Printup vs. Fort. But was he so deceived as to induce him to make a less favorable contract for himself than he otherwise would have made? Did he agree to let Printup, the agent, have the convicts at a cent less per day than he would have been willing to hire them for to Printup, the partner? He does not even so say, nor does he state a fact from which it is to be inferred. His forty-eight cents per day seems, as far as the bill shows, as much as Fort asked for the convicts. The contract, so far as we can see, is not different from what it would have been had Daniel Printup appeared and contracted as a partner. If there was deceit and falsehood, it did Fort no harm in the contract. The real complaint of Fort is, that the contract has not been kept and performed; that Printup has not done as he promised, kept a correct account of the days the convicts were at work. For this breach of the contract Fort has a right to redress, and as we have said, he may, under the charges he makes, ask a Court of Equity to give him relief, not to set aside the contract, as to which he was not misled, but as to its enforcement, in which he has been deceived. The agreement was, that Printup should keep a correct account, and the bill gives the belief of Fort that Printup was only agent, as the reason why Fort trusted this matter to him. If Printup made a promise he has not performed, and misled Fort, so as to induce him to trust to that promise, Fort has a right to recover all the loss he has suffered by reason of the promises and failures of Printup. If by that deception, it has resulted that less days have been paid for than was right, for that Fort has his redress. He is entitled to the price agreed upon for every day they were at work. 2. But to permit him to repudiate the contract on his part, and become a sharer in the enterprise, is, in our judgment, contrary to the agreement. Fort agreed upon forty-eight cents per day. It does not appear but that he has got the pay for the time, except as to the one thousand days, just as they agreed, to-wit: at forty-eight cents per day. In our judgment this prayer asks entirely too much, and had the bill no other equity, we would have felt constrained to hold Napier vs. Dickson. it demurrable. But as we have said, it is a good bill for the purposes we have mentioned, and in a demurrer to the whole bill for want of equity, if there be any equity, the demurrer is not good. Judgment affirmed. 1 THOMAS T. NAPIER, plaintiff in error, vs. MICHAEL DICKSON, defendant in error. In 1858, N. sold to D. certain negro slaves, for the sum of $7,000 00, $2,000 00 of which was paid at the time of sale, the purchaser giving his promisory notes for the balance, due at one, two, three, and four years after date; to secure the payment of which, D. executed to N. a mortgage on real estate. In November, 1865, that mortgage was foreclosed, for the sum of $5,000 00, principal, and $2,685 25, interest. At the May Term of the Court, 1866, D., the defendant, appeared in Court and made a motion to have said judgment of foreclosure opened and a new trial had, on the ground that the defendant therein was unavoidably absent from the Court, at the time said judgment of foreclosure of the mortgage was rendered, as provided by the Ordinance of 1865, and that the plaintiff was indebted to the defendant in the sum of $3,000 00, besides interest, which should be credited on said mortgage debt; and the prayer of the defendant, in his motion, was, that this latter sum might be set off against the plaintiff's demand, and, in the meantime, that all proceedings be stayed, until there could be a hearing of the case. The Court granted the order, as prayed for, suspending all further proceedings, until the further order of the Court. This was the state of things when the Constitution of 1868 was adopted, denying to the Courts of this State jurisdiction or authority to try or give judgment on, or enforce any debt, the consideration of which was a slave, or slaves. The Court below declined to take jurisdiction of the case, for any purpose whatever, but left the parties just as they stood, in regard to their respective rights, when the Constitution of 1868 was adopted. Both parties excepted to the decision of the Court: Held, that under the former ruling of a majority of this Court, in regard to debts the consideration of which was a slave, or slaves, the judgment of the Court below was right, and should be af firmed. Constitutional Law. Slave Debts. Before Judge PARCatoosa Superior Court. August Term, 1869. ROTT. Napier vs. Dickson. On the 21st of August, 1858, Napier sold to Dickson slaves, at $7,000 00, $2,000 00 of which was paid, and Dickson gave to Napier his four notes for $1,250 00 each, due one, two, three, and four years after date, with interest from date, and, to secure these notes, gave Napier a mortage on real estate in said county. At November Term, 1865, of said Court, a rule was had, absolutely foreclosing said mortgage, for $5,000 00, principal, $2,685 24, for interest, and $7 50 for costs; Napier says that sum was and is due on said notes, but Dickson denies it. At May Term, 