and which has an accepted signification, both in commercial and judicial language, proof of usage will not be permitted to show that such term has a local meaning repugnant to its settled sense. The best considered and most discriminating cases, and the commentators of highest repute establish, in the language of Chancellor (then chief Justice) Kent, in Frith v. Barker, 2 Johns. 335, that "usage ought never to be received to contradict a settled rule of law." Homer v. Dorr, 10 Mass. 26. Phillips, in his treatise on Evidence, page 436 (marginal paging), says: "Where the legal effect of an instrument or of the terms in it has been settled, no evidence of commercial usage is admissible." To same effect see Starkie, Ev. pt. 4, pp. 1036, 1038. In Angomar v. Wilson, 12 La. Ann. 857, the court cxcluded testimony as to the meaning of the term "household furniture," the ground that "there was no ambiguity in the expression." In Woodruff v. Merchants' Bank, 25 Wend. 674, affirmed in the court of errors (6 Hill, 174), parol evidence of usage, to show that days of grace were not allowed upon an order upon a bank to pay to the order of A. B., on such a day, a certain sum of money, was excluded; the court saying that "the effect of the proof of usage as given in this case, if sanctioned, would be to overturn the whole law on the subject of bills of exchange in the city of New York." The doctrine is adhered to in Bowen v. Newell, 8 N. Y. 194. U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. Louisiana, December, 1882. Pederson v. Eugster. Opinion by Billings, D. J.

on

MARITIME LAW VESSEL. In the absence of circumstances showing cruelty or great hardship the admiralty courts of the United States cannot be required or allow themselves to entertain jurisdiction of a case where subjects of a foreign government invoke their assistance against a merchant vessel of another foreign government. See The Carolina, 14 Fed. Rep. 424; Gienar v. Meyer, 2 H. Bl. 603; The Golubchick, 1 W. Rob. 143; Gonzales v. Minor, 2 Wall. Jr., 348; The Becherdass Ambaidass, 1 Low. 569; The Maggie Hammond, 9 Wall. 435; One Hundred and Ninety-four Shawls, Abb. Adm. 317; Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134; Johnson v. Dalton, 1 Cow. 543. U. S. Cir. Ct., E. D. Louisiana, Nov., 1882. The Monta Pedia. Opinion by Billings, D. J. REMOVAL OF CAUSE -DOMICILE TEST OF CITIZEN

JURISDICTION AS TO FOREIGN

v. County Commissioners, 2 McCrary, 483. U. 8. Cir. Ct., S. D. New York, Jan. 4, 1882. Poppenhauser v. India Rubber Comb Co. Opinion by Wallace, C. J.

NEW JERSEY COURT OF CHANCERY ABSTRACT.

OCTOBER TERM, 1882.*

CORPORATION · -ULTRA VIRES -PURCHASE BY RAILROAD COMPANY OF RIVAL ROAD INJUNCTION BY STOCKHOLDER.-The directors of a railroad company, without any authority either by statute or charter, passed a resolution to assume certain debts and to buy a majority of the stock and bonds and the equipment of a rival railroad. The resolutions also provided for the calling of a special meeting of the stockholders to vote upon the matter, and it was not to be carried out without their approval. Held, that the proposed purchase was ultra vires, and hence could not be executed even if ratified by the stockholders; that it was void and against public policy in that its object was to prevent lawful competition, and that it could be enjoined upon the application of a single stockholder of the purchasing company, and that the fact that such stockholder had obtained his stock after the passage of the resolutions, and with the avowed design of preventing its consummation, would not affect his right to relief. See Colles v. Trow Directory Co., 11 Hun, 397; Potter on Corp., 130, 131, 132; High on Inj., § 767; Boone on Corp., $$ 148, 149; Kean v. Johnson, 1 Stock. 401; Gifford v. New Jersey Railroad Co., 2 id. 171; Beman v. Rufford, 6 Eng. Law & Eq. 106; Grant on Corp. 290; Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N. Y. R. Co., 3 C. E. Gr. 178; Black v. Del. & Rar. Can. Co., 9 id, 455. In a recent case, Hawes v. Contra Costa Water Co., 21 Am. L. R. (N. S.) 252. Elkins v. Camden & Atlantic Railroad Co. Opinion by Runyon, Ch.

