ever another abuse connected with jury service which should be carefully inquired into in these two cities, which cannot have escaped the notice of every active practitioner in the courts held in New York and Brooklyn. There is a class of men who frequent the court rooms, and whose faces are to be seen on juries almost every day during term time. Their plan of operations is somewhat in this wise. They make the acquaintance of the clerk who draws the jury, and who is generally a ward politician, and ascertain whether or not there is danger of operating in his presence. They then observe the appearance of the attending jurors, and drop into a casual conversation with some juror whom they deem to be a proper subject for operation. If they ascertain that the juror desires to be excused, they will ask him for his notice, and tell him that they will have him excused. If the juror is credulous enough, he departs believing he has escaped the duty imposed upon him by the laws of his country. The professional juror simply holds his notice, and when the name of the regular juror is called, answers and steps into the jury box. That this business exists as I have stated was proved recently in Kings county, when one of the rascals was exposed, but for some reason or other escaped punishment. These matters must be within the cognizance of judges and court officials, and they deserve the severest censure for their failure to prevent such abuses. What has become of the Bar Associations? Surely such matters merit their notice and demand a searching investigation at their hands. WE LEGAL OBSERVER. NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. 13TH FEDERAL REPORTER. E have so often called attention to the merits of this publication that it is now unnecessary to do more than say, that it is better than ever and is unrivalled in its department. We find it of the greatest practical use, and the occasional notes by Mr. Desty, the editor, are excellent. BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY. The 15th edition of this celebrated work, "greatly enlarged and improved," is before us. It is edited by Francis Rawle, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar. He states that the present contains three times the matter of the original edition, and that more than one hundred gentlemen of eminence have supplied the new matter. More than 700 new titles have been added to this edition, and others have been amplified. It is sufficient to say that this is the best law diction ary ever published, and likely to remain so. The two volumes are well printed. Published by J. B. Lippincott & Co., of Philadelphia. INDERMAUR'S LEADING COMMON LAW CASES. An Epitome of Leading Common Law Cases; with some short notes thereon; chiefly intended as a guide to "Smith's Leading Cases." Fifth edition. By John Indermaur. American edition by Charles A. Bucknam and Boardman Hall, of the Boston Bar. Boston, Soule and Bugbee, 1883. Pp. xii, 107. This is an excellent and well known work, to which the editors have judiciously added American authorities, and notes. There is an astonishing amount of our common law in these few pages. cases, the mere sound of their names, shows that their aim is to translate and not to change. A New York correspondent says he is acquainted with one Maglori Vincent who now rejoices in the appellation of "My Glory Twenty Hundred!" A Pierre Chabot has become "Peter Catshoe" (why not Puss in Boots?"); Noel Vien subscribes himself "Christmas Coming"; Joseph Marchterre is now "Joseph Sidewalk"; Noel Prairie is "Christmas Meadow"; Toussaint Cote, "All Saints Side"; Joachim Poulin, Washington Colt"; Noel Trudeau, "Christmas Waterhole"; Jean Phaneuf, "Jack Makes-nine"; Vincent Archambault Twenty hundred Arch in beauty." Magloire Benoit has evidently been hard pressed for a translation, and has turned his name into " My Glory by Night!" which sounds like a bad pun on his patronymic.- Canada Legal News.-At the recent dinner given to Chief Justice Sharswood, Wm. Henry Rawle, of the Philadelphia Bar, expressed the hope "that the day is not distant when our Rules of Property may be wedded to immortal verse,'" and read the following: THE RULE IN SHELLY'S CASE. When by a will or deed, in tail or fee, The will or deed a limitation makes To heirs, in fee or tail, the word heirs shall be- Or how absurd it seems upon the surface- This is the Rule, and it will bear the test Some words of Coke's and some of Smith's are pressed And mending Coke's atrocities of grammar; It will be found that it contains compressed in The style is Byron's but is much more stupid— Whose lively amours can my thoughts beguile From dusty tomes, to which my mind must stoop at From morn to midnight, without rest the while; But students now will read the law with pleasure. With this hard rule set in Byronic measure. The American Law Register for January contains an article on Auction Sales, by Edmund H. Bennett; and the following cases: Ex parte Reynolds (Eng.), on privilege of witness to refuse to answer criminating questions, with note by Henry Wade Rogers; Seib v. Pierpont (Iowa), on assignment for benefit of creditors by one partner without assent of the others, with note by M. D. Ewell; Hays v. Pennsylvania Company (U. S. Circ.), on discrimination in railway freights, with note by Adelbert Hamilton; Binford v. Johnson (Ind.), on negligent sale of dangerous article to child, with note by W. W. Thornton.