ministration, p. 590, it is said: "There is no occasion to repeat citation of authorities on the proposition that, at common law and in all the states, all mere personal property, including chattels real, goes to the executor of a testator, and to the administrator of an intestate." At page 594 it is said: "Chattels real, which, as already remarked, go to the executor or administrator, include all leases of lands or tenements for a definite space of time, measured by years, months, or days, or until a day named; also estates at will, by sufferance, and, generally, any estate in lands not amounting to a freehold.” On page 231 it is said: "Leasehold estates and estates for years are treated at common law as personal property, and the widow of a lessee dying is not entitled to dower therein, although it be for a period of a thousand years, or renewable forever, or although the lease contain a covenant to convey the estate in fee on the demand of the lessee. In some of the states, however, dower is given by statute in leasehold estates of a given duration." But it is also said at page 379: "All the authorities, in both England and America, so far as they go, recognize the principle in its fullest import that real estate, or immovable property, is exclusively subject to the laws of the country within whose territory it is situate. The reason of the rule includes leasehold and chattel interests in land, servitudes and easements, and other charges on lands, as mortgages and rents, and trust estates. All of these are deemed to be, in the sense of the law, immovables, and governed by the lex rei sitæ." In 18 Cyc. p. 186, § 7, it is said: "A lease for years, since this is no freehold interest, but a chattel real, vests in the executor or administrator of the lessee, and the same is true of rights incidental to or given by the lease, such as a privilege of renewal or an unexpired option to purchase the demised premises, these also being mere chattel interests."

In Cunningham v. Baxley, 96 Ind. 367, Sarah Applegate had a life estate in land, “and made a parol contract with William Applegate that, if he would build a house and barn and plant an orchard on the land and give to said Sarah one-third of the corn and wheat raised and a load of hay yearly, in consideration thereof he might occupy, use, and have the possession of said land during Sarah's lifetime." William had died, and Sarah was still living, and Baxley had got into possession, and William's widow and heirs sued, alleging that they were "the joint owners of said land for and during the life of said Sarah," and were "entitled to the immediate possession thereof." The court said: "The complaint does not aver a purchase of Sarah Applegate's interest; it shows that William Applegate was only a sub-tenant under a parol lease; it shows that Sarah Applegate, owning the life estate, agreed that William Applegate 'might occupy' the land until her death, in consideration of his building a house and barn and planting an orchard and paying her a fixed yearly rent; it shows that he took possession, and during his life performed the conditions and paid the rent, and died during the lifetime of Sarah Applegate. He had a lease of her land which was not to terminate until her death, provided the rent should be duly paid. Such a lease is not real estate; it is a chattel interest; it does not descend to the heirs, but goes to the executor or administrator; and he is the party to maintain a suit for possession against one who has wrongfully taken possession of the leased premises. * * There was no cause of action in favor of the plaintiffs.'

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In McCormick v. Stephany, 57 N. J. Eq., loc. cit. 264, 41 A. 843, it is said that the unexpired term of a lease "is an asset in the hands of

the executor or administrator. * * * By the express terms of the will all real and personal estate are given to the complainant," the lessee's widow. "But, however absolute may be the gift to her, if the thing be an asset to be administered, the executor primarily takes it and all rights touching it must, during the period of administration, be asserted by the executor as such, or it must appear that the executor assents to the possession of the legatee." In Thornton v. Mehring, 117 Ill. 55, 25 N. Ë. 958, the court held in judgment a lease for 89 years to a lessee who had died intestate, and his administratrix, after final settlement, had sold it. The court said: "There would seem to be no doubt that the lease in this case was personalty, and the legal title and power of disposal passed to the administratrix on the grant of letters of administration." In Faler v. McRae, 56 Miss. 227, it was held that a lease of land for 99 years is a chattel real, and upon the death of the lessee descends to the administrator of his estate, and that so long as there is a valid debt against the estate the heirs and distributees cannot acquire any title as against the creditor, and any conveyance thereof by them is ineffectual as against such creditor.

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In Gutzweiler's Adm'r v. Lackmann, 39 Mo., loc. cit. 97, this court said: "Being a lease for 10 years, we think it should be treated as a mere chattel interest, which, of course, goes to the administrator upon the death of his intestate, and not to the heirs, and therefore the suit was properly revived in the name of the personal representative." That seems to be the only case in this state where the point was considered, and in that, in disposing of the point of proper parties plaintiff in an ejectment for the leasehold, it was decided that a leasehold for 10 years was personal property, and that the administrator of the lessee was the proper plaintiff. That decision cites no authorities, and does not consider the statutes. We have found no case that holds a leasehold to be real estate, and it seems to be clear that at common law it was personal property, whatever might be its duration in years, whether for 1, or 20, or 99 years. Dillingham v. Jenkins, 15 Miss. 479.

