219 U. S.

Argument for the United States.

lich, § 396; United States v. Bowen, 100 U. S. 508. Inter. Comm. Comm. Circular No. 2-A of September 15, 1906; State v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 126 N. W. Rep. 859.

Whether or not the contracts in question, or any of them, actually work discriminations or preferences contrary to §§ 2 and 3, the practice of bartering commodities for transportation, if once permitted, will invite frauds upon the law, and cannot fail ultimately to result in all sorts of discriminations and preferences. This fact not only explains the insertion of the word "different" in § 6, but furnishes a conclusive reason why this court should not depart from the literal interpretation of that section. In re Persons Free or at Reduced Rates, 5 I. C. C. Rep. 69; Ex parte Koehler, 31 Fed. Rep. 315, 321; In re Charge to Grand Jury, 66 Fed. Rep. 146; Int. Comm. Comm. v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 145 U. S. 263, 282; Denaby Colliery Co. v. Manchester Ry. Co., 11 App. Cas. 97, 120; Wight v. United States, 167 U. S. 512; Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56.

Whether this or any other court has ever upheld a preference given to some particular patron and not open to all who are similarly situated, Int. Comm. Comm. v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 145 U. S. 263; Int. Comm. Comm. v. Alabama Midland Ry. Co., 168 U. S. 144; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Behlmer, 175 U. S. 648; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Adams, 192 U. S. 440, are not in point.

If railroad companies may accept advertising in payment for transportation, then the right of the railroad to barter transportation for any sort of commodity or any kind of consideration is at once established. What abuses it would lead to no one can tell. As to the necessity for a literal interpretation of the statute by the courts, see Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Goodridge, 149 U. S. 580, 690; A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. United States, 163 Fed. Rep. 111, 113.

The undoubted purpose of § 6 was to compel carriers to

fix rates which would be uniform in their operation, N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v. Int. Comm. Comm., 200 U. S. 361, 391; T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 439, and since the statute in that respect is remedial, it is "entitled to receive that interpretation which reasonably accomplishes the great public purpose which it was enacted to subserve.

The necessity of adopting the literal interpretation of § 6 is also shown by a comparison of its language and purpose with the language and purpose of §§ 2 and 3. American Express Co. v. United States, 212 U. S. 522.

The literal interpretation of § 6 will not cause any of the inconveniences or inconsistencies suggested by appellant.

It is claimed that the publisher could hand over $500 in money for transportation which could be handed back for advertising without violating the law, and that it is absurd to forbid the parties from doing directly what they could undoubtedly do indirectly. The obvious answer is, however, such a transaction would be a mere barter of transportation for advertising, however cleverly its real nature might be concealed. The only way in which a violation of the statute could be avoided would be by bona fide purchase of transportation or advertising without contemporaneous agreement on the part of the seller to purchase on his part a like amount of advertising or transportation.

Section 6 undoubtedly requires the kind of compensation to be specified in the published tariffs.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

By the act of Congress of February 19, 1903, further regulating commerce with foreign nations and among the States, as amended by the act of June 29, 1906, it was provided that whenever the Interstate Commerce Commission had reasonable ground to believe that a common carrier was engaged in carrying passengers or freight between

given points at less than the published rates on file or was committing any discrimination forbidden by law, the facts could be set forth in a petition in equity to the proper Circuit Court of the United States, whose duty it was made summarily to inquire into the circumstances, without formal pleadings and proceedings applicable to ordinary suits in equity. If the court became satisfied upon investigation that the facts existed as alleged, it was then by proper orders to enforce the observance of the published tariffs or direct a discontinuance of the alleged discrimination, with such right of appeal as was then provided by law to the parties interested in the traffic or to the carrier. February 19, 1903, 32 Stat. 847, 848, Pt. 1, c. 708; June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584.

The present suit was brought by the United States under that statute against the Chicago, Indianapolis and Louisville Railway Company, a corporation of Indiana which operated the lines of railroad known as the Monon Route, and extending from Chicago through Indiana to Cincinnati and from Michigan City, Indiana, to Louisville, Kentucky. The railway company was engaged in the business of carrying passengers over the above lines.

The petition alleged that on the twenty-fourth day of January, 1907, the defendant made a written contract with the Frank A. Munsey Company, publisher, at New York of Munsey's Magazine, which contained, among other provisions, the following:

"Agreement between the Monon Route (Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Railway Company) and. Frank A. Munsey Co..... ..publisher. Entered into this........24 day of January, 1907.

"Whereas, the said publisher issues.. Magazine..

a.

Munsey's

. publication, published at New York City, N. Y., Chicago office 423 Marquette Building, and which has a regular circulation of...... 643,000... each issue.

"And whereas, the said Monon Route desires to advertise in said publication, which advertising the said publisher agrees to do upon the following terms and conditions, which are mutually agreed upon:

"1st. The said publisher agrees to publish in said publication an advertisement of the Monon Route as follows:... One page 'ad' (divided as desired).

said advertisement to appear.

Favorably.

. . . . one page...

and occupy a space of not less than. and to be published as desired in issues of said publication.

"2d. In full consideration of the foregoing advertising, the Monon Route agrees to issue the following nontransferable transportation based on regular published rate:

Trip tickets or mileage.

To the value of........ Five hundred...

Dollars

($500. . . . . . . .,) for the personal use of the publisher, his employés or immediate members of his or their families, which said transportation shall be limited for use not later than December 31, 1907.

"3d. Under no circumstances must the transportation issued under this contract be sold or transferred to or used by any other than the person to whom issued, as such sale, transfer or use would be a misdemeanor under the law.

"4th. It is understood and agreed that the transportation issued under this contract shall read to points on the Monon Route, and not to points on any other road. . . Further, should said publisher or any person named on said tickets allow any other person to use same or offer to sell, sell or transfer the same, then said publisher agrees to pay the said Monon Route as a penalty the full rate of fare which would have been paid

cember 31, 1907, unless otherwise stipulated."

The petition also alleged that after that contract was entered into, and previous to April 3, 1907, the defendant railway company, pursuant to the above contract, transported over its railway from points in one State to points in other States the employés of the Munsey Company upon trip and mileage tickets issued for their benefit.

That such interstate transportation paid for according to the company's published rates, amounted to $145.10, while the only compensation received by it for transportation previous to May 10, 1907, was the publication in the March issue of the Munsey Magazine of one-fourth of a page advertisement of the Monon Route which the parties valued at $125;

That while the railroad company was thus transporting the Munsey employés it contemporaneously transported over its lines between the same points other persons and exacted and received in money from them, in each instance, the full amount of its published rates and fares, the conditions and circumstances of the transportation being the same in the cases of employés and others;

That in accordance with the contract in question the railway company was, at the date of this suit, still furnishing interstate transportation to the publisher of Munsey's Magazine and the members of his family and to his employés and the members of their families;

That the railway company had entered into like contracts with other publishers of magazines, newspapers and similar periodicals to the number of two hundred and fifty-one, under the terms of which latter contracts the company, at the date this suit was commenced, was furnishing interstate transportation over its lines to such persons as were from time to time designated by the publishers last above mentioned, but not receiving compensation in money in any instance when furnishing trans