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does not lie by one who has the right of possession against one who has the actual adverse possession "and sets up title to it "-that conflicting claims of title cannot be tried in the action of trover. To the same effect Baker v. Howell, and Brown v. Caldwell, 6 Serg. & R. 476; 10 id. 114. The cases go to the point that where the property sued for has been severed from plaintiff's land, he can show his ownership of the chattel by showing his ownership of the land, unless defendant has, and had when the property was severed from the free-hold, adverse possession of the land claiming title thereto. Of course, to exclude plaintiff's right to sue for the personal property, defendant must have the adverse possession claiming title. If a tenancy or quasi tenancy exists, the defendant and occupant not claiming to be owner of the personal property, as owner of the realty, the reason for precluding the personal action does not exist. Harlan v. Harlan, supra; Ferrand v. Thompson, 5 B. & Ald. 826; Mooers v. Wait, 9 Wend. 104.

But we find nowhere except in Kimball v. Lohmas, 31 Cal. 159, that with respect to the right of a plaintiff to resort to a replevin, a distinction exists between a defendant in adverse possession of the land, claiming title by writing, and a defendant in adverse possession, claiming title without any written foundation for the claim. The distinction seems to have been suggested by a phrase employed in the opinion of Halleck v. Mixer, with reference to a holding adversely "in good faith," etc.

But the case now before us differs in two respects from Kimball v. Lohmas: First-The defendant claims a right to the possession under color of title. SecondThe grain, the subject of the present controversy, was sown while defendant was in the adverse possession of the land. It did not exist, even potentially, while plaintiff had possession of the land - if plaintiff ever had possession of the land.

The present is also unlike the case of Atherton v. Fowler, 96 U. S. 513. There the hay, the subject of controversy, was cut from the meadows set in grass by plaintiff's testator. And besides, in that case the District Court of the State, "having given the law on the subject very clearly "-(in favor of plaintiff's right to maintain the action)-and inasmuch as it related to "a doctrine not affected by the Constitution or laws of the United States," the Supreme Court of the United States held, they "must take it to have been correctly expounded to the jury." 96 U. S., p. 515.

There is no precedent for an action like the present, and no good reason why this should be made a precedent.

We cannot say the court abused its discretion in disallowing plaintiff's motion to file a second amended complaint. It does not appear from the transcript that any proposed amendment was served or presented, or that the notice of motion pointed out the precise amendment which plaintiff would ask leave to make or file.

Judgment and order affirmed.

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giving of a promissory note for a certain amount by defendant, she discontinued the action, and furnished to defendant a stipulation signed by herself and her attorneys to discontinue the action without costs. She also condoned the adultery charged, and returned to live with defendant. Held, that this was sufficient consideration for the note, and the arrangement was not against public policy. An objection by defendant that the settlement was not a good consideration, because it was not final within the case Kirby v. Kirby, 1 Paige, 565, where it was held that a settlement of a divorce suit was subject to the supervision of the court, was not tenable, it appearing that this settlement had stood and defendant had received the benefit of it. Order affirmed. Adams v. Adams. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

[Decided Feb. 9, 1883.]

CORPORATION LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS FOR DEBTS OF MANUFACTURING, NOT ENFORCEABLE BY RECEIVER. The liability of stockholders of a corporation created under the general law of 1848, relating to manufacturing corporations, is a several individual liabil ity of each stockholder, directly to such of the creditors as have complied with the requisite conditions precedent. There is no statutory provision by which the rights of such creditors can be vested in a receiver of the corporation. The provision of section 448, Code Civ. P., which empowers one or more of the creditors to sue in behalf of all who are similarly situated, and to enjoin separate suits, recognizes that the right of action is in the creditors, and is the only one by which any creditor can be enjoined from bringing his separate action. The liability imposed by the act of 1848, referred to, does not exist in favor of the corporation itself nor for the benefit of all of its creditors, but only in favor of such creditors as are within the prescribed conditions. It is not a general right, but one which attaches only to the particular creditors, who are within the conditions. The case Story v. Furman, 25 N. Y. 214, does not apply in this case, being limited to an act relating to Herkimer county. See Cuykendall v. Corning, 88 N. Y. 129. Judgment reversed. Farnsworth v. Wood. Opinion by Rapallo, J. [Decided Feb. 6, 1883.]

