E. 310, and People v. Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Co., 224 III. 523, 79 N. E. 657, where it was held that a tax levied under said section was illegal and void when levied for several purposes without stating the amount for each purpose separately. In Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Co. v. People, supra, the levy was for "current expenses." In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. People, supra, the levy was for "county purposes." In Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. v. People, supra, the levy was for "county revenue." In People v. Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Co., supra, the levy was "for payment of county claims (janitor's services, supplies, repairs, improvements, and current expenses), $12,000," and each of said tax levies was held to be illegal and void.

It is sought by appellant to distinguish this case from those cases on the ground that said tax levy sufficiently designates the different purposes for which said tax levy was made, in this: That the different items mentioned in said tax levy are sufficiently specific, and fully comply with the requirements of a stat

ute which requires a tax levy, when for several purposes, to state the amount of each purpose separately, while in each of those cases the entire tax was levied as one amount and for a single purpose, as for "current expenses," or for "county purposes," etc. It is the object of said section 121, and similar statutes, to give the taxpayer an opportunity to know for what purpose taxes are being levied and collected, and to give him an opportunity, if necessary, to prevent an unjust levy for the purpose of taxation. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. People, supra. We think, therefore, the fact that some of the purposes, and the amounts thereof, which go to make up a tax levy, are properly stated by the authorities making the levy, does not authorize the taxing body to include in the tax levy a general item, such as a tax for "general fund," as under the designation "general fund" the taxing body, in a levy like this, might include matters which they were not authorized to include in such tax levy, and the taxpayer would, by the method of making such tax levy, be unable to discover that improper matters were included in the tax levy.

It is also urged that it is impracticable for the county boards to state specifically all the purposes for which taxes are to be levied. While it is not necessary that each purpose for which a tax is levied be minutely described, it is the duty of the authorities levying a tax under a statute which requires the purpose for which the tax is to be levied, and the amount thereof, to be stated, to specify the various purposes of the tax levy with reasonable certainty; and to state that $5,000 of the tax levy is made to produce a "general fund" is not sufficient. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. v. People, supra.

The town tax of the town of Robinson was itemized, and included an item of $650 for "contingent expenses," the village tax of the village of Hutsonville was itemized, and included an item of $700 for "general expenses," and the village tax of the village of Flat Rock was itemized, and included an item of $245 for "general and contingent fund." It has been repeatedly held by this court that under the statutes of this state now in force a levy for town taxes or a levy for city or village taxes must specify in detail the several purposes for which the tax is levied (People v. Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railroad Co., 116 Ill. 410, 6 N. E. 459; Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Co. v. People, supra), and that the designation of a tax for "town purposes," or other similar designation, is not sufficiently definite, and in numerous instances such tax levies have been held to be invalid. We are of the opinion that all of said tax levies, in the particulars pointed out, were illegal, and that the county court erred in overruling all of the objections of the appellant.

The judgment of the county court of Craw

ford county will therefore be reversed, and the cause remanded to that court for further proceedings in accordance with the views hereinbefore expressed.

Reversed and remanded.

(231 III. 377)

PEOPLE ex rel. CORRELL, County Treasurer, V. ILLINOIS & I. R. CO.

(Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 17, 1907.) 1. COUNTIES-TAXATION-PURPOSE OF LEVYDESIGNATION-STATUTORY PROVISIONS.

Under Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, c. 120, § 121, providing that, when the county board levies a tax for several purposes, the amount for each purpose shall be stated separately, a specification of a tax as being for the "general fund" is insufficient.

2. TOWNS-TAXATION-DESIGNATION OF PUR

POSE.

A designation of a town tax levied "for payment of contingent expenses incurred for the use and benefit of the town" was not such a designation of the purpose of the tax as would enable the taxpayer to determine whether the purpose was legal or not, and was insufficient.

Appeal from Crawford County Court; J. C. Maxwell, Judge.

