claim was filed. The language of the Court of Appeals in Corkings v. State, 99 N. Y. 491, 499, is particularly applicable to this case. It was there said: "When the State, to a just claim, such as this is found to be, has no better or other defense than the statute of limitations, it should at least, both upon the law and the facts, establish that defense with reasonable clearness and certainty." Second Division, June 2, 1891. Yaw v. State. Opinion by Follett, C. J.

LIEN-MARITIME-WHEN NOT LOST BY RECEIVING NOTES UNFINISHED VESSELS PLACE OF CONTRACT

- FERRY-BOATS. —(1) In July, 1884, W. S. & Co., shipbuilders, contracted with the H. L. & I. Co. to construct two iron ferry-boats. Part of the materials were obtained from plaintiffs, terms cash, but were not paid for.

In November, 1884, W. S. & Co. sent the plaintiffs their notes at three and four months, and in December made a general assignment. W. S. & Co. were insolvent at the time of giving the notes, and knew it, and had previously transferred the unfinished boats and materials to the H. L. & I. Co. Held, that the notes were sent with fraudulent intent and relieved plaintiffs from the extension of credit which they purported to create. (2) Hulls on the stocks in the course of completion are unfinished vessels, and within the contemplation of the statute subject to lien of debt for work done and materials furnished in building them. (3) Plaintiff was a corporation doing business in Philadelphia, and the goods were there shipped to the builders and delivered to them at Newburgh in this State. Held, that the debt, within the meaning of the statute, was not contracted until the iron was delivered, and then was contracted at the place of delivery. (4) Ferryboats are within the term vessels as used in the statute. Second Division, June 2, 1891. Phoenix Iron Co. v. The Vessels "Hopatcing," et al. Opinion by Bradley, J.

PATENTS―JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS.-A patentee of a corset clasp entered into an agreement with plaintiffs, granting them a license to take and sell it upon a royalty, she agreeing not to license more than one other person without their consent. She issued the second license and then assigned the patent. In an action to restrain defendant from making and selling the patented article, held, that as the validity of the patent and the license were admitted, there was practically no conflict of claim other than arose upon the construction of the license to plaintiff, and the case was properly within the jurisdiction of the State court. Defendant in manufacturing and selling the patented article was not a wrong-doer and trespasser against the rights acquired by the plaintiffs by the license granted to them. Second Division, June 2, 1891. Mayer v. Hardy. Opinion by Bradley, J.

WILL-CONSTRUCTION.-By the will of testator plaintiff was disinherited and specifically excluded from the benefits of any of its provisions. By section 16 the residuum of the estate was divided into six shares, to be held in trust by the executors, the first to be applied to the use of testator's daughter Sarah for life, then for her sister Catharine for life, and then the share to be paid to the next of kin of his first wife's blood, with a provision that any invalid gifts, etc., should be added to this "residue." By section 40 he disposed of any legacy, devise, etc., lapsing or failing for any cause, and section 41 directed that all provisions which should be held illegal should be, stricken out and not considered as affecting the valid provisions. Held, that plaintiff had no case as he could take nothing even though certain provisions imposed upon the beneficiaries by the thirty-ninth section were void. Second Division, June 2, 1891. Opinion by Haight, J. 37 St. Rep. 919, affirming 26 id. 966.