MORTGAGE TO SECURE LOSSES IN STOCK SPECULATIONS VALIDITY OF -CONSTRUCTION OF.-A mortgage was given by a married woman, on her own lands, to secure the payment of $11,000, representing partly moneys due the mortgagee, a stock-broker, for losses theretofore incurred by the mortgagor's husband; partly, similar losses incurred on the mortga gor's own account, and partly to secure any further

diction of the court of the United States, domicile is the test of citizenship. A person may be a resident alien, but cannot be a citizen of the State when he has abandoned his domicile there. Case v. Clark, 5 Mass. 70; Cooper v. Galbraith, 3 Wash. C. C. 546; Lanz v. Randall, 4 Dill. 425; (2) The defendant having removed this suit from the State court, the plaintiff moves to remand upon the ground that she was at the time of the commencement of the action, and now is a citizen of the State of New York, where the defendauts reside. By the affidavit of the husband of the plaintiff in support of this motion, and another affidavit in the case, it appears that the plaintiff and her husband, a naturalized citizen of the United States, resided in the State of New York from 1859 to 1871; that in the latter year she removed with her husband to Hamburg, Germany, where she has since continuously resided, her husband having returned to this country occasionally on business. Held, that though by reason of her husband's naturalization the plaintiff might be entitled to all the privileges of citizenship here, the practical inference from the facts as they appear in the affidavits is that she has changed her residence, and that the plaintiff's position is no better than that of a native-born citizen who has changed his domicile. The suit was properly removed. Berger

might make on account of subsequent stock speculations of the mortgagor through the mortgagee. Held, that the mortgage was a valid security for so much of the consideration as represented the husband's debt to the mortgagee; that it was also valid for so much as represented the mortgagee's losses incurred in bona fide purchases or sales of stock by the mortgagee for account of the mortgagor, and at her request, includ ing commissions, interest and premiums for money used in carrying her stock, and that a stipulation by the mortgagee that he would not "assign or dispose of the mortgage until his future advances, amounting to $4,000, had actually been made," would not prevent his foreclosure of the mortgage for the sum actually advanced and due thereou, although such advances did not amount to $4,000. See Campbell v. Tompkins, 5 Stew. 170, and 6 id. 362; Knowlton v. Fith, 52 N. Y. 288; White v. Smith, 54 id. 522; Smith v. Bouvier, 70 Penn. St. 325; Thacker v. Hardy, L. R., 4Q. B. D. 685; Ex parte Rogers, L. R., 15 Ch. D. 207; Maxton v. Gheen, 75 Penn. St. 166; and see also Lehman v. Strassberger, 2 Woods C. C. 554; Bigelow v. Benedict, 70 N. Y. 202; Dart v. McAdam, 27 Barb. 187; Coleman v. Galbreath, 53 Miss. 303; Robinson v. Cromelein, 15 Mich. 316; Maryott v. Renton, 6 C. E. *Appearing in 9 Stewart (36 N. J. Eq.), Reports.

Gr. 381. Baldwin v. Flagg. Opinion by Runyon, Ch.

CONSTRUCTION

-

GIFT

WILL OF PERSONALTY WHEN ABSOLUTE- GIFT FOR LIFE.- (1) A gift of personal property for life, with power to the legatee to use it as she may deem proper, or to sell it, or any part of it, for her benefit, as she may deem needful or best. Held, to be an absolute gift. Dutch Church v. Smock, Sax. 148; Bradley v. Westcott, 13 Ves. 445; Maxwell's Will, 24 Beav. 246; Pennock v. Pennock, L. R., 13 Eq. 144; Diehl's Appeal, 36 Penn. St. 120. (2) A devise of a residue for the benefit of the testator's children, and in case of the death of them and their children without leaving any child or children them surviving, the residue to go after the death of the testator's widow, to his "heirs bearing the Kendall name." Held, a gift for life to the children (there being evidence that the testator intended to give only a life-estate to his children), with remainder in fee to the grandchildren with limitation over to the testator's heirs "bearing the Kendall name," in case of the death of the children, and their children, without leaving lawful issue surviving, in the life-time of the widow. 4 Kent Com. 541; 2 Powell on Dev. 212; Ex parte Rogers, 2 Madd. 449; Dowling v. Dowling, L. R., 1 Eq. 442; Holton v. White, 3 Zab. 330, 425. Kendall v. Kendall. Opinion by Runyon, Ch.

