must be a duty voluntarily assumed or one imposed by law. A deposit received by a servant not in the line of his duty and without the expressed or implied consent of his principal, and against positive instructions, cannot impose a liability upon the principal. In such the deposit is a mere personal trust in the servant. Ala. Sup. Ct., May 1, 1891. Gleem v. Jackson. Opinion by Coleman, J. MASTER AND SERVANT-DEFECTIVE APPLIANCES. Plaintiff sued his employer for injuries received from iron bars that fell on him from a vehicle that he was pushing, because the holes in which the pins intended to hold the bars on the vehicle fitted were worn so as not to hold the pins. The evidence showed that the vehicle was loaded by plaintiff and his fellow-servants, who failed to observe the defect therein, though it was plainly apparent; that they were not bound to use that particular vehicle, because many others were available; that defendant had no knowledge of the defects, and that he kept constantly employed a machinist whose duty it was to make repairs whenever his attention was called to the need of them by the workmen. Held, that a verdict should have been directed for defendant. In Railroad Co. v. Sentmeyer, 92 Penn. St. 276, we held that where an employer has furnished his employees with tools and appliances, which, though not the best possible to be obtained, may by ordinary care be used without danger, he has discharged his duty, and is not responsible for accidents. trine is precisely applicable to this case. This doc There was become through use unsafe, and continues without any special order of the company, and without making any complaint, to use the said appliances, that he will be held to have either run the risk of being injured, or to have been guilty of contributory negligence, and hence in case of injury to him occasioned by such defect the company will not be liable; and this is true, even though the defect be such a one as under ordinary circumstances the company would be bound to repair.' Railroad Co. v. Huber, 128 Penn. St. 63, distinguished. Penn. Sup. Ct., May 27, 1891. Benusch v. Roberts. Opinion by Green, J. - NEGLIGENCE-ACCIDENT AT CROSSING-FAILURE TO LOOK OR LISTEN - ABSENCE OF SIGNALS. - Where a boy stopped on a railroad at a street crossing to await the passage of a train on another track, and did not look or listen for a train on the track on which he stood, it is error to charge, that though he did not exercise care according to his age and discretion, the company is liable if the bell of the engine by which he was struck was not sounded for the crossing, and the failure so to sound the bell directly caused the injury. Does the instruction No. 1, given at plaintiff's request, correctly declare the law of the case? If it does, then there is no longer such a defense as contributory negligence in this State. This instruction told the jury in unmistakable terms, that notwithstanding plaintiff went upon the railroad track, and stood there without looking or listening, and notwithstanding he did not exercise care according to his age and discretion in so doing, and standing upon said track without looking or listening for the approach of a train, yet if defendant failed to ring its bell eighty rods from the crossing, and such failure directly caused the injury to plaintiff, then plaintiff was entitled to recover. This instruction was unanimously condemned by this court in Guenther v. Railway Co., 95 Mo. 286. Said Judge Brace in that case: "Reading the first and second (instruction) together, the jury were in effect told, that although the deceased had been guilty of negligence contributing directly to his death, yet if they found from the evidence that no bell was rung while the locomotive was passing over the street or road immediately before the accident, and that the death of said Guenther directly resulted from the omission to sound the bell, they should find for plaintiff." "In other words, the jury were told: 'Here are two acts of negligence-one of the plaintiff in being on the track, the other of defendant in not sounding the bell no complaint against the buggy that was used, except the absence of the pins. If they were absent because the plaintiff or his fellow-workmen failed to put them in, of course it was the result of their own negligence. It being their duty to put them in, they must necessarily know whether they could or could not put them in the holes, and if they used the machine without the pins, they were by necessary consequence guilty of negligence, whether the holes were too large or not. By the exercise of the most ordinary care they could have avoided any danger from such a source. The learned court correctly charged the jury that "if the defect complained of was visible, it was the duty of the plaintiff, and those working with him, to know that it existed, and know the danger which was incident to that defect." This is in exact accordance with the authorities, and should have been followed by a direction to render a