indorser is placed in no worse position than he was before, while by receiving the money the holder of the note makes himself liable to a judgment for the amount in favor of the bankrupt's assignee, and loses his right to recover, either of the indorser or of the bankrupt's estate." Within the rule in Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U. S. 438, 21 S. Ct. 906, 45 L. Ed. 1171, and In re Ft. Wayne Electric Corp., 99 F. 400, 39 C. C. A. 582, we have no doubt that the amount of these notes thus paid should be refunded as a condition that the bank prove its other claim. * * SECTION 2.-SET-OFFS AND COUNTERCLAIMS Federal Bankruptcy Act, § 68 (U. S. Comp. St. § 9652): a. In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated and one debt shall be offset against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid. b. A set-off or counterclaim shall not be allowed in favor of any debtor of the bankrupt which (1) is not provable against the estate; or (2) was purchased by or transferred to him after the filing of the petition, or within four months before such filing, with a view to such use and with knowledge or notice that such bankrupt was insolvent, or had committed an act of bankruptcy. Although normally all creditors share equally in the estate of the bankrupt, in certain cases the result is to allow certain creditors to gain more than their proportionate share by giving to them the right to set off against what they owe the bankrupt any sum . they may owe the bankrupt estate. If the amount owing to the estate is larger than the amount owed by the estate, the result is the same as though all of the creditor's claim were paid. The following cases. show how the ability to set off certain amounts works in certain particular situations: WHITAKER v. CROWDER STATE BANK. (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1910. 26 Okl. 786, 110 P. 776.) Error from District Court, McIntosh County; Preslie B. Cole, Judge. Action by Charles Whitaker, as trustee, against the Crowder State Bank. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff brings error. KANE, J. This was a suit commenced by Charles Whitaker, as the duly and legally appointed trustee for the creditors of Rowton Bros., who were adjudged bankrupt on the 27th day of January, 1906, in the United States Court for the Western District of the Indian Territory, sitting in bankruptcy. The grounds for the action were that within four months prior to the time when the said Rowton Bros. were declared bankrupt they had paid into the Crowder State Bank a large amount of money, which money had been obtained by the bank under circumstances that amounted to a preference within the meaning of the bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418]). The cause was tried to a jury, which_returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Subsequently the appellee, the defendant below, filed its motion for judgment in its favor, notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, which motion was sustained by the court, whereupon judgment was entered for the defendant below, to reverse which this proceeding in error was commenced. Paragraph 2 of the plaintiff's complaint contains the averments with reference to the turning over by Rowton Bros. of the money sued for in this action, the manner in which it was turned over, and the manner it was accepted by the appellee. It reads as follows: "That the said Rowton Bros., bankrupts, were merchants in Crowder, I. T., and owned a stock of goods in said town and did a general store business, and the buying and selling of cotton; that said Rowton Bros., during all the time they were in business in Crowder, did their banking business with the defendant, the State Bank of Crowder, and made all their deposits with the said bank, and that during the four months. prior to the filing of the said petition the said bank, the defendant herein, caused all the indebtedness due it from said Rowton Bros. to be paid out of money, checks, and drafts deposited with it by said. bankrupts, amounting to the sum of $5,000; that the bankrupts deposited the sum of $2,167 from the sale in bulk of the stock of goods with the defendants three days prior to their filing of the said petition, which sum was applied by the defendants upon its own indebtedness due it from the said bankrupts; that said money was paid to and received by the defendants for the purpose of giving it a preference, and causing the defendants to receive payment for its debts in full and taking practically all of the estate of said bankrupts so that there was nothing with which to pay the debts of the other creditors; that at the time of such payments the said bankrupts were insolvent, and the defendants had reasonable cause to believe that the receipt of said payments would effect the payment of a greater per cent. of its debts or claims against said bankrupts than would be received by any other creditors.' This part of the complaint set out a specific statement of facts constituting a transaction had between Rowton Bros., afterward bankrupts, and the appellee, Crowder State Bank. This