spiracy between Dickerman and the prisoners,” and that Dickerman “was their confidant, to whom they imparted their plans and their movements, as he had testified.” Still all the inculpating testimony came from the accomplice; so that the case is an authority for holding that he may be corroborated as to any material fact in issue, although that fact does not connect the prisoner with the offense. In that case, as in this, there was other corroborating evidence which did inculpate the prisoners. In that case it was not held, and we do not hold in this, that corroboration as to facts which do not inculpate the prisoner will be sufficient, but simply that evidence which corroborates as to any fact in issue is admissible for what it is worth. Bishop on Criminal Procedure, § 1170, says: “Not inconsistently with these views it is permissible also to submit to the consideration of the jury evidence tending to show the accomplice’s probable credibility in his narration, though coming short of the required corroboration.” But we cannot say that the evidence objected to in this case has no tendency to connect the prisoner with the crime. The witness was corroborated as to the cellar, its condition and things in it ; particularly as to the bottles and the barrel of kerosene oil. The fact that the bottle of oil was found in the place he pointed out shows that he had it, as he said he had ; and that fact, in connection with the fact that there was on that day an empty barrel, from which a small quantity of oil could be taken by tipping it, and that there were also in the cellar empty bottles of similar size and shape, renders it probable that he got the oil at the time and place named. The fact being established that he had the bottle of oil, and that he got it in the prisoner’s cellar, the inquiry is a pertinent one, of whom did he receive it, and for what purpose? In answer to these questions the accomplice says he received it of the prisoner, and for the purpose of firing this barn. And here he is corroborated by the prisoner’s declarations made to the detectives. The testimony of the detectives, however, goes further than that; and, if believed by the jury, fastens the crime upon the prisoner. The question is not, therefore, whether this evidence is admissible as supplying the corroboration which the evidence of an accomplice needs at a point which connects the prisoner with the crime, for the corroborating evidence of that character had already been furnished, but whether the testimony of an accomplice may be corroborated in other and minor points, which do not, taken by themselves, touch the prisoner. And this is a question not arising under the law peculiar to accomplices, but under the general rules of evidence with reference to witnesses who from any cause stand before the jury with their credibility seriously impaired. Thus, suppose doubt were thrown upon the whole story of the accomplice, and it was claimed by the defense that he did not set the barn on fire, would it not, on general principles, be admissible to prove, by a person who saw him do it, that his story was true? And yet this would not connect the prisoner with the crime. The remaining question arises upon the charge of the court to the jury. The learned counsel for the prisoner complain that the charge of the court puts the testimony of an accomplice “on a par with other kinds; and says merely, if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, by the testimony of an accomplice, of the defendant’s guilt, that is sufficient; stating exactly the same rule that applies to all kinds of evidence, and containing no caution, no advice, and showing no distinction between testimony of an accomplice and other testimony.” If that is a right view of the charge, there is doubtless foundation for the complaint. But we do not so interpret the charge. .The court first told the jury that “ Frawley was the active agent in this crime, and his story comes to you under such circumstances as to call for the most careful scrutiny. In the argument a good deal of stress has been laid upon what is claimed to be a rule of law,-——that the story of an accomplice ought to be received with great care; and that undoubtedly is the rule. Our supreme court, quite a number of years ago, laid down this rule in language better than I can give it myself, and, in order that you may have it exactly, I will read it to you.” The court then proceeded to read the charge of the superior court to the jury in the case of State v." Wolcott, 21 Conn. 272, and from the opinion of the supreme court sustaining that charge. Of course, the jury must have understood that the court adopted the portions read from that case as a part of his instruction to them. In that charge, consequently in this, we find these words: “An accomplice is an admissible witness, but, as he comes before the court under suspicious circumstances, his testimony ought to be received with great caution. As a general rule, it will be unsafe to convict upon the testimony of an accomplice alone, uncorroborated by other testimony. It ought to be corroborated in material facts connecting the prisoners, and each of them, with the crime; but the degree of credit to be given to the testimony of an accomplice, and the amount of corroboration necessary to render it satisfactory, are matters to be considered and determined by the Jury.” That charge was sustained by this court in the former case, and we