Bank of Crawfordsville, 112 U. S. 405 [28: 733]; | approved, entitled "An act to establish a court This suggestion is the more important in view of statute of Florida which authorizes a court of equity in partition cases "to ascertain and adjudicate the rights and interests of the parties," which has apparently been held to authorize the court, in its discretion, to settle the question of title as incidental to the main controversy, or retain the bill and refer it to a court of law. Street v. Benner, 20 Fla. 700; Keil v. West, 21 Fla. 508. These questions, however, are not presented by the record in this case, and are mentioned only as giving color to plaintiff's claim that the existence of controversies between different defendants is not fatal to the jurisdiction of the Federal court upon the allegations of this bill. (3) The objection that Eliza B. Anderson was alleged in the bill to be a resident and citizen of the District of Columbia was met by an amended allegation that Anderson was "a citizen of South Carolina, now residing in Washington city, District of Columbia;" and while this allegation was traversed, it must, for the purpose of this hearing, be taken as true. 76] *As this case was appealed under section 5 of the Act of March 3, 1891, upon a question of jurisdiction, no other question can be properly considered, and the decree of the court below must, therefore, be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, dissented. UNITED STATES, Appt. V. EARL B. COE. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 76–86.) By the first section it was provided "that there shall be, and hereby is, established a court to be called the court of private land claims, to consist of a chief justice and four associate justices, who shall be, when appointed, citizens and residents of some of the states of the United States, to be appointed by the Presi- [77 dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to hold their offices for the term expiring on the thirty-first day of December, Anno Domini eighteen hundred and ninety-five; any three of whom shall constitute a quorum. Said court shall have and exercise jurisdiction in the hearing and decision of private land claims according to the provisions of this Act." Under section six it was made lawful "for any person or persons or corporation, or their legal representatives, claiming lands within the limits of the territory derived by the United States from the Republic of Mexico and now embraced within the territories of New Mexico, Arizona, or Utah, or within the states of Nevada, Colorado, or Wyoming by virtue of any such Spanish or Mexican grant, concession, warrant, or survey as the United States are bound to recognize and confirm by virtue of the treaties of cession of said country by Mexico to the United States which at the date of the passage of this Act have not been confirmed by Act of Congress, or otherwise finally decided upon by lawful authority, and which are not already complete and perfect, in every such case to present a petition, in writing, to the said court in the state or territory where said land is situated and where the said court holds its sessions, but cases arising in the states and territories in which the court does not hold regular sessions may be instituted at such place as may be designated by the rules of the court." Section seven provided: "That all proceedings subsequent to the filing of said petition shall be conducted as near as may be accord Jurisdiction of United States Supreme Courting to the practice of the courts of equity of court of private land claims-inferior courts. 1. Congress has power to confer upon this court jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the de cree of the court of private land claims. 2. The Act creating the court of private land claims, in prescribing the course of procedure upon appeal did not impose upon this court the exercise of original jurisdiction contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. the United States, except that the answer of the attorney of the United States shall not be required to be verified by his oath, and except that, as far as practicable, testimony shall be taken in court or before one of the justices thereof. The said court shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all questions arising in cases before it relative to the title to the land the subject of such case, the 8. The judicial action of all inferior courts estab-extent, location, and boundaries thereof, and lished by Congress may in accordance with the Constitution be subjected to the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme judicial tribunal of the government. [No. 591.] Submitted Oct. 9, 1894. Decided Oct. 29, 1894. other matters connected there with fit and proper to be heard and determined, and by a final decree to settle and determine the question of the validity of the title and the bound- [78 aries of the grant or claim presented for adjudication, according to the law of natious, the stipulations