Aside from the fact that there was not a sufficient number of regular troops and insular forces to guard and protect all the outlying barrios of the various towns, it was seen that the unfortunate conditions then existing would be indefinitely prolonged unless the pulahanes were put upon the defensive and beaten up in the remote recesses of the mountains which they inhabited. The distances to be traversed from stations along the coast in order to reach the interior of the island, together with the difficult character of the country, made it practically an impossibility to conduct effective operations. It therefore became necessary to open trails and establish posts closer to the pulahan country which would serve as bases of operations. There are a number of rivers of considerable volume which have their sources in the interior of Samar, some of which empty into the Pacific Ocean and others into the sea on the north and west coasts. Nearly all of these streams are navigable for launches and small boats for considerable distances from their mouths, and it was deemed expedient to use these waterways as much as possible. Accordingly, after considerable delay, proper craft were obtained, the naval authorities furnishing some of them for operations upon the river, and subposts were gradually established and made the bases of supply and operation for the detachments who were to operate in the interior. After this was accomplished an aggressive campaign was carried on by the combined forces, but the difficulties of campaigning in such a country as Samar can hardly be appreciated by those who have never seen a tropical jungle which, at least in Samar, is a combination of dense vegetation, morass, and mountain streams. The soil of this island is very rich and the rainfall is tremendously heavy. It has no decided dry season, as is the case throughout the rest of the archipelago, but rains fall heavily during every month in the year. Our detachments are compelled to follow the beds of mountain streams or narrow trails, and the pulahanes, knowing the country thoroughly as they do, were generally in a position to strike either the front or the rear of the detachments toiling along under these discouraging circumstances, or to evade an attack at pleasure. There were numerous small encounters between our forces and the pulahanes, some of them desperate and sanguinary. The long-range rifles of our men were of little value in such a theater of operations. As a rule the officers carried repeating shotguns and found them the best weapons for warfare of this character. Progress was exceedingly slow, although the large pulahan bands gradually disintegrated and smaller bands contented themselves with occasional raids where there was an exposed settlement.

The governor-general, with Commissioners Luzuriaga and Forbes, made a personal visit to Samar in the latter part of November, 1904,

WAR 1905-VOL 10—4

All the presidents of the various towns of the island had been assembled to meet them at the capital, and a general discussion of the situation was had. From the information there and heretofore gathered it was developed that the presidents and municipal councilors in nearly all coast towns had been employed as agents of the large export houses in Manila to purchase hemp, which is the principal product of the island and in which it is very rich. It was reasonably evident that in very many instances these municipal officials had not dealt fairly with the ignorant people who inhabited the more remote barrios and the hill country, and that they were in the habit of practically taking their hemp at a nominal valuation, or one much below the market price, and turning it into the export houses at the market price. In many cases it was fairly evident that when a producer protested against this imposition he was arrested upon some trumped-up charge, and thus both despoiled and punished. With the sense of injustice and wrong rankling in the breasts of these ignorant people it was an easy matter for shrewd and unscrupulous leaders, some of whom had been outlaws from Spanish times, to organize them into bands for purposes of reprisal and revenge against their oppressors. It seemed, therefore, both politic and just that so soon as the outbreak could be suppressed the causes which led to it should be eradicated. This necessarily involved a total change of administration, both provincial and municipal. It was also seen that if future recrudescences of these raids were to be prevented it was necessary to get more closely in touch with these remote hill people, many of whom had never seen a white man, and whose only real knowledge of civilization was derived from infrequent contact with the people of the coast towns, whom they regarded, and with some degree of reason, as their natural enemies and oppressors. In order to accomplish this it was obviously necessary to open communication with the interior and to establish towns into which the inhabitants could be brought, schools and churches established, and a firm and just administration inaugurated. Upon the return of the governor-general and Commissioners Luzuriaga and Forbes to Manila the whole subject was carefully considered by the Commission, and as a result thereof the then governor of the province of Samar resigned and an American governor was placed in charge. The best available man was Capt. George Curry, then governor of the province of Isabela, in northern Luzon. He came to the islands as a volunteer officer in the early days of American occupation, and was afterwards employed in various responsible positions by the civil government and had always shown administrative capacity of a high order. He was sympathetic and kind, but at the same time firm and courageous. He spoke several native dialects and possessed to a rare degree the faculty of engaging the affections of the people with whom he came in contact. Alto

gether he was admirably equipped for the work assigned him. He had been governor of the province of Isabela, and conditions which existed there when he took charge were not very different from those in Samar. There were in Isabela several populous non-Christian tribes who were hostile to the Filipinos largely for the same reasons which had created bad blood in Samar. His administration was remarkably successful. He spent the major portion of his time in going about from one barrio to another, hearing the complaints of the people, correcting abuses, and weeding out incompetent municipal officials. He also extended his visits to the non-Christian tribes, going among them without a guard, sleeping in their houses, and conferring with their headmen. As a result he soon acquired the complete confidence of the people and they became pacified, contented, and prosperous. It was believed by the Commission that he could be safely transferred to Samar, which offered a larger and perhaps more difficult field of operations. Accordingly, as soon as he could wind up his affairs in Isabela and install his successor, he was placed in charge as provincial governor of Samar. In the meantime an arrangement was made between Generals Carter and Allen in which the former was given the exclusive control of the east, northeast, and north sides of the island, and the constabulary took exclusive control of the northwest and west sides of the island, and a vigorous campaign was begun and continued until all the pulahan leaders of any importance were killed or captured and their bands dispersed. The majority of the guns which they formerly held was also recaptured. In April Governor Curry took charge, and he has been industriously occupied in visiting and reorganizing various municipalities and getting into touch with the people. He is also laying out trails and establishing interior towns among the hill people.