- In the introduction to Salmon's Gazetteer (8th ed.), published in 1769, the author in describing the courts of England says: "There are also Sheriff's Courts and Hundred Courts, held in all parts of England where little matters are controverted; but these inferior courts are the plague of every neighborhood, the suit being managed by little rascally pettyfoggers, who commit more robberies under color of law, than all the highwaymen in England; and what renders these oppressions still more grievous is, that they are usually exercised on the poorest people, unable to defend themselves, who are surprised into an execution and their beds taken from under them, where the matter in dispute is but for a trifle." The Albany Law Journal. THOSE ALBANY, MARCH 3, 1883. CURRENT TOPICS. HOSE who are opposed to the practice of receiving the testimony of accomplices, informers, decoys and detectives will find reason for reconsideration in the pending star-route trial in this country and the State trial in Ireland, so far at least as the testimony of accomplices is concerned. The accomplices who have turned State's evidence in these cases may be detestable persons, but the admissibility of their testimony may lead to the punishment of others as bad or worse, which could not otherwise be effected. It is wise for the State to offer inducements for accomplices to turn informers. The practice will always render conspiracies weak and deter men from the commission of crimes requiring co-operation. Against this potent fact it is hardly worth while to array the sentimental argument of the baseness of informers, and the practical argument of the untrustworthiness of their testimony. Sentiment is nothing in comparison with the safety of society, and there is a tribunal to judge of the credibility of testimony. The latter. point is one upon which the jury is peculiarly fitted to decide, and no substitute can well be devised. It looks now as if the Irish murderers were caught and would be punished. It would be unsafe to predict any thing concerning the star-route trial. In England an innkeeper was recently indicted for refusing to take in his guests at two o'clock in the morning, and it is stated that a public subscription was made to defray his costs. It would be a very unenterprising innkeeper who should refuse to take in a new arrival, and a very unaccommodating one who should refuse to re-open to an old one, at that hour. It might be well to supply guests, who already have rooms, with night keys. The London Law Times says: "That it is an indictable offense for an innkeeper to refuse to receive travellers is clear beyond doubt, as may be seen from the very full report of R. v. Ivens, 7 C. & P. 214, in which the landlord of the Bell Inn, at Chepstow, was fined twenty shillings for refusing to admit a solicitor's clerk at a few minutes before twelve on a Sunday night. Some distinction might perhaps be drawn between the refusal to admit a traveller upon his first appearance at a late hour, and the refusal to admit him at a late hour after his appearance and retainer of rooms at an earlier one; for when he has once retained rooms it might perhaps be said that he is no longer a traveller in the proper sense of the term, with reference to the old case of R. v. Luellin, 12 Mod. Rep. 445, in which an indictment was quashed because it did not appear therefrom that the rejected guest was a traveller. * * It is curious to observe that the learned Criminal Code VOL. 27-No. 9. In Pugh v. Telephone Association (Notes of Cases, post), in considering the defendant's right to cut off the plaintiff for " damning" over the wire, the court, as may well be supposed, could not find any case exactly in point. The nearest approach is Pendegrast v. Compton, 8 C. & P. 462, an action of damages, by a captain in the army, for breach of contract by a ship captain to carry the plaintiff and his wife as cuddy passengers on a voyage from Madras to England. The defendant undertook to justify by showing that "the conduct of the plaintiff was vulgar, offensive, indecorous and unbecoming," and constituted good cause of exclusion from the cuddy. The court said: "There is some evidence that he was in the habit of reaching across other passengers, and of taking potatoes and broiled bones with his fingers. It would be difficult to say, if it rested here, in what