verdict for the defendant, as this court has declared should be done in repeated instances. Thus in Sykes v. Packer, 99 Penn. St. 465, we said: "The defendant had as good an opportunity of seeing the condition of the tackle as any other employee had He must be held to have known what was clearly visible to his sight. It was not necessary that he should be specifically informed of a fact so patent to him." In Brossman v. Railroad Co., 113 Penn. St. 498, Mr. Justice Trunkey, in delivering the opinion of this court, said: "When an employee, after having the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the risks of his situation, accepts them, he cannot complain if subse-diately before and at the time Guenther was struck in quently injured by such exposure. By contracting for the performance of hazardous duties, he assumes such risks as are incident to their discharge from causes open and obvious, the dangerous character of which causes he has had opportunity to ascertain. Whart. Neg., § 214. This is the general rule. In Ballou v. Railway Co. (Wis.), 11 N. W. Rep. 559, the deceased was killed by reason of a defect in the ladder of a freight car, and it was held that his representative could not recover. A well-prepared note reviewing the cases on the subject, upon the point which touches the case in hand (5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 506) states the doctrine as follows: 'It seems clear if a person in the employment of a railroad company discovers that the appliances with which he is working are or have concurring at the same time and place, the result of which is death. Now if you find that the death resulted directly from the failure to ring the bell, you must find for the plaintiff,' practically ignoring deceased's contributory negligence, without which no death could have happened, by leaving the jury at liberty to select out the defendant's act of negligence, and say that was the direct cause of his death, and render a verdict accordingly, and under it the jury have only to find the bell was not rung imme a publicly-travelled street, in order to find for plaintiff, notwithstanding Guenther's act contributed directly to his death." "It is not necessary to quote authorities to show this is not the law." Notwithstanding the confidence expressed in this position, counsel for respondent challenge it. In Kelley v. Railroad Co., 75 Mo. 138, Judge Henry, speaking for the whole court, says: "That it is such negligence for one to attempt to cross or get upon a railway track, at a public crossing or elsewhere, without looking or listening for an approaching train, as precludes a recovery for an injury sustained by him from a passing train or locomotive, whether the company's negligence also contributed directly to produce the injury or not, has so often been decided by this court that it must now be re regarded as the settled law of this State; citing Maher v. Railroad Co., 64 Mo. 267; Fletcher v. Railroad Co., id. 484. In this last case Judge Henry with approval quotes from the opinion of Judge Allen in Gorton v. Railway Co., 45 N. Y. 662: "It is not imposing an onerous duty upon the traveller crossing a railroad in broad daylight, over which trains of cars were frequently passing and are liable to pass at any time, to make use of the most common and lowest degree of observation and care and to cast his eyes in both directions and in every direction from which danger may be apprehended." "The doctrine has given for plaintiff in this case and the instruction given and condemned by this court in Guenther v. Railway Co., 95 Mo., 286, were given by the learned Circuit judge who tried those cases upon the authority of the case of Kelly v. Transit Co., 95 Mo. 279; and it must be confessed that if we accept the quotation made by Judge Norton from the opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in the same case, reported in 18 Mo. App. 151, as the law, there would appear to be ample justification of this instruction; but it seems evident that Judge Norton did not so understand the law and the instructions in the Kelly Case. He says: "It is argued that said instructions are erroneous because they authorize a recovery for plaintiff notwithstanding his negligence, if defendant either knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have known, the danger in which plaintiff had placed himself in time to have avoided injuring him and failed to exercise such care. This contention is not well founded. When a plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence the company is nevertheless liable if by the exercise of ordinary care, after a discovery by defendant of the danger in which plaintiff stood, the accident might have been prevented, or if the company failed to discover the danger through recklessness when ordinary care would have discovered the danger and averted the calamity." And citing with approval the former cases decided by this court. So that if we interpret the Kelly Case in 95 Mo. 279, it only means to announce