In People v. Kipley, 171 Ill., 44, the court said (page 58): The evils, sought to be remedied by legislation of this character, are well known and well understood. These evils are such as grow out of what is generally called "the spoils system" in the matter of appointments to public office. This system rests upon what Mr. Justice Peckham, now of the Supreme Court of the United States, then a member of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, speaking for the latter court in Rogers v. Common Council of Buffalo, 123 N. Y., 173, calls the "semi-barbarous maxim, that to the victors belong the spoils." Under the system thus designated as "the spoils system," party service and party fealty are made the tests for appointments to office. Wherever this system prevails, political work, done by the applicant, and his supposed power to do more, are regarded as the chief reasons for his appointment to office. Public office is thus made to be the reward for political work. All the offices are "parceled out by the chiefs of the victorious party to their faithful followers in recognition of past political services, or in expectation of future support of the same nature. Possession of office, under such a system, is to be the reward of party fidelity and party service." (Rogers v. Common Council of Buffalo, supra.) Where an appointment is made under the system in question, the officer making it is apt to ignore any sense of personal or official responsibility to the people, and to substitute in its stead a feeling of responsibility to his party only. The appointments to offices are such as the leading men therein choose to ask for. (Rogers v. Common Council of Buffalo, supra.) Where civil service laws have been adopted, they have been so adopted for the purpose of doing away with the evils which necessarily result from "the spoils system." Those evils have been fitly characterized as inefficiency, extravagance, the interruption of public business by place hunters, corruption of the electoral franchise, and political assessments. A distinguished writer on the constitutional history of the United States has spoken of the maxim, "to the victors belong the spoils," as being "an inviolable principle of American politicians," and he says: "It is owing only to the astonishing vitality of the people of the United States, and to the altogether unsurpassed and unsurpassable favor of their natural conditions, that the State has not succumbed under the onerous burden of the course.' (2 Von Holst's Const. Hist. of U. S., 26.) To do away with the onerous burden of this curse in the cities of Illinois, the Act of March 20, 1895, was passed by the Legislature of this State. The foundation principles of the Act are, that appointments to municipal offices or employments must be made according to merit and fitness, to be ascertained by competitive examinations, free to all; and that promotions from lower to higher grades in the public service must be made upon the basis of merit. The character of this law and every question here raised as to its validity have been already passed upon by this court: In People v. Kipley, just cited, an original petition was filed in this court for mandamus against the Superintendent of Police of Chicago (in whom the Constitution vested no power to appoint subordinates), that he fill vacancies existing in his department, in accordance with the terms of the City Civil Service Act, whose provisions are substantially similar to the State law. Its constitutionality was attacked upon numerous grounds, including those mentioned in this petition. Its constitutionality was sustained. The court said, page 61: In 1884 the State of Massachusetts passed a civil service act, whose general provisions are substantially the same as those of the Illinois Act now under consideration. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, being requested by the House of Representatives in that State to give their opinion upon the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Act held that the legislature has the constitutional right to provide for the appointment of civil service commissioners, and to delegate to them the power to makes rules, not incon sistent with existing laws, to guide and control their discretion, and the discretion of the officers of the cities in whom the appointing power is vested; that the duty of determining and ascertaining the qualifications of such officers and servants cannot be performed directly by the Legislature, but must be delegated to certain officers or agents; that it is not a delegation of power to enact laws, but merely a delegation of administrative powers and duties; that there was no provision of the Constitution, which prevented the Legislature from enacting that such rules, when duly made, should be binding upon the officers and citizens to whom they apply, and that they might be enforced by suitable penalties; that the power of the Legislature to make or to authorize local laws for the administration of local affairs was beyond question. (Opinion of the Justices, 138 Mass., 601.) In 1883, the Legislature of the State of New York passed a civil service law, which is similar in most of its features to the Illinois Act. In Rogers v. Common Council of Buffalo, supra, it was held, that the provision of the Act which creates a board of commissioners consisting of two or more persons, and which provides that not more than a certain proportion shall be taken from one party, does not amount to an arbitrary exclusion from office, or to a general regulation requiring qualifications not mentioned in the State Constitution, and is not unconstitutional, and that a provision therein, which required an applicant for appointment to a position in a public office to show his fitness therefor, was not an illegal test within the meaning of the Constitution. In the course of the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Peckham, in the latter case, he says: "Looking at it as a matter of common sense, we are quite sure that the framers of our organic law never intended to impose a constitutional barrier to the right of the people through their Legislature to enact laws, which should have for their sole object the possession of fit and proper qualifications for the performance of the duties of a public office on the part of him who desired to be appointed to such office. So long as the means adopted to accomplish such end, are appropriate therefor, they must be within the legislative power. The idea cannot be entertained for one moment, that any intelligent people would have consented to so bind themselves with