dict those other principles. To fhew this then particularly: 1. The immortality of the foul is very agreeable to the natural notion which we have of God, one purt whereof is, that he is effentially good and juft. ift, For his goodnefs. It is very agreeable to that, to think that God would make fome creatures for as long a duration as they are capable of. The wisdom of God hath chofen to display itself, in creating variety of things of different degrees and perfections; things devoid of life and fenfe; and feveral degrees and orders of fenfitive creatures of different fhapes and figures, of different magnitude, fome vastly great, others extremely little, others of a middle fort between thefe. And himself being a pure fpirit, we have no reason to doubt, but he could make creatures of a fpiritual nature, and fuch as fhould have no principle of felf-corruption in them. And feeing he could make creatures of fuch perfection, if we believe him to be effentially good, we have no reafon to doubt, but that he hath done fo: For it is the very nature of goodness, to communicate and diffuse itself, and to delight in doing fo; and we cannot imagine but that the fame goodness which prompted and inclined him to give being to thofe creatures which are of an inferior degree of perfection, would move him likewife to make creatures more perfect and capable of greater degrees of happiness, and of a longer enjoyment of it, if it were in his power to make fuch; and no man that believes the omnipotency of God can doubt of this. For he, who by a pure act of his will, can command things to be, and in an inftant to start out of nothing, can as eafily make one fort of creatures as an other. Now the power of God being fuppofed, his goodnefs fecures us of his will: For we cannot imagine any fuch thing as envy in a being which we fuppofe to be perfectly good; nothing being more inconfiftent with perfect goodness, than to be unwilling to communicate happiness to others, and to grudge that others should partake of it.. Now, this being fuppofed, that God could and would make creatures of a spiritual and immortal nature, and the utmost imaginable perfections of such creatures being knowlege knowledge and liberty, wherever thefe perfections are found, we have reafon to conclude that creature to be endowed with a principle that is of a fpiritual and immortal nature. Now, thefe perfections of understanding and will being found in man, this argues him to be endowed with fuch a principle, as is, in its own nature, capable of an immortal duration. It is true, indeed, this fpiritual part of man, which we call his foul, is united to a vifible and material part, viz. his body; the union of which parts conftitutes a peculiar fort of creature, which is utriufque mundi nexus, "unites “the material and immaterial world, the world of mat❝ter and of fpirits." And as it is very suitable to the wildom of God, which delights in variety, that there fhould be a fort of creatures compounded of both these principles, matter and fpirit; fo it is very agreeable to his goodness to think that he would defign fuch creatures for as long a duration and continuance as they were capable of. For, as it is the effect of goodness to bring creatures forth into the poffeffion of that life and happiness which they are capable of, fo to continue them in the enjoyment of it for fo long as they are capable. The fum of all this is, that as it is agreeable to the wifdom of God, which made the world, to display itself in all variety of creatures, fo it is agreeable to his goodpefs to make fome of as perfect a kind as creatures are capable of being Now, it being no repugnancy nor contradiction, that a creature fhould be of a fpiritual and im mortal nature, we have no reafon to think, but that the fruitfulness of the divine goodnefs hath brought forth fuch creatures; and if there be reafon to conclude any thing to be of a fpiritual and immortal nature, certainly the prin ciple of underftanding and liberty, which we are confcious of in ourselves, deferves to be reputed fuch. 2dly, It is very agreeable to the justice of God, to think the fouls of men remain after this life, that there may be a ftate of reward and recompence in another world. If we believe God to be holy and juft, we cannot but believe that he loves righteoufnefs and goodness, and hates iniquity; and that as he is Governor and pub lick lick magiftrate of the world, he is concerned to counte nance and encourage the one, and to discountenance and difcourage the other. Now, the providences of God being, in a great meafure, promifcuoufly adminiftered in this world, fo that no man can make any certain judgment of God's love and hatred towards perfons by what befals them in this world, it being the lot of good men many times to fuffer and be afflicted, and of wicked men to live in a flourishing and profperous condition; I fay, things being thus, it is very agreeable to these notions which we have of the divine holiness and justice, to believe that there will a time come, when this wife and juft Governor of the world will make a wide and vifible difference between the righteous and the wicked; fo that though, for a while, the juftice of God may be clouded, yet there will a time come when it fhall be clearly manifefted, and every eye fee it, and bear witnefs to it; when judgment shall break forth as the light, and righteousness as the noonday. It is poffible that fin, for a while, may go unpu nished, nay, triumph and profper; and that virtue and innocence may not only be unrewarded, but oppreffed, and defpifed, and