But appellant contends that, even though a leasehold were personal property at common law, it is no longer such under the statutes, * * * Section 936 is found in the chapter concerning "Conveyances of Real Estate," and reads: "The term 'real estate,' as used herein, shall be construed as coextensive in meaning with lands, tenements and hereditaments, and as embracing all chattels real." "Chattel's real include estates for years, at will, by sufferance, and various interests of uncertain duration." Rapalje & Lawr. Law Dict. p. 200, tit. "Chattel." They are to be distinguished, on the one hand, from things, which have no concern with the land, such as mere movables and rights connected with them, which are chattels, personal, and, on the other hand, from a freehold, which is realty. The section of the statute quoted clearly says that for purposes of conveyance a leasehold is to be considered as real estate. But does it not mean more than that? Does it not mean that a leasehold is to be assigned or conveyed by a quitclaim or a warranty deed or mortgage, just as any other interest in land is to be conveyed? We think it means only that. It does not attempt to convert what was personal property at common law into real estate. And that view brings section 936 into harmony with section 3415 of the statute of frauds (Ann. St. 1906, p. 1949), which reads: "No leases, estates, interests, either of freehold or term of years, shall

at any time hereafter be assigned, granted or surrendered, unless it be by deed or note in writing." * * *

We will assume, though it is a liberal assumption, that this section is meant to be a definition of the words "real estate" wherever used in any of the statutes, and that it is not confined in its application to the chapter in which used, as in section 936. If it means to say that a leasehold or a chattel real is to be held to be real estate, that meaning is to be found in the words "lands, tenements and hereditaments." The word "land" is well understood; it comprehends ground, soil, or earth, pastures, woods, springs, wells, lakes, ponds, and all things that have become a fixed part of the soil. The word "tenement," in "its plain and ordinary meaning," means a house; but in a larger sense it signifies a thing which is the subject of tenure, and includes, not only corporeal hereditaments which are or may be held, but also all inheritances issuing out of any of these inheritances, or concerning or annexed to or exercisable within the same, though they lie not in tenure.

Rapalje and Lawrence's Law Dictionary says that the term "hereditaments' includes a few rights unconnected with land, but it is generally used as the widest expression for real property of all kinds, and is therefore employed in conveyances, after the words 'lands' and 'tenements,' to include everything in the nature of realty which they do not cover. * * Real hereditaments are lands and tenements. A personal hereditament is one which concerns neither lands nor tenements." In 3 Kent's Commentaries, p. 401, it is said: "Things real consist of lands, tenements, and hereditaments. The last word is almost as comprehensive as property, for it means anything capable of being inherited, be it corporeal, incorporeal, real, personal, or mixed. The term 'real estate' means an estate in fee or for life in land, and does not comprehend terms for years or any interest short of a freehold. A tenement comprises everything that may be holden, so as to create a tenancy, in the feudal sense of the word, and no doubt includes things incorporate, though they do not lie in tenure." For practical purposes, the word "hereditament" means an appurtenance. * * Blackstone (2 Bl. Com. 16) says: ""Tenement' is a word of still greater extent" than lands, "and though, in its vulgar acceptation, it is only applied to houses and other buildings, yet, in its original, proper, and legal sense, it signifies everything that may be holden, provided it be of a permanent nature, whether it be of a substantial and sensible, or of an unsubstantial, ideal kind." See, also, 28 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, p. 42.

In Barr v. Doe, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 335, 38 Am. Dec. 146, "the plaintiff brought an action of ejectment to recover the possession of five acres of land, to which his lessor claimed title by virtue of a purchase at a constable's sale. The facts were that the defendant was the owner of a lease of said premises for the term of three years, created by parol; that a judgment had been rendered against him by a justice of the peace; that an execution had been issued on the judgment, by virtue of which the term had been levied on and sold; and that Binford, the plaintiff's lessor, became the purchaser." The court said: "It is contended that a term of years cannot be sold or an execution issued from a justice's court. The forty-sixth section of the justice's act (Rev. St. 1838, p. 373) provides that executions issued by a justice of the peace shall operate as a lien upon the personal property of the judgment debtor, etc.; and the fifty-first section of the same act further provides that, in all cases where execution shall issue, and goods and chattels cannot

be found to discharge the same, in case it shall be made known to the justice who issued it that the debtor has lands or tenements, the justice shall, on application, etc., forward a transcript of his proceedings to the clerk of the circuit court who shall file the same and issue a scire facias thereon, etc. Every species of property comprehended under the general name of 'chattels' is, by statute, made liable to execution on a judgment rendered by a justice. A term of years is a chattel interest. Upon the death of the tenant, it does not descend to the heir, but goes to his executor. In the division of property into real and personal, it is classed among the latter. And in England, upon a fieri facias against the goods and chattels of the debtor, it is liable to be seized and sold. It is contended that the fifty-first section of the act, by the use of the word 'tenements,' explains the meaning of the Legislature, and shows that the movable chattels only of the debtor were intended to be made liable. We cannot adopt that construction. "Tenement' is a word of extensive signification, and in the connection in which it is found in the statute refers to such interests in real estate as are connected with the freehold, and not included in the term 'chattels.''