WHERE TITLE TO

COSTS - ASSAULT AND BATTERY REAL ESTATE NOT IN CONTROVERSY.-A complaint alleged that defendant wrongfully entered plaintiff's grounds and house, and there committed an assault. No injury to the freehold was alleged, nor were damages claimed for entering upon the premises. The injury for which indemnity sought was to the person. The answer, besides a general denial, averred that one H. was the owner of the house, but the defense set up was, that the acts complained of were committed in defense of certain parties who being first assaulted by the plaintiff requested the assistance of the defendant as their servant. The evidence of neither party was exerted to obtain or defend possession or title. Held, that title to land was not brought in question by the pleadings, and there being no certificate that the title to lands came in question upon the trial, upon a recovery of less than $50, plaintiff was entitled to no more costs than damages, under Code Civ. Pro., § 3228, sub. 1, 3. Judgment reversed. Langdon v. Guy. Opinion by Danforth, J.

[Decided Feb. 9, 1883.]

EMINENT DOMAIN RIGHTS OF ABUTTING OWNER WHEN TITLE TO STREET IN CITY DAMAGES STREET

RAILWAY-USE OF STREET FOR STORING CARS.- - (1) In an action by an abutting owner against a street railway company injuring him by occupying the street with its cars in front of his premises, the rule of damages differs according as the occupation is lawful or unlawful. If the structure is unlawful, plaintiff is

entitled to damages for all the annoyance caused by the cars in front of his premises; if lawful, only for such as results from an unreasonable use. (2) An abutting owner simply, the fee of the street being in the city, is entitled to the use of the street, and neither the legislature nor the city can devote it to purposes inconsistent with street uses without compensation, according to the principle of Story v. Elevated R. Co., 90 N. Y., recently decided. But that case has left untouched the decision in People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188, that a horse railroad constructed under legislative authority on the surface of a city street, the fee of which is in the city, is not an unlawful interference with the rights of abutting owners; but is a street use consistent with their rights therein. A street can not however be converted into a yard for the storing of cars to the injury of adjoining owners, and an unreasonable use of the street by a street railway company may afford a right of action to the property owners, specially injured thereby. Judgment reversed. Mahady v. Bushwick Railroad Co. Opinion by Andrews, C. J. Rapallo, Miller, and Earl concur. Danforth and Finch dissent.

[Decided Jan. 23, 1883.]

COMPETENCY

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WITNESS CEDENT- CODE CIV. PRO., § 829.-Plaintiff brought action upon an alleged loan made to defendant's intestate, and produced in evidence of the loan a check for the amount claimed, given by him to intestate and paid to intestate. It was shown that on the day the loan was alleged to have been made, plaintiff and intestate had a transaction in relation to a corporation in which they were both interested, in which plaintiff gave intestate a check for the same amount as the alleged loan. Plaintiff claimed that he had two transactions with intestate that day involving equal amounts. On the trial, plaintiff was asked whether the check produced had any thing to do with the affairs of the corporation mentioned. Held, that an answer was inadmissible as involving a personal transaction with a deceased person under Code Civ. Pro., § 829. It is not the test of the admissibility of the evidence, that an answer in the affirmative would have been adverse to the interest of the plaintiff; but whether proof of the fact to which the inquiry related would involve a disclosure of the nature of the transaction at the time the check was given. The case Pinney v. Orth, 88 N. Y. 451, does not determine the question. There it was held that defendant might deny that he ever had any conversation with plaintiff's intestate at a place where a witness for plaintiff had testified there was a conversation between defendant and intestate. Judgment affirmed. Koehler v. Adler. Opinion by Andrews, J. [Decided Feb. 6, 1883.]