degree want of polish would, in point of law, warrant a captain in excluding a passenger from the cuddy. Conduct unbecoming a gentleman, in the strict sense of the word, might justify him; but in this case there is no imputation of the want of gentlemanly principle." The poet says (very ungrammatically), "To swear is neither brave, polite, nor wise;" but leaving out of question the precise moral status of the word "damn," we think the court were right in justifying the shutting off of Mr. Pugh, on the ground that his language might accidentally startle some innocent "family circle," or shock the "welldisposed females" who are the "operators at the Exchange," especially as the offender refused to promise not to do so any more, or as he phrased it, to "eat dirt." The telephone is a very vexatious institution at times, but those who would use it should turn away their heads and speak in an "aside" when they are provoked to bad language. The sesquipedalian and alliterative Argus takes a column in its issue of Tuesday last to defend the proposed bill for letting the contracts for printing the Court of Appeals Reports. The ponderous Regent trots out his favorite and inevitable expressions, such as 66 'denuded," "facile falsehood," "slime," venom," ""fat-witted temerity," and the like, which have obtained for him his deserved celebrity as the "brainy" Boanerges of the daily press. We are glad he omits "monumental." is probably saving that for his last crushing blow. The Argus says the present contract makes three dollars the maximum price for a volume. That is true, but the contract has been let, for a year to come, at one dollar a volume, and the pro He received his degree at Harvard, was two years at the Harvard Law School, and subsequently practiced at the Boston bar. He was never married. Mr. Newell was a singularly modest and conscientious man. His editorial labor was characterized by rare discrimination and intelligence, and unfailing industry and fidelity. Our readers will regret with us that he should have been called away so soon from a life so full of faithful performance and fair promise. We frequently receive letters from attorneys, criticizing, sometimes with moderation, sometimes with considerable sharpness, the decisions of our courts. We occasionally publish the former; the latter very rarely, and when we have published the latter we have always meant to examine the matter posed bill would abrogate that contract, and make it possible to re-let the contract at three dollars a volume. The Argus says the present law bases the above maximum price on a volume of 500 pages, and that the proposed bill extends the volume to 750 pages, "a gain of one volume more of the present size in every two issues of the proposed size." But the Argus omits to state that the present contract calls for volumes of at least 750 pages, with the right to demand 900 pages. No "facile falsehood" here on the part of the Argus! The Argus says any obligations under or pertaining to the present contract cannot be impaired by any new act. The Argus knows perfectly well that the present contract expressly provides that it shall be abrogated by the passage of any new act No "facile falsehood" about this on the part of the Argus! The Argus vainly tries to embroil us in a misunder-subsequently for ourselves, and express our own imstanding with the judges of the Court of Appeals. He cannot succeed. The judges know us, and they know the Argus man, and that is enough. They knew us years before the astounding adjectives of the Argus agitated the Albanian atmosphere. We explicitly said on the start that we did not object to vesting the power of awarding the contracts in the judges, provided they were not empowered to delegate the letting to the partisan clerk and reporter, and provided the present reasonable and well-performed contract were not abrogated. Even the Argus does not charge that the contract has not been faithfully performed. To be sure, he says something about the reporter's "prodding" the contractors, but he does not allege any fault in their performance. Now that it is the Lenten season, we really wish the wildly-rhetorical Regent of the Argus would deny himself the luxury of his sesquipedality, and answer this plain question for the benefit of the public: why should the contract, now let by the secretary of State, comptroller and State reporter, at one dollar a volume of from 750 to 900 pages, and having nearly a year to run, be abrogated, and re-awarded by the clerk and reporter to somebody else at possibly three dollars a volume of 750 pages, for five years, when no fault is found with the contractors? Or if it be granted that the judges themselves will let the contract, why should the present contract be abrogated? Let us have no "petty indirection," and no Falstaffian quibbling and puffing and roaring, but give us a plain answer to a simple question. We suspect that the Argus will not give us a reason upon compulsion, though reasons were as plenty as blackberries." 