4. APPEAL-HARMLESS ERROR-INSTRUCTIONS.

Error of an instruction, in an action by a parent for the death of his infant child, in not requiring absence of contributory negligence of plaintiff, is harmless, the answers to interrogatories showing he was not negligent.

[Ed. Note.--For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 3, Appeal and Error, §§ 4225-4228, 4230.] 5. NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCEBURDEN OF PROOF.

Under Acts 1899, p. 58, c. 41, the burden of establishing contributory negligence is on defendant.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 37, Negligence, §§ 229-234.]

6. STREET RAILROADS-NEGLIGENT EQUIPMENT OF CARS EVIDENCE.

That a street car runs 150 feet after the brakes are set is evidence that the car's equipment for stopping was ineffective.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 44, Street Railroads, § 241.]

7. SAME QUESTIONS FOR JURY.

It being a question of fact whether the conditions were such as to render the omission of the motorman of a street car to sound the gong between street crossings negligence, it is properly left to the jury.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 44, Street Railroads, §§ 253, 254.] 8. SAME OPERATING CARS

-

NEGLIGENCE

WITHOUT FENDERS.

Whether it is negligent to operate a street car without a fender is a question for the jury. 9. TRIAL-ARGUMENTATIVE INSTRUCTIONS.

A requested instruction, argumentative in form, is properly refused.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 46, Trial, § 561.]

10. STREET RAILROADS-ACCIDENT TO PEDES

TRIAN-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

An adult, much less a child, is not necessarily negligent in failing to anticipate negligent

operation of a street car.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 44, Street Railroads, §§ 204-218.]

Appeal from Circuit Court, Clark County; Harry C. Montgomery, Judge.

Action by Edward S. Short against the Louisville & Southern Indiana Traction Company. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

George H. Voigt and Chas. D. Kelso, for appellant. Geo. H. Hester and James W. Fortune, for appellee.

ROBY, C. J. Action by appellee for recovery of damages on account of the death of his infant son, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of appellant in operating a street car upon its line. The complaint was in six paragraphs. The answer was a denial. The issue was submitted to a jury, and verdict rendered against appellant for $2,250, with answers to interrogatories. Appellant's motion for judgment on the answers to interrogatories and for a new trial were overruled, and judgment rendered upon the verdict.

It is averred in each paragraph of complaint that appellant, on April 2, 1904, operated a single track railway along Main street, in the city of New Albany, for a distance of about two miles; that said street is practically straight; and that for one-half

'mile, between State and Eighth streets, it was straight and level, and in a populous and thickly settled part of the city. It is also averred that about 5:30 p. m. of said day a certain car operated by appellant collided with and killed appellee's son, and that such collision was due to the negligence of appellant's servants in the operation of said car. The negligent acts set up in the first paragraph are that the car was run at a dangerous and unreasonable rate of speed; that it was by ordinance of said city made unlawful to run a street car within the limits of said city at a greater rate of speed than 10 miles an hour, and that the car in question was run at a greater rate than 10 miles per hour; that the car was a long and cumbersome car of great weight, and that it was defective in that the only means of stopping it was a hand brake to be used by the motorman; that such brake was insufficient when the car was run at an ordinary rate of speed, and especially insufficient when it was run at a high rate; and that there was no means of stopping or checking it, except by the use of such insufficient hand brake. It is also averred that appellee's son started to cross said street and appellant's track, where the same was level and straight for one quarter of a mile each way; that he was in plain view of the motorman; and that said car was run to a point within 50 feet of him at said rate of speed, and until it was too late to stop the same. It is also averred that the son was six years of age, and of such immature judgment and experience that he was incapable of negligence, and did not comprehend or appreciate the danger of the situation, and that no bell was sounded or other warning given.

In the second paragraph these charges are repeated with the additional ones that there was no fender or guard on the front of the car, that its vestibule did not afford the motorman a proper lookout; and these charges are repeated in slightly varying combinations throughout the other paragraphs, in some of which the child is averred to have been non sui juris, others being silent upon the subject.