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

CORPORATION-MISSOURI STATUTE-LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDER FOR DEBT-COLLATERAL SECURITY EXEMPTION CONFLICT OF LAW WHEN FEDERAL COURT WILL NOT FOLLOW STATE IN CONSTRUING STATE LAW.-(1) By a statute of Missouri, stockholders of a corporation at its dissolution are liable for its debts; but it is provided that no person holding stock as executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee, and no person holding stock as collateral security, shall be personally subject to such liability, but the persons pledging such stock shall be considered as holding the same and liable; and the estates and funds in the hands of executors, etc., shall be liable. Held, that persons to whom stock of a corporation is pledged as

collateral security by the corporation itself are within the exemption of the statute; that certificates of the stock absolute on their face, issued to a creditor as collateral security, or in trust may be shown to be so held by evidence in pais; that the holder of such stock, as collateral security or in trust, though he vote on such stock is not thereby estopped from showing that the stock belongs to the company and not to him, and that he only holds it as collateral security. See 1 Lindsay Partn. 128; Matthews v. Albert, 24 Md. 527; McMahon v. Macy, 51 N. Y. 155. (2) The Supreme Court of Missouri, after the transaction arose, and after the Circuit Court had decided this case, made a contrary decision against the same stockholders, at the suit of another plaintiff, holding that the clause of exemption in the statute does not extend to persons receiving stock as collateral security from the corporation itself; and this decision being urged as conclusive upon the Federal courts, held, that this court is not bound to follow the decision of the State court in such a case. The Federal courts have an independent jurisdiction in the administration of State laws in cases between citizens of different States, co-ordinate with and not subordinate to that of the State courts; and are bound to exercise their own judgment as to the meaning and effect of those laws. But since the ordinary administration of the law is carried on by the State courts, it necessarily happens that by the course of their decisions certain rules are established which become rules of property and action in the State, and have all the effect of law, especially with regard to the law of real estate and the construction of State Constitutions and statutes; such established rules are always regarded by the Federal Courts, no less than by the State Courts themselves, as authoritative declarations of what the law is. But where the law has been thus settled, it is the right and duty of the Federal Courts to exercise their own judgment; as they also always do in reference to the doctrines of commercial law and general jurisprudence; and when contracts and transactions have been entered into and rights have accrued thereon under a particular state of the decisions, or when there has been no decision of the State tribunals, the Federal courts properly claim the right to adopt their own interpretation of the law applicable to the case, although a different interpretation may be adopted by the State courts after such rights have accrued. But even in such cases, for the sake of harmony and to avoid confusion, the Federal courts will lean toward an agreement of views with the State courts if the question seems to them balanced with doubt. Acting on these principles of comity, the courts of the United States, without sacrificing their own dignity as independent tribunals, endeavor to avoid, and in most cases do avoid, any unseemly conflict with the well considered decisions of the State courts. As however the very object of giving to the National courts jurisdiction to administer the laws of the States in controversies between citizens of different States was to institute independent tribunals which it might be supposed would be unaffected by local prejudices and sectional views, it would be a dereliction of their duty not to exercise an independent judgment in cases not foreclosed by previous adjudication. McKeen v. Delancy's Lessee, 5 Cr. 22; Polk's Lessee v. Wendell, 9 id. 98; Thatcher 7. Powell, 6 Wheat. 127; Preston's Heirs v. Bowman, id. 581; Daly v. James, 8 id. 535; Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 id. 159, 165; Shelby v. Guy, 11 id.367; Jackson v. Chew, 12 id. 167-168; Fullerton v. Bank U. S., 1 Pet. 604; Gardner v. Collins, 2 id. 58; United States v. Morrison, 4 id. 136; Green v. Neil's Lessee, 6 id. 295-300: Groves v. Slaughter, 15 id. 497; Swift v. Tyson, 16 id. 18; Carpenter v. Washington Ins. C., id. 511; Carroll

