exercise of war powers. But the applicable principle to determine the validity of such action is not new. Even in times of peace we are familiar with the principle of regulation which extends to callings "affected with a public interest." The Supreme Court, after reviewing the decisions, recently said: "They demonstrate that a business, by circumstances and its nature, may rise from private to be a public concern and be subject, in consequence, to governmental regulation. And they demonstrate... that the attempts made to place the right of public regulation in the cases in which it has been exerted, and of which we have given examples, upon the ground of special privilege conferred by the public on those affected cannot be supported. The underlying principle is that business of certain kinds holds such a peculiar relation to the public interests that there is superinduced upon it the right of public regulation."" The extraordinary circumstances of war may bring particular business and enterprises clearly into the category of those which are affected with a public interest and which demand immediate and thorough-going public regulation. The production and distribution of foodstuffs, articles of prime necessity, those which have direct relation to military efficiency, those which are absolutely required for the support of the people during the stress of conflict, are plainly of this sort. Reasonable regulations to safeguard the resources upon which we depend for military success must be regarded as being within the powers confided to Congress to enable it to prosecute a successful war. In the words of the Supreme Court: "It is also settled beyond dispute that the Constitution is not self-destructive. In other words, that the power which it confers on the one hand it does not immediately take away on the other..." This was said in relation to the taxing power. Having been granted in express terms, the Court held it had not been taken away by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. As the Supreme Court put it in another case: "the Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring upon the one hand a taxing power and taking the same power away on the other by the limitations of the due process clause." German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S., 389, 411. Brushaber v. United States, 240 U. S. 1, 24. Similarly, it may be said that the power has been expressly given to Congress to prosecute war, and to pass all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying that power into execution. That power explicitly conferred and absolutely essential to the safety of the Nation is not destroyed or impaired by any later provision of the constitution or by any one of the amendments. These may all be construed so as to avoid making the constitution self-destructive, so as to preserve the rights of the citizen from unwarrantable attack, while assuring beyond all hazard the common defence and the perpetuity of our liberties. These rest upon the preservation of the nation. It has been said that the constitution marches. That is, there are constantly new applications of unchanged powers, and it is ascertained that in novel and complex situations, the old grants contain, in their general words and true significance, needed and adequate authority. So, also, we have a fighting constitution. We cannot at this time fail to appreciate the wisdom of the fathers, as under this charter, one hundred and thirty years oldthe constitution of Washington-the people of the United States fight with the power of unity,-as we fight for the freedom of our children and that hereafter the sword of autocrats may never threaten the world. THE REPRESENTATIVE IDEA AND THE WAR. BY ROBERT MCNUTT MCELROY, OF NEW JERSEY. It is an axiom among students of history that the causes of great historical processes are never simple; and this present war, the greatest of all wars, is no exception to the rule, having its roots far back in the mazes of racial, dynastic, religious and territorial complications. A simple explanation would be an anachronism. There are the racial antipathies, no less strong because pure races do not exist. There is Russia's age-long ambition for an outlet to the Mediterranean. There is Britain's pride in her Admiralty; France's desire for revenge for the days of 1871. There are the ancient racial complications which have caused men to say of Austria that she is not an empire but a mistake. These and a hundred others must be reckoned with when the day comes for the historian to speak as an historian of the present war. Today no man who values his reputation as a scientific historian will venture to pronounce an historical judgment upon the more obscure questions of the war. For three things are necessary before a real historical judgment can be pronounced: We must know, if not all, at least the most essential facts. We must be able to speak impartially and judicially, with a minimum of personal bias. We must be able to see the results, as the tracing of cause and effect is a large part of an historian's task. All of these elements are necessarily lacking at present. It is true that the world has been flooded