ACKNOWL

WILL HOLOGRAPH EXECUTION OF EDGING SIGNATURE.-Each of the four statutory requisites for the execution of a will must be complied with. The acknowledging of the “making of the signature" will not supply the want of the siguing by the testator. At common law, if a person wrote his name in the body of a will or contract, with intent to execute it in that manner, the signature so written was as valid as though subscribed at the end of the instrument. Merritt v. Clason, 12 Johns. 102; S. L., sub. nom. Clason v. Bailey, 14 id. 484; People v. Murray, 5 Hill, 468. Caton v. Caton, L. R., 2 H. L. 127; 2 Kent's Com. 511; 1 Dart V. & P. (6th ed.) 270; 1 Jarm. Wills (Big. ed.) 79. We shall assume, without deciding, that under the laws of New Jersey a will may be legally executed if the name of the testator is written by him in the body of the instrument with intent to so execute it. The statute of that State, which prescribes the mode in which wills shall be executed, provides: "All wills and testaments * * shall be in writing and shall be signed by the testator, which signature shall be made by the testator, or the making thereof acknowledged by him, and such writing declared to be his last will in the presence of two witnesses present at the same time, who shall subscribe their names thereto as witnesses in the presence of the testator." Under this statute it was held (In re McElwaine, 18 N. J. Eq. 499) that "Four things are required: First, that the will shall be in writing; secondly, that it shall be signed by the testator; thirdly, that such signature shall be made by the testator, or the making thereof acknowledged by him in the presence of two witnesses; fourthly, that it shall be declared to be his last will in the presence of these witnesses. Each and every one

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of these requisites must exist. They are not in the alteruative. The third requisite contains an alternative, but one of these alternatives must exist. The second requisite, the signing by the testator, must exist. The second alternative of the third, to-wit, that he acknowledge 'making of the signature,' will not supply the want of the second. Where there is no proof as to the making of the signature, such acknowledgment is sufficient evidence that he made it, and would prove compliance with the requisite of signing by him. But when it is clear that the testator did not sign the will this acknowledgment is not sufficient. The words of the act are clear, and the object is equally clear, and requires this construction to the words." This language was used in respect to a will to which the name of the testatrix was subscribed by one of the subscribing witnesses at her request, in her presence and in the presence of both subscribing witnesses. After this was done the testatrix said, "that was her name and seal," but did not acknowledge it to be her signature, nor did she then declare that the instrument was her will, and it was held not to have been executed in accordance with the statute. Whenever the name of a testator appears, whether in the body or at the end of a will, it must have been written with intent to execute it, otherwise it is without force. When a testator, or the maker of a contract, subscribes it at the end and in the manner in which legal instruments are usually authenticated, a presumption arises that the signature was affixed for the purpose of creating a valid instrument. But when the name is written near the beginning of the document, where as a rule names are inserted by way of description of the person who is to execute it, and rarely as signatures, it must, before it can be held to have been inserted for the purpose of validating the instrument, be proved to have been written with that intent. The record contains no evidence tending to show that Mrs. Booth, directly or indirectly, by word or gesture, referred to her name in the first line of the paper as her signature, nor is there evidence of any act on her part from which it might be inferred that the name there written was intended

to be in execution of a completed will, and her simple declaration to Mamie Clifford, one of the subscribing witnesses, "This is my will, take it and sign it," standing alone, is insufficient to sustain a finding or verdict that the name "Cecilia L. Booth," written by her in the first line of the document, was there written with intent that it should have effect as her signature in final execution of a will. We are referred by the learned counsel for the appellant to In re Higgins, 94 N. Y. 554; In re Phillips, 98 id. 267; In re Hunt, 110 id. 278, in which it was held that when a testator subscribes a will at the end and exhibits it and the signature to the subscribing witnesses, declares it to be his last will and testament, and requests them to sign it as witnesses, it is a sufficient acknowledgment of the signature. Those cases are quite different from the one at bar, in this, the signatures having been subscribed at the end, in the usual way in which instruments are finally authenticated, the legal presumption arose that the signatures were written for the purpose of finally executing the documents, but, as we have before shown, there is no legal presumption arising from the face of this instrument that the name was written as a signature, nor is there evidence outside of the paper from which such an inference can be safely drawn. It has been the object of the statutes of the various States, prescribing the mode in which wills must be executed, to throw such safeguards around those transactions as will prevent fraud and imposition, and it is wiser to construe these statutes closely, rather than loosely, and so open a door for the perpetration of the mischiefs which the statutes were designed to prevent. Second Division, June 2, 1891. Matter of Booth. Opinion by Follett, C. J.

