victions and sentences in extenso. Wilde v. Commonwealth, 2 Met. 408.- Plumbly v. Commonwealth. — Ibid. 413. - 2. Such information for a third offence, after the infliction of additional punishment for a second, ought to, even if the law does not absolutely require that it should, directly allege the two former convictions, instead of merely reciting the former information, in which they were alleged. Wilde v. Commonwealth, 2 Met. 408. 3. Upon such information, the former convictions and sentences are to be held valid, until reversed. They cannot be collaterally questioned, in this process. — Ibid. 4. Sts. 1832, c. 73, and 1833, c. 85, imposed additional punishment on convicts who had been discharged from former sentences "in due course of law." Held, in an information for such punishment, it was sufficient to allege a discharge from a former sentence in consequence of a pardon." Evans v. Commonwealth, 3 Met. 453. Ensolvency. A. Insolvent estates of persons deceased. B. Insolvent laws of Massachusetts. C. Insolvent laws of other States. A. Insolvent estates of persons deceased, (See Executors &c.) 1. Where an intestate estate is represented insolvent, and, in a suit by the administrator, the defendant files in set-off a claim exceeding that upon which the suit is brought; he will have a judgment for the balance, and need not present his claim to the commissioners. The judgment will then be presented to the judge of Probate, and by him added to the claims allowed by the commissioners. Bigelow v. Folger, 2 Met. 255. 2. St. 1833, c. 189, provides a remedy, for one having a claim against an insolvent estate, who is prevented, through accident or mistake, from prosecuting his claim to the commissioners of insolvency. Held, the presenting a claim to the commissioners for allowance was a prosecuting of it, within the act. -Freeman v. Ward, xvi. 201. 3. Commissioners of insolvency, though notified that a certain claim was partially secured by mortgage, and that the creditor, to this extent, waived his claim for an allowance, and relied upon his mortgage, allowed the whole debt. Held, the Probate Court, upon the creditor's petition, and by virtue of St. 1784, c. 2, might and ought to re-open the commission, before distribution and within the time limited by the act, for the purpose of correcting the mistake. — Towle v. Bannister, xvi. 255. 4. The proper evidence of the rejection of a claim by commissioners of insolvency, is their report and its acceptance; and the creditor cannot legally give notice of his intention to bring an action upon the claim, and actually commence such action, before such report and acceptance, though after an actual rejection.— Goff v. Kellogg, xviii. 256. B. Insolvent laws of Massachusetts, (see Assignment; C.) 1. By St. 1836, c. 238, all creditors of an insolvent, who assigned his property according to that act, might become parties to the assignment at any time before a final dividend was declared ; but "no creditor, who comes in after any dividend is declared, shall be allowed to disturb the same, but he shall receive an equal proportion with the other creditors, so far as the funds then remaining unappropriated in the hands of the assignees shall be sufficient therefor." A creditor became party to an assignment, after the first dividend was made, but before the second was declared, the assignees having enough unappropriated money to pay him the first dividend, without disturbing the payments made to other creditors. Held, he was entitled to such dividend, without interest. Peck v. Stimpson, xx. 312. 2. It seems, where funds are reserved under § 6, of the statute, to provide for remote or contingent claims; these should be specified, so far as known, and the funds specially reserved to meet them; and that, when such creditors become parties, or their contingent debts become absolute, they are entitled to receive from the reserved funds the full amount of the prior dividends, as against a creditor who voluntarily forbears to become party, till after such prior dividends were made. — Ibid. 3. Bill in equity by a creditor against the assignees, to recover his share of the first dividend from the unappropriated funds. Defence, that the plaintiff did not become party before the dividend was made. Judgment being given for the plaintiff, held, he should recover costs, and, the defence having been made for the benefit of the other creditors, that they should be paid from the funds. Ibid. 4. St. 1838, c. 163, provides, that an assignment for creditors, under the act, shall vest the property in the assignees, though attached, and shall dissolve the attachment. Held, applicable to an attachment made after the act took effect, to secure a debt due before that time, the debtor and creditor being citizens of Massachusetts, and the contract being made and to be performed here. Bigelow v. Pritchard, xxi. 169. 5. Held, in this application, the act was not repugnant to the constitution of the United States, as it affected the remedy only, not the contract. Ibid. 6. St. 1841, c. 124, § 3, extending the provisions of the above act, and forbidding the discharge of a debtor, who within six months previous to the petition had given preference to any creditor, applies to the case of a petition filed under the former law and before the passage of the latter, and does not thereby deprive the debtor of any vested right. - Ex parte Lane, 3 Met. 213. C. Insolvent laws of other States. 