of the treaty concluded between the United States and the Republic of Mexico at the city of Guadalupe Hidalgo, on the sec ond day of February, in the year of our Lord, eighteen hundred and forty-eight, or the treaty concluded between the same powers at the city of Mexico, on the thirtieth day of December, in the year of our Lord, eighteen hundred and fifty-three, and the laws and ordinances of the Messrs. E. M. Sanford, A. M. Stevenson and S. L. Carpenter, for appellee, in favor of motion: government from which it is alleged to have a motion to dismiss the appeal for want of been derived, and all other questions properly jurisdiction was submitted. arising between the claimants or other parties in the case and the United States, which decree shall in all cases refer to the treaty, law, or ordinance under which such claim is confirmed or rejected; and in confirming any such claim, in whole or in part, the court shall in its decree specify plainly the location, boundaries, and area of the land the claim to which is so confirmed." The Congress of the United States has no power to confer upon the Supreme Court jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a decision of the court of private land claims, the latter tribunal not being vested with judicial power in virtue of any provision of the Constitution. As the Act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. at L. 854) establishing the court of private land claims, provides that the judges thereof shall hold their offices for a term expiring on the 31st day of December, 1895, it is clear that such tribunal is not a constitutional court. U. S. Const. art. 3, §1; American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U. S. 1 Pet. 511546 (7: 242-256); Benner v. Porter, 50 U. S. 9 How. 235-242 (13: 119, 122); McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174 (35: 693); Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 434-447 (20: 659--662). No jurisdiction is conferred upon the court by the Act to administer the judicial power of the United States in respect of any of their territory or property. United States v. Ferreira, 54 U. S. 13 How. 40 (14:42). As the court of private land claims is not a court in the sense of having been vested with the judicial power of the United States, Congress may not impose upon this court the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over its decisions. Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. 698, appx. Under the eighth section, "any person or corporation claiming lands in any of the states or territories mentioned in this Act under a title derived from the Spanish or Mexican government that was complete and perfect at the date when the United States acquired sovereignty therein" was given the right to apply to the court in the manner in the Act provided for other cases, for a confirmation of such title. Section nine was as follows: "That the party against whom the court shall in any case decide the United States, in case of the confirmation of a claim in whole or in part, and the claimant, in case of the rejection of a claim, in whole or in part-shall have the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, such appeal to be taken within six months from date of such decision. and in all respects to be taken in the same manner and upon the same conditions, except in respect of the amount in controversy, as is now provided by law for the taking of appeals from decisions of the circuit court of the United States. On any such appeal the Supreme Court shall retry the cause, as well the issues of fact as of law, and may cause testimony to be taken in addition to that given in the court below, and 79] may amend the record *of the proceedings below as truth and justice may require; and on such retrial and hearing every question shall be open, and the decision of the Supreme Court thereon shall be final and conclusive. Should no appeal be taken as aforesaid the decree of the court below shall be final and conclusive." By paragraph five of section thirteen it was provided: "No proceeding, decree, or act under this Act shall conclude or affect the private rights of persons as between each other, all of which rights shall be reserved and saved to the same effect as if this Act had not been passed; but the proceedings, decrees, and acts herein provided for shall be conclusive of all rights as between the United States and all persons claiming any interest or right in such lands." It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisSection nineteen read thus: "That the pow-diction that it revises and corrects the proceeders and functions of the court established by ings in a cause already instituted and does not this act shall cease and determine on the thirty- create that cause. first day of December, eighteen hundred and ninety-five, and all papers, files and records in the possession of said court belonging to any other public office of the United States shall be returned to such office, and all other papers, files, and records