the qualification of the rule that plaintiff's contributory negligence will preclude a recovery, as uniformly held by this court prior to that decision, then we indorse it; but if it means, as interpreted by the learned judge who tried this case in the Circuit Court, that the negligence of the defendant in not ringing its bell of itself gave plaintiff a good cause of action, notwithstanding he might be guilty of the most reckless contributory negligence, and without reference to when defendant's servants discovered the danger to plaintiff, then we unhesitatingly say that decision is not in harmony with an almost unbroken line of decisions of this court, and ought not to be followed; and this qualification of the rule has been expressly limited by the decisions of this court to those cases in which the injured party was not a trespasser. Barker v. Railroad, 98 Mo. 50. "At railroad crossings there are reciprocal duties. Both the company and the public have a right of way. Neither is exclusive. It is the duty of each to so exercise their respective rights as not to interfere unnecessarily with the rights of the other. A crossing is a known place of danger. The engineer of a train, when he approaches it, has a right to expect that persons may be there; hence it is his duty to approach it with his engine under control. The citizen, when he attempts to cross, knows that a train may come at any moment. It is his plain duty to look out for it, and avoid it if possible. Moore v. Railroad Co., 108 Penn. St. 349. It is not pretended the train was running at an unlawful rate of speed. It came to the station about the time it was due, and stopped at the usual place. The court, of its own motion, withdrew the violation of the ordinance as to keeping a watchman and as to ringing the bell on the engine continuously from the jury, so that the issue was narrowed down to the sole question whether the defendant failed to ring its bell eighty rods before reaching the crossing, and at intervals until it passed the crossing where the accident happened. As before stated, the positive evidence on the part of the defense is that the bell was rung continuously. That on part of the plaintiff is negative, save that of the witness Vance or Frank Diauhi. His evidence might well have been wholly disregarded by the court and the jury, as he testifies that at the very moment his brother was being crushed under this powerful engine my object in looking was to have a good case against been declared by this court and re-affirmed that a traveller approaching a railroad track is bound to use his eyes and ears, so far as there is opportunity, and when, by the use of those senses, danger may be avoided, notwithstanding the neglect of the railroad servant to give signals, the omission of the plaintiff to use his senses to avoid the danger is concurring negligence, entitling defendant to a nonsuit." In Zimmerman v. Railroad Co., 71 Mo. 476, the exact point was made: "The doctrine contended for is, that although a traveller could have seen if he had looked, or heard if he had listened, for an approaching train, yet without looking or listening he may go upon the track, and not be chargeable with contributory negligence if run against and injured by a train of cars passing over the road; that he may shut his eyes and close his ears, and walk, drive or ride across or along a railroad track; and if the company fails to blow its whistle or ring its bell as required by law, his negligence is cancelled by that of the company, and ceases to be a proximate cause of the injury, of which the negligence of the company is then to be regarded as the sole proximate cause. "This court wholly repudiated such a doctrine then. Bell v. Railroad Co., 72 Mo. 50; Purl v. Railroad Co., id. 168; Turner v. Railroad Co., 74 id. 602. In Powell v. Railway Co., 76 id. 80, the facts were very similar to the facts in the case now under consideration. In that case Judge Sherwood, speaking for the court, says: "Making the broad concession, for argument's sake, that the testimony tending to show the defendant was negligent, still there was nothing to show that this of necessity caused the injury. On the contrary thereof, the only inference which can be fairly drawn from the testimony is, that but for the boy's neglect to act in a manner suitable to the situation in which he was placed suitable to the dangerous machinery by which he was surrounded-that but for his heedlessness, not to say absolute rashness, in failing to look and listen for the train, of whose expected arrival he was fully aware, the accident would not have occurred. That he could have seen the train if he had looked, that he could have heard if he had listened, is abundantly established." This court reversed that case without remanding. In the same volume-Lenix v. Railway Co., 76 Mo. 86-the same doctrine is reiterated, and the failure to give the signals was held not to condone the contributory negligence of plaintiff. And so the law was written and accepted until