specific statement of facts is followed by certain general allegations, asserting various conclusions drawn by the plaintiff from the facts previously stated. It is a well-settled rule of pleading that a specific statement of facts will always control a general statement, whether that general statement be or be not regarded as a mere conclusion of law (4 Enc. of Pl. & Pr. p. 742), and that, "where both general and specific allegations are made respecting the same matter, the latter control." * * An application of these principles to the allegations of the complaint in this case leads to the conclusion that all the general allegations of the petition supplemental to the specific statement of facts, and beginning with the words in the second paragraph, "that said money was paid to and received," etc., must be disregarded in ascertaining the facts alleged in respect to the transaction which is made the basis of this action. These supplemental averments are but conclusions drawn by the plaintiff from the facts previously set out, and are mere repetitions of the language of the bankruptcy law. The specific facts set up in the petition are admitted by the counsel, and, in addition to such admission, the answer also sets up further details of the same transaction showing particularly that the deposits made by the Rowton Bros. were made in the usual course of their banking with defendant, and, as general deposits, subject to check; that deposits were made and checks drawn in varying amounts, and from time to time, in the regular course of their banking relations, up to the morning of the day upon which the bank exercised its right of lien upon its depositor's funds and applied the Rowton Bros. balance to the payment, so far as it would go, of their indebtedness to the bank. In the Matter of New York County National Bank v. Massey, 192 U. S. page 138, 24 S. Ct. page 199, 48 L. Ed. 380, in discussing a similar state of facts in a bankruptcy case, the learned justice who prepared the opinion for the court said: "It is true that it creates a debt, which, if the creditor may set it off under section 68, amounts to permitting a creditor of that class to obtain more from the bankrupt's estate than creditors who are not in the same situation, and do not hold any debts of the bankrupt subject to set-off. But this does not in our opinion operate to enlarge the scope of the statute defining preferences so as to prevent set-off in cases coming within the terms of section 68a." In that case, as in this, the question involved was the right of the bank to make application of the deposits of an insolvent debtor to the payment of his debt to the bank. The same question was also passed upon by this court in West, Trustee, v. Bank of Lahoma, 16 Okl. 328, 85 P. 469. The second paragraph of the syllabus reads as follows: "Where an insolvent person has money on deposit in a bank subject to check, and also owes the bank upon a promissory note, upon such insolvent person being adjudged bankrupt, the bank is entitled to have the amount of the bankrupt's deposit set off against the sum due on the promissory note, and to prove its claim against the bankrupt for the balance." The rendition of judgment for the defendant upon the pleadings, notwithstanding the verdict, is expressly authorized by section 5179, of Mansfield's Digest of the Laws of Arkansas (Ind. T. Ann. St. 1899, § 3384) and section 5933, of Snyder's Compiled Laws 1909 of Oklahoma. Both sections are identical, and read as follows: "Where, upon the statements in the pleadings, one party is entitled by law to judgment in his favor, judgment shall be so rendered by the court, though a verdict has been found against such party." The judgment of the court below is affirmed. DUNN, C. J., and WILLIAMS, HAYES, and TURNER, JJ., concur. SUFFEL v. McCARTNEY NAT. BANK. (Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1906. 127 Wis. 208, 106 N. W. 837, 115 Am. St. Rep. 1004.) See ante, p. 828, for a report of the case. SECTION 3.-LIEN FOR PRESENT CONSIDERATION Federal Bankruptcy Act, § 67 (U. S. Comp. St. § 9651): d. Liens given or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of or in fraud upon this act, and for a present consideration, which have been recorded according to law, if record thereof was necessary in order to impart notice, shall to the extent of such present consideration only, not be affected by this act. e. That all conveyances, transfers, assignments, or incumbrances of his property, or any part therof, made or given by a person adjudged a bankrupt under the provisions of this act subsequent to the passage of this act and within four months prior to the filing of the petition, with the intent and purpose on his part to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, or any of them, shall be null and void as against the creditors of such debtor, except as to purchasers in good faith and for a present fair consideration; and all property of the debtor conveyed, tranferred, assigned, or encumbered as aforesaid shall, if he be adjudged a bankrupt, and the same is not exempt from execution and liability for debts by