port valuing the property destroyed at and making the companies liable for about $9000.00 on $20,000.00 face value of insurance policies, to the payment of a fair amount of which the bankrupt's officers had looked for money to meet all of its obligations and resume business. The bankrupt refused to accept the adjustment as binding upon it and brought suit against the insurers. Its counsel, however, realizing the binding force of the adjustment, joined in by the bankrupt's own appraiser, and feeling that recovery of a larger amount was under the law in the face of such adjustment, impossible, convinced the bankrupt's officers that they had no choice but to accept the amount so fixed, which, of course, left the bankrupt insolvent. The facts just detailed developed, as I understand the evidence, after May 28th, the date of the assignment. At that time the bankrupt's officers believed themselves justly entitled, and expected, to receive insurance money considerably in excess of liabilities. Viewed in this light, the transaction falls properly within the rule indicated in Hill vs. Standard Tel. Mfg. Co., 9 Dist. Rep. 445, where the court, citing Cowan vs. Penna. Plate Glass Co., 184 Pa. 1, Neal's App. 129 Pa. 64, and Mueller vs. Monongahela Fire Clay Co. 183 Pa. 450, says: "Where an officer or director, who is a creditor of an insolvent corporation, manages to have his claim preferred over those of other creditors whose debts are equally meritorious, the presumption of equity is that he has taken an unfair advantage of his special knowledge and special power to save himself to their prejudice; and if he would escape the consequence of this presumption and hold his preference, he must rebut it by showing that the circumstances of the transaction make it just and right that he should be paid before the other creditors. *** The presumption of fraud will not arise, of course, unless at the time the security is taken or the payment is received the corporation is insolvent." If the bankrupt's officers knew on May 28, 1915, or had been advised by their counsel that the Company was, right or wrong, irretrievably committed to an adjustment binding it to a settlement of a little over $9000.00, with no hope of ever by action at law recovering more on policies calling for $20,000.00 the result would be entirely different, and the decision would. have to be against the validity of the assignment, following the conclusion reached in Hill vs. Standard &c. Co., supra. This memorandum might end here, were it not for another element in the case which must be considered. The fund can properly be awarded to the claimants only insofar as they act for one or more of their cestuis que trustent as creditors of the bankrupt, endeavoring to assert through their trustees, the claimants here, their equitable lien on it. That is to say, Wolfinger is liable for having accommodated the bankrupt and is, through trustees for himself and others, asserting a claim against money in the hands of the bankrupt's trustee which was pledged to them to secure him against loss by reason of such liability. To obtain standing in court so as to assert such claim, it is a condition sine qua non that Wolfinger prove his claim like any other creditor in his position. No claim upon the funds under the court's control can be recognized without a proof of debt before it. Is Wolfinger's claim a provable debt though he is only liable to pay for accommodating the bankrupt but has not yet in fact paid? There is no doubt of it under the authority of Swarts vs. Stiegel, 8 A. B. R. 689, 117 Fed. Rep. 30, and kindred cases, which hold that the debt of a principal debtor to his accommodation maker before the latter has paid the obligation is a contingent liability founded upon contract, and, falling directly within the meaning of Sec. 63 (4) of the bankrupt law, may be proved and allowed against the bankrupt's estate. This puts him in a position to receive that portion of the estate which is found to belong to him at such time when he, upon making good his undertaking by payment, classifies himself as a creditor having a claim on which the liability of the bankrupt has thus become fixed. Then we have Sec. 57 (i) which provides that "whenever a creditor, whose claim against a bankrupt estate is secured by the individual undertaking of any person, fails to prove such claim, such person may do so in the creditor's name, and, if he discharge such undertaking in whole or in part, he shall be subrogated to that extent to the rights of the creditor," which has been held to include an accommodation maker. It is, of course, plainly implied, where not expressed by the act, that no distribution is to be made upon a claim proving a debt or liability of this character until the creditor dis. charges the obligation in whole or in part, and, accordingly, no such creditor may be permitted to realize on rights he may have upon funds in court until he has not only proved his claim but wholly or partly discharged the obligation on which the claim is founded. Thus the order to be entered on the claim of the trustees named in the assignment, allowing their claim for the balance of money received by the bankrupt's trustee on the assigned policies and now in the latter's hands, must be conditioned on the cestuisque trustent filing proofs of their claims and showing payment to the holder of the notes involved to the extent of at least $3409.81, the amount of the fund over the disposition of which this litigation has arisen. End of Volume Nine. INDEX ACTS OF ASSEMBLY CONSTRUED. 1810, March 20, 5 Sm. 172, Sec. 26. Affidavit of Claim. WER- Poor Directors. BINGAMAN 1824, March 29, P. L. 200, Sec. 6. 1866, May 17, P. L. 1096. Dower. KINTZER'S EST., 152. VS. 1893, April 6, P. L. 10. Incorporation of Beneficial Society. IN 1895, June 29, P. L. 403. Control of Fiscal Affairs of County. 1901, July 9, P. L. 614. Service. HAAG ET AL. vs. MT. LAU- 1906, March 5, P. L. 78, Sec. 3. Election Laws. DIETRICH vs. 1907, March 22, P. L. 29. Dower. KINTZER'S EST., 152. 1910, June 4, P. L. 404, Sec. 17. Assignment for Benefit of Cred- 1911, School Code. Public Playgrounds. STAAB ET AL. vs. 1915, Practice Act, Sec. 5. Statement. BULLOCH ET AL. vs.. 1915, Practice Act, Sec. 20. Practice, C. P. DIRECTORS OF THE POOR, 27. BINGAMAN vs. 1915, Practice Act, Sec. 20 and 21. BARTO vs. SHAFFNER, 20. AFFIDAVITS OF DEFENSE (See Practice, C. P.) AGENCY (See Principal and Agent). ALIENATION OF AFFECTION. 1. Gist of the Action. The gist of an action for damages for alienation of affection ASSIGNMENTS. 1. Assignment of Interest in Real Estate. NIES vs. NIES' ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. 1. Deed of Assignment-Exemption-Assignee's Account-Ex- Where in making an assignment for the benefit of creditors the The reservation of exempt property in a deed of assignment for 2. Insolvency Act 4 June, 1910, P. L. 404, Sec. 17-Right to The Insolvency Act of 4 June, 1910, P. L. 404, Sec. 17, providing No one can participate in the distribution of a fund who claims ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. 1. Scope of Authority-Rescission of Contract. Whilst counsel employed to examine the title of property about Notwithstanding the parties originally intended a sale absolute 2. Charge on Land. A grantor who conveys land to an adopted daughter, subject to |