Each paragraph was sufficient, and the demurrers thereto were correctly overruled. The acts of negligence charged are, as is sufficiently shown by the above summary, not dependent upon one another, and the principle which ruled in Railroad Company v. McCorkle, 140 Ind. 613, 40 N. E. 62, is not therefore applicable at any stage of the case. N. Y., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Flynn (Ind. App.) 81 N. E. 741; Ft. W. & W. V. T. Co. v. Crosbie (Ind.) 81 N. E. 474; N. Y., C. & St. L. v. Callahan (Ind. App.) 81 N. E. 670.

The court also overruled motions by appellant to require appellee to separate the several causes of action stated in the different paragraphs of complaint. These motions were also properly overruled. The complaint, as filed, contained an unnecessary number of paragraphs, but the particular acts and omis

sions relied upon were clearly specified, the defendant notified thereby of the issue it would be called upon to meet, and nothing further is required. C., St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Wolcott, 141 Ind. 267, 272, 39 N. E. 451, 50 Am. St. Rep. 320. A plaintiff may aver much and prove enough. Long et al. v. Doxey, 50 Ind. 385; Gould Steel Co. v. Richards, 30 Ind. App. 348, 353, 66 N. E. 68; Indpls. St. Ry. Co. v. Slifer, 35 Ind. App. 700, 702, 74 N. E. 19.

Other questions discussed are presented by the assignment that the court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial. The third instruction was to the effect that it was not necessary to a recovery that the plaintiff prove all the acts of negligence set up in his complaint, unless the injury would not have occurred but for the happening of them jointly; and "if, therefore, you find from the evidence that the defendant at the time of the accident was negligently running the car which killed plaintiff's son at an excessive rate of speed, or failed to sound a gong or bell for the purpose of giving warning to travelers or in failing to check the speed of the car after the motorman thereon discovered the perilous position of the child, if he was in such position, or in failing to have the car equipped, and if you further find that any one of these facts was sufficient to, and did bring about the death of said child independent of any other, you will be warranted in finding actionable negligence on the part of the defendant, and your verdict should be for the plaintiff, if the said child was not, at the time, at fault." The question of negligence was by this instruction properly left to the jury, while as shown by the authorities above cited the plaintiff was not necessarily required to prove each independent act of negligence charged in the complaint. The criticism that the court told the jury that all six of the paragraphs were substantially the same is not well taken, such statement not appearing in the instruction.

It is objected that the negligence by appellee is a bar to the action, and that the absence of such negligence was necessary to a verdict for him. This is correct. Indpls. St. Ry. Co. v. Antrobus, 33 Ind. App. 663, 668, 71 N. E. 971. The instruction contained no reference to appellee's conduct, and therefore was erroneous in directing a verdict for plaintiff upon the facts enumerated. The error is not a reversible one, for the reason that the answers to interrogatories show that appellee was not negligent. Baum v. Palmer, 165 Ind. 513, 76 N. E. 108.

In the fourth instruction the jury were told that the burden of establishing contributory negligence was on the defendant. This is the statute. Acts 1899, p. 58, c. 41; New Castle Bridge Co. v. Doty, 37 Ind. App. 84, 76 N. E. 557; New Castle Bridge Co. v. Doty, 168 Ind. 259, 79 N. E. 485.

Instruction No. 6 given has reference to the duty of appellant to equip its cars so that

they could be controlled and stopped. It is conceded that the instruction stated the law abstractly, but it is contended that it was wholly inapplicable to the evidence; but there was evidence to the effect that the car ran 150 feet after the brake was applied. Such fact was relevant to the question of equipment, and tended to show that the brake or other equivalent apparatus was ineffective. Indpls. St. Ry. Co. v. Bordenchecker, 33 Ind. App. 138, 142, 70 N. E. 995; Davis v. Mercer Lumber Co., 164 Ind. 413, 425, 73 N. E. 899; Wolfe et al. v. McMillan, 117 Ind. 587, 593, 20 N. E. 509; Gregory, Adm'r, v. C., C., C. & I. R. Co., 112 Ind. 385, 388, 14 N. E. 228. There being contradictory evidence upon the subject, appellee was entitled to an instruction upon his hypothesis.