66 We regret to be compelled to chronicle the death of Mr. Robert R. Newell, the editor of the INDEXREPORTER. He died at Cambridge, Mass., on the 23d ult., after a few days' illness, of pneumonia, at the age of thirty-nine. He was in the class of 1865 at Harvard, but left college to enter the military service in the civil war, in December, 1863. He became a captain in the 54th Massachusetts regiment, and served until the end of the war. He afterward pressions about it. We are reminded of this subject by the following excellent observations by the editor of the Western Jurist, in which "we concur:" "We are in receipt of many communications inquiring as to our silence concerning certain, in the opinion of correspondents, erroneous decisions of the Supreme Court of this State. Now we desire to say here that we do not assume to act as superior to our Supreme Court, and do not feel called upon to assail its decisions whenever it may see fit to differ with the opinion of the bar or that of other courts. Occasionally, when that court rules contrary to its own previous decisions, or to the law as recognized by the majority of the courts, we feel at liberty to review their work and point out wherein we believe them to be in error. Courts are not infallible; they do not claim to be so; and it is showing no disrespect to them to call their attention to errors unintentionally committed; and when such instances occur we are glad to have our attention called to them, if they have been overlooked by us. But these do not afford excuse for assailing the supreme tribunal of a State whenever its views happen to be at variance with our own. It is highly important that our courts have the respect and confidence of all parties, and it does not become any journal to lessen these by any utterances of its own." NOTES OF CASES. General Term of the second department, Gilbert, 'N Freel v. Buckley, 28 Hun, it was held by the J., dissenting, that the married women's acts of this State have abolished tenancy by the entirety. There is no discussion in the memorandum. Meeker v. Wright, 76 N. Y. 262, is cited as authority for this holding, but it does not hold any thing of the sort, although it looks that way. See notes, 26 Am. Rep. 64; 33 id. 269. In Sheldon v. Vail, 28 Hun, it was held that the trustees of a free church have the right to control and designate the places where persons shall sit, and in the absence of any proof that by usage or other wise, a person has acquired the right to occupy a special seat, they or any one of them may, after requesting him to leave the seat he is occupying and take another, forcibly remove him therefrom. The court said: "No proof is given as to the conditions upon which any person was allowed to occupy any particular seat, or any seat at all. Undoubtedly the habit of the plaintiff of sitting in the seat where he was at the time in question might be considered a license, so that he could not be removed without being first requested to go from that seat. But such a request was made by the defendant, who was one of the trustees. And it was only after refusal by the plaintiff that force was used. The plaintiff's counsel admits that an usher or doorkeeper would have authority in regard to unrented pews, if his authority were reasonably exercised. We think it must be that the trustees would have a right to control the places where persons should sit, in the absence of any proof that by usage or otherwise rights were acquired to special seats. It does not affirmatively appear that the plaintiff was a tributor to the expenses of the corporation, so as to entitle him to a vote. But however that may be, we think that to establish a right to remain in that seat, against the request of the trustees that he should remove, something more should have been shown than in this case. con "Damn," if not profane, is not "nice." So it is held by the District Court of Cincinnati, affirming the judgment of the Superior Court, in Pugh v. Telephone Co., which we believe we reported at the time. The question was whether Pugh had forfeited his right to use the telephone by "damning" the company over the wire. The rule prohibited the use of "improper or vulgar language." The court said in substance that it was hardly necessary, by its understanding of the rules of society, to go into an examination as to whether the word "damn "is profane or vulgar. Judge Barr of the United States District Court of Kentucky had already held that the word "damn," while not "obscene," was to be classed as "coarse, unbecoming, and profane," and in view of all the circumstances in the present case under which the word was used, it was patent to a majority of the court that it was used with a vile, low and insulting spirit, and if not profane, was manifestly