WILL DEVISE OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO PERSONAL USE BY ANOTHER.-A testator gave to his wife certain legacies for life, and then provided: "It is my wish that my wife, Margaret, shall have the privilege of occupying so much of the house in which I now live as she may need, during the time she remains my widow." He then gave his residuary estate to his son. The house stood on an ordinary town lot. Held, that the fee of the house and lot passed to the son under the residuary devise, subject to the right of the widow to occupy personally so much of the house as she might need, during her widowhood, including the use of the curtilage, in common with the occupants of the remaining parts of the house. See King v. Eatington, 4 T. R. 157; Rabbeth v. Squire, 4 De. G. & J. 406; Maclaren v. Stainton, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 199; Stone v. Parkes, 29 L. J. (Ch.) 874; Kingman v. Kingman, 121 Mass. 249; Marck v. Nason, 21 Vt. 115. Ingersoll v. Ingersoll. Opinion by Runyon, Ch.

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT JANUARY, 1883.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE — AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY. - A chattel mortgage will not cover after-acquired property unless it expressly so provides. It is immaterial that the parties may have intended that it should have that effect. The mortgage cannot be changed, or its legal effect altered, by any parol agreement or understanding between the parties at the time of its execution; the instrument must speak for itself. The intention that it shall take effect upon property to be afterward acquired must be expressed in the instrument, and cannot be shown by extrinsic evidence. It will not help matters to say that the description in the mortgage calls for property not then owned by the mortgagors, and therefore it may be shown by extrinsic evidence that they intended to include property of that description then expected to be acquired. This mode of helping out the written instrument is liable to the same objection. Jones, Chat. Mort., § 167; Tapfield v. Hillman, Man. & G. 245; Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Com. Bank of Racine, 15 Wis. 424. Montgomery v. Chase. Opinion by Mitchell, J.

VIOLATION OF SUNDAY LAW NOT AS TO WATERS DIVIDING

DEFENSE JURISDICTION

TWO STATES.-(1) In an action for the death of a passenger on defendant's steamboat through their negligence. Held, that the fact that the accident causing death took place on Sunday while defendants were violating the law in carrying passengers was not a defense on the ground that intestate was particeps criminis. To such an objection it is a sufficient answer that the defendants on that day occupied the relation of common carriers of passengers, and their general obligation to use such care and diligence as the law enjoins is not limited by the contract with the passengers, nor with the person who engaged the use of the boat and the services of the crew for that day, but is governed by considerations of public policy. That the undertaking was unlawful does not touch the question. 58 N. Y. 134; Jacobus v. Railroad Co. 20 Minn. 130. As remarked by the court in that case, "any relaxation of the rule as to duty or liability naturally tends to bring about a corresponding relaxation of care and diligence on the part of the carrier." The suggestion that if the deceased had not joined the excursion he would have escaped, may perhaps serve to enforce a valuable lesson which finds a sanction in law and morals, but as between him and the defendants he was rightfully on the boat. His presence did not (in a proper sense) contribute to or cause the accident; and in such cases wrong-doers, though answerable to the State or parties injured by them for their own acts, are entitled to the protection of the laws against the wrongful acts or culpable negligence of others. Carroll v. Staten Island R. Co., 58 N. Y. 136. (2) The action was brought in Minnesota, the accident took place on the St. Croix river, which forms a boundary between Minnesota and Wisconsin, on the Wisconsin side of the channel of such river. Held, that the Minnesota court had jurisdiction of the action. By the legislation of Congress, and the Constitutions of the States of Wisconsin and Minnesota, adopted in conformity therewith, these States have concurrent jurisdiction on the St. Croix river and its waters. The interstate boundary line is conceded to be the center of the main channel, and the jurisdiction of each State beyond that and opposite the shore possessed by it is limited to the river and its waters. Since each State has accepted and consented to this qualified grant of jurisdiction on the waters of the river within and beyond its boundary line, and incorporated it in its Constitution, it is substantially the same as if each had ceded such jurisdiction, and the rights and privileges incident thereto. This doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction was recognized in State v. Dimick, 12 N. H. 194, where the State of New Hampshire had ceded territory to the United States, reserving to the State certain jurisdiction therein. See also, Com. v. Frazee, 5 Amer. Law Reg. (O. S.) 169. If there were any question upon principle as to the power of a State thus to grant or accept a qualified jurisdiction, the practice of the State and general governments has too long been recognized and acted on to permit the courts to question the existence or validity of such concurrent but limited jurisdiction. The operation of the general laws of the States, without any express provision therein on the subject, must be co-extensive with its jurisdiction. Sherlock v. Alling, 44 Ind. 193. But beyond its own boundary the courts of each State can only take recognizance of such causes of action as arise upon "the river and its waters," and such as are appropriate to the nature of the jurisdiction which the State is entitled to exercise. State v. Mullon, 35 Iowa, 199; Gilbert v. Water Power Co., 19 id. 321; State v. Cameron, 2 Pinney, 491. Opsahl v. Judd, Opinion by Vanderbergh, J.

one.