constitutional restrictions on the power of their own representatives, as to prevent the adoption of any means by which to secure, if possible, honest and intelligent service in public office.. * * * Statutes looking only to the purpose of ascertaining whether candidates for an appointive office are possessed of those qualifications, which are necessary for a fit and intelligent discharge of the duties pertaining to such office, are not dangerous in their nature, and in their execution they are not liable to abuse in any manner involving the liberties of the people." * * * The Act, passed by the Legislature of Illinois on March 20, 1895, is not unconstitutional in requiring examinations as therein provided for, as tests for appointments to public office, nor in requiring promotions to be made in the manner therein specified, nor in attaching a penalty to the violation of the provisions of the Act. The Act does not delegate legislative power to the civil service commissioners by authorizing them to make the rules therein provided for. * * In most instances before the passage of * the civil service act, the municipal officers, having the power to make appointments to office, removed their appointees at their own pleasure. It is certainly not a violation of the organic law to require them to conform to and obey regulations which make merit and fitness the necessary qualifiIcations for office. In People v. Loeffler, 175 Ill., 585, 592, 604, 605, the constitutionality of the City Civil Service Act was again attacked upon every conceivable ground. The city clerk contended that it was an unconstitutional interference with his power to appoint his subordinates, by requiring him to appoint the applicant standing. highest on the eligible list of successful contestants in competitive examinations. This court said (p. 592): The civil service act does not take away the power of appointment absolutely, but qualifies such power by requiring appointments to be made from persons who have been ascertained to be competent by examinations under the civil service act. Under the provisions of the civil service act the city clerk still appoints his clerks and subordinates, and, as the power of appointment thus remains with him, it cannot be said that it has been altogether taken from him by the civil service act, even if that Act applies to positions in his office. Neither the city clerk, nor any other public officer, should appoint men to subordinate positions in his office, unless they are qualified to perform the duties of such positions. The civil service act merely substitutes the results of the examinations required by such Act for the uncontrolled will of the appointing officer in the matter of selecting those who are to perform the required duties. * * ** The object of section 22, above referred to, was to designate a particular mode for the appointment of the employés of the city comptroller, city clerk, city treasurer and city collector. That mode may be termed the pleasure of the appointing power. The object of the civil service act is to designate another and different mode of appointing such employés, and that mode is fitness and merit, as ascertained by free and public and competitive examinations. In discussing the power of the Legislature over offices of its own creation, the court said, page 604: Counsel for respondent fail to distinguish between officers created by the Constitution, and offices created by statute. It is asserted, that a right defined by the Constitution is in the nature of a constitutional grant and cannot be taken away by any authority known to the government. It is sought to apply this principle to the definition of an office contained in said section 24. * * When an office is created by a statute, it is wholly within the control of the Legislature creating it. The length of term and mode of appointment may be altered at pleasure, and the office may be abolished and the compensation taken away from the incumbent, unless forbidden by the Constitution. (People v. Lippincott, 67 Ill., 333; Arnold v. Alden, 173 id., 229; Crook v. People, 106 id., 237.) As is well said by the learned author of the article on Public Officers in 19 American and English Encyclopedia of Law (p. 416): "Where the manner of filling an office is prescribed by Constitution, a different mode cannot be provided by legislative enactment; but if the manner of filling it is not prescribed, or if it is not an office of constitutional origin, it is competent for the Legislature to declare the manner of filling it, either through the agency of an election by the people, or by the appointment by such authority as it may deem just and proper, and in like manner to change from time to time the mode of election or appointment." In the absence of constitutional provision on the subject, the power of prescribing the manner of making appointments to office falls naturally and properly to the legislative department, and may be exercised by it. (19 id., pp. 421, 423, 428, 552; Cooley on Const. Lim., 6th ed., p. 228; Tugman v. City of Chicago, 78 Ill., 405.) EXAMINATION AND CERTIFICATE ARE NOT APPOINTMENT. In People ex rel. Laist v. Lower et al., (decided October 25, 1911), Laist filed his petition for mandamus directing the Civil Service Commission of Chicago to certify him for appointment as city architect. He had duly passed the examination prescribed by the commission, and had been certified to the Commissioner of Public Works as standing highest on the eligible list. But before his appointment the Civil Service Commission discovered that Laist had not been licensed as an archi tect under the State law, and revoked his certification. Laist contended that under the City Civil Service law, his appointment was complete when he was certified to the Commissioner of Public Works, and was thereafter irrevocable. This court, by Mr. Justice Cartwright, said: It is true that an appointment is complete when the last Act required of the appointing power has been performed, and the authority to make the appointment has then been exhausted. * * * In this case, however, the relator was not appointed city architect and the civil service commission made no attempt to appoint him to that position. The commission has no power to appoint to any office or position, but the power to appoint is in the head of the department or office in which a position classified under the civil service act is to be filled. There was no attempted revocation of an appointment since none had been made, but when it was learned that the certificate had been improvidently made and the relator was lacking in a