v. Sofford, 3 How. 460; Lane v. Vick, id 476; Rowan v.
Runnels, 5 id. 139; Smith v. Kernochen, 7 id. 219;
Nesmith v. Sheldon, id. 818; Williamson v. Berry, 8
id. 558; Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 id. 318; Web-
ster v. Cooper, 14 id. 504; Ohio Life & Trust Co. v.
Debolt, 16 id. 431; Beauregard v. New Orleans, 18 id.
500; Watson v. Tarply, id. 519; Pease v. Peck, id. 598;
Morgan v. Curtenius, 20 id. 1; League v. Egery, 24 id.
266; Suydam v. Williamson, id. 433; S. C., 6 Wall. 736;
Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 603; Mercer Co. v
Hacket, 1 Wall. 95; Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 id.
175; Seybert v. Pittsburg, id. 273; Havemeyer v. Iowa
City, 3 id. 294; Thompson v. Lee Co., 3 id. 330; Christy
v. Pridgeon, 4 id. 203; Mitchell v. Burlington, id. 274;
Lee Co. v. Rogers, 7 id. 183; Butz v. Muscatine, 8
id. 583; City of Kenosha v. Lamson, 9 id. 485; Olcott v.
Supervisors of Fond du Lac, 16 id. 678; Supervisors v.
United States, 18 id. 81; Boyce v. Tabb, id. 548; Town-
ship of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 id. 677; Elmwood v.
Marcy, 92 U. S. 294; State Railroad Tax cases, id. 617;
Ober v. Gallagher, 93 id. 207; Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 id.
260; Davie v. Briggs, 97 id. 637; Fairfield v. Gallatin
Co., 100 id. 47; Oates v. Bank of Montgomery, id. 245;
Douglass v. Pike Co., 101 id. 686; Barrett v. Holmes,
102 id. 655; Town of Thompson v. Perrine, 103 id. 616;
S. C., 106 id. 99. (3) A judgment entered by consent
for a specific amount, subject to any credits which
the defendant may produce vouchers for, is good as
between the parties themselves and their privies.
Judgment of U. S. Cir. Ct., E. D. Missouri, affirmed.
Burgess v. Seligman. Opinion by Bradley J.
[Decided Jan. 29, 1883.]

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MARITIME LAW PRIZE MONEY AND BOUNTY INLAND WATERS.-(1) Prize money, or bounty in lieu of it, is not allowed by the laws of Congress where vessels of the enemy are captured or destroyed by the navy with the co-operation of the army. To win either, the navy must achieve its success without the direct aid of the army, by maritime force only. No pecuniary reward is conferred for anything taken or destroyed by the navy when it acts in conjunction with the army in the capture of a fortified position of the enemy, though the meritorious services and gallant conduct of its officers and men may justly entitle them to honorable mention in the history of the (2) Under the procountry. The Siren, 13 Wall. 389. vision of the act of Congress of June 30, 1864, § 7, regulating prize proceedings, etc. (13 Stat. at L. 377), "that no property seized or taken upon any of the inland waters of the United States by the naval forces the thereof, shall be regarded as maritime prize; term "inland" was intended to apply to all waters of the United States upon which a naval force could go, James other than bays and harbors on the sea coast. river is an inland water where it lies within the body of counties in Virginia, and where a person can see from one of its banks what is done on the other. Rivers across which one can thus see are inland waters. It matters not that the tide may ebb and flow for miles above their mouths; that fact does not make them any part of the sea or bay into which they may flow, though they may be arms of both. United States v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290. Decree of Dist. Columbia Sup. Ct., affirmed. United States v. Steam Vessel Seabord. Opinion by Field, J. [Decided Jan. 15, 1883.]