the decision in Kelly v. Transit Co., 95 Mo. 279, with this qualification: that it has been held, that notwithstanding plaintiff's contributory negligence, he may recover if the defendant's negligence, which directly caused the injury, occurred after the defendant knew, or by the exercise of reasonable or proper care might have known, of the danger or peril in which the injured party stood, and by the exercise of ordinary care might then have prevented the injury, or if the company failed to discover the danger through the recklessness or carelessness of its employees when the exercise of ordinary care would have discovered the danger, and averted the calamity." Kelley v. Railroad Co., 75 Mo. 138; Scoville v. Railroad Co., 81 id. 434; Harlan v. Railroad Co., 65 id. 22; Isabel v. Railroad Co., 60 id. 482. The instruction No. 1 the railroad company." But conceding that the bell was not rung as required by statute or ordinance, what was the proximate cause of this injury? We must assume that this boy, in the absence of all proof that he was weak-minded, or that he was not possessed of ordinary intelligence, knew it was dangerous to stand between the rails of a railroad track. He had been reared in the sight of this railroad, and within a block of the depot. He knew also it was about the time for this train to arrive. The evidence on his part shows that passengers had collected at the depot waiting for the train. It was broad daylight. He could have seen an engine approaching for two blocks from the south. His view was unobstructed. He voluntarily placed himself in a place of known danger. According to his own evidence he could have stood between the tracks in perfect safety while watching the outgoing freight. If it be said that the engineer ought to have seen him, with equal force it can be asserted that he ought to have seen the train approaching. It was quite as easy for him to see the train as for the engineer to see him. Under these circumstances then, we think the first instruction for plaintiff incorrectly stated the law, and moreover was contradictory of the sixth instruction given by the court of its own motion. The defendant was entitled under this evidence, to an instruction on contributory negligence in accordance with the views herein expressed, and as set forth in defendant's refused instruction, and the sixth given by the court of its own motion. For this error in the instructions the cause is reversed and remanded. Mo. Sup. Ct., May 19, 1891. Dlauhi v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. Opinion by Gavitt, P. J. A pa STATUTE-SALES OF LIQUOR TO MINORS-PERMIT FROM PARENT.--Written authority from the parent or guardian for selling or furnishing intoxicating liquors to a minor must be special for each occasion. rental decision not founded on the circumstances of any particular occasion, but applicable alike to all occasions, and measuring the supply of liquors to be furnished by nothing but the desires and appetites of the child, is simply an effort to repeal the law pro tanto. To give it effect would be in direct conflict with the principle aunounced by this court, during the prevalence of slavery, in the case of Reinhart v. State, 29 Ga. 522, in which it was held that the master's discretion to determine the quantity of spirituous liquors necessary for the health of a slave could not be delegated. Consistently with the policy of the law, there can be no general authority by the parent conferred upon any one to furnish liquors at his own pleasure or the pleasure of the child. The parent must hold control of the supply, both as to time and quantity, and the written authority must be special, as contradistinguished from general. It must be applicable to one occasion only, and must be repeated separately for each subsequent occasion. Once acted on it is exhausted, and is no more authority for subsequent supplies than if it had never existed. Parental license to run indefinitely would, if granted by a sufficient number of rash and inconsiderate fathers, enable one or more drinking saloons in large cities to flourish on the patronage of minors alone. We think such a license shows on its face an attempted evasion of the law. It treats the parent alone as interested in the conduct of the child, and ignores the wider and more important policy of the statute, which is to rear good citizens and conserve the public order and general welfare of the State. If we are correct in what has been said, the instrument relied upon as a defense in this case was void upon its face. It was no authority for selling or furnishing even in a single instance, for it had no limitation as to time or quantity, and was obviously intended as a general license rather than as a particular authority. It was an unlimited permit to drink whisky and HERE is an important head-note in a Scotch case: "The defender, seeing a cat ruuning past in a public street, called to a dog beside him to 'seize it.' The dog accordingly gave chase to catch the cat, and in doing so