1. By the laws of Louisiana, after an insolvent debtor has surrendered his property to his creditors, and a syndic appointed by them has taken charge of it, if any of the property is lost, the creditors must bear the loss, and the debtor cannot be sued, unless the plaintiff can show that he shall receive nothing from the property surrendered. In an action by one surety, living in New Orleans, against another, for money paid on account of their principal, it appeared that the principal in New Orleans had surrendered his property to his creditors, that a syndic had been appointed, and that the property was apparently more than enough to pay all his debts, including the claim of the plaintiff, who was named as a creditor. Held, the plaintiff must be presumed to have known of the surrender, and was bound thereby, it being a public proceeding, conducted according to law; that the facts were primâ facie a defence, to rebut which, the plaintiff must prove how the property had been disposed of, and that, upon settlement of accounts, it would pay him nothing. Cockayne v. Sumner, xxii. 117. 2. Action by a citizen of New York against one of two partners, upon a note dated and payable there. From the date of the note to the commencement of the suit, the defendant was a citizen of Massachusetts, and his partner, of New York; and they carried on the business in both states, under the same firm. The defendant was discharged under the insolvent law of New York, which existed prior to the date of the note. Held, no defence to this suit. Agnew v. Platt, xv. 417. 3. Nor would it be a defence, it seems, had the defendant been a dormant partner, and the business done in New York only. 4. An insolvent law provided, that the debtor should apply for its benefit in the county of which he was an inhabitant, or in which he was imprisoned; and not elsewhere. Held, the defendant's being imprisoned in a county in New York, at the time of his petition, raised no presumption that he then resided in the State.Ibid. 5. If the plaintiff in an action, against one who has been discharged under the insolvent law of another State, joined with the latter in his petition for the benefit of the law; this fact does not render the discharge valid as against the plaintiff. Ibid. 6. A discharge under the insolvent law of another State, which does not affect the contract, but merely exempts from imprisonment, affects the remedy only, and is inoperative in Massachusetts. Coffin v. Coffin, xvi. 323. Enspection. By St. 1830, c. 99, § 6, "if any side or sides of sole leather shall vary, when thoroughly dried, so as to weigh five per cent. more or less than the weight marked thereon by any inspector, the inspector who inspected the same shall be subject to the payment of the whole variation, at a fair valuation, to be recovered by the party injured thereby." Held, by thoroughly dried was meant, that the leather should be suitably and sufficiently dried, so as to be in a proper state for sale and use. Tenney v. How, xxiv. 335. Ensurance. A. Who may obtain insurance, and on what property. B. What will be covered by an insurance; and of the commencement, continuance and termination of the risk. And herein, of barratry. C. What amount shall be recovered upon an insurance. D. Total loss abandonment and sale of property in sured. E. Partial loss, and average. F. What avoids insurance. G. Return of premium. H. Actions upon policies of insurance, and evidence therein. A. Who may obtain insurance, and on what property. 1. Insurance against fire is a contract of indemnity with the owner or other person, having, at the time, an interest in its preservation; and if, before any loss occurs, he transfers his interest in the property, the purchaser does not thereby become entitled to the benefit of the insurance. Wilson v. Hill, 3 Met. 66. 2. A factory being subject to two mortgages, the owners obtained an insurance upon it and upon the machinery, for $2,700, payable to A., a mortgagee of the machinery. They afterwards conveyed the factory to B., subject to the two mortgages thereon, and B. procured an assignment of one of them. The factory being burnt, the insurers paid a total loss to A., whose mortgage on the machinery was only $2051. The owners then became insolvent, and an assignee was appointed of their estate, under St. 1838, c. 163, who brought an action against A. for $649, the balance in his hands, and recovered judgment against him by default; whereupon he paid to the assignee $626 and costs. B. afterwards procured an assignment of the other mortgage on the factory, and brings an action against the assignee for the sum paid him by A. Held, the action would not lie. Ibid. 3. A part-owner of a vessel may insure his interest, without communicating what it is; as, for instance, that he owns as administrator. But a part-owner, insuring only in his own name, and not mentioning any other party in interest, can recover only to the extent of his own title. Finney v. Warren, &c. 1 Met. 16. 4. A part-owner of a vessel has no insurable interest in the other part, though he keep the accounts, receive the avails, make the disbursements, and direct the voyages. — Ibid. 5. One who effects insurance in his own name for another, or for whomsoever it may concern, cannot maintain an action on the policy in his own name, if his authority has been previously disavowed or revoked, unless the policy expressly empowers such suit, or he has a lien or other beneficial interest. Reed v. Pacific, &c. 1 Met. 166. 6. One who thus effects insurance, not as broker or general agent, but according to a specific order, and under directions to forward the policy to the party who gives the order, has no lien upon, or interest in, the policy; and, though he be ship's husband for the general management of the vessel, he has no lien on the policy for the balance of his account. Ibid. 7. A. & B. purchased a ship, A. indorsing B.'s notes, given for his share, but not then taking from B. any writing. A. effected an insurance for whom it concerned, to the amount of the value |