Instruction 11 given contained a correct statement upon the subject of the measure of damages. L., N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Rush, 127 Ind. 545, 548, 26 N. E. 1010. The objection to No. 12 is based upon Railroad v. Thrasher, 35 Ind. App. 58, 73 N. E. 829. This case is not authority. I. & N. W. T. Co. v. Henderson, 39 Ind. App. 324, 79 N. E. 539. Instruction No. 1, requested by appellant, would, if given, have taken the question of defendant's negligence in failing to sound a gong or ring a bell away from the jury. It stated "that if the motorman did not sound the gong or ring the bell between the street crossings such fact would not charge the defendant with negligence." Whether the conditions were such as to render the omissions referred to negligent was, under the evidence, a question for the jury, and the court did not err in refusing to take it from them. The second requested instruction is to the effect that it was not negligence in the defendant to operate its cars without fenders. This was also a question of fact. The fifth instruction requested was argumentative in form, and should have been refused for that reason if for no other.

There is evidence supporting the verdict. The child was crossing appellant's track on Main street, and was struck by its car running at an excessive rate of speed, without apparent concern or precaution. It was not provided with a fender. There was evidence that its brakes were in good condition, but there were circumstances justifying a contrary inference. An adult is not necessarily negligent in failing to anticipate the negligent operation of a street car, and the standard by which the conduct of a child is measured is not so high as that applied to the action of an adult. Citizens' St. Ry. Co. v. Hamer, 29 Ind. App. 426, 62 N. E. 658, 63 N. E. 778. The jury was justified in finding that the casualty was entirely due to appellant's negligence. It is extremely easy for companies operating street cars to avoid liability for damages on account of such occurrences as the one in question, and also to avoid killing either children or adults This they can do by simply running cars at moderate speed, and keeping them under reason

able control. The necessity of rapid transit will be more completely served by moderate speed and a sufficient number of cars properly controlled than by fewer cars recklessly

run.

The amount of the verdict and judgment is not so great as to induce the conclusion that the jury acted through partiality or corruption, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.

(41 Ind. A. 385)

STEPHENS et al. v. DUFFY. (No. 6,061.) 1 (Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2. Jan. 10, 1908.)

1. MECHANICS' LIENS-NOTICE OF LIEN-SUFFICIENCY.

By the express provisions of Burns' Ann. St. 1901, § 7257, a notice of a mechanic's lien is sufficient as regards description of the real estate, if from the description, or any reference therein, the lot or land can be identified.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 34, Mechanics' Liens, § 169.]

2. SAME-ENFORCEMENT-LIEN-Decree.

Where, in an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, the lienor testified that the buildings on which the work was done were situated on the real estate described in the complaint, and the notice of lien contained a sufficient description to satisfy Burns' Ann. St. 1901, § 7257, stating the requirements of a notice, the lienor's proof of a more accurate description of the same real estate entitled him to a decree of foreclosure upon such specific description. 3. SAME PERSONS ENTITLED TO LIEN-SUBCONTRACTOR OF SUBCONTRACTOR.

Burns' Ann. St. 1901, § 7255, giving mechanics' liens to "contractors, subcontractors, laborers, and all persons performing labor or furnishing material" is sufficiently broad to give a lien to one who contracts with a subcontractor. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 34, Mechanics' Liens, § 138.]

On rehearing. Petition overruled.
For original opinion, see 81 N. E. 1154.

ROBY, C. J. In support of the petition for rehearing appellants' attorneys insist that the holding that a lien might be had upon two separate buildings was not justified in the absence of a showing that the two buildings were related or appurtenant to each other. The premise is not correct. The first witness examined testified that the real estate is "what is known as the 'Old Stephens' Homestead.'" One of defendants' witnesses testified as follows: Q. Now this barn and this house are both on the same piece of land in Center township? A. Yes, sir. Q. You are in charge of this farm? A. Yes, sir. Q. You make this contract for them, and attend to everything that is needed? A. Yes, sir. There is no lack of evidence to support the finding aside from the above. The description of real estate contained in the notice of intention to hold a lien was sufficient. "Any description of the lot or land in a notice of a lien will be sufficient, if from such description or any reference therein the lot or land can be identified." Acts 1889, p. 257, c. 123 (section 7257, Burns' Ann. St. 1 Transfer denied.