improper. The rule prohibiting the use of "improper or vulgar" language was certainly a reasonable rule. "The telephone reaches into many family circles. It must be remembered that it is possible, from the peculiar arrangement of the instrument, to have a communication that is intended for one individual reach another. All communications, therefore, should be in proper language. Moreover, in many cases the operators in the exchanges are many of them refined ladies, and even beyond this, all operatives are to be protected from insult. Besides, the inventors have a right to be protected, and have their instrument placed in a respectable light before the world, otherwise it might go out of use." One judge dissented on the narrow view that "damn " is not profane. In Davis v. Falconbridge, a recent English county court case, an action for damages for injury to a carriage by collision with a cart, it was held that the plaintiff was barred from recovery because his carriage had no lights, although the street was well lighted, and the collision occurred about 7 o'clock on the 21st of October. The court said: "If a man chooses to drive about the country in a horse and carriage, or as you call it a trap - and no doubt it was a trap in the literal sense of the word- without lights, he is to my mind guilty of contributory negligence, and cannot recover. I am not speaking without book. Crofts v. Waterhouse, reported so long ago as 3 Bing. 319, was a case in which a man sought to recover damages against the proprietors of a coach for an accident which happened to that coach, and he failed. But in giving judgment in that case, Lord Chief Justice Best said something which is extremely valuable in all these cases. 'This action cannot be maintained unless negligence be proved. There was no negligence proved, and whether that be proved or not that is a question for the determination of the jury. The coachman must have competent skill, and use that skill with diligence; he must be well acquainted with the road he undertakes to drive, must be provided with steady horses, a coach and harness of sufficient strength and properly made, and also with lights by night; for if there be the least failure of any one of these things the duty of the coach proprietors is not fulfilled, and they are answerable for any injuries and damages that occur.' In the case quoted all these requirements had been properly fulfilled, but very great emphasis was laid on words 'and lights by night.' If a coach proprietor chooses to drive about without lights by night he is guilty of negligence, and cannot recover. I have had a great many cases of this sort, and I never will help a man who chooses to drive about without lamps. He cannot recover if he is guilty of any negligence which contributed to the damage. The other man might not have lights, but still if the plaintiff has none he cannot recover. It is of no use bringing cases before me of collisions at dusk and after dark when the man does not carry lights." This looks like a singular holding. With us there would be at least a question for the jury. In Willems V. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Jan. 10, 1883, 12 W. N. C. 471, it was left to the jury to say whether "billiards" and "pool" are the same or different. The court said: "The game called pool is shown to be played on a billiard table containing pockets, and with billiard balls and cues. Although most billiard tables manufactured for some years past are without pockets, yet as a matter of law, we cannot say that both are not billiard tables. The jury have found the two games to be practically and substantially billiards, although played in a different manner." But in Bartender v. State, 51 Ind. 73, and Squier v. State, 66 id. 317, it was held that they are different games. In Murphy v. People, 104 Ill. 528 (Mr. Freeman's advance sheets), the accused received a gold coin for the purpose of getting it changed for smaller coin, and never returned the coin nor accounted for it. Held, larceny. Citing Farrell v. People, 16 Ill. 506. The court said: "In Welsh v. People, 17 Ill. 339, (a case similar in the controlling principle to that in the present case), it was said: 'Where, as in this case, the alleged larceny is perpetrated by obtaining the possession of the goods by the voluntary act of the owner, under the influence of false pretenses and fraud, when the cases are carefully examined and well understood there is no real difficulty in deducing the correct rule by which to determine whether the act was a larceny, and felonious, or a mere cheat and swindle. The rule is plainly this: if the owner of the goods alleged to have been stolen parts with both the possession and the title to the goods to the alleged thief, then neither the taking nor the conversion is felonious. It can but amount to a fraud. It is obtaining goods under false pretenses. If however