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pany would not be liable for the loss of or injury to luggage arising from ** negligence of the company's servants." It contained also nearly two quarto pages of printed matter, minutely describing the rights and liabilities of the parties during the voyage. Held, that one who has travelled on such ticket, although he has not read or signed it, cannot recover for damage to his baggage by the negligence of the steamship's servants. Such contract being valid in England, where made, will be enforced in Massachusetts, although, if made in the latter place, it would be void as against public policy. The principal question before us is whether the plaintiff, by reason of his acceptance and use of his ticket, shall be conclusively held to have assented to its terms. It has often been decided that one who accepts a contract and proceeds to avail himself of its provisions is bound by the stipulations and conditions expressed in it, whether he reads them or not. Grace v. Adams, 100 Mass. 505; Insurance Co. v. Buffum, 115 id. 343; Rice г. Manufacturing Co., 2 Cush. 80; Hoadley v. Transportation Co., 115 Mass. 304; Insurance Co. v. Railroad Co., 72 N. Y. 90. This rule is as applicable to contracts for the carriage of persons or property as to contracts of any other kind. Grace v. Adams, ubi supra; Railroad Co. v. Chipman, 146 Mass. 107; Parker v. Railway Co., 2 C. P. Div. 416, 428; Harris v. Railway Co., 1 Q. B. Div. 515; York Co. v. Railroad Co., 3 Wall. 107; Hill v. Railroad Co., 73 N. Y. 351. The cases in which it is held that one who receives a ticket which appears to be a mere check showing the points between which he is entitled to be carried, and which contains conditions on its back which he does not read, is not bound by such conditions, do not fall within this rule. Brown v. Railway Co., 11 Cush. 97; Malone v. Railroad Corp., 12 Gray, 388; Henderson v. Stevenson, L. R., 2 H. L. Sc. 470; Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306; Railway Co. v. Stevens, 95 U. S. 655. Such a ticket does not purport to be a contract which expressly states the rights of the parties, but only a check to indicate the route over which the passenger is to be carried, and he is not expected to examine it to see whether it contains any unusual stipulations. The precise question in the present case is whether the "contract ticket" was of such a kind that the passenger taking it should have understood that it was a contract containing stipulations which would determine the rights of the parties in reference to his carriage. If so he would be expected to read it, and if he failed to do so he is bound by its stipulations. It covered with print and writing the greater part of two large quarto pages, and bore the signature of the defendant company, affixed by its agent, with a blank space for the signature of the passenger. The fact that it was not signed by the plaintiff is immaterial. Quimby v. Railroad Co., 150 Mass. 365, and cases there cited. It contained elaborate provisions in regard to the rights of the passenger on the voyage, and even went into such detail as to give the bill of fare for each meal in the day for every day of the week. No one who could read could glance at it without seeing that it undertook expressly to prescribe the particulars which should govern the conduct of the parties until the passenger reached the port of destination. In that particular it was entirely unlike the pasteboard tickets which are commonly sold to passengers on railroads. In reference to this question the same rules of law apply to a contract to carry a passenger as to a contract for the transportation of goods. There is no reason why a consignor who is bound by the provisions of a bill of lading which he accepts without reading should not be equally bound by the terms of a contract in similar form to receive and transport him as a passenger. In Henderson v. Stevenson, ubi supra, the ticket was for transportation a short distance-from Dublin to Whitehaven-and the passenger was held not bound to read the notice on the