SURETYSHIP - ALTERATION SIGNATURE BY ADDITIONAL SURETY NOT.—The obtaining by a principal intrusted with an obligation by his surety of the signature of another surety without the knowledge of the first is not an alteration which will discharge the first surety. The rule that a material alteration of a contract avoids it, had its origin largely in the necessity of preserving and protecting the integrity and sanctity of contracts. Properly applied, the rule is a salutary But the general sentiment of courts now is, that the doctrine had been extended quite far enough, and that formerly, especially in England, it had been carried too far, and applied to cases not within the mischief intended to be prevented. Therefore the tenancy now is, if not to restrict at least not to extend it beyond what has been already decided. The idea that when a person signs a note as surety, and delivers it to his principal, no other surety is to be obtained, and if the note cannot be negotiated in that form it cannot be used at all, unless all parties consent to the introdnction of a new surety, is contrary to the general understanding of the commercial world. It seems that, at least as against an innocent holder, the principal obligor to whom the paper has been intrusted by the surety, has implied authority to obtain additional sureties, until the note is launched into the market by delivery to the payee; and as already remarked, this common understanding is the only just basis of an implied contract resulting from the facts. Courts have in some cases gone so far in holding that the addition of a new name to a note under certain cir cumstances amounted to a material and unauthorized alteration of the instrument, that it may be difficult to state the principle which distinguishes some of these cases from the present. Keith v. Goodman, 31 Vt. 268. See also, Gardner v. Walsh, 5 El. & Bl. 84; Gov. ernor v. Lagon, 43 Ill. 134; Sampson v. Barnard, 98 Mass. 359; State v. Dunn, 11 La. Ann. 549. Hackett. Opinion by Mitchell, J.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

Ward v.

BILL OF PARTICULARS-WHEN NOT ALLOWED IN SEDUCTION ACTION.-The plaintiff, in an action for the seduction of his daughter by the defendant and consequent loss of her services, alleged that the defendant, when engaging his daughter as servant, had entered into a contract to treat his daughter in a proper and becoming manner; but that the defendant had committed a breach of that contract by behaving to his daughter in an improper manner, namely, by seducing her whilst in his service, whereby she had become pregnant, and that in consequence of her pregnancy the plaintiff had lost her services. The defendant did not deny the seduction on oath, but sought to obtain particulars of the times and places at which the alleged connection between himself and the plaintiff's daughter had taken place. Held, that under the circumstances the defendant, without denying the seduction on oath, was not entitled to an order for such particulars. Q. B. Div., Dec. 14, 1882. Thompson v. Birkley. Opinion by Hawkins, J. (47 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 700.)

MARITIME LAW SALVAGE COLLISION.-Where two vessels are in collision, and a salvor renders service to one, without a request from or engagement by the other, and the latter is thereby rescued from a position of immediate danger, such service being a direct benefit to both vessels, entitles the salvor to salvage reward from both. Court App., March 8, 1882. The Vandyck. Opinions by Lord Coleridge, C. J., and Brett and Holker, L. JJ. (47 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 694.)

WILL -GIFT CUM ONERE DISTINCT GIFTS-ACCRETIONS TO LEGACY.-(1) Where a testator has by one and the same gift given to a person property part of which is onerous, part beneficial, the court will prima facie infer an intention on the part of the testator that such person is not to be allowed to disclaim the onerous part and accept the beneficial part. Where however there are in a will two distinct gifts to the same person, one gift of onerous, the other of beneficial, property, an opposite intention will prima facie be inferred, and such person will be allowed to disclaim the onerous and accept the beneficial gift. Either inference may be repelled by a contrary intention ap pearing on the face of the will. See Green v. Britten, 27 L. T. Rep. (N. 8.) 811. (2) Where a specific legacy is given contingently upon the happening of a certain event (i. e., where the vesting is postponed), the intermediate accretions to the subject-matter of the gift fall into residue, or pass to the testator's next of kin, as the case may be. Where however the legacy is given to a person, subject to a condition postponing the enjoyment until the happening of a certain event, the intermediate accretions go to the legatee whose enjoyment is postponed. Shaw v. Cunliffe, 4 Bro. C. C. 99; Wyndham v. Wyndham, 3 id. 58. Chan. Div., Jan. 16, 1883. Gutherie v. Walrond. Opinion by Fry, J. (47 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 614.)