in the possession of or appertaining to said court shall be returned to and filed in the Department of the Interior." The court of private land claims was accordingly duly organized and upon the pleadings and evidence in this case proceeded to a decree confirming a Mexican grant in favor of the appellee to land in the territory of Arizona. An appeal having been duly prayed and allowed and the record having been filed in this court, Congress cannot extend the appellate power of this court beyond the limits prescribed by the Constitution, and can neither confer nor impose on it the authority or duty of hearing and determining an appeal from a commissioner or auditor or any other tribunal exercising only special power under an Act of Congress. United States v. Ritchie, 58 U. S. 17 How. 525 (5: 236); Hayburn's Case, 2 U. S. 2 Dall. 409 (1: 436); Re Sanborn, 148 U. S. 222 (15: 429); Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 363 (18: 863); State Auditor v. Atchison, T. & 8. F. R. Co. 6 Kan. 505; Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U. S. 3 Dall. 321 (1:619); Elliott, Appellate Procedure, SS 15-17. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. 1 Cranch, 175 (2:72). Mr. Lawrence Maxwell, Jr., Solicitor Gen., for appellant, in opposition: While claimants under grants made by Mexico or the Spanish authorities prior to the cession have no right to a judicial determination of their claims (Astiazaran v. Santa Rita Land & Min. Co. 148 U. S. 80-82 (37: 376, 377) and cases cited) Congress may, nevertheless, provide for their determination by judicial proceedings, if it sees fit. United States v. Ritchie, 58 U. S. 17 How, 525, 533, 534 (15: 236, 238). It is competent for Congress, if it sees fit, to provide for the judicial determination of claims against the United States for lands granted by the Mexican authorities prior to the cession. United States v. Arredondo, 31 U. S. 6 Pet. 691, 709 (8: 547, 554); Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U. S. 238 (32: 926). The authority for the establishment of the court of private land claims is not found in article 3, but in other provisions of the Constitution. It is a legislative and not a constitutional court. Section 1 of the Constitution does not exhaust the power of Congress to establish courts. American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U. S. 1 Pet. 511 (7: 242); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U. S. 2 Dall. 419 (1: 440); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. 127 U. S. 265 (32: 239); United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 223 (27: 171, 182). The court of private land claims has the essential characteristics of a judicial tribunal, including the most essential attribute of all, the power to bind the parties by its judgments. The judicial power of the United States under article 3 of the Constitution may be vested in temporary courts, provided the judges are appointed for the life of the court. Kentucky & 1. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 351, 2 L. R. A. 289, 37 Fed. Rep. 567, 612. The course of procedure prescribed for this court on appeals from the court of private land claims does not have the effect to convert such appeals into original proceedings. The constitutionality of the court so far as it has jurisdiction over lands in the territories is not open to debate. McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174, 180, 184 (35: 693, 695, 696). Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court: The motion to dismiss rests upon two grounds: 1. That the Congress had no power to confer upon this court jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the decree of the court of private land claims because the latter is not vested with judicial power in virtue of any provision of the Constitution. 2. That if this be not so, nevertheless the Act creating that court, in prescribing the course of procedure upon appeal, imposed upon this court the exercise of original jurisdiction contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, and that therefore no appeal would lie. The second of these grounds does not appear to us to afford any support to appellee's contention. This is not one of the cases within the original jurisdiction of this court, and if it be one of those in respect of which the court has appellate jurisdiction, that jurisdiction exists both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make." 83] *If the paragraph in the ninth section of the Act providing that this court shall retry causes coming up on appeal, "as well the issues of fact as of law, and may cause testimony to be taken in addition to that given in the court below, and may amend the record of the proceedings below as truth and justice may require; and on such retrial and hearing every question shall be open," were obnoxious to the objection that in whole or in part it was not such a regulation as the Congress had power to enact, then the section would to that extent be invalid, but