back because it did not purport to be a contract, but a mere check given as evidence of his right to carriage. In later English cases it is said that this decision went to the extreme limit of the law, and it has repeatedly been distinguished from cases where the ticket was in a different form. Parker v. Railway Co., 2 C. P. Div. 416, 428; Harris v. Railway Co., 1 Q. B. Div. 515; Burke v. Railway Co., 5 C. P. Div. 1. The passenger in the last-mentioned case had a coupon ticket, and it was held that he was bound to know what was printed as a part of the ticket. Steers v. Steamship Co., 57 N. Y. 1, is in its essential facts almost identical with the case at bar, and it was held that the passenger was bound by the conditions printed on the ticket. In Quimby v. Railroad Co., ubi supra, the same principle was applied to the case of a passenger travelling on a free pass, and no sound distinction can be made between that case and the case at bar. We are of opinion that the ticket delivered to the plaintiff purported to be a contract, and that the defendant corporation had a right to assume that he consented to its provisions. All these provisions are equally binding on him as if he had read them. The contract being valid in Eugland, where it was made, and the plaintiff's acceptance of it under the circumstances being equivalent to an express assent to it, and it not being illegal or immoral, it will be enforced here, notwithstanding that a similar contract made in Massachusetts would be held void as against public policy. Greenwood v. Custis, 6 Mass. 358; Forepaugh v. Railroad Co., 128 Penn. St. 217, and cases cited; In re Missouri S. S. Co., 42 Ch. Div. 326, 327; Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., May 19, 1891. Fonseca v. Cunard S. S. Co. Opinion by Knowlton, J.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTER-STATE COMMERCEPEDDLERS.-The charter of the city of Bloomington, which confers on the common council power to license and tax hawkers and peddlers, and the ordinances passed pursuant thereto, imposing a license tax, in so far as they operate on persons soliciting orders for goods for a principal in another State, are void, being in contravention of the Federal Constitution, vesting in Congress the authority to regulate commerce between the States. We are unable to distinguish this case, in principle, from Robbins v. Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489. In that case Robbins was soliciting trade in Tennessee for a firm in Cincinnati, Ohio; and it was held that a law of Tennessee requiring him to take out a license in order to transact his business was in conflict with that clause of the Constitution of the United States which gives to Congress the power to regulate commerce between the States, and therefore void. Substantially the same class of goods was there sought to be sold as is here sought to be sold; only there, it would seem, the attempt to sell was at wholesale, while here it was at retail. But that is not dwelt upon as a matter of any significance in the opinion in that case; and when it is reflected that it is the locality of the sales with reference to the locality of the ownership of the goods, and not the quantities of the goods soid or the number of persons to whom sold, that determines whether given sales are to be regarded as belonging to inter-State commerce, it is important to see how it could be. It is manifest that in that case the court must have regarded the license fee as in the nature of a tax, as contradistinguished from a mere police regulation imposed for the protection of the public against the harmful tendency, to the citizens of the district, of the business itself, as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Com. v. Gardner, 133 Penu. St. 284, held that a license regulation in regard to hawkers and peddlers is; for where the business itself may be regulated or suppressed in a community because of its inherent harmful tendency to the citizens of such community, it may be regulated by a license

without regard to the locality of the property in which the business is conducted. But it is impossible to say that there may be injury or danger to the public welfare in permitting sales by retail, and yet none in permitting sales of the same thing in the same locality by wholesale, since in the very nature of things, the difference is not in principle, but in the extent of its exercise only. The fact that the ordinance makes no discrimination between those soliciting orders for houses in this State and those soliciting for houses in other States is of no moment. It was said in the Robbins Case: "It is strongly urged, as if it were a material point in the case, that no discrimination is made between domestic and foreign drummers-those of Tennessee and those of other States; that all are taxed alike. But that does not meet the difficulty. InterState commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the same amount of tax should be laid on domestic commerce, or that which is carried on solely within the State. This was decided in the case of State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232. The negotiation of sales of goods which are in other States, for the purpose of introducing them into the State in which the negotiatiou is made, is inter-State commerce." Ill. Sup. Ct., May 11, 1891. City of Bloomington v. Bourland. Opinion by Scholfield, C. J.

because of the fact that he had in his possession, ou board of an enrolled vessel, while on a voyage apon the waters of the great lakes, property which had been stolen in the Menominee river, would be in effect to hold that any person who takes his passage upon an enrolled vessel for a voyage, either long or short, on the great lakes, can be indicted and tried in the United States Circuit or District Courts if he has with him on such vessel property he has stolen elsewhere. But a more conclusive reason in this particular case in answer to this position on the part of the prosecution is that the indictment itself is defective in showing that the crime was committed in a place over which this court had no jurisdiction, and the prosecution on the trial should have been limited to proof of the offense in the place alleged. The motion in arrest of judgment is sustained, and an order will be entered quashing the indictment for want of jurisdiction, and discharging the prisoner. U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D. III., Feb. 9, 1891. United States v. Rogers. Opinion by Blodgett, J. 46 Fed. Rep. 1.