MARINE INSURANCE-PRESUMPTION AS TO NOTICE OF CHARTER-PARTY - PERILS OF THE SEA-PROXIMATE CAUSE. In the case of an ordinary time policy upon freight outstanding, the underwriters must be taken

to have notice of the existence of a charter-party, though not so as to extend the contract by implication to any thing not covered by the terms of the policy. A time-charter contained a clause enabling the charterers, in case the ship should become inefficient for the service contracted for, "to make such abatement by way of mulct out of the hire or freight of the said ship as they should adjudge fit and reasonable." The ship was rendered temporarily inefficient by reason of the perils of the sea, and the charterers exercised their power of mulct. Held (affirming the judgment of the court below), that the perils of the seas were not the proximate cause of the loss of freight, so as to render the underwriters of an ordinary time policy "on freight outstanding" liable as for a loss by the perils insured against. See Beatson v. Schank, 3 East, 233; Boone v. Eyre, 1 H. Bl. 273n.; Havelock v. Geddes, 10 East, 555; Everth v. Smith, 2 M. & S. 278; Philpott v. Swan, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 270; Moretoya v. London Assur. Co., 6 Ex. 458; Ionides v. Universal Mar. Ins. Co., 14 C. B. (N. S.) 259; Boudrett v. Hentigg Holt, N. P. 149; Jackson v. Union Mar. Ins. Co., L. R., 10 C. P. 125; Hadkinson v. Robinson, 3 B. & P. 388; Taylor v. Dunbar, L. R., 4 C. P. 206; McSwiney v. Royal Ex. Assur. Co., 14 Q. B. 634; Flint v. Flemyng, 1 B. & Ad. 48; De Vaux v. Salvador, 4 A. & E. 420. House of Lords, Aug. 1, 1882. Inman Steamship Co. v. Bischoff. Opinions by Lord Ch. Selborne, and Lords Blackburn, Watson and Fitzgerald. (47 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 581.

ASSAULT -JUSTIFICATION MEMBER REMOVED FROM HOUSE BY ORDER OF PARLIAMENT.-To a claim for damages for an assault committed on plaintiff, a member of Parliament whilst attempting to enter the House of Commons, for the purpose of taking his seat, the defendant pleaded in justification thereof that the house had previously resolved and ordered that the defendant (one of its officers) should remove the plaintiff from the house until he should engage not further to disturb the proceedings of the house," and that acting in pursuance of such order the defendant resisted and removed the plaintiff. Held, on demurrer that the plea was good. Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, and Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East, 1, commented

66

ou. See Regina v. Paty, 2 Raym, 1; Ashby v. White, 2 id. 950; Howard v. Gossett, 10 Q. B. 359, Q. B. D. Jan. 11, 1883. Bradlaugh v. Erskine. Opinion by Field, J. (47 L. T. Rep., N. S. 618).

CRIMINAL LAW.

HOUSE OF ILL FAME - WHAT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE. -A single act of illicit intercourse in a house is not sufficient to constitute a house of ill fame, and a refusal so to instruct when requested is erroneous. See Commonwealth v. Lambert, 12 Allen, 177. Maine Sup. Jud. Ct., Oct. 12, 1882. State of Maine v. Garing. Opinion by Appleton, C. J., (74 Me. 152).

TRIAL ONCE IN JEOPARDY WHAT IS NOT. Defendant was put on trial for forgery at the March Term, 1880. After all the evidence had been introduced the presiding judge received a telegram from his home at another town to the effect that his wife was sick, and asking him to go to his home. This was on the ninth day of March, 1880. The court was adjourned until the following Friday, and the jury were discharged until that time, and the judge went to his home. On Friday the judge by a telegram, ordered the court to be finally adjourned, and on the Monday following his wife died. At the March Term, 1881, of said court, the defendant was again put upon trial upon the indictment. Held, that he had not been once in jeopardy and the second trial was proper. See State v. Redman, 17 Iowa, 329; State v. Callendine, 8 id. 288. Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct. 17, 1882. State of Iowa v. Tatman. Opinion by Rothrock, J.