NATIONAL BANK -ACTS ULTRA VIRES-DENIAL OF RIGHT UNDER BANKING ACT APPEAL JURISDICTION. In this action, plaintiff in error, sought in a State court to enjoin the enforcement of an execution for the delivery of property on a judgment against them, on the ground that the owner of the property at whose instance the writ was issued, a National bank, which had acquired such property by convey

ance, had no power under the provisions of the Na-
tional banking law to take and hold the property, and
that the conveyance to it was inoperative and void.
They set up no title to the property against the bank.
The decision of the State court was against plaintiffs
in error. Held, that they were not by that decision
denied any "title, right, privilege, or immunity speci-
As
ally set up or claimed" under the banking act.
early as 1809, it was held by this court in Owings v.
Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cr. 344, that in order to give it
jurisdiction in this class of cases the right, title, or
immunity which is denied must grow out of the Con-
stitution, or a treaty, or statute of the United States
relied on.
Under this rule jurisdiction was not taken
in that case, although it was an action of ejectment
by Norwood's lessee, and the record showed that an
effort was made to defeat the recovery because of an
outstanding title in a third person adverse to Norwood
and protected by a treaty. The court said: "When-
ever a right grows out of, or is protected by a treaty,
it is sanctioned against all the laws and judicial decis-
ions of the States, and whoever may have this right,
is to be protected. But if the person's title is not
affected by the treaty, or if he claims nothing under a
treaty, his title cannot be protected by the treaty."
The principle thus announced has been recognized in
many cases since. Montgomery v. Hernandez, 12
Wheat. 129; Henderson v. Tennessee, 10 How. 323;
Wynn v. Morris, 20 id. 5; Hale v. Gaines, 22 id. 160;
Verden v. Coleman, 1 Black, 472; Long v. Converse,
91 U. S. 105. Henderson v. Tennessee, like Owings v.
Norwood's Lessee, was an action of ejectment, and the
effort was to defeat the recovery by showing an out-
standing title in a third person under a treaty with
which the party in possession did not connect himself,
but the jurisdiction was denied, it being said: "The
right to make this defense is not derived from the
treaties, nor from any authority exercised under the
general government. It is given by the laws of the
State, which provide that the defendant in ejectment
may set up title in a stranger in bar of the action. It
is true the title set up in this case was claimed under
a treaty. But to give jurisdiction to this court the
party must claim the right for himself, and not for a
third person in whose title he has no interest." And
in Hale v. Gaines, it was said: "The plaintiff in error
must claim (for himself) some title, right, privilege, or
exemption under an act of Congress, etc., and the
decision must be against his claim to give this court
jurisdiction. Setting up a title in the United States
by way of defense is not claiming a personal interest
affecting the subject in litigation." Writ of error to
Kentucky Court of Appeals, dismissed. Miller v.
National Bank of Lancaster. Opinion by Waite,

C. J.

[Decided Jan. 15, 1883.]

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IMPLIED REPEAL.When an affirmative statute contains no expression of a purpose to repeal a prior law, it does not repeal it unless the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, or unless the later statute covers the whole ground occupied by the earlier and is clearly intended as a substitute for it, and the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest. The leaning of the courts is against repeals by implication (United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88), and if it be possible to reconcile two statutes, one will not be held to repeal the other. McCool v. Smith, 1 Black. 459. It was held by this court in Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, that a repeal by implication must be by "necessary implication; for it is not sufficient to establish that subsequent laws cover some or even all the cases provided for by it, for they may be merely affirmative or cumu. lative or auxiliary." In United States v. Tynen, it

was declared that "it is when the later act plainly shows that it was intended as a substitute for the former act that it will operate as a repeal of that act." So in the case of Henderson v. Tobacco, 11 Wall. 652, this court said, that "when the powers and directions under the several acts are such as may well subsist together an implication of repeal cannot well be allowed." In the case of King v. Cornell, decided at the present term, the court on this point said: "While repeals by implication are not favored, it is well settled that when two acts are not in all respects repugnant, if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier and embraces new provisions which plainly show that the last was intended as a substitute for the first, it will operate as a repeal." See also Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590. Accordingly where there were two acts, the first one passed to authorize the towns in a certain group of counties to aid in the construction of one line of railroad, and the other to authorize the towns in another group of counties to aid in the construction of another line of road, and

the county of M. happened to be common to both groups,held, that considering the different objects which it was reasonably clear the legislature had in view in the passage of these two acts, it was a fair construction to hold that it was not the intention of the legislature, by the passage of the later act, to repeal the older act, either totally or partially. Judgment of U. S. Cir. Ct., Minnesota, affirmed. Town of Red Rock v. Henry. Opinion by Woods, J.