1901). The appellee testified that the buildings upon which the work was done were situated upon the real estate described in his amended complaint. The notice of lien containing a sufficient description, appellee's proof of a more accurate description of the same real estate entitled him to a decree foreclosing upon such specific description, and this was given. No question of reformation was in issue. The proof simply identified the land with particularity. The imperfect description in the notice was supplemented by extrinsic evidence. Dalton v. Hoffman, 8 Ind. App. 101, 35 N. E. 291; Davis, etc., Co. v. Vice et al., 15 Ind. App. 117, 43 N. E. 889. It is finally insisted, renewing the contention first made in the original brief, that appellee was a subcontractor, and therefore not entitled to the benefit of the statu tory lien. The statute provides that "contractors, subcontractors, mechanics, journeymen, laborers, and all persons performing labor or furnishing material," etc. Section 7255, Burns' Ann. St. 1901. The ejusdem generis rule is invoked in support of the claim, in effect, that the words "all persons" adds nothing to the enumeration of those who may acquire a lien. Applying it to the act under consideration, the phrase "all persons" includes a person who comes within the spirit of the act, and who like subcontractors and the employés of subcontractors contribute labor or material necessary to the completion of the work which the owner bas contracted to have done.

Appellants' proposition comes to this: A laborer employed by the day to do a job of work which takes one day is within the protection of the law, but if he agrees with the same man to do the same work for $2 the law is not for him. The work done was inseparably incidental to the improvement that appellants contracted to have done. Had the sub-subcontractor employed appellee to do this work under a contract to pay him therefor by the day, the statute would have been available. Wells v. Christian, 165 Ind. 662, 665, 76 N. E. 518. Counsel have supported their proposition that a sub-subcontractor cannot acquire a lien by the citation of 11 cases decided in other jurisdictions in which statements to that effect are made. The cases are necessarily confusing without an examination of the statutes with reference to which the decisions were made. There are three classes of mechanic's lien statutes in the United States, and the cases cited by appellant do not relate to the class which has been enacted in Indiana. These classes are (1) those which create a lien without regard to any contractual relation with the owner of the building or structure, (2) those which confine the lien to those who have contractual relations with the owners of the building or structure, (3) those which have regard to the contractual relation of the parties and limit the persons, who, besides the owners, can create a contractual relation un

son

*

* *

of

der which a lien can be taken. Central Trust Company v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (C. C.) 54 Fed. 723, 726. Our statute must be ineluded in the first class. It does not demand a contract relation with the owner. The courts have frequently declared that the work must be contracted for by the owner, otherwise a mere interloper could acquire a lien. Littler v. Robinson, 38 Ind. App. 104, 77 N. E. 1145; Ogg v. Tate, 52 Ind. 159; Hopkins v. Hudson, 107 Ind. 191, 195, 8 N. E. 91; Alvey v. Reed, 115 Ind. 148, 149, 17 N. E. 265, 7 Am. St. Rep. 418; Littler v. Friend, 167 Ind. 36, 78 N. E. 238. The Oregon statute involved in Fisher v. Tomlinson, 40 Or. 111, 60 Pac. 390, 66 Pac. 696, 56 L. R. A. 630, 91 Am. St. Rep. 492, will serve as an example of those statutes coming within the third class. It is in part as follows: "Every per* furnishing material of any kind to be used in the construction any building * * shall have a lien upon the same for the material furnished at the instance of the owner of the building, or his agent; and every contractor, subcontractor, architect, builder, or other person having charge of the construction * * of any building shall be held to be the agent of the owner for the purpose of this act." Hill's Ann. Laws Or. 1892, § 3669. The wording of the federal statute under which the case of Monroe v. Hannan, 7 Mackey (D. C.) 197, 3 L R. A. 549, was decided, is, in part, "shall be subject to a lien in favor of the contractor, subcontractor, materialman, journeyman, and laborer, respectively, for the payment for work done or materials contracted for," etc. Act Cong. July 2, 1884, c. 143, 23 Stat. 64, relating to District of Columbia. Under such statutes it is necessarily held that one who neither deals with the owner nor any other person expressly empowered by the statute to bind the owner cannot acquire a lien, and the distinction between such statutes and our own differentiates the cases cited by appellant.