necessary qualification for appointment, it was within the power of the civil service commission to correct its mistake by withdrawing the certificate. We respectfully submit that the State Civil Service law is free from constitutional objection. W. H. STEAD, Attorney General, JOEL H. FITCH, Asst. Attorney General, EDGAR A. BANCROFT, Of Counsel. The People, ex rel. James W. Gullett, et al. Petitioners v. James S. McCullough, Auditor of Public Accounts, Defendant. OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT. Mr. Justice Dunn delivered the opinion of the court: This cause has been submitted for decision on demurrer to an amended petition for a writ of mandamus filed originally in this court, upon leave granted, for the purpose of testing the validity of the amendment to the State Civil Service law, approved on June 10, 1911, (Laws of 1911, p. 222), as applied to certain employés. The three petitioners are, respectively, the assistant chief clerk, the chief corporation clerk and the bookkeeper in the office of the Secretary of State, and the prayer of the petition is that the Auditor of Public Accounts be directed to issue to the petitioners, warrants on the State Treasurer for the respective amounts due to them upon payrolls, certified by the Secretary of State, for the months of July and August, 1911, without the certificate of the State civil service commission required by section 31 of the Civil Service law. The petition sets forth the various duties imposed by law upon the Secretary of State, and avers that these duties are in the main ministerial, and are so numerous that it is impossible for the Secretary of State personally to perform them all, and that they are necessarily delegated to a large number of assistants of various kinds, who perform them under the direction of the Secretary of State. These duties naturally fall into departments, over each of which has been placed a chief assistant. The duties of the relator James W. Gullett, as assistant chief clerk, are, under the direction of the chief clerk, who is the chief assistant or deputy of the Secretary of State, to assist in supervising the work of the office and in the absence of the chief clerk to perform his duties; to pass upon the legality of petitions of foreign corporations for license to do business in this State and perform or direct all work in respect to such license; to direct or assist in the performance of any other work assigned him. In the absence of the chief clerk he has general supervision of all the work of the office, with discretionary power on all questions, handles all fees received, directs their entry in the proper accounts, reports them to the Secretary of State, and decides and disposes of all matters relating to the legality of foreign and domestic corporations referred to him. Acting either as chief clerk or assistant chief clerk, he has authority to give and enforce, and does give, directions to subordinates in the various departments, being subject at all times to the directions and control of the Secretary of State. The relator, Hezekiah B. Williams is the head of the corporation department, and his duties are, under the supervision of the chief clerk, to handle, decide and dispose of all matters regarding the formation of domestic corporations or changes therein; to see that all papers filed in connection with such formation and changes are according to law; to supervise and direct the work of those clerks under him, and to check the fees payable in connection with the organization or increase of capital stock of domestic corporations. The relator, James C. Peek is the bookkeeper, whose duty it is to check the expense accounts and pay rolls and keep full and complete records and books of account of all moneys received and disbursed by the Secretary of State. The relators have been performing their respective duties since the election of the Secretary of State, in 1908. The General Assembly, by an Act approved June 10, 1911, to provide for the expenses of the State government until the expiration of the first fiscal quarter after the adjournment of the next regular session of the General Assembly, appropriated to the Secretary of State for clerk hire, among other sums, $3,000 per annum for an assistant chief clerk; $2,400 per annum for a chief corporation clerk and $2,000 per annum for a bookkeeper, and authorized and directed the Auditor of Public Accounts to draw warrants on the State Treasurer for such sums on monthly payrolls, duly certified to by the head of the department. On July 31, 1911, the Secretary of State duly certified to a payroll, as required by the appropriation act, showing that the relators were entitled to receive for services rendered during the month of July, 1911, James W. Gullett, $250, H. B. Williams, $200 and J. C. Peek, $166.66. A similar payroll was certified on August 31, 1911, for the month of August. The services certified in these payrolls were actually performed by the relators. The payrolls were presented to the Auditor on their respective dates, and he was then, and afterward, requested to issue warrants to the relators but refused, claiming that he was not authorized to do so upon the certified payroll of the Secretary of State without the further certificate of the State civil service commission required by section 31 of the Civil Service Act. The relators insist that the certificate of the civil service commission is unnecessary, for the reason that the Civil Service Act, as applied to officers whose offices are created by the Constitution, is null and void because it violates the following provisions of the Constitution: First, that which declares that the powers of the government of this State are divided into three distinct departments-the legislative, executive and judicial; second, that which declares that the executive department shall consist of a Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Auditor of Public Accounts, Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction and Attorney General; third, that which directs that the executive officers, except the Lieutenant Governor, shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by law. The State Civil Service Act follows closely, section for section, the City Civil Service Act and is substantially a copy of it, only such changes being made as are rendered necessary to adapt it to the State service instead of municipal service. The City Civil Service Act was passed in 1895 and has been in force in the city of Chicago since November of that year. Controversies as to its constitutionality soon arose, and cases involving that ques |