The good effect of the work done by him is already apparent. Many of the pulahanes have voluntarily surrendered, bringing in their guns, and it now looks as if the worst were over in Samar. It is obvious, however, that until the people of the interior have all been gathered into the towns being established among them, and have been brought into contact with civilizing influences, his work is but begun. In order to facilitate his efforts the provincial board of Samar has been given. authority, by act No. 1398, to apply to such towns as may be established, or wherever it is deemed desirable, the provisions of acts Nos. 1396 and 1397, which establish local governments among the nonChristian tribes. This is not only a just and humane policy, but, in our opinion, is the only sensible thing to be done. As a rule the hill people are naturally neither intractable nor vicious, but they are ignorant and semibarbarous, and the same is true of many of the people inhabiting the more remote barrios of the coast towns of Samar. To give to them local self-government as provided by the municipal code

for the civilized Filipinos is unwise, not to say ridiculous, and can only be productive of all sorts of abuses, which will surely culminate in disorder. If they are really to be developed and civilized, their first need is a simple, strong, paternal government, by which they must be guided and protected in their rights of person and property. It is not doubted that with this kind of government, when schools and churches are established among them and they are made to appreciate the benefits and blessings of decent and orderly living, they will become law-abiding and prosperous.

The Tagalog provinces of Luzon, and especially the province of Cavite, have always been afflicted by ladrone bands, generally recruited from the idle and vicious classes, who preyed upon the people. Cavite in particular has been the theater of their operations, and it has passed into a proverb among the Filipinos that "Cavite is the mother of ladrones." This province lies upon Manila Bay, and the country slopes back to the mountains which form its southern boundary. It is intersected by many streams, which cut deep into the volcanic rock and which empty into the bay. The soil is rich, and where not cultivated is covered with a thick, heavy jungle, and the adjoining provinces of Rizal and La Laguna, on the north and east, and Batangas, on the south, possess the same general physical characteristics, so that the more remote sections of these provinces furnish ideal lurking places for outlaws and bandits, who have been accustomed to raid the cultivated portions of the country along the shores of Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay. Owing to the vigorous efforts of the authorities for several years past, many of these bands have been destroyed, and at the time the last report of the Commission was made to the Secretary of War there was little ladrone activity in these two provinces, although there still remained undisposed of several outlaws, one or two of whom were noted during the Spanish régime. It was also known that these bands had under their control two or three hundred rifles, left over from the insurrection, but as the bands were inactive and spent their time principally in avoiding the constabulary it was believed that they could be gradually picked up one by one, and would give little trouble in the future; but in the autumn of 1904 it became necessary to withdraw a number of constabulary and scout companies from these provinces, to assist in suppressing disorder which had broken out in the province of Samar. At the same time the enlistments of many of the constabulary and scout soldiers expired, so that the available and efficient forces in these provinces were comparatively small. There was at this time also considerable activity among the small group of irreconcilables in Manila, who began agitating for immediate independence, doubtless because of the supposed effect it would have on the Presidential election then pending in the United States, in which the Philippines was a large topic of discussion,

Evidently this was regarded as a favorable time for a demonstration by Felizardo, Montalon, De Vega, Oruga, Sakay, and other ladrone leaders of more or less importance or prominence. All of these men had been officers of the Filipino army during the insurrection, and most of them had criminal records during the Spanish régime.

Sakay was an ex-barber from Manila, who took to the woods some two and a half years since and found refuge in the mountains of Rizal Province. He had about a dozen followers armed with rifles, and styled himself "Dictator of the Filipino Republic," and issued frequent manifestos, while spending most of his time dodging the police. Whether the sudden and concerted activity exhibited by these leaders was due to political considerations or not has been a subject of discussion. There are not lacking strong evidences to show that this was at least a factor. Montalon was regarded as the commander of all the ladrones, and held a sort of loose and indefinite authority over them, although Felizardo was by far the more dangerous man. The former styled himself "LieutenantGeneral of the Army of Liberation," and the other leaders sported correspondingly high-sounding titles. Whatever may have been the cause of their sudden activity, they attacked the town of San Pedro Tunasan in November last, which is in the province of La Laguna, near the Cavite border, surprised the police, and secured three guns. About the same time 30 desperate prisoners from the military prison at Malahi Island, in Laguna de Bay, who were being conveyed on a launch from their work, overpowered and killed their guards and obtained their rifles and joined the bandits. Shortly thereafter an attack was made upon Parañaque, a town on the bay shore, about 6 miles from Manila, in the province of Rizal, near the Cavite line, surprising a body of native constabulary commanded by a corporal, whom they killed, and whose rifles they secured. On January 5 the town of Taal, in Batangas, near the southern boundary of Cavite, was attacked, the municipal police making only a show of resistance, the ladrones securing 35 guns and a considerable amount of ammunition. The attack upon this town. was made in the early evening, and, as afterwards developed, the ladrones in large numbers had been in its immediate vicinity for a number of days, and it was generally known in the neighborhood that the attack would be made, although no hint of it was given the constabulary officers nearby, and there was much evidence tending to show collusion between numbers of the townspeople and the bandits.

Brigadier-General Allen, chief of Philippines constabulary, had been absent for more than a month in the province of Samar in personal charge of operations there. It was therefore determined to organize a provisional constabulary district composed of the four