It would be easy to enumerate all the advantages attached to the purification of the moral law; but what would it avail to enlarge on the power of opinion? Who does not know that there is no department of the social economy which escapes its influence; and that it is as omnipotent over rulers as private individuals? Let it suffice, therefore, to have pointed out the principal results which in this respect follow from an equality of rights, and to have made it apparent, that if privilege, in diversifying, classifying, and dividing existences and modes of activity, creates interests whose empire falsifies or perverts the natural instincts of conscience, a regime founded on the austere principles of justice, in giving to conditions of life analogous bases, must purify the elements whose fusion forms opinion, and impress on that sovereign of the world a direction so much the more strong and beneficial, as it will be more enlightened, unanimous, and agreeable to the interests of all.

CHAPTER XIV.

ON THE BEST SYSTEM OF ORGANIZATION UNDER AN EQUALITY OF RIGHTS.

WHATEVER the state of civilization may be, as there always exists much inequality in private conditions, we do not find amongst individuals either the same motives of attachment to established order, or the same intelligence.

On this head, Hobbes observes, "When a man feels at his ease, and nothing hinders him from becoming

still more so, it is impossible that he should desire a change." A small share of comfort, the possibility of increasing it, a fear of events that may compromise it, such have been in all times the causes that have given rise to a protective authority; and it is with reason that we consider all the classes possessing the advantages of wealth, as directly interested in the maintenance of government and the stability of the state.

Perhaps we exaggerate the influence of those envious and sullen feelings, which tend to make the poorer orders brood over and repine at their painful and often humiliating condition; but if the danger from these is only rarely felt, it is at least clear, that in believing themselves to have nothing to fear from social commotions, these classes offer a greater hold to the passions whose turbulence causes an explosion. So, in every society are mingled together, and co-exist, tendencies unequally conducive to good order, or, if you will, defensive and aggressive tendencies :-to weaken the latter, and strengthen the former, is the object of government; and the goodness of their organization will always be measured by the degree of success which they may attain in these respects.

That governments owe their origin to the necessity of guarantees for the rights of labour and property; that in all subsequent periods they have been aided by the support of men in possession of advantages, which the weakening of the sovereign power would have exposed to the assaults of violence or dishonesty, is a fact that requires no proof. From the most ancient times, the rich have perceived how the support of the laws was indispensable to the protection of their persons and property; thus did they ever coalesce to hold

in check the ignorant and needy classes; and, profiting by an incontestable superiority, we have seen them almost always go beyond the prescribed end, and impose on the multitude the yoke of slavery.

Nevertheless, we ought not to believe that it is sufficient for government to protect the rights of property, in order to obtain the support of the more elevated classes. These classes have ulterior wants, the neglect of which may detach them from power, change into hatred their natural tendencies, and give to the offensive forces a formidable ascendancy. But such wants, varying according to circumstances, still flow from the two following causes: first, from the interests developed by the progress of industry; secondly, from the intellectual and moral notions accruing from the increase of public intelligence.

Men naturally look forward to the enjoyment of their rights of property in all their plenitude imaginable. Accustomed in private life to grant nothing except in exchange for articles of value or useful services, they gradually carry the same ideas into their relations with the state. Are unwonted sacrifices imposed on them, they insist that the urgency of them should be made apparent; they exclaim against the rapacity of governments, and it becomes more and more difficult to subject them to taxes to which they have not consented. Add to that, the imperfections with which a change of circumstances affects institutions;-new interests are found deprived of guarantees; sometimes a commercial regulation arrests the extension of a branch of trade; at other times, civil laws impede the circulation of capital; sometimes, it is the mode or incidence of taxation that produce a train of

inconveniences ;-all, in fine, unite to induce them to seek in a participation in the right of legislation, a protection against the partiality, the ignorance, or the encroachments of power.

It is the same with the progress of intelligence. True, it is more easy to rule a rude and ignorant multitude than an enlightened and flourishing population; but other means are necessary.

It is with the

As the latter

enlightened man as with the rich man. becomes more sensible of physical privations, the other is more alive to the imperfections of the social state. Impelled by a patriotism whose ardour increases in proportion as he becomes capable of forming sound opinions upon the acts of power, and their influence on his own interests, he watches with a jealous eye the march of rulers; he feels indignant at being made the sport of their selfish passions; he becomes irritated by their faults and errors; and avails himself of every opportunity to rein them in. Such has been in all ages the tendency of classes the most interested in the maintenance of good order. We constantly see them demanding political rights, and rising up against the obstacles opposed to the attainment of that desire.

Under an equality of rights, as under all imaginable forms of society, subsist, in all their activity, the causes whose influence tends to produce an unequal division of fortunes and conditions. There are, therefore, rich and poor,-men well informed, and others ignorant,— some interested in the maintenance of good order, and others accessible to the anti-social passions. The first are the natural defenders of government; in possession of wealth and intelligence, feeling the constant need of the protection of an authority conservative of the rights

of property, nothing is wanting to stimulate in them a zeal dictated by powerful interests, but to grant them the political rights which the state of civilization has made a real necessity.

Thus is it to real superiority-to a selection from all those who enjoy a happy existence, that reason desires to see delegated the powers necessary for the protection of public liberties, as well as the administration of common interests.

This principle once established, let us see how we would apply it in order that only salutary consequences may result from it.

Here several considerations claim our attention. Although it is easy to prove that all the members of a community are positively interested in maintaining the security of persons and property, it is not thus that things present themselves to the eyes of men. Individuals scarcely raised above the reach of want, do not regard with the same eye as the rich the dangers of revolution. Having little to lose, deprived besides of the benefits of a solid and liberal education, they may, in certain circumstances, allow themselves to be seduced by the hope of deriving advantage from such changes; and thence arises the necessity of not granting them too great an ascendancy over the government. Nor is the supremacy of riches any more exempted from inconveniences. If opulence presupposes the love of order, it is without implying the superiority of intelligence; on the contrary, ambitious tendencies and selfish views are very ordinarily the fruit of a too elevated situation; and experience proves only too well the danger of abandoning the reins of power to a small number. Care ought, therefore, to be taken, in a good