perfecuted. And this may be recon cileable enough to the wifdom of God's providence, and the juftice of it, fuppofing the immortality of the foul, and another state after this life, wherein all things shall be fet ftraight, and every man fhall receive according to his works; but unlefs this be fuppofed, it is impoffible to folvé the juftice of God's providence. Who will believe that the affairs of the world are administered by him who loves righteoufnefs, and hates all the workers of iniquity, who will not let the leaft fervice that is done to him pafs unrewarded, nor, on the other hand, acquit the guilty, and let fin go unpunished, which are the properties of juftice; I fay, who will believe this, that looks into the courfe of the world, and fees with how little difference and diftinction of good and bad, the affairs of it are managed? that fees virtue difcountenanced and defpifed, poor and deftitute, afflicted and tormented; when wickedness is many times exalted to high places, and makes a great noife and ruffle in the world? He that confiders what a hazard many times good men run, how, for goodness fake, they they venture, and many times quit all the contentments and enjoyments of this life, and submit to the greatest fufferings and calamities that human nature is capable of; while, in the mean time, profperity is poured into the lap of the wicked, and heaven feems to look pleafantly upon thofe who deal treacherously, and to be filent whilft the wicked devours the man that is more righteous than himfelf; he that confiders this, and can, without fupposing another life after this, pretend to vindicate the justice of these things, must be as blind as the fortune that governs them. Would not this be a perpetual ftain and blemish upon the divine providence, that Abel, who offered up a better facrifice than Cain, and had this teftimony, that he pleafed God: yet, after all this, fhould have no other reward for it, but to be flain by his brother, who had of fended God by a flight and contemptuous offering? If there were no reward to be expected after this life, would not this have been a fad example to the world, to see one of the first men that ferved God acceptably thus rewarded? What a pitiful encouragement would it be to men to be good, to fee profane Efau bleffed with the dew of beaven, and the fatness of the earth; and to hear good old Jacob, in the end and conclufion of his days, to complain, Few and evil have the days of my pilgrimage been; If this had been the end of Efau and Jacob, it would puzzle all the wit and reafon of mankind to wipe off this reproach from the providence of God, and vindicate the juftice of it. And therefore I do not wonder that the greateft wits among the Heathen Philofophers were so much puzzled with this objection against the providence of God; if the wife, and juft, and good God do adminifter the affairs of the world, and be concerned in the good or bad actions of men, cur bonis male, & malis bene? How comes it to pafs, that good men many times are "miferable, and bad men so happy in the world?" And they had no other way to wipe off this objection, but by referring these things to another world, wherein the temporal fufferings of good men fhould be eternally rewarded, and the short and tranfient happiness of wicked men fhould be rendered infignificant, and drowned in an eternity of mifery. So So that if we believe the being of God, and the providence of God (which I do ali along take for granted in this argnment;) there is no other way imaginable to folve the equity and juftice of God's providence, but, upon this fuppofition, that there is another life after this. For to fay, that virtue is a fufficient and abundant reward for itself, though it have fome truth in it, if we set aside thofe fufferings, and miferies, and calamities, which virtue is frequently attended with in this life; yet, if these be taken in, it is but a very jejune and dry fpeculation. For, confidering the ftrong propension and inclination of human nature to avoid thefe evils and inconveniencies, a state of virtue attended with great fufferings, would be fo far from being a happiness, that it would be a real mifery; fo that the determination of the Apoftle, 1 Cor. xv. 19. is according to nature, and the truth and reason of things, that, If in this life only we had hope, we were of all men moft miferable. For although it be true, that as things now ftand, and as the nature of man is framed, good men do find a ftrange kind of inward pleasure and fecret fatisfaction of mind in the discharge of their duty, and in doing what is virtuous; yet every man that looks into himself, and confults his own breast, will find that this delight and contentment fprings chiefly from the hopes which men conceive, that a holy and virtuous life fhall not be unrewarded: and without thefe hopes, virtue is but a dead and empty name; and, notwithstanding the reasonableness of virtuous actions, compared with the contrary of them, yet, when virtue came to be incumbered with difficulties, and to be attended with fuch fufferings and inconveniencies as were grievous and intolerable to human nature, then it would appear unreafonable to chufe that for a happiness, which would rob a man of all the felicity of his life. For though a man were never fo much in love with virtue, for the native beauty and comeliness of it; yet it would strangely cool his affection to it, to confider that he should be undone by the match, that when he had it, he muft go a begging with it, and be in dan ger of death, for the fake of that which he had chosen for |