[Decided Jan. 8, 1883.]

PUBLIC OFFICER — WHEN NOT LIABLE FOR INTEREST ON MONEYS IN CHARGE.-Where an officer of the government has money committed to his charge, with the duty of disbursing it as required, he cannot be charged with interest until it is shown that he has converted it to his own use or failed to pay when occasion required, or to transfer or pay to the government on some lawful order. United States v. Curtis, 100 U. S. 119. Judgment of U. S. Cir. Ct., Massachusetts, affirmed. United States v. Power. Opinion by Miller, J.

[Decided Jan. 8, 1883.]

WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

BOUNDARIES-ORDER OF DEGREE OF PROOF FIELD MONUMENTS PREFERRED. - The rules of evidence to be resorted to in ascertaining the true location of the streets, blocks and lots of a city or town, according to the plat and survey thereof, are ranked in degree as follows: (1) The highest regard is had to natural boundaries; (2) the lines actually run, and corners actually marked on the ground, at the time of the making of the plat and survey; (3) the lines and corners of an adjoining lot or block, if called for or ascertained; (4) if no monuments are mentioned or in existence, evidence of long-continued occupation; (5) if the description is ambiguous or doubtful, parol evidence of the practical construction given by the parties by acts of occupation, recognition of monuments, or boundaries; and (6) the courses and distances marked on the plat or survey. In this case, in ascertaining the true location of the street in question before resorting to the uncertain courses and distances on the plat and survey, recourse should have been had (1) to the natural monuments referred to in the plat and survey; and (2) to the artificial monuments placed by the surveyor to mark the lines or boundaries thereof. The plat or survey should be resorted to, to show the existence of the street or block as such,

and the monuments to establish the lines and corners according to the same. "The principle on which these rules are founded is that effect should be given to those things about which men are least liable to make a mistake." Davis v. Rainsford, 17 Mass. 210; McIvor v. Walker, 9 Cranch, 178; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 301 and note. See also Owen v. Bartholomew, 9 Pick. 520; Stone v. Clark, 1 Metc. 378; Vroman v. Dewey, 23 Wis. 530; Marsh v. Mitchell, 25 id. 306; Fleischfresser v. Schmidt, 41 id. 223; Nys v. Biemeret, 44 id. 104; Lampe v. Kennedy, 49 id. 602. City of Racine v. Case Plow Co. Opinion by Orton, J.

[Decided Jan. 9, 1883].

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

REPAIRS OF STREETS TAKING MATERIALS FROM ONE STREET TO REPAIR

ANOTHER.-In the absence of any provision to the contrary in its charter, a city may take stones or other material from one street for the purpose of repairing another street therein. In Bissell v. Collins, 28 Mich.

277, the court say: "We would not assent to the doctrine that a city, in improving a street, may not take the natural material found within its limits sultable for the purpose, and distribute it in making improvements as the authorities may deem best." The same language, in substance, was held in the case of New Haven v. Sergent, 38 Conn. 50. In the case of Aldrich v. Drury, 8 R. I. 454, it was held that a railroad com. pany might use the materials taken from the land of one man in grading their road-bed for the purpose of making embankments on the land of another on the line of the road, but the company would have no right to sell such materials to persons who used it for purposes not connected with the railroad. The same doctrine was held by the Supreme Courts of Iowa and New Hampshire. See Henry v. Dubuque & Pacific R. Co., 2 Clarke, 288; Chapin v. Sullivan R. Co., 39 N. H. 564. Huston v. City of Fort Atkinson. Opinion by Taylor, J.