the owner parts with the possession voluntarily, but does not part with the title, expecting and intending that the same thing shall be returned to him, or that it shall be disposed of on his account, or in a particular way, as directed or agreed upon, for his benefit, then the goods may be feloniously converted by the bailee, so as to relate back and make the taking and conversion a larceny. The pointed inquiry in such a case must always arise, did the owner part with the title to the things, and was the legal title vested in the prisoner.' Again, in Stinson v. People, 43 Ill. 397, the same doctrine was reiterated. It was there, among other things, said: 'If, however, the owner parts with the possession voluntarily, but does not part with the title, expecting and intending the same thing shall be returned to him, or that it shall be disposed of on his account, or in a particular way, as directed or agreed upon, for his benefit, then the goods may be feloniously converted by the bailee, so as to relate back and make the taking and conversion a felony, if the goods were obtained with that intent.' This settles the law in this State, but analogous ruling, elsewhere, may be found in the following cases, referred to in argument by the Attorney-General: Bailey v. State, 58 Ala. 414; Commonwealth v. Barry, 124 Mass. 325; State v. Williamson, 1 Houst. Crim. C. 155; State v. Anderson, 25 Minn. 66; S. C., 33 Am. Rep. 455; People v. Abbott, 53 Cal. 284; S. C., 31 Am. Rep. 59; Elliott v. Commonwealth, 12 Bush, 176; Macino v. People, 19 N. Y. 127; Commonwealth v. Hurd, 123 Mass. 438; People v. McDonald, 43 N. Y. 61; Hildebrand v. People, 56 id. 394; S. C., 15 Am. Rep. 455." See 26 Alb. L. J. 381. review. It is a work of singular erudition, wisdom and impartiality, and of strong fascination, whether the reader agrees with the writer or not. Our present purpose is to place before our readers the author's views on the important topic of punishment. On this subject he says: "My opinion is that we have gone too far in laying it "—the punishment of death -"aside, and that it ought to be inflicted in many case not at present capital. I think, for instance, that political offenses should in some cases be punished with death. People should be made to understand that to attack the existing state of society is equivalent to risking their own lives. In many cases which outrage the moral feelings of the community to a great degree, the feeling of indignation and desire for revenge which is excited in the minds of decent people is, I think, deserving of legitimate satisfaction. If a man commits a brutal murder, or does his best to do so and fails only by accident, or if he ravishes his own daughter (I have known several such cases), or if several men acting together ravish any woman, using cruel violence to effect their object, I think they should be destroyed, partly in order to gratify the indignation which such crimes produce, and which it is desirable that they should produce, and partly in order to make the world wholesomer than it would otherwise be by ridding it of people as much misplaced in civilized society as wolves or tigers would be in a populous country. What else can be done with such people? If William Palmer had not been hanged in 1856, he would probably have been alive at this day, and likely to live for many years to come. What is the use of keeping such a wretch alive at the public expense, for say half a century? If by a long series of frauds artfully contrived a man has shown that he is determined to live by deceiving and impoverishing others, or if by habitually receiving stolen goods he has kept a school of vice and dishonesty, I think he should die. These views, it is said, are opposed to the doctrine that human life is sacred. I have never been able to understand distinctly what that doctrine means, or how its truth is alleged to be proved. If it means that life ought to have serious aims and to be pervaded by a sense of duty, I think the doctrine is true, but I do not see its relation to the proposition that no one ought ever to be put to death. It rather suggests the contrary conclusion as to persons who refuse to act upon it. If it means only that no one ought to be killed, I do not know on what grounds it can be supported. Whether life is sacred or not, I think there are many cases in which a man should be ready to inflict, or if necessary, to suffer death without shrinking. As however these views are at present unpopular and peculiar, and in the present state of public feeling on the subject it is useless to discuss this matter at length, no good purpose is served by making specific proposals which no one would entertain; but I may remark that I would punish with death offenses against property only upon great deliberation, and when it was made to appear by a public formal inquiry held after a conviction for an isolated offense |