before the movement was known, and much sooner than the Federal army could be transferred from the Peninsula for its defence. This was proved in the sequel by Jackson's raids against the insufficient armies which were kept as a guard between Washington and Richmond. And the reflecting mind will be satisfied, that it would have been the height of imprudence to add to the great host of the Peninsula the small armies of Banks and McDowell and the few undisciplined forces detained about Washington. The result must have been the ruinous loss of the Federal capital, while it is by no means demonstrable that the further increase of the vast army upon the Peninsula would have changed its fortunes. History will not ascribe the failure of that campaign to lack of numbers or deficiency of courage in the troops, or want of ample munitions of war.

A route was chosen for the new advance upon Richmond, via Fredericksburg, which would at least have the advantage of not leaving Washington uncovered. The campaign commenced under critical circumstances. The time of the nine-months volunteers was wearing away, and unless some important blow were struck before their term had expired, the cost of them to the country would be thrown away, nor would they easily be persuaded to enlist again, while it would be still more difficult to obtain fresh recruits.

The cry was, from every part of the loyal country, for an important victory. This would restore public confidence, reduce the premium on gold, and lure forth silver change from its hoarding-places, while it gave to business a fresh impulse.

This, too, would repress the disloyal element in the Free States, which Federal reverses had emboldened to come forth from its hiding-places and take advantage of the absence of loyal voters in the volunteer armies, to make itself felt in the elections, while, though pretending loyalty, it sought popular pretexts against the government.

To obtain this most needed victory, it was of the utmost importance to revive the enthusiasm and confidence of the army, which had been somewhat depressed by finding that the unflinching valor and endurance of the rank and file had not availed to win decisive success, or even to avoid disastrous

reverses.

Great, therefore, was the anxiety with which the nation regarded the new campaign. A decisive battle it was expected, must soon be fought, as it was not supposed that the Rebels would retire to Richmond without a sanguinary contest. But should the Union army prevail in the battle, it was believed that victory would this time be so promptly followed up as to make sure of the capture of Richmond, and with this capture the war would be practically ended.

In this state of public expectation, the army of the Potomac advanced from Aquia Creek till it reached the Rappahannock. It was determined to cross the river at the city of Fredericksburg, although this purpose was disguised, by feints at other points. The design was rendered patent to the enemy by a delay of many days, caused by the failure to furnish the requisite pontoon-bridges. Summons to surrender and notice

to remove

women and children also preceded the

attack for several days. Meanwhile the active foe had fortified heights at the distance of two or three miles in the rear of Fredericksburg, while they refused to surrender the city, and took measures to obstruct the crossing of the stream.

The 11th day of December, 1862, was the day fixed for the passage of the Rappahannock. The pontoonbridges had been conveyed to its banks, during the previous night, and one hundred and forty-three pieces of artillery had been so placed as to command the city. During the night rockets had been seen to rise within the lines of the enemy, and at five o'clock in the morning, as the Federals began to construct three pontoon-bridges, two signal-guns were fired by the Rebels.

At six o'clock, when the pontoon-bridges were half completed, a murderous fire from the enemy, under cover of the houses in Fredericksburg, was opened upon our infantry and upon the engineers engaged in constructing the pontoons, and the latter were driven from their work.

Thus the enemy took advantage of General Burnside's forbearance toward the city; and such forbearance ceased to be a virtue. The order was now given for all the guns to be opened upon the city. The cannonade was terrific, and the main body of the enemy's infantry was compelled to retire. Yet, upon a fresh attempt to construct the pontoons, it was found by the enemy's fire that they were still in sufficient force in the city to render the work impracticable. Again our artillery was opened upon the city, firing it in several places. Yet the enemy were not induced to evacu

ate. By this time it got to be noon. The Federals now placed every available battery in position, and, at a given signal, opened upon the city a terrific cannonade of one hundred and seventy-six guns. The concentrated thunder of this artillery exceeded any previously heard during the war. The shot and shell went crashing through the houses, firing them in many places. The smoke of the conflagration and of our own artillery almost hid the city from view.

It was now three o'clock in the afternoon, and under the belief that the enemy had been forced to retire, the work upon the pontoons was resumed. But the fire of their sharpshooters from cellars, rifle-pits, fences, and every available shelter, was still so deadly, that the pontoons could not be laid. A new expedient must be adopted. The main body of the enemy had unquestionably retired, and though the sharpshooters were evidently numerous, they were of necessity somewhat scattered, and might not resist a bayonetcharge, could it be brought to bear upon them. them. But how could the Federals be got over the river? The boats at hand would not transport much over a hundred, and during their transit they would furnish marks for more than a hundred rifles. To select a particular company for so hazardous a service might be invidious, and should they obey with unwillingness or hesitation, their example might have a damaging influence. It was resolved to call for volunteers; for thus not only would those engaged in the service be best adapted to it by the possession of superior bravery, but, in case of a fatal result, should all or the greater number of them be killed or wounded or taken prisoners, they could not

reproach their commander with requiring of them a desperate service.

Would it be

The call was made for volunteers. responded to? If not, it would scarcely then be practicable to resort to compulsion. The crossing of the river must be abandoned, while at the same time a reproach was put upon the courage of the army, and their failure in the crisis must have a demoralizing influence. Nor was this the only evil to be anticipated. This was the first engagement of the army of the Potomac under the command of Burnside. How many there were at hand to say, "Ah! this proves that he cannot command the enthusiasm of the army! The change of generals has ruined the Federal cause. This results as we expected." How important to prove, in that hour, that the Federal army was composed of patriotic hearts, who understood and prized principles more than men, and were too devoted to their country's cause, too enlarged and intelligent, to identify their cause with any general, even if he enjoyed the popularity, inexplicable on the score of success, which partisan clamor asserted on behalf of a past commander.

Chaplain Fuller was the man to appreciate these considerations, and to feel the momentous issue of that hour through every pulse and fibre of his enthusiastic nature. And he was upon the spot, watching with anxious concern the events of the day. He had, indeed, been discharged from all official obligations to the army; but not from the higher duty which had called him to his army mission. On leaving Washington to resign his chaplaincy, he had said that he should return in a few days, unless he learned there was to