[Decided Dec. 12, 1882.]

SALE RESCISION OF, FOR CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD — RIGHT OF PURCHASER TO RE-IMBURSEMENT. Where a sale of real estate was rescinded on the ground of constructive fraud, but there was no actual or positive fraud in the transaction, held, that the purchaser was entitled to re-payment of the purchase-money with interest, also taxes paid, and was to be charged with the rental value of the property. In such case where the one entitled to do so objects to the purchase it is a common practice for the court to order a resale of the property at a fixed price, which is called the upset price, which includes the purchase-money paid, and interest, with costs of all the substantial and permanent improvements made by the purchaser, charg ing him with the profits or the fair annual rent of the property. That was the decree in Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johus. Ch. 251, where Chancellor Kent discusses the doctrine of purchases by persons standing in the relation of actual trustees for the sale in a most elaborate and able opinion. Sometimes the court orders the sale to be set aside entirely, and the purchasemoney refunded. As bearing on this question see Mason v. Martin, 4 Md. 124; Spindler v. Atkins, 3 id. 409; Scott v. Freeland, 7 S. & M. 409; Buckley v. Lafferty's Legatees, 2 Rob., (Va.) 294; Bailey's Adm'r v. Robinson, 1 Grat. 4; Mulford v. Ulrich, 3 Stock. 16: Britton v. Johnson, 2 Hill, Ch. 430, 436, note; Imboden v. Hunter, 23 Ark. 622; King v. Wilcox, 11 Paige, 589; Drury v. Cross, 7 Wall. 299; Murray v. Palmer, 2 Schoales & L. 474. Cooke v. Berlin Woolen Mill Co. Opinion by Cole, C. J. [Decided Jan. 30, 1883.]

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT AB-
STRACT.

DECEMBER, 1882.*

ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS-SALE VALID AS TO ASSIGNOR IS AS TO ASSIGNEE.-A bill of sale given in good faith, which would be binding on the vendor, is binding on his assignee, in insolvency. The assignee in insolvency stands in the place of the insolvent, and takes the property subject to all valid claims and liens. Ex parte Dalby, 1 Lowell, 431; Windsor v. McLellan, 2 Story, 492. Creditors electing to avoid a fraudulent conveyance take the property as it was when transferred and subject to all liens then existing. Hackley, 20 Wall. 411. Hutchinson V. Opinion by Appleton, C. J.

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Avey v.
Murchie.

CESTUI QUE TRUST AND TRUSTEE.Time does not run against a cestui que trust until the trust is disavowed, and the disavowal made known to the cestui que trust. Frost v. Frost, 63 Me. 399. Haskell v. Hervey. Opinion by Appleton, C. J.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LIABILITY FOR DEFECT ON ROAD FORMING BOUNDARY. When the centre of a road is the divisional line between two towns, and no crosswise division has been made in pursuance of the provisions of a statute allowing such division, each town is liable for defects occurring within its limits, and is bound to repair them. Towns so situated cannot be jointly indicted, and neither town is to be held liable for defects arising from the neglect of the other. "In England," observes Bell, J., in State v. Canterbury, 28 N. H. 218, "if a part of a bridge is within one county and the other part in another county, each county shall repair that part of the bridge which is within it. Arch. Cr. Pl. 375; 3 Chitty Cr. Law, 595. If a difficulty should arise from this cause, it would seem to call for legislation as to the mode of building, rather than for a change of the law imposing liability." In Commonwealth v. Deerfield, 6 Allen, 449, the defect was in the Deerfield part of the bridge. In delivering the opinion of the court, Hoar, J., remarks: "If they (defendants) have neglected to repair a part of the road which it is their duty to maintain, it is no defense that this part would be of no practical use, because the bridge company have always been guilty of a neglect of duty. Otherwise, if a bridge between two towns were carried away, neither of them could be compelled by indictment to restore the structure, and the public would be without remedy." State of Maine v. Inhabitants of Thomaston. Opinion by Appleton, C, J.

NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION.

A meeting of the Executive Committee of the New York State Bar Association was held in the Association Rooms in the New Capitol in the City of Albany, on the 21st day of March, 1883.

Present: The Chairman Mr. Burt, and Messrs. Smith, Forsyth, Shepard, Dexter, Hickman, White, Bissell, Stevens, Cary, Gerry, Nelson, Foote, Low, Olney and Buchanan - a quorum.

each District Committee shall choose from their number a chairman thereof;" and inserting the following:

"Candidates for membership must be proposed in writing by one or more members of the Association, and any member of the Committee on Admissions in the district where the nominee resides or practices may affix thereto the approval of the Committee on Admissions, and transmit the same to the Secretary of the Executive Committee for further action. Proposals of the candidates for membership will state the name of the candidate, his place of residence and business, the time and place of his admission to the bar, and such particulars as may best make known his character and professional status.

"Each District Committee, in accordance with the regulations prescribed by the General Committee, may examine into the qualifications of any candidate, and transmit a report thereon to the Secretary of the Executive Committee.

"The proceedings of the General Committee and of each District Committtee, shall be secret and confidential, except as communicated between the committees or to members thereof, or as publicity is required under the Constitution.

"It shall be the duty of the Committee on Admissions to seek to bring into membership of the Association all the lawyers in the respective Judicial Districts of the State of honorable standing in the profession who have been at the bar at least three years."

Proof of twenty days' previous notice in writing of the proposed amendment to the Executive Committee and also to the Chairman of the Committee on Admissions was offered. The resolution was unanimously adopted.

It was announced that the Committee of Arrangements had renewed the invitation to Lord Chief Justice Coleridge of England to visit America as the guest of this Association and that he had accepted the same and stated his intention of visiting this country next

summer.

Many candidates were proposed and elected to membership in the Association; including members of the present legislature who belong to the legal profession. The following are some of those who were elected from the First Judicial District:

Henry M. Alexander, Charles B. Alexander, Daniel
H. Chamberlain, George A. Adee, Frederick Billings,
George Zabriskie, Walter S. Carter, William C.
Beecher, Sherman W. Knevals, Amos G. Hull, Smith
E. Lane, Welcome R. Beebe, Gunning S. Bedford,
Franklin A. Paddock, Benjamin F. Dunning, Frank
Dunning, Philo T. Ruggles, T. G. Strong, Rufus G.
Beardsley, John H. Riker, William Brodsky, Osborne
E. Bright, Jacob M. Patterson, Jr., Governeur M.
Ogden, Jr., Edward S. Rapallo, Butler H. Bixby,
John H. Cadwalader, Thomas Boese, Samuel G. Court-
ney, George Henry Warren, George H. Warren, Jr.,
Thomas C. E. Ecclesine, N. Gano Dunn, John H.
Platt, Cephas Brainerd, Lispenard Stewart, Augustus
Schell, Ward McAllister, Philip VanVolkenburgh, Jr.,
Cephas Brainerd, Jr., George De F. Lord, Nathaniel
A. Cowdrey, James A. Dering, John H. Platt, William
C. Trull, Charles S. Fairchild, William C. Whitney,
Howard Payson Wilds, John D. Townsend, Edwin M.
Felt, Ulysses S. Grant, Jr., Smith E. Lane, Thomas
Herland, James K. Hill, Orlando B. Potter, Charles
H. Russell, Jr., Thomas E. Stillman, William K.

On motion, the minutes of the last meeting of this
Committee were adopted and their reading dispensed Thorn, J. Egmont Schermerhorn, and others.

with.

Mr. Shepard offered the following resolution: Resolved, That Article VI of the By-Laws be and is "And amended by striking out all after the words: *To appear in 74 Maine Reports.

Among those elected from the Third Judicial District

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