knocked down and injured a child. Held, that the defender, in setting a dog to chase a cat through the street, acted negligently and without due care for passers-by, and was found liable in damages." -Law Times. The event of the week has been Sir Edward Clarke's concluding speech for the plaintiff in the baccarat case, one of the ablest and most skillful pieces of advocacy which has occurred in our generation. We think it may be said that not a point which could tell in favor of his client was missed; that the difficulties of the case were cleverly grappled with, and that the "obligation of the robe," to which he referred at the commencement of his address, "to disregard all private friendships, all political associations, all personal interests in the discharge of his duty toward his client," was fulfilled. Eloquent, powerful, temperate and courageous, the speech maintained the best traditions of the bar. That it was not effectual to win the day was due to the fact that no skill of argument or rhetoric could avail to avert the inference to be drawn from the plaintiff's own conduct after the accusation had been mnade against him-an inference which the lord chiefjustice, in his summing up, took occasion quite properly to bring into prominence. It is needless, but we trust not impertinent, to say that the trial was conducted throughout by the presiding judge with skill and perfect judicial demeanor; and but for the regulation which converted the greater part of the public accommodation into an exclusive rendezvous of fashion, we might well look back on the case as an exceffent example of our English system of trial by jury. As it was, although the judge very pointedly remarked that "this is not a theater, the audience apparently could not be brought to believe that it was not. They are stated to have applauded Sir E. Clarke and hissed and mobbed the defendants. We earnestly hope that, notwithstanding the lord chief justice's statement, in his reply to the ill-mannered epistle addressed to him, that the practice will be continued, he will have come to see from the incidents of the late trial that a pubiio exclusively composed of so-called "persons in society does not altogether tend to the convenient or orderly administration of justice.-Solicitors' Journal. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, JULY 11, 1891. CURRENT TOPICS. of the law not only over the criminals who pay the HE New York Court of Appeals struck a popular bar is, that the lawyers are officers of the courts and der cases, into weapons of opposition to the law, into "The subsequent proceedings in the case on behalf of the defendant have been discreditable to the administration of justice. His case has been twice to the Supreme Court of the United States, and is now here for the third time, and thus the courts have been need lessly vexed for no possible purpose except delay. Upon this occasion a motion is made for a reargument of the case after the lapse of nearly a year from the original argument upon pretexts manifestly frivolous, and for which there can be no possible excuse or justification, and which will not now be dignified by any further notice. When all the forms of law have been observed, and the defendant has had every opportunity to make his defense, and his conviction has been affirmed by the highest court of the State, the contest in the courts should end and the final judgment should be executed unless the governor of the State, in the exercise of his clemency, should grant a reprieve or a of terror." mous. With all due respect for the learned and distinguished court which has given us our text — though with much less for the organs of public opinion which have so unthinkingly joined in the hue and crywe desire to enter our protest against the new view of professional duty which is here propounded. The Court of Appeals has our profound sympathy in its unequal contest with the technicalities of the law. In the utterance above quoted it has, with force and feeling, voiced the revolt of all rightminded men, whether on or off the bench, against that iron law of procedure which, in the halls of Justice, spreads a net for her feet. Probably there has never been a time in the history of legal procedure in this country or in England when this protest was more needed than it is at the present time. The exigencies of our complex modern life have driven our lawyers to put the ancient weapons of pardon. The forms of law should not be used to sub- day it is the writ of habeas corpus, which is used, their profession to new and unexpected uses. vert the criminal law of the State. Attorneys and counsellors admitted to practice in the courts of this again and again, in the forlorn hope of saving a State are under a duty to aid in the administration of client from death. Yesterday, it was the writ of justice and they cannot, consistently with this duty injunction, whose lavish use in behalf of great corengage in vexatious proceedings merely for the pur-porations stirred the popular