this would not take away the right of appeal itself, nor could the question of such invalidity arise except when particular action was asked under the clause. We understand the suggestion as made to relate to the authority to allow further proofs or the record to be amended. Causes in the court of private land claims are in effect equity causes and brought to this court by appeal, and, as observed by Chief Justice Ellsworth, in Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U. S. 3 Dall. 321 [1: 619], "an appeal is a process of civil law origin and removes a cause entirely; subjecting the fact, as well as the law, to a review and retrial; but a writ of error is a process of common law and it removes nothing for examination but the law." The remedy by appeal in its original sense was confined to causes in equity, ecclesiastical, and admiralty jurisdiction. Undoubtedly ap pellate courts proceeding according to the course of the civil law may allow parties to introduce new allegations and further proofs, and such has been the settled practice of the ecclesiastical courts in England and of the admiralty courts in this country. Nevertheless orders allowing this to be done are not granted as matter of course, but made with extreme caution, and only on satisfactory grounds. As to appeals to this court from the decrees of circuit courts in equity causes, it was provided by the second section of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1803 (2 Stat. at L. 244, chap. 40; carried forward into section 698 of the Revised Statutes) which was the first enactment giving the remedy by appeal, "that no new evidence shall be received in the said court, on the hearing of such appeal, except in admiralty and prize causes. Holmes v. Trout, 32 U. S. 7 Pet. 171 [8: 647]; Mitchel v. United States, 34 U. S. 9 Pet. 711 [9: 283]; *Boone v. Chiles, [84 35 U. S. 10 Pet. 177 [9: 388]; Blease v. Garlington, 92 U. S. 1 [23 521]. And in respect of the allowance of amendments, when the ends of justice require it, the course has been to remand the cause with directions. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio & M. R. Co. 142 U. S. 396 [35: 1055], and cases cited. Under what circumstances and to what extent the power to amend the record of the proceedings below under this Act, or to cause additional testimony to be taken, was intended to be exercised, we are not now called on to consider. The statute is not mandatory, but empowers the court to direct further proofs and to amend the record if in its judgment the case demands its interposition to that effect, and, as the question is one of power merely, and not properly arising for determination on this motion, we need not prolong these observations. The principal ground relied on by appellee is that the court of private land claims is not a tribunal vested with judicial power in virtue of any provision of the Constitution, and, therefore, the Congress bad no power to confer upon this court jurisdiction to entertain appeals from its decisions. By article 8 of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and article 5 of the Gadsden treaty, the the judicial power of the United States expressly conferred by the Constitution, and to be exercised in correlation with the presence and jurisdiction of the several state courts and governments.' Hornbuckle v., Toombs, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 648, 655 [21: 966, 967]. And as wherever the United States exercise the power of government, whether under specific grant, or through the dominion and sovereighty of plenary authority as over the territories (Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 48 [38: 331, 349) that power includes the ultimate executive, legislative, and judicial power, it follows that the judicial action of all inferior courts established by Congress may in accordance with the Constitution be subjected to the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme judicial tribunal of the government. There has never been any question in regard to this as applied to territorial courts, and no reason can be perceived for applying a different rule to the adjudications of the court of private land claims over property in the territories. property of Mexicans within the territory ceded | are parts of the Federal system, "invested with by Mexico to the United States was to be "in violably respected," and they and their heirs and grantees were to enjoy with respect to it "guaranties equally ample as if the same belonged to citizens of the United States." 9 Stat. at L. 929, 930; 10 Stat. at L. 1035. While claimants under grants made by Mexico or the Spanish authorities prior to the cession had no right to a judicial determination of their claims, Congress, nevertheless, might provide therefor if it chose to do so. Astiazaran v. Santa Rita Land & Min. Co. 148 U. S. 80 [37: 376]. And it was for this purpose that the Act of March 3, 1891, was passed, establishing the court of private land claims for the settlement of claims against the United States to lands "derived by the United States from the Republic of Mexico, and now embraced within the territories of New Mexico, Arizona, or Utah or within the states of Nevada, Colorado, or Wyoming." 