VARIANCE HORSE FOR MARE. The statute of California relating to larceny of horses uses the words "horse" and "mare." Held, that an information charging defendant with the larceny of a horse was sustained by proof of the larceny of a mare. Although the courts of some of the States have held, under a statute similar to that of this State, where both words "horse" and "mare" are used, the proof must agree with the indictment as to the sex of the animal, yet as at common law the word "horse" was used in its generic sense, and was held to include all animals of the horse species, whether male or female, the legislature of this State in using the word "mare" did not intend to modify or change the common-law rule, but inserted the word possibly for more definiteness. California Sup. Ct., Nov. 15, 1882. People of California v. Pico. Opinion by Myrick, J.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE "LEGAL PARADOX."

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

In the statement of "A Legal Paradox" in the present volume of your JORNAL at page 260, occurs a clerical or typographical error. I quote as follows: "Thus C. can subject the property as against D., but A. can take it from the clutches of C.'s judgment, only however to be driven out by the recorded deed of D." Mr. Lumpkin probably means B. (not A.) can take it from the clutches of C.'s judgment.

It seems to me that in the case stated, C., the judgment creditor of A., prevails over the claim of B. It is true C. has no priority over B., as between C. and B. C. does not take precedence of the deed of B. C. takes precedence of the deed of D., who takes the land as against B., by reason of the neglect of B. to record his deed. The title of B. has failed, and D. is owner. C. takes from D., and does not take from B. B. cannot take from C. by reason of his title, for B. has no title. It passed to D.

B. is out therefore; perhaps a serious question arises between C. and D. From and during the time of C.'s judgment against A., A. did not own the land. How then can the judgment of C. be interposed as a lien on the land against D., or does it at the very instant of the passage of title to D. intersect and intercept the interest of D? A. had no title from the time of his deed to B. in January, 1876, and D. only acquires the title by operation of the provisions of the statutes for recording and for priority. Yours truly,

EGBERT WHITAKER.

SAUGERTIES, N. Y., April 2, 1883.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

POMEROY'S MUNICIPAL LAW.

An Introduction to Municipal Law, by John Norton Pomeroy, Second Edition. A. L. Bancroft & Company, San Francisco, 1883.

and altered, reaches us from San Francisco. It is designed as an introduction to the study of municipal law, and its purpose is to indicate the leading and more general features of the entire system of positive law, now prevailing in this country. The scope of the work necessarily involves an inquiry into the history and development of law in general, which necessitates again a short excursion into the philosophy of history and into the domain of ethics. The treatment of the subject is popular rather than scientific, as it is intended for laymen as well as for lawyers. As a text book for high schools and colleges this work certainly has its special advantages; it is not at all technical, and yet is exact enough to inculcate those more general principles which all educated people should not only know, but know well.

HE second edition of this work, somewhat revised

The first chapter gives some account of that source of law which we term legislation, and incidentally of these leading examples of codification, the Twelve Tables, the Code Justinian, the Code Civil and the Revised Statutes of New York. This chapter is followed by an account of the courts of justice as a source of law, the author here distinguishing the functions of the judges from that of the jury, by a reference to the history of those judicatories, with which we are more or less familiar. That section of

this chapter which relates to procedure contains a great deal of useful and practical information about the development of the law of pleading, together with an outline of criminal procedure in various countries. The second part of the work treats among other things of the "National Sources of English and American law." The chapter on the feudal system is particularly good, though sometimes a little too dogmatic for the nature of the treatise, as it makes no pretension to historical research. The merit to which we allude is the lucid and simple style in which many important facts are so arrayed as to convey to the reader, without a sense of fatigue, much technical knowledge of importance. The same comment will apply to the chapter on the Roman Law. To the modern critical student of Roman law some statements in this chapter may seem trite, but it is on the whole a chapter well adapted to the popular taste. What most persons want, in a summary of Roman law, is not technical precision but general accuracy and a statement, half history, half law, which shall give an outline of the system, to be filled in more precisely at the readers' pleasure. This the author gives. If the reader is not satisfied with this sketch of the Roman law let him turn aside and glance at Professor Hadley's delightful "Introduction to Roman Law," and then proceed with Professor Pomeroy's chapter on