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In Gibson v. Brockway, 8 N. H. 471, 31 Am. Dec. 200, it is said: "With us the word 'tenement' is applied exclusively to land, or what is usually denominated 'real property.' In that case a deed conveyed "a certain tenement, to wit, one-half of a corn mill, situated in Washington, * with all the privileges thereto belonging, the same as I now possess, with the full privilege to pass and to repass to and from the mill to the road, for himself and his customers, to have and to hold the same, with all the privileges and appurtenances," etc.; and it was held that the deed conveyed, not only the mill, but the land on which it was situated, together with such portion of the water privilege as was essential to the use of the mill, and that, when the mill washed away, the grantee was entitled to restore it, or to own and use the land. In Mitchell v. Warner, 5 Conn. 518, it is said, quoting Blackstone, that "tenement' signifies anything that may be holden, provided it be of a permanent nature, whether it be of a substantial and sensible, or of an unsubstantial, ideal, kind," and then by way of explaining that definition it was held that the word "tenement" did not include water in a brook passing through the land, and which was diverted by a millowner before it reached the land granted, because running water is not of a permanent nature.

In People ex rel. v. Kelsey, 14 Abb. Prac. (N. Y.) loc. cit. 376, it is said: "The word 'tenement' signifies everything which may be holden, if it be of a permanent nature, and a wharf or pier is so permanent that it becomes a part of the soil and freehold itself." In People v. Westervelt, 17 Wend. (N.Y.) 676, it was said: "No doubt the notion that tenements comprehended chattels real was taken, in Vredenbergh v. Morris, 1 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 223, from the very general words of Blackstone (2 Black. Com. 16, 17), who says that 'it includes everything that may be holden, provided it be of a permanent nature.' But none of his illustrations given at the same page go so far; and the generality of his phrases is still more plainly restricted by Co. Litt. 6a, to which he refers. Coke's words are: "Tenementum, tenement, is a large word, to pass not only lands and other inheritances which are holden, but also offices, rents, profits à prendre out of lands, and the like, wherein a man hath any frank tenement, and whereof he is seised ut de libero et tenemento.' The illustrations of the same writer (Co.

Litt. 19 and 20a) show also that the term in its technical sense is confined to freeholds. Perkins, § 114, is to the same effect. Preston on Estates, 8, 9, is very full in his examples, all of which are confined to freeholds; indeed, terms of years are expressly excluded. Wood's Inst. 114, also contains a very full enumeration to the same effect. Blackstone himself excludes terms for years by so many words at another place (Black. Com. 386; Co. Litt. 118b, s. p.). Speaking of leaseholds for years, he says: "They are called real chattels, as being interests issuing out of or annexed to real estates, of which they have one quality, viz., immobility, which denominates them real, but want the other, viz., a sufficient, legal, indeterminate duration; and this want it is which constitutes them chattels. A freehold, which alone is real estate, is conveyed by corporeal investiture and livery of seizin.'

In that case the sheriff had sold, under execution, a leasehold for a term of 21 years, and the real question in the case was whether or not it was real estate, and the circuit court held that it was not. When the case went to the Court of Errors (20 Wend. 416) it was said by the Chancellor: "The term 'real estate,' when applied to an interest in lands or other real property, includes all estates or interests in such real property, which are held for life or some greater estate, but does not embrace terms for years or other chattel interests in lands, which, as between the heirs at law and the personal representatives, belong to the latter, upon the death of the owner thereof. Hence it was settled that the act of 1813, which declared judgments recovered in courts of record to be a lien upon all the lands, tenements, and real estate of the judgment debtor must be docketed, did not make the judgment a lien upon terms for years or other chattels real. Putnam v. Westcott, 19 Johns. 73; Merry v. Hallett, 2 Cow. 497."

In Moor v. Denn, 2 Bos. & Pul. 247, it is said with respect to the word "hereditament": "The settled sense of that word is to denote such things as may be the subject-matter of inheritance, but not the inheritance itself" that is, in this case, the lot, which is the "subjectmatter of inheritance," and not the leasehold, which is "the inheritance itself." In New York it has been held that a term of years in lands is not in law a tenement or a hereditament. In Mayor of New York v. Mabie, 13 N. Y. 151, 64 Am. Dec. 538, the court said: "Section 10 of title 5 defines certain terms there used thus: "The term "real estate" and "lands," as used in this chapter, shall be construed and coextensive in meaning with lands, tenements and hereditaments.' In a subsequent chapter of the Revised Statutes-that which relates to the proof and record of conveyances-there is another definition of one of these terms, as follows: "The term "real estate," as used in this chapter, shall be construed as coextensive in meaning with lands, tenements and hereditaments, and as embracing all chattels real, except leases for a term not exceeding three years.' 2 Rev. St. p. 762, § 36. There is much significance in the language added to the first definition when the same. terms came again to be defined for another purpose. It is a virtual declaration that the words employed to define real estate, in the first definition, would not embrace chattels real. We must intend that in those definitions language was used with great care and discrimination. The object being to remedy, by precise definitions, the inconveniences arising from the use of words to which different meanings might otherwise be attached, we cannot suppose that any vagueness of expression would be indulged. In comparing these two definitions with each