1866, Dickson averred that he was unavoidably absent from said November Term, and that such rule absolute ought not to have been taken, because at that time Napier owed him for rent of a hotel, for 1861, 1862, 1863, $1,000 00, and for a lot of furniture, $2,000 00; that Napier could not pay said amount, and prayed that said rule be set aside, and that he be allowed to plead his said demand, as a set-off to said notes; and he prayed for a supercedeas of said rule, pending his motion for a new trial. The Court, at May Term, 1866, ordered Napier to show cause why said rule should not be set aside, etc., and that, ad interim, said rule should be stayed. This motion and supercedeas still pending, the Constitution of Georgia, of 1868, became of force. When the facts were brought to the attention of the Court, in August, 1869, he decided that he had no jurisdiction of the matter, under said Constitution, and refused to have anything to do with it. In a joint bill of exceptions, Napier complains that the Court refused to hear the cause and remove the supercedeas, and Dickson complains that the Court should have granted the new trial, and then have allowed him a judgment for his demand against Napier. A. T. HACKET, C. D. MCCUTCHEN, D. A. WALKER, for plaintiff in error. WILLIAM H. DABNEY, for defendant. WARNER, J. Crawford vs. Cantrell. Under the former ruling of a majority of this Court, in regard to debts, the consideration of which was a slave, or slaves, the judgment of the Court below was right, and should be affirmed. Let the judgment of the Court below be affirmed. JOHN CRAWFORD, plaintiff in error, vs. D. S. CANTRELL, guardian, defendant in error. When a suit was brought in 1861 against a principal and security, and the security had a good defense, but by reason of his attorney having gone into the army, and by reason of the principal having also gone into the army, the said security rested under the belief that the cause would not be tried, and judgment was, nevertheless, taken without the knowledge of the security: Held, that a bill in equity for a new trial, filed within twelve months after the adoption of the Constitution of 1868, and setting up the foregoing facts was not demurrable. Motion to set aside Judgment. Laches. Before Judge PARROTT. Gordon Superior Court. October Term, 1869. Crawford's bill, filed in February, 1869, contained the following averments: One Phillips was elected Clerk of the Court of Ordinary of Cass (now Bartow) county and asked him to become one of the securities on his official bond, telling him that Lewis Tumlin would also stand his security. Knowing Tumlin's wealth and prudence, he agreed to sign with Tumlin. On the 9th of May, 1849, he went with Phillips before the Justices of the Inferior Court (whose duty it was to take said bond) and signed the bond, as a security, with the express understanding with Phillips, and the Justices, that Tumlin, who was absent, was to sign it also, or he, Crawford, was not to be bound by his signature. Some time afterwards, two other persons signed it as securities, but Tumlin never did, and the Justices accepted it so signed. Crawford never knew that Tumlin had not signed the bond, Crawford vs. Cantrell. nor that the other persons had, till in 1861, when a suit was brought on said bond, in favor of said Cantrell as guardian. of Moses Cantrell, against Phillips and his securities. Crawford employed his son to defend him against said suit. Before the trial term, Phillips and Crawford's son were both in the Confederate army. Crawford was told that the absence of Phillips and his son, in the army, was cause for said cause to be continued. He was very old and infirm, being now eighty years old, and lived five miles from the Court house. He, therefore, paid no attention to it. He heard nothing more about it, and supposed the cause had been settled, or abandoned, until in October, 1868, when a fi. fa., founded upon a judgment which had been obtained againstPhillips, and his securities, in said cause, in October, 1861, was levied upon Crawford's land. One of the co-securities, and said Phillips, died insolvent, and the other security is insolvent, while Tumlin is wealthy. In slaves, and other specified property, Crawford lost by the war, and without his fault, $26,000 00. He prayed for injunction against said fi. fa., and that said judgment might be set aside, and a new trial be granted. This bill was demurred to for want of equity. The demurrer was sustained, and the bill was dismissed. This is assigned as error. W. AKIN for plaintiff in error, said the bond did not bind Crawford, because Tumlin did not sign it: 6th Ga. R., 202; 10th, 414; 3rd Wend. R., 380; and that he gave sufficient excuse for not defending. WILLIAM H. DABNEY, for defendant. McCAY, J. It is not denied but that the complainant sets forth a good defense to the debt he is seeking to have enjoined, unless he has so slept over his rights as that, under the rules, he cannot ask for the interference of a Court of Equity. The suit at law was brought to April Term, 1861, just after the breaking out of the war. The principal defendant went into the |