In holding that one who does work for a subcontractor is within the statute, nothing is added to the terms of the statute. The consent of the owner, to evidence which some contract obligation on his part is required by the decisions, exists in this case as it does where the laborer is employed by the day by a sub-subcontractor. Pere Marquette, etc., v. Smith, 36 Ind. App. 439, 74 N. E. 545; Wells v. Christian, supra.

Petition for rehearing overruled.

(231 III. 502)

PEOPLE ex rel. ARNOLD, Tax Collector, v, CARR et al.

(Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 17, 1907.) 1. EVIDENCE-PAROL EVIDENCE-DRAINS-ASSESSMENTS-RECORDS.

Since Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, c. 42, § 76, provides that the town clerk as clerk of the drainage commissioners shall be the custodian of all

papers and records, and shall keep in a book a record of their proceedings, and shall enter at length therein all findings and orders of the com missioners on the subject of drainage, such rec ord is the only lawful evidence of the acts of the commissioners to which they refer, and cannot be contradicted or supplemented by parol.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 20, Evidence, §§ 1698-1706.1

2. DRAINS ASSESSMENTS-OBJECTIONS-TIME. Since the amendment of farm drainage act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, c. 42) in 1901 striking section 101, which provided for an appeal to the county court from any special assessment levied under section 100, the first opportunity that a property owner has to be heard after the special assessment is levied is when the matter comes up on application for judgment of sale. 3. SAME-APPLICATION FOR JUDGMENT-BurDEN OF PROOF.

A special assessment for drainage of lands within a drainage district will be held void on an application for judgment in the absence of an affirmative showing of strict compliance with the statute; a court being without power to levy a tax where none has been levied by the proper officer, though mere irregularities may be supplied by amendment.

4. SAME MEETING OF COMMISSIONERS-RECOrd.

Under Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, c. 42, § 100, relating to drainage, and providing that, when the assessment roll (designated as the tax list) has been completed in accordance therewith, it shall be filed with the town clerk, it is essential to the legality of a drainage assessment that there be a legal meeting of the drainage commissioners, and also that the record thereof be preserved by the clerk in his book of records as provided by section 2.

5. SAME PLACE OF MEETING.

Meetings of drainage commissioners for the levy of assessments authorized by Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, c. 42, § 100, should be held within the boundaries of the drainage district. 6. SAME-NOTICE.

It is necessary to the legality of a meeting of drainage commissioners that the commissioners and the town clerk, who is clerk of the board and custodian of its records and papers, should be given due notice so that they may have an opportunity to attend.

7. SAME--QUORUM-MAJORITY.

After due notice of a meeting of drainage commissioners has been given to all the members of the board and the town clerk, a majority of the commissioners are competent to hold a legal meeting.

8. SAME ASSESSMENTS-VALIDITY.

A special drainage assessment not levied at a legal meeting of the drainage commissioners, and of which no legal record was kept, as required by Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, c. 42, § 76, was void.

Error to La Salle County Court; W. H. Hinebaugh, Judge.

Action by the people, on the relation of Henry L. Arnold, county tax collector of La Salle county, against Levi Carr and others. A judgment was rendered for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Reversed and remanded.

L. W. Brewer and Lester H. Straun, for plaintiffs in error. J. J. Conway, B. F. Lincoln, and Butters, Armstrong & Ferguson, for defendants in error.

'CARTER, J. The county collector of La Salle county made application at the May

term, 1907, of the county court of that county for judgment and order of sale against the lands of plaintiffs in error on three installments of a special assessment alleged to be due Drainage District No. 1 of the town of Ophir, in said county. Objections were filed, and, after a hearing, the court overruled all the objections and entered judgment, to reverse which judgment this writ of error was sued out.