85] *The argument is that the court thus created, composed of judges holding office for a time limited, is not one of the courts mentioned in article 3 of the Constitution, whereby the ju dicial power of the United States is vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time establish, the judges of which hold their offices during good behavior, receiving at stated times for their services a compensation that cannot be diminished during their continuance in office. and are removable only by impeachment; and that the appellate power of this court cannot be extended to the revision of the judgments and decrees of such a court. Granting that the court of private land claims does not come within the third article, the conclusion assumes either that the power of Congress to create courts can only be exercised in virtue of that Submitted Oct. 15, 1894. Decided Oct. 29, 1894. article, or that judicial tribunals otherwise The motion to dismiss is denied. Mrs. A. F. SIPPERLEY ET AL., Appts. v. JOHN O. SMITH ET AL. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 88-89.) Parties to an appeal. Intervenors in a suit cannot appeal from judg- established cannot be placed under the super- APPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme visory power of this court. It must be regarded as settled that section one of article 3 does not exhaust the power of Congress to establish courts. The leading case upon the subject is American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U. S. 1 Pet. 511, 546 [7: 242, 256], in which it was held in respect of territorial courts, Chief Justice Marshall delivering the opinion, that while those courts are not courts in which the judicial power conferred by article 3 can be deposited, yet that they are legislative courts created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government over the territories, or of the clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The authorities are referred to and commented on by Mr. Justice Harlan in McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174 [35: 693]. Court of the Territory of Utah, affirming the judgment of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of that territory, adjudging an assignment faudulent and void, etc., in an action brought by John O. Smith et al., against A. F. Sipperley et al., in which action M. J. Gray, Mrs. A. F. Sipperley et al., intervened. On motion to dismiss or affirm. Dismissed. Statement by the Chief Justice. A. F. Sipperley and H. S. Lee, composing a partnership under the firm name of A. F. Sipperley & Co., doing business in the city of Salt Lake, Utah, made an assignment of their partnership*property to one Ross in trust to[87 convert the same into money and pay creditors in the order named, first, M. J. Gray and the Union Bank of Greeley, Colo., in full; second, Mrs. A. F. Sipperley, Mrs. E. J. Walling, and H. A. Lee, certain individual indebtedness, in full; third, their remaining creditors. John O. Smith, George Whiting, Charles F. Conner, and George S. Smith, composing the firm of Smith, Conner & Co., brought suit against A. F. Sipperley and H. S. Lee, in the District Court for the Third Judicial District of Utah The case before us relates to the determination of a claim against the United States to lands situated in the territory of Arizona, and, as it was clearly within the authority of Congress to establish a court for such determi nation, unaffected by the definitions of article 3, the question is not presented whether it was within the power of Congress to create a judicial tribunal of this character for the determination 86] *of title to property situated in the states, where the courts of the United States, proper, 201. note to Owings to Kincannon, 8: 727. NOTE.-A8 to parties in error, who necessary, see That only parties to record can be heard on appeal or writ of error, see note to Harrison v. Nixon, 9: Territory, and levied an attachment on the assigned property upon the ground that Sipperley & Co. had disposed thereof with intent to defraud their creditors. Thereupon the preferred creditors, M. J. Gray, the Union Bank of Greeley, Colorado, Mrs. Sipperley, Mrs. Walling, and H. A. Lee, filed an intervening complaint in said suit, praying for a receiver, and that the assignment be declared valid and the indebtedness due them be ordered to be paid out of the proceeds of the property and for general relief; which intervening complaint was answered by the original plaintiffs, who prayed therein that the assignment be adjudged fraudulent and void. The cause was tried by the District Court of the Third Judicial District, a jury having been duly waived; the trial Judge filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and rendered judgment, adjudging the assignment fraudulent and