the law of his domicile, be and remain a part of the assets and estate of the bankrupt and shall pass to his said trustee, whose duty it shall be to recover and reclaim the same by legal proceedings or otherwise for the benefit of the creditors. And all conveyances, transfers, or encumbrances of his property made by a debtor at any time within four months prior to the filing of the petition against him, and while insolvent, which are held null and void as against the creditors of such debtor by the laws of the state, territory, or district in which such property is situate, shall be deemed null and void under this act against the creditors of such debtor if he be adjudged a bankrupt, and such property shall pass to the assignee and be by him reclaimed and recovered for the benefit of the creditors of the bankrupt. For the purpose of such recovery any court of bankruptcy as hereinbefore defined, and any state court which would have had jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened, shall have concurrent jurisdiction. The Bankruptcy Act has always recognized the right of a person in financial difficulty to make an attempt to extricate himself through financial help from the outside. Therefore it allows a preference to be given to third parties within the four months, providing it is given for a present consideration. In other words, any lien given for money advanced at the time, or for goods delivered at the time the lien was given, will be upheld by the courts. Just what is present consideration has given some trouble. Will some present consideration be sufficient to support a lien partly for the present consideration and partly for past consideration? Is a sale on ten or thirty days' credit a cash sale? These and other questions will be answered in the cases that follow. In re WOLF. (District Court of the United States, Northern District of Iowa, 1899. 98 F. 84.) In Bankruptcy. On appeal from ruling of referee on claims of Julius Arkin, a mortgage creditor. SHIRAS, District Judge. From the facts certified to the court, it appears that the bankrupt, Wolf, being indebted to Julius Arkin, on the 15th day of May, 1899, executed and delivered to him, as evidence of his indebtedness, a promissory note for $200, payable in 90 days from date. On the 22d day of July, 1899, the bankrupt borrowed of Arkin the sum of $100, giving his note therefor, payable in 30 days from date; and to secure this indebtedness, as well as that evidenced by the note dated May 15, 1899, the bankrupt executed and delivered to Arkin a chattel mortgage on his stock of goods in Lisbon, Iowait appearing that Arkin would not advance the loan of $100 unless the bankrupt would give security to cover, also, the pre-existing indebtedness. Shortly after the execution and recording of this mortgage, Wolf, the mortgagor, was adjudged to be bankrupt, and his stock in trade was taken possession of and was sold by the trustee; and the mortgagee filed his intervening petition before the referee, praying that he be held to have a valid lien on the stock of goods as security for the indebtedness due him. Upon the hearing before the referee, it was held that the mortgage security was void as to creditors, in that it was a preference, and taken under circumstances rendering it invalid as against the creditors represented by the trustee. Viewed as a security given to secure the payment of the pre-existing indebtedness evidenced by the note dated May 15th, the holding of the referee that the mortgage was invalid, because thereby a preference was intended to be created in favor of the creditor, is sustained. Viewed, however, as a security for the sum of $100, money advanced to the bankrupt at the time of the execution of the mortgage, there is nothing shown in the evidence which required the holding that the security given for this loan is not valid. As the security was given for a debt then created, it was a present security, and not a preference which was created by the mortgage; and the case comes within the rule announced by Judge Dillon in Darby v. Institution, 1 Dill. 144. Fed. Cas. No. 3,571, wherein it is said that: "An insolvent person may properly make efforts to extricate himself from his embarrassments, and therefore he may borrow money, and give at the time security therefor, provided, always, the transaction be free from fraud in fact, and upon the Bankrupt Act. And hence it is a settled principle of bankrupt law, both in England and in this country, that advances made in good faith to a debtor to carry on business, upon security taken at the time, do not violate either the terms or policy of the Bankrupt Act." When the mortgage security was taken in this instance, it was shown on the face of the instrument that it was given in part to secure a preexisting debt, and in part to secure a note of even date. The mortgage was duly recorded, and no other creditor could be misled by the provisions thereof. As between the bankrupt and the creditor, the mortgage was valid, was not tainted with fraud in fact, and the only objection to be urged against the same is that if the trustee should pay the |