and the felt necessity of a Divine interposition. "The truth is," says Plato, "to determine or establish anything certain about these matters, in the midst of so many doubts and disputations, is the work of God only." Again, in his apology for Socrates, he puts these words into the mouth of the sage, "You may pass the remainder of your days in sleep, or despair of finding out a sufficient expedient for this purpose (the reformation of manners); if God, in his providence, do not send you some other instruction." But the most remarkable passage, is in the well-known dialogue between Socrates and Alcibiades, on the duties of religious worship. Alcibiades is going to the temple to pray, Socrates meets him, and dissuades him, because of his inability to manage the duty aright. "To me," he says, "it seems best to be quiet; it is necessary to wait till you learn how you ought to behave towards the gods, and towards men." "And when, O Socrates! shall that time be, and who will instruct me," says the wondering disciple, "for gladly would I see this man, who he is?" "He is one," replies Socrates, "who cares for you; but, as Homer represents Minerva taking away the darkness from the eyes of Diomedes, that he might distinguish a god from a man, so it is necessary that he should first take away the darkness from your mind, and then bring near those things, by which you shall know good and evil.” "Let him take away," rejoins Alcibiades, "if he will, the darkness, or any other thing, for I am prepared to decline none of those things, which are commanded by him, whoever this man is, if I shall be made better." Such were the utterances of nature's longings, for that revelation which has since been given to the world.

3. In favor of the presumptive argument, for which we contend, we remark again, that the expectation thus expressed, is justly founded upon the known attributes of God.

Let it be observed here, however, that the idea of obligation on the part of God, to bestow the desired boon upon mankind, is utterly excluded by the origin and nature of that necessity under which they labor. The revelation, of whatever kind it was, given to man at his creation, though measured by his wants, was not granted as his right. No such claim can be based upon the mere relation of creatures to their Creator: much less can it be made out, in favor of those, who originally endowed, have "become vain in their imaginations," and whose "foolish hearts" are thereby "darkened."

Nevertheless, there may be a well-founded expectation of a desired good, where there is no valid claim to its enjoyment. Such an expectation will be more general or defined, according to the extent of our knowledge. If derived from obscure analogies it is indefinite and vague, and therefore only partially fulfilled by the event, yet the event which disappoints it in part, may at the same time justify the reasoning upon which it was built. I may know enough of God and his government to infer the probability of a revelation, and yet the very analogies from which I reason, will themselves teach me, that I do not know enough to anticipate beforehand, the extent or mode of that revelation. If, then, passing beyond the only conclusion which my information will warrant, I go about to form a definite conception of my own, as to the how, or the when, of this supposed revelation, the event may entirely disappoint all such expectations, and yet by fulfilling, justify, the primary inference.

It is by these considerations, that we vindicate our argument from the objection, that God has not given to all men a revelation, though all men are under a like necessity. If a revelation is to be inferred from the condition of men, it may be said, that a universal revelation ought to be inferred, since all men are in this respect in the same condition. But as all have not been blessed with the light of the truth, the fact is, therefore, in opposition to the inference. Now, if the argument necessarily implied, that man's necessities constituted a claim upon his Maker; or if it professed to proceed upon so clear a knowledge of Jehovah's purpose, as to determine beforehand, the extent and mode of any Divine communication, this objection would be fatal. But as man has no claim of right, and can expect the desired boon only as the bestowment of grace, he cannot know beforehand, that God will make no distinctions in its bestowment. He cannot anticipate the degree, or any one circumstance in the manner of imparting the supposed revelation. Such detailed and definite expectations are not warranted by his information. Their being disappointed by the event, therefore, can in no way impair the force of an inference, justly derived from ascertained premises. To say that there are considerations which warrant the expectation of a Divine revelation, is one thing but to say furthermore, that such a revelation if given, will be universal, is a very different assertion, and one which would require a very different set of analogies to prove it.

Assuming then, the necessity of our condition, we argue, that

the expectation of a Divine revelation is justly founded upon what may be known of God and his government.