claim arising upon a judgment recovered against the testator or intestate is not barred by the statute of limitations upon a refusal to refer, so as to deprive the creditor of the right to compel the executor to account. The surrogate ordered the administratrix to account. It was held by the Court of Appeals in MoNulty v. Hurd, 72 N. Y. 518, that a judgment against a deceased person, although disputed or rejected by his personal representatives, need not be sued over in order to authorize a decree for its payment by the surrogate. If this be so, it is difficult to see how the claim arising upon the judgment can be barred by the statute of limitations, upon a refusal to refer. In MoNulty's Case, Church, C. J., says: "We think that there is a distinction between judgments against the testator or intestate and other claims. A judgment is an adjudication of the rights of the parties in respect to the claim involved. It imports absolute verity. It cannot be disputed in the sense contemplated by the statute any more than a judgment against the administrators. In the same sense it is final and conclusive. The statute recognizes a distinction by giving priority to judgments over each other according to date of recovery and over other debts. § 27. This right of priority might be interfered with if a new judgment was necessary in case of dispute, and thus a right secured by statute might be seriously impaired or en

CRIMINAL LAW-JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS BRINGING STOLEN PROPERTY WITHIN JURISDICTION.-Under the act of Congress of September 4, 1890, extending the criminal jurisdiction of the Federal courts to offenses "committed upon any vessel registered or enrolled under the laws of the United States, and being on a voyage upon the waters of any of the great lakes," or any of the waters connecting any of the said lakes," such courts have no jurisdiction of a larceny committed upon a steam-barge while lying in the Menominee river, a tributary of Lake Michigan, half a mile from its mouth. The United States courts have no common-law jurisdiction in criminal matters, and can only take such jurisdiction as is given them by statute; and the fact, that though the larceny was committed within the limits of a State, the stolen property was not discovered in defendant's possession until the vessel was upon Lake Michigan, will not aid their jurisdiction. The authorities in the State courts of this country and in England are in the main to the effect that personal property stolen in one county, and carried into another county, and found there in possession of the thief, will give the courts of the county where the goods are found the same jurisdiction to try and punish the offender as is given to the author-tirely destroyed by the construction claimed. We are ities of the county where the original crime is perpetrated. 2 Archb. Crim. Pr. (8th ed.), p. 1141; 1 Bish. Crim. Law, § 136 et seq.; Myers v. People, 26 Ill. 176; Stinson v. People, 43 id. 400. But the United States courts have no common-law jurisdiction in criminal matters, and can only take such jurisdiction as is given them by statutes. United States v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384; United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32; United States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415; United States v. Britton, 108 U. S. 193. It having been decided that the United States had no jurisdiction over crimes committed upon the waters of the great lakes (E parte Byers, 32 Fed. Rep. 404), Congress in September OF CONTRACT FALSE last passed the law just quoted, to confer jurisdiction; Where in a suit to cancel a couand jurisdiction can only be taken under that act, and tract for the purchase of land upon the ground of to the extent there granted. The jurisdiction taken fraud, the complaint alleges that defendant's president by common-law courts in cases of constructive larceny pointed out two lots as suitable for a warehouse and makes the possession of the stolen goods elsewhere elevator corporation, saying: "We are building our than in the jurisdiction where the crime of actual lar- belt railway right down * ** street, so that ceny was committed in respect to said goods a felonious you see we will pass that ground five hundred feet on possession as against the law of the place where its east side;" and "We are at work on it now; the he has such possession, but that rule does not apply to engineers are out there now at work at it;" wherecourts that have no common-law jurisdiction. To hold upon plaintiff was induced to purchase the iots; and that this court has jurisdiction to try this defendant | alleges a failure to build the road - a failure to aver