In 1906 judgment was entered against some of these same lands as to the first installment and the objectors appealed to this court, where the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded. Carr v. People, 224 Ill. 160, 79 N. E. 648. The early history of these proceedings is there set forth, and need not be here repeated. This is a proceeding under the farm drainage act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, p. 799, c. 42), and the court in the former case found the classification roll illegal. After the cause was reversed by this court, two of the drainage commissioners were called by telephone to the office of the attorney of the drainage district in Ottawa, outside of the district and some 12 or 14 miles distant from it by the shortest line. The third commissioner and the clerk were not notified, and were not present. On this date, December 24, 1906, the two commissioners, under the advice of their attorney, attempted to levy a special assessment upon the lands of the drainage district, as provided for under section 26 of said farm drainage act. Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, p. 807, c. 42. The clerk testified that he had no record of any kind of this special assessment proceeding. Section 2 of this act (page 799) provides that the town clerk, as clerk of the drainage commissioners, shall be the custodian of all papers and records, and shall keep in a well-bound book, known as the "Drainage Record," a record of proceedings of the commissioners, and shall enter at length therein all findings and orders of the commissioners pertaining to the subject of drainage. Said section 26 of this act provides that, when the assessment roll (designated as the tax list) has been completed in accordance therewith, it shall be filed with the town clerk. The assessment roll or tax list provided for in this section was not filed with the town clerk, and it is apparent from this record that he had never seen it or had it in his possession, or made any record of it, previous to this application for judgment of sale. When the law requires records of proceedings to be kept by drainage commission. ers, as in this instance, they are the only lawful evidence of the action to which they refer, and such records cannot be contradicted, added to, or supplemented by parol. People v. Madison County, 125 Ill. 334, 17 N. E. 802; Dunn v. Youmans, 224 Ill. 34, 79 N. E. 321; O'Connell v. Chicago Terminal Railroad Co., 184 Ill. 308, 56 N. E. 355; Chaplin v. Highway Com'rs, 129 Ill. 651, 22 N. E. 484. Since the amendment of this farm drainage act in 1901 (striking out section 27,

which provides for an appeal to the county court from any special assessment levied under section 26), the first opportunity to be heard by the property owner after the special assessment is levied under section 26 is when the matter comes up on application for judg ment of sale. In that respect it is similar to the proceedings to build sidewalks by special taxation under the special sidewalk act of 1875. Biggins' Estate v. People, 193 Ill. 601, 61 N. E. 1124. In a proceeding of this character, as under special tax proceedings, in the absence of affirmative showing of strict compliance with the requirements of the statute, the special assessment levied thereunder must be held void. Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v. People, 190 III. 20, 20 N. E. 69.

While the revenue law is liberal in allowing irregularities, informalities, or omissions not affecting the substantial justice of the tax to be corrected or supplied upon application for judgment, it does not authorize the court to levy a tax where none has been levied by the proper officers. People v. Glenn, 207 Ill. 50, 69 N. E. 568; People v. McDonald, 208 Ill. 638, 70 N. E. 646; Holland v. People, 189 Ill. 348, 59 N. E. 753. To make the special assessment under section 26 legal, there must not only be a legal meeting of the drainage commissioners held, but the record must be kept and preserved by the clerk in his book of records, as required by this act. It is not necessary that the clerk keep it with his own hand or write out the findings himself, but it must be his record. Hepler v. People, 226 Ill. 275, 80 N. E. 759. The letter of the statute does not appear to designate where the meetings of the drainage commissioners shall be held, but we think the spirit of the act requires them to be held within the boundaries of the drainage district. We think, also, that, in order to hold a legal meeting, it is necessary that the drainage commissioners and the clerk should all be given due notice of the meeting so they may have an opportunity to attend. After such notice, we are inclined to think a majority of the commissioners might hold a legal meeting. Hinkle v. City of Mattoon, 170 Ill. 316, 48 N. E. 908; Gage v. City of Chicago, 192 Ill. 586, 61 N. E. 849. To hold that this special assessment upon which the judgment is based is valid without any legal meeting of the drainage commissioners being called or held or any legal record kept, in accordance with the provisions of the statute pointing out the necessary steps to be taken, would be to hold that the statute could be entirely disregarded in this respect and the property of the citizen taken to satisfy the tax. Biggins' Estate v. People, supra; Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Co. v. People, 205 Ill. 538, 69 N. E. 40.

Several other objections have been strenuously urged against the validity of this tax. It would unduly extend this opinion to discuss them in detail; and, as most or all of