Application by Arthur A. Correll, as county treasurer, for a judgment and order of sale for taxes against the property of the Illinois & Indiana Railroad Company. From the judgment, the railroad appeals. versed.

Re

This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Crawford county in favor of appellee against the lands of the Illinois & Indiana Railroad Company in Crawford county for certain taxes alleged to be delinquent for the year 1906. Objections were filed by the appellant to the application for judgment. The first objection was to a portion of the county tax, amounting to $101.46, which was extended against the property of appellant by reason of an item contained in the levy made by the board of supervisors of $5,000 for the "general fund." The second objection was to $29.06 of the town tax of Robinson. The certificate of the town clerk of that township shows that a levy of $650 was made "for payment of contingent expenses incurred for the use and benefit of the town." The town tax objected to was that extended against appellant's property by virtue of this item. Upon a hearing these objections were overruled and judgment was rendered against the lands of appellant for the two amounts, with interest, penalties, and costs. It is contended by appellant that the court erred in holding that the purposes for which these taxes were levied were sufficiently designated by the taxing bodies and in rendering judgment against the property.

John G. Drennan and Parker & Crowley, for appellant. W. H. Stead, Atty. Gen., and William A. Thompson, State's Atty., for appellee.

SCOTT, J. (after stating the facts as above). The county tax objected to was levied 83 N.E.-8

for the "general fund." Section 121 of chapter 120 of Hurd's Revised Statutes of 1905 provides that when, as in this instance, the county board levies a tax for several purposes, the amount for each purpose shall be stated separately. "This requirement gives the taxpayer an opportunity to know for what purpose taxes are being levied and collected, and gives him an opportunity, if necessary, to prevent unjust levy and assessment. Taxes raised for county purposes include many different things, and these various amounts and purposes can be ascertained by the county board the same as they are ascertained by other taxing bodies." Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. People, 213 Ill. 458, 72 N. E. 1105; People v. Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Co., 224 Ill. 523, 79 N. E. 657; Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Co. v. People, 213 Ill. 197, 72 N. E. 774. To specify a tax as being for the "general fund" does not enable the taxpayer to ascertain for what purpose the tax is being levied and collected, and gives the taxing body an opportunity to impose a tax which may later be expended for an illegal purpose.

The town tax of the town of Robinson objected to was levied "for payment of contingent expenses incurred for the use and benefit of the town." As has been stated in reference to the county tax, this was not such a designation of the purpose for which the tax was levied as would enable the taxpayer to determine whether that purpose was legal or illegal, and for this reason the levy of the town tax was, as to that item, invalid. People v. Chicago & Alton Railroad Co., 194 Ill. 51, 61 N. E. 1064; Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Co. v. People, supra.

The judgment of the county court will be reversed and the cause will be remanded to that court, with directions to enter an order sustaining the objections and refusing judgment for the sale of the property of appellant.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

(231 Ill. 498)

PEOPLE ex rel. BAIRD, County Collector, v. TOLEDO, ST. L. & W. R. CO.

(Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 17, 1907.) 1. COUNTIES-TAXATION-PURPOSE OF LEVY-DESIGNATION-STATUTORY PROVISIONS.

Under Revenue Code, § 121 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, c. 120), providing that, where the county board levies taxes for several purposes, the amount for each purpose shall be stated separately, a levy for the payment of "unpaid claims" is insufficient.

stated specifically, the various purposes must be set out with reasonable certainty. 3. SAME.

Under said section, a levy for "coal, light, and water," and for "judiciary and boarding prisoners," was insufficient.

4. SAME.

Under said section, a levy "for contingent" is insufficient.

Appeal from Cook County Court; T. N. Cofer, Judge.

Application by N. M. Baird, county collector, for judgment for taxes against the property of the Toledo, St. Louis & Western Railroad Company. From the judgment, the railroad appeals. Reversed in part.

Wilson, Warren & Child, for appellant. John McNutt, for appellee.