void; dismissing the complaint of intervention; and directing the receiver (the assignee having in the meantime been appointed receiver) to pay plaintiffs in certain other suits consolidated with this and then these plaintiffs. "Whereas the above named Mistress A. F. Sipperley, Mistress E. J. Walling, H. A. Lee, and the Union Bank of Greeley, Colorado, have prosecuted an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, etc." This bond was approved by the Chief Justice of Utah, and filed on the day of its date. Citation was issued, dated January 4, 1894, and directed to John O. Smith, George Whiting, Charles P. Connor, George S. Smith, and their attorneys, reciting that Mrs. Sipperley, Mrs. Walling, H. A. Lee, and the Union Bank of Greeley, Colorado, had appealed, etc., service of which citation was admitted January 12, 1894. An assignment of errors in this court was also filed in that court January 12, entitled "John O. Smith et al. [89 vs. A. F. Sipperley et al., and Mrs. A. F. Sipperley, Mrs. E. J. Walling, H. A. Lee, and The Union Bank of Greeley, Colorado, Intervenors & Appellants." No application for summons and severance as to M. J. Gray or any equivalent therefor appeared in the record, nor any order permitting severance; nor was any application made in this court for the issue of citation to A. F. Sipperley and H. S. Lee, or leave to perfect the appeal as to them; nor did they or Gray appear herein. Appellees moved to dismiss or affirm. tion. Mr. C. H. Armes for appellees, for the moMr. J. W. Judd for appellants, in opposition. sustained upon the authority of Masterson v. The Chief Justice: The motion to dismiss is Howard, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 416 [19: 953]; Har dee v. Wilson, 146 U. S. 179 [36: 933]; Inglehart Stansbury, 151 U. S. 68 [38: 76]; Davis v. Mercantile Trust Co. 152 U. S. 590 [38: 563]. Appeal dismissed. The title of the cause in the district court under which the findings of fact and conclusions of law appeared in the record, and also the judgment, was as follows: "John O. Smith et al., Plaintiffs, vs. A. F. Sipperley et al., Defendants, and M. J. Gray, Mrs. A. F. Sipperley, Mrs. E. J. Walling, H. A. Lee, and The Union Bank of Greeley, Colorado, Intervenors." The record did not contain the prayer for and allowance of appeal to the supreme court of Utah, but showed as at the June term, 1893, of that court, the following order: "John O. Smith et al. vs. A. F. Sipperley et al., Def'ts, 88] and M. J. Gray *et al., Intervenors & Apv. pellants. This cause coming on regularly to be heard, was argued by Hon. John W. Judd in behalf of appellants, by Charles C. Dey, Esq., in reply, was submitted, and taken under advisement." The judgment of the district court was thereafter affirmed. The opinion of the supreme court is given and is entitled, "John O. Smith et al., Respondents, vs. A. F. Sipperley et al., Appellants." sequently this order was entered: "John O. Smith et al. vs. A. F. Sipperley, Def'ts, and M. J. Gray et al., Intervenors & Appellants. In this cause counsel for appellants prays the allowance of an appeal from the judg ment of this court, rendered therein, to the Supreme Court of the United States, and asks that the amount of a bond to be given thereon be now fixed, and it was ordered that such appeal, as prayed for, be and is hereby allowed, and the amount of a bond to be given thereon is fixed in the sum of five thousand dollars, and the amount of a bond for costs is fixed in the sum of five hundred (500) dollars." Sub The record disclosed a bond dated December 22, 1893, entitled "John O. Smith et al., Respondents, v8. A. F. Sipperley et al., Defendants, and M. J. Gray et al., Intervenors, Appellants," signed by Mrs. Sipperley, Mrs. Walling, H. A. Lee, and the Union Bank of Greeley, Colorado, as principals, running to John O. Smith, George Whiting, Charles P. Conner, and George S. Smith, composing the firm of Smith, Whiting, Connor & Co., in the penal sum of $5500, and reciting that, 1. 2. STATE OF NEW YORK, Appts., v. JOHN C. ENO. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 89-99.) Habeas corpus-when should be denied. The Circuit Court of the United States should not, except in cases of urgency, discharge upon habeas corpus, from custody under warrants issued by a state court, one charged with the offense committed while president of a national bank, of forgery by making false entries in the books of the bank with intent to defraud, where he is not indicted in any court of the United States for such offense. The claim of the accused of immunity from prosecution in a state court, should be first passed upon by the highest court of the state, and NOTE.-As to when habeas corpus may issue, and when not; and from what courts, and by what judges: what may be inquired into by writ of, see note to United States v. Hamilton, 1: 490. As to what questions may be considered on habeas corpus, see note to Ex parte Carll, 27: 288. As to suspension of writ of habeas corpus, see note to Luther v. Borden, 12: 581. |