must regard it as correct in this. Immediately after reading from the report of that case, the court said: “Now, if I should attempt to make a rule out of this language of the supreme court, it would be something like this: that the jury may hear the testimony of an accomplice, and that upon the naked testimony of an accomplice they have the right to find a verdict of guilty, but that they ought never to do so unless they find such evidence to be so clear, strong, and con vincing that it removes from their minds every reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.” This is the portion of the charge which is complained of. If this was the whole charge, or if we were required to consider the rule thus formulated apart from what precedes and what follows it, there would be difficulty in sustaining it. But we cannot presume that the judge intended to withdraw from the jury the caution he had already given them. They must have understood that the scales in which the evidence of an accomplice is to be weighed are different from those in which other evidence is weighed. It is true, the testimony of an accom plice may be so strong and convincing as to justify a verdict of guilty without corroboration; and that was what the jury were told. They were also instructed to exercise caution in weighing his testimony. That negatives the claim that his testimony was placed upon the same footing as that of other witnesses. We think, therefore, that the fair import of the whole charge is that if the jury, after making due allowance for the suspicious circumstances under which the testimony is given, are fully convinced of the prisoner’s guilt, they may return a verdict of guilty. Again, the case was not submitted to the jury upon the naked testimony of the accomplice; for the court had previously told the jury that his testimony should be received with caution, and that it ought to be corroborated in material facts connecting the prisoner with the crime; and, immediately after laying down the rule just alluded to, the judge said to the jury: “Now, taking that to be the rule, the state say there is no occasion for its application in this case, because they say that Fraw-1ey is corroborated.” He then called attention to the corroborating evidence, which we can see was amply sufficient to justify the jury in finding that the witness was corroborated as to material facts. Now, we must presume that the jurors did their duty,—that they considered the case as it was presented to them; that they required the accomplice to be corroborated; and that they considered the corroborating evidence, and regarded it as sufficient. To suppose otherwise, and assume that they founded their verdict upon the naked uncorroborated testimony of the accomplice, imputes to them a culpable neglect of duty, and a manifest violation of their oaths. We find no error in the judgment. (The other judges concurred.) HOLMAN v. CONTINENTAL LIFE INs. Co. LIFE INsURANCE—“PAIn-UP” POLICY—FORFEITURE—PAYMENT OF INTEREsT ON PREMIUM NOTEs. Where a policy of life insurance provided that, on default in the payment of an premium subsequent to the second annual premium, the company woul convert it into a “paid-up” olicy for as many tenth parts of the sum originally insured as there should ave been complete annual payments, and also contained a provision entailing forfeiture in the event of failure to pay any premium or interest upon any premium notes, and where, on default in the payment of a premium, an indorsement was made upon the policy that it was recognized as binding upon the company for two-tenths thereof, “subject to the terms and conditions expressed in the policy, ” failure to pay the Interest on the premium notes, at the dates prescribed by the policy, after the conversion into a “paid-up” policy, will operate as a forfeiture of the amount due. CARPENTER and GRANGER, JJ., dissenting. Action in the court of common pleas, Hartford county, to recover under a policy issued upon the plaintiff’s life. Demurrer to defendant’s answer reserved for the opinion of the supreme court of errors. H. B. Freeman, for plaintiff. T. M Maltbie, for defendant. Looms, J. The complaint in this case seeks to recover the amount due under a so—called “paid-up” policy of insurance on the life of William W. Holman for the benefit of his Wife. The demurrer to the defendant’s answer raises the question whether the defense therein set forth is sufficient in law to prevent a recovery by the plaintiff; and this depends entirely upon the contract of the parties. By the terms of the contract, as originally made, the defendant was to receive an annual premium of $108.72 during the continuance of the policy, for the term of 10 years, payable, as appears from the margin, partly in cash and partly by note. At the end of the term, or upon the previous death of the insured, the defendant was to pay $1,000, “deducting therefrom all indebtedness to the said company on account of this policy, if any, then existing,” subject to sundry express conditions and agreements mentioned in the policy, the third and fourth of which only are involved in this case. These are as follows: “Third. If the said assured shall not pay the said annual premiums on or before noon of the several days hereinbefore mentioned for the payment of the same, and the interest annually in advance on any outstanding premium notes which may be given for any portion thereof, or shall not pay, at