of opinion therefore that a judgment against a deceased, even if disputed or rejected by executors or administrators, need not be sued over in order to authorize a decree for its payment by the surrogate." It is doubtful whether the other matters set up by way of defense could be tried by the surrogate. Stilwell v. Carpenter, 59 N. Y. 414; McNulty v. Hurd, 72 id. 518. Even if cognizance could be taken of them, an account between the parties would still be necessary. N. Y. Sup. Ct., Gen. Term, First Dept., April 17, 1891. Matter of Lyman. Opinion by Lawrence, J.

FRAUD

CANCELLATION

REPRESENTATION.

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that the representations were false and fraudulently made, with intent to deceive, or an equivalent averment, is fatally defective. The averment that complainant relied upon the assurances of defendant to complete the belt road as he agreed to do at the time he sold the land will not supply a failure to set forth the facts necessary to constitute an assurance or promiee to complete the road. In the case of Lawrence v. Gayetty, 78 Cal. 126, the court declared that "the representations alleged to have been made are not as to existing facts, but consist in mere promises to perform certain acts in the future. The rule is that representations, to constitute sufficient grounds for relief, must be as to existing, material facts, or the affirmation of a matter in the future, as a fact, and not a mere opinion, statement of intention, or promise to do some act in the future:" quoting, among others, Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 877, 888. A "promise," strictly speaking, is not a "representation." The failure to make it good may give a cause of action, but it is not a false representation which authorizes a rescission of a contract like the present. The making of a promise, and having no intention at the time of performing it, constitute a fraud for which a contract may be rescinded. 78 Cal., supra. The rule laid down in Railway Co. v. Matthews, 77 Ala. 357, and followed in Bradfield v. Land Co., supra, as to promises and acts to be performed in the future, is abundantly sustained both by text-books and numerous decisions in other States. Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 877, 888; 78 Cal., supra; Williams v. McFadden, 23 Fla. 143; Hexter v. Bast, 125 Penn. St. 52; Adams v. Schiffer, 7 Am. St. Rep. 202, note p. 216; 11 Colo. 15; McLain v. Buliner, 4 Am. St. Rep. 36, note p. 41; Knowlton v. Keenan, 146 Mass. 86; Furnace Co. v. Moffat, 9 Am. St. Rep. 727, and note pp. 729, 730; People v. Healy, 128 Ill. 9; Griel v. Lomax, 89 Ala. 420; Dawe v. Morris, 149 Mass. 188; Atwood v. Wright, 29 Ala. 346. The failure of the bill to aver that the representations made by Caldwell were false and fraudulently made, with intent to deceive, or its equivalent of such averment, renders it fatally defective and subject to demurrer. Ala. Sup. Ct., April 30, 1891. Birmingham, etc., Co. v. Elyton Land Co. Opinion by Coleman, J.

INDICTMENT-MOTION TO QUASH STENOGRAPHER IN GRAND JURY ROOM.-The fact that the grand jury, after voting not to find an indictment, but before reporting to the court, reconsidered their decision. and voted to find one without hearing any new evidence, is no ground for quashing the indictment. The fact that a stenographer who was in the employ of the district attorney at the latter's request attended beforə the grand jury, and took notes of the testimony of a witness, is no ground for quashing an indictment, as such stenographer was an assistant to the district attorney. U. S. Circ. Ct., S. D. N. Y., Jan. 17, 1891. United States v. Simmons. Opinion by Benedict, J. INJUNCTION-APPREHENDED NUISANCE-CITY SEWERS. The apprehended fouling or pollution of a stream of water in the future by the sewage of a part of a city from sewers, which have been legally, scientifically and properly constructed, but which has not yet'taken place, and of which there is no immediate or imminent danger, and which depends upon a contingency that may not happen, does not present a case for an injunction. Board v. Passaic (N. J., 1890), 20 Atl. Rep. 54; Citizens' Coach Co. v. Camden, etc., R. Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 299; Stitt v. Hilton, 31 id. 285; Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Central Stock-Yard, etc., Co., 43 id. 605; Hagerty v. Lee, 45 id. 255; Stoudinger v. City of Newark, 28 id. 187; Merrifield v. Worcester, 110 Mass. 216; Brookline v. Mackintosh, 133 id. 215; Morgan v. City of Binghamton, 102 N. Y. 500; Dunn v. City of Austin (Tex., 1889), 11 S. W. Rep. 1125; High Inj., § 742; Wood Nuis.,