FARMER, J. This is an appeal from the judgment of the county court of Coles county overruling appellant's objections to judgment for certain taxes levied for county purposes by the board of supervisors for the year 1906. Among the items levied by said board for county taxes for that year were the following: "For unpaid claims, $20.000"; "for coal, light, and water, $2,000"; "for judiciary and boarding prisoners, $6,000"; "for contingent, $6,000." The total amount of the taxes levied for those purposes and extended against appellant was $919.61. It objected to judgment being rendered for any part of said amount on the ground "that each of said amounts so levied were for more than one purpose, and that the amount for each purpose was not stated separately, as required by section 121 of chapter 120 of Hurd's Revised Statutes 1905, wherefore the said county tax for said amounts as extended against your objector's property was illegal and void." The court sustained appellant's objections to judgment for the taxes extended under the levies made "for coal, light and water," "for judiciary and boarding prisoners," and "for contingent." Appellant's objection to judgment for taxes extended under the levy "for unpaid claims" was overruled and judgment entered for $527, the amount of the tax extended against the appellant under the levy made for "unpaid claims." From that judgment, this appeal is prosecuted.

Section 121 of the Revenue Code reads as follows: "The county board of the respective counties shall, annually, at the September session, determine the amounts of all taxes to be raised for county purposes, the aggregate amount of which shall not exceed the rate of seventy-five cents on the $100 valuation of property, except for payment of indebtedness existing at the adoption of the present state Constitution, unless authorized by a vote of the people of the county. When for several purposes, the amount for each purpose shall be stated separately." It is contended the levy of taxes "for unpaid claims" is not in compliance with the requirements of the statute; that, when a tax is

levied for several purposes, the amount levied for each purpose must be stated separately. A very similar question was before us in People v. Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Co., 224 Ill. 523, 79 N. E. 657. In that case the levy was "for payment of county claims (janitor's services, supplies, repairs, improvements and current expenses), $12,000"; and it was there held that a levy for the payment of county claims would include claims of every kind which might be presented against the county, and that said levy was not aided by the statement in parenthesis, "janitor's services, supplies, repairs, improvements and current expenses," as this left it "indefinite as to how much is levied for the defraying of the expenses for each of said items, and adds nothing to the general statement that the tax is levied for the payment of county claims." A levy for the payment of "unpaid claims" is as indefinite and uncertain as a levy for the payment of "county claims." A levy for the payment of “unpaid claims" is not the equivalent of a levy for the payment of claims already allowed and for which orders or warrants had been drawn. It as much included claims of every kind that might be presented against the county as did the levy for the payment of "county claims." It is neither necessary nor practicable that each particular claim the tax is levied to pay shall be specifically stated, but, as said in People v. Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Co., supra, "it is the duty of the authorities levying a tax under a statute which requires the purpose for which it is levied to be stated to specify the various purposes with reasonable certainty." Cases holding that a grant of power to levy taxes must be strictly construed and the methods prescribed by the Legislature substantially followed in order to make a tax levy legal will be found cited in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. People, 213 Ill. 458, 72 N. E. 1105. We are of opinion the court erred in overruling appellant's objection to the tax levied "for unpaid claims" and rendering judgment against it for said tax.

Appellee excepted to the ruling of the court in sustaining appellant's objections to the taxes extended under the items "for coal, light and water," "for judiciary and boarding prisoners," "for contingent," and denying judgment therefor, and has assigned cross-errors upon said ruling. The statute requires the taxes levied for each purpose to be stated separately, and this requirement is not complied with by the levying of one sum, to be distributed, when collected, among different classes of expenses, as the authorities may desire or determine. It was expressly held in People v. Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Co., supra, that the levy of a lump sum for the payment of county claims, enumerating janitor services, supplies, repairs, improvements, and current expenses, was invalid. The reason for requiring the amount for which each tax is levied to be stated sep