maturity, any notes or obligations given for the cash portion of any premium, or part thereof, then, and in every such case, this policy shall cease and determine, and said company shall not be liable for the payment of the sum insured, or any part thereof, except as hereinafter provided. “Fourth. If, after the receipt by the company of two or more annual premiums upon this policy, default shall be made in the payment of any subsequent premium when due, then, notwithstanding such default, this company will convert this policy into a ‘ paid-up ’ policy for as many tenth parts of the sum originally insured as there shall have been complete annual premiums paid when such default shall be made: provided, that this policy shall be transmitted to and received by this company, and application made for such conversion, Within one year after such default. ” The defendant’s answer, after admitting the issuing of the policy, its terms, and demand and refusal to pay as alleged in the complaint, further alleged that-— “(2) On the first day of April, 1874, the plaintiff had paid to the defendant in cash a portion of two annual premiums, and had given to the defendant premium notes for the remaining portion of said premiums, which notes were then and are now outstanding and unpaid. “(3) Thereafter the plaintiff made default in the payment of premiums, and transmitted said policy to the defendant, and with his wife, Rebecca J. Holmes, applied to the defendant to adjust the insurance under said policy, according to the stipulations thereof, by reducing the amount thereof to $200; and in said application agreed to pay the defendant annually, in advance, the interest on all outstanding notes given in part payment of annual premiums. “(4) Thereupon the defendant made the following indorsement upon said policy of insurance: ‘ This policy, having lapsed after two annual payments, :is hereby recognized as binding upon the company for two-tenths thereof, or $200, subject to the terms and conditions expressed in this policy and in the \quitclaim to this company, bearing even date with this entry; ’ and returned said policy to the plaintifi, who accepted the same. “ (5) Thereafter the plaintiff paid the interest on said outstanding premium motes, annually, in advance, until the year 1876, when he ceased to pay the :same, and has not since paid the same. “(6) Said policy provided that if the assured should not pay the interest annually, in advance, on any outstanding premium notes given for any portion of the annual premiums on said policy, then said policy should cease and determine, and said company should not be liable for the payment of the sum insured, or any part thereof. “(7) By reason of the failure and neglect of the plaintiff to- pay the interest annually, in advance, on said outstanding premium notes in the year 1576, and thereafter, said policy of insurance has ceased and determined, and the defendant is not liable for the payment of the sum insured, or any part thereof.” The plaintiff’s reply was as follows: “The plaintiff demu-rs to the answer of the defendant, as the facts therein stated are insufficient in the law, because the paid-up policy upon which complaint is brought was non-forfeiting by its terms, and contained no provision that the failure to pay interest on the outstanding premium notes should work a forfeiture of said paid-up policy, and the same is nowhere averred in said answer.” The special- ground of this demurrer presents the precise question involved in the case, namely, does the paid-up policy contain a provision that the failure to pay interest on the outstanding premium notes shall work a forfeiture of the policy? This question is different from the one considerably discussed in other jurisdictions, namely, what will entitle the insured to a paid-up policy, and what provisions as to forfeiture :should it contain? The parties have settled these questions themselves by giving and accepting the reduced insurance; and, if the policy thus accepted contains a provision whereby the failure to pay interest will make it void, then the plaintiff, by his pleadings, impliedly admits that he has no case, even though he would have .been entitled to a different policy under the original contract. ' The new contract, whereby the insurance was reduced to $200, states that the company recognize the policy binding for that sum, “subject to the terms and conditions expressed in this policy, and in the quitclaim to this company bearing even date with this entry.” This, in effect, is the same [thing as a new policy containing the terms and conditions of the old one as far as applicable. Now, among these conditions is the clear stipulation that “if the assured shall not pay the interest annually, in advance, on any outstanding premium notes, this policy shall cease (and determine.” In what manner did this provision become eliminated from the paid-up policy? It cannot be claimed to be inapplicable, because there is a subsisting obligation to pay this interest annually, in advance, recognized, not only in the original policy, but in the quitclaim, whereby the plaintiff and his wife, when they applied for the' reduced insurance, made a fresh promise and agreement to pay this interest; and this quitclaim is referred to and made part of the new contract, and the promise on the part of the company is made subject to it as a condition. But a specious argument, always urged against this view by counsel |