$$ 796, 797. Kaus. Sup. Ct., May 9, 1891. City of Hutchinson v. Delano. Opinion by Horton, C. J.

INNKEEPERS LIABILITY - LOSS OF BAGGAGE. Where a transient guest of an hotel delivered his baggage to a porter to be checked for safe-keeping, the porter having no authority to check it without directions from the clerk, but doing it nevertheless, and the guest then pays his bill and leaves the hotel, the relation of innkeeper and guest is thereby terminated, and if the baggage is stolen during the guest's absence the innkeeper is not liable therefor. The commonlaw liability of innkeepers, except so far as modified by statute, is recognized and applied in this State. Rates of charges, and reasonable limitations upon their liability, may be fixed by special contract. A guest may also be guilty of such proximate contributory negligence as to exonerate innkeepers from responsibility. Lanier v. Youngblood, 73 Ala. 592; Story Bailm., §§ 483, 484; Story Cont., §§ 744-749. The strict common-law liability of innkeepers is for the protection of the goods of their guests, and while the relation of innkeeper and guest exists. The words of the common law were, eorum bona et catalla infra hospitia. Cayle's Case, 8 Coke, 32a; Wilkins v. Earle, 44 N. Y. 172. The evidence in the present case shows that on each several visit of the plaintiff to the hotel, he was a guest and was entitled to all the protection of the common law. It is equally clear that this relation terminated after each stoppage. He was charged and paid the usual day rates without reduction, and no agreement was made as to future visits. When the plaintiff paid his bill and left, the relation of innkeeper and guest ceased to exist. O'Brien v. Vaill, 22 Fla. 627. If when he paid his bill he had called for his valise, and it then had been stolen or lost, there could be no doubt of the liability of the defendant, or if he had requested the defendant or his authorized clerk to take charge of his baggage until his return, agreeing to return within a short time, and the defendant or clerk had consented to do so, a liability would have been assumed by such agreement. Story Bailm., § 477, and note. Or if the plaintiff had not paid his bill, and the defendant had undertaken to retain the baggage to secure the plaintiff's debt to him, the defendant would be liable. Haas v. Taylor, 80 Ala. 465. And there may be cases, according to the particular circumstances, where an innkeeper may be liable for the goods of a guest, for a reasonable time, after the departure of the guest from the inn. Adams v. Clem, 41 Ga. 65. See criticism on this case in 22 Fla., supra. If a traveller, intending to become a guest at an hotel, meets a porter of the hotel at the depot or other usual stopping places for travellers, aud intrusts his baggage with the porter, sent out for the purpose of soliciting patronage and caring for the baggage of such guest, the relation of innkeeper and guest for the protection of the baggage is thereby created; or if a guest, intending to leave the hotel, intrusts his baggage to a porter of the hotel whose duty it is to deliver the baggage at depot, the relation is continued until the delivery at the designated place. But these principles of law afford no protection to one who intrusts his baggage to a mere servant of the hotel not authorized to receive baggage, with directions to him to check it, for safe-keeping until he returns, then pays his bill to the clerk, and terminates his relation as guest, and gives no notice to the innkeeper or clerk that he expects to return, and that he has left his baggage to be taken care of until his return. "When a person came to an inn with a hamper of hats, and went away and left them there for two days, and in his absence they were stolen, it was held that he was not to be deemed a guest, and that the innkeeper was not liable for the loss thereof." Story Bailm., § 477. It is not in the power of a bailor to force upon another the custody of his goods. It