with books of many colors, each purporting to contain all the essential documents; but we know that each is a brief for a particular party-in-interest, carefully edited with a view of making a certain definite impression. Many missing links will appear in each as the years roll by. History will not be ready to pronounce her complete verdict for half a century. We cannot say, for example, whether the battle of the Marne ranks with Marathon, Chalons and Tours, battles which saved civilizations, until we are certain that our civiliza tion has been saved. Today we do not know enough to speak as the historian of the future will speak, but we know enough to fight as the patriot, the friend of law and humanity, fights. We have not all the facts, but we have enough to be certain that we are fighting for our national existence, for free government, and for the rights of nations. We know enough to justify even the most judicial among us in subscribing to the view expressed by one of the wisest among us, Elihu Root, whose words I wish to read to you: "The principles of our fathers must go down before this German Moloch, unless the triumphant manhood of our republic gives support. As surely as the sun shall rise tomorrow, if this war ends with the triumph of Germany, this country will become a subject nation." "A subject nation "-this is the opinion of a statesman, calm, clear-eyed and accustomed to weigh his words. With America a "subject nation," what chance would liberty have in any other part of the earth? Representative government could no more exist in a world dominated by Prussia than it was able to survive in a Germany dominated by Prussia. Fundamentally this is a Prussian war against a Germanic idea; for the idea of representation, the Teutonic idea in government as we used to call it, was born in the forests of Germany, if we may still venture to follow Montesquieu and a long line of political philosophers of many lands who followed him. For a time it seemed to have a chance of developing there into a real system of government; but the demands of an age of war, the need of quick decision and centralized power soon led to the complete triumph of absolutism; and the Teutonic idea ceased to gain ground upon the continent. The spirit of Cæsar again ruled upon the mainland, except in the mountains of Switzerland and in the lowlands of Holland, where the germ of representative government still survived. Germany, the birthplace of free government, had "reverted to type." But in the meantime, certain Teutonic tribes, as yet untouched by Rome, had migrated to England, taking the idea of representation with them. From the landing of Hengest in 449 A. D. to the arrival of Augustine and his 40 Roman Catholic monks in 597 A. D., the Teutonic idea grew and prospered in England as it had never been allowed to do upon the continent. During all those years, "no foreign influence, not German in origin," says Bishop Stubbs, 66 was admitted at all." The native Britons were almost exterminated and the Saxons became the sole masters of England. Their isolated position protected them and their ideals of government from the pressure which, on the continent, had made it necessary to sacrifice everything to military efficiency. As the years passed, the county meeting came to maturity, a meeting where sat representatives from each township, speaking and voting for their constituents. Thus the Teutonic idea, beaten in its native forests, flourished here in the seclusion of the British Isles. Absolutism strove in vain to gain control. King after king arose, filled with the Roman idea which came with Augustine, and strove to imitate his brother kings across the Channel; but each in turn was beaten. King John dared to aspire to absolute rulership, and was forced to face his infuriated barons at Runnymede. Henry III tried it, and the grim, determined figure of Simon de Montfort scattered his forces at Lewes, and issued the summons which gave nationality to the Teutonic idea in England. In 1265 the people's representatives, whom Earl Simon had summoned, assembled at Westminster, and the idea of government by a parliament representing all the people of England, nobility, clergy and commonalty alike, took its place in history. Against it the despotic Tudors, the treacherous Stuarts and the dull Hanoverians struggled in vain. Earl Simon's Parliament had given an ideal of government which could not be moved. REPRESENTATION'S STRUGGLE. In 1760 George the Third came to the throne of England. He had been reared under the ideal of government which by this time dominated his Germanic fatherland. His ambitious mother had dinned into his ears from childhood the words, "be a King, George," by which she meant an irresponsible, absolute monarch. But in the path of his ambition stood the Great Prime Minister, William Pitt, the man whose genius had changed the Kingdom of England into the British Empire; the man of whom Frederick the Great declared, " England has been long in travail, but at last she has brought forth a man." With Pitt at the helm of State, no man could hope to be a king in the sense in which George the Third unde stood the words. The young monarch |