In the exercise of those attributes which are deemed essential to every reasonable conception of God, he has created man with a physical, intellectual, and moral nature. With varied dispensations towards races, and ages, and individuals, we yet find that he has made ample provision for man's physical and intellectual wants. The earth, though bearing the marks of changes, unfriendly to its products and its clime, and in some of its widespread regions yielding a precarious, and in some a scanty, and in all a seemingly reluctant support to her teeming populations, is yet, by evident design, adapted to man's physical constitution. The very difficulties of its climate and soil, requiring skill and labor to overcome them, as they stimulate to exertion, furnish also "verge and scope" for the exercise of his intelligence. If gifted with faculties seeking a wider range than the daily supply of his necessary wants, he is surrounded also with objects appealing to his curiosity and inviting his research: he is in the midst of a world of wonders which ages would be too short to explore, and himself the greatest wonder of them all. If, with still more adventurous thought, he would rise from the actual to the probable, and from a real to an imagined existence, his discursive fancy may weave into unnumbered combinations the elements of being, or a bold speculation may busy itself in conjecturing or discovering the reasons of things. By the wise arrangements of the Creator, there is then abundant employ and a rich reward to the utmost stretch of his intellectual powers. But man has no less certainly a moral, than he has a physical and intellectual nature. There is that within him which recognizes the distinction of right and wrong, and gives no unequivocal notice of his accountability. Yea, he has a religious nature; a sense of the Divine existence, if you will, which, not until he has reasoned himself into metaphysical madness, or besotted his soul by long habits of sensuality, will permit him to say in his heart "there is no God," or leave him wholly insensible to the obligation of his worship.

Might we not then expect, from the analogy of his dealings in other things, that God would make provision also for this part of man's nature? And might we not expect it the more, by as much as this is the highest and most distinguishing element of his complex being? Is it conceivable, that whilst caring for all

his subordinate wants, as he manifestly has, God should leave him unprovided in this the most essential want of his nature: that he should leave him with the consciousness of obligation and accountability, and yet uninstructed in the relation which he sustains to his Maker, and the paramount duties growing out of that relation?

It is a monstrous supposition, which sober Deism itself would reject, with indignant scorn. And yet on the assumption that man needs a revelation, by just so much as this supposition is at war with right reason, and the analogies of the divine government, by so much the opposite presumption gathers strength and forcethat a revelation would be granted. The Deist would, of course, contend that God had made ample provision for man's moral and religious nature without a revelation. But we are arguing now upon the assumption that he has not, and we say, that that assumption being granted, or the fact being proved, even Deism itself must admit that a revelation is probable.

Now thus much, we have deemed it necessary to say, towards exhibiting in advance, the nature and strength of that presumptive argument, which from the necessities of our condition, infers a revelation. Standing thus by itself, the argument, of course, claims not to have the urgency of a demonstration. But establishing a probability, that probability may serve as a link in the chain of induction, which binds us down to a positive and unavoidable conclusion. We have intimated already, that the inference of a revelation as probable from its alleged necessity, is but a part of the general argument in its affirmative aspect. The expectation of a revelation brings us to the Book itself, and we come to the investigation of its claims, not as if it were an unlooked-for phenomenon, but as to an event, which from its antecedent probability, has already an established title to our credence; a title which can only be set aside by being actually disproved. There is here a presumptive claim which casts the onus probandi upon the opposite party. Arrived at this presumption, we hold then that the argument has made progress, and the evidence of revelation in any of its departments gains force and urgency from this foregone probability.

But the probability thus derived especially leads us-and in the attitude of expectants, an attitude perfectly compatible with exemption from prejudice-to examine the claims of any supposed revelation, with particular reference to those necessities on account

of which it was given. And if we find in the Bible an adaptation to the felt wants of our spiritual nature, we are brought to the direct conclusion, upon the principles of Deism itself, that the Bible is a revelation from God. For just as we argue from the adaptations of external nature, a designing cause, we may also argue from the adaptations of Scripture its supernatural and Divine origin. As conclusively as in the one case, these adaptations prove the being of a God; those, in the other case, transcending as they do, the discoveries of the human intelligence, prove the Bible to be from Him. Thus much, Dr. Chalmers fully concedes, and in conceding it, shows that his previous exceptions can only hold against those defective representations of the argument, which make of the presumption a certainty, or suppose the reasoning to stop short at the inference, and passing over the intermediate steps, to leap at once from the bare probability of a revelation, to the conclusion that the Bible is that revelation. It is only with reference to such a view that we can understand him as saying that "the argument is altogether premature if we base it upon the necessity alone." We may certainly base upon the necessity the strong presumption which we have considered, and that presumption leading us to examine and find the perfect adaptations of Scripture to our felt necessities, we may thus "arrive at the truth of the gospel through the medium of its necessity," and by "a pathway" too, sufficiently "solid" for even the Herculean tread of a Chalmers. "The fitness of the Bible," he says, "or of the truths which are in it, to the necessities of the human spirit, may as clearly evince the hand of a designer in the construction of this volume, as the fitness of the world, or of the things which are in it, evinces the same hand in the construction of external nature. They are both cases of adaptation, and the one is just as good an argument for a revealed as the other is for a natural theology."

If we have occupied considerable space in exhibiting the true ground and scope of our argument, it is not more than seemed to be required by the treatment which it has received. If we have succeeded in establishing its logical propriety and force, and marking out the track by which it advances to a just and definite conclusion, we shall follow, with the greater interest and satisfaction, the several steps of its progress.

The main question is now before us, and we shall endeavor to substantiate what we have hitherto assumed.

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