indignation; to-morpose of undermining the final judgments of the courts and defeating the behests of the law. It ought to be a subject of inquiry therefore whether they can thus become the allies of the criminal classes and the foes of organized society, without exposing themselves to the disciplinary powers of the Supreme Court." This utterance of the supreme tribunal of the State in a case, or group of cases, which had aroused an unusual degree of popular interest, and whose developments had been keenly followed by the public mind, was at once adopted as the expression of public opinion upon the question involved; and the seal of condemnation was at once shifted by the organs of that opinion from the courts and the supposed employers of counsel in these cases to the counsel themselves. The executions of the poor wretches, who have this week been sent to their account, are celebrated, in reputable newspapers, as a triumph VOL. 44-No. 2. 66 To row, it may be that another emergency will bring another of the ancient remedies out of the scabbard to aid or embarrass the administration of justice. But in all these cases, be it remembered, the counsel, who has been made the victim of the judicial and popular censure in this case, does no more than apply to the court for the remedy which he seeks. It is in every case the court that grants the remedy, and it can only be granted by the court under sanction of the law. Here, then, we have three elements in the production of this grave situation: the counsel, eager for success, employing all the resources of his trained skill and ingenuity in behalf of his client or of the cause which has been intrusted to him; the courts of law, acting with or without discretion upon the case presented; and, lastly, the system of which law has provided the remedies in question and clothed the courts with the power or imposed upon them the duty of applying these remedies. If there is an abuse of legal machinery and a perversion of justice here and upon that point we may well take the testimony of the witnesses arrayed above- upon which of these three parties does the responsibility for the abuse rest? Is it fair to throw it upon the counsel, who has only availed himself, for the benefit of his clients, of the remedies which the law has provided, and which the courts have authorized? Nay, would the counsel not have been false to his trust if he had allowed a sentimental doubt as to the proper scope of the remedy placed in his hands to restrain him from using it? We yield to no one in our reverence for the bar at its best. We magnify our office. We would exact of members of the bar a much higher standard of professional honor than is required by the so-called ethics of the profession. But we must confess our inability to understand how the counsel in these cases could, in justice to themselves, to their clients and to the profession, have done less than they did to save their clients and the cause which had been committed to them. We doubt very much if any one of the acute and learned lawyers who constitute our highest tribunal would, under similar circumstances, have hesitated to make use, as these counsel did, of all the resources of the law which their learning and ingenuity could have brought into requisition. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in saying that we believe that the righteous indignation of the Court of Appeals against the abuses complained of blinded it to the real sinner; that the fault is not with the counsel, who only did their duty in the premises, but with the whole system of law and administration of justice under which these abuses have grown up, and by which they are protected. Reform this system by restricting and more carefully guarding the exercise of the abused remedies, and you will have no further cause to complain. But so long as these remedies are available for all, and so long as they will be granted by the courts upon application, so long will there be earnest, zealous and ingenious counsel who will use them. May they live and prosper! They need not fear the disciplinary powers of the Supreme Court. Those powers will not be set in motion against them, and they would not harm them if they were. Astute and learned counsel are not so common among us that we can afford to discipline them for displaying those qualities. The "instantaneous and painless" death of the four murderers, who were executed by electricity at Sing Sing this week, probably puts an end to the long controversy as to the legality and humanity of the new mode of executing the death penalty which has been adopted in this State. We may now probably look for the general adoption of this method of disposing of capital oases, and if society is to continue to kill men, this most humane and efficient mode of doing it should surely prevall. We have no penchant for hanging, or for the guillotine or the bow-string, and if our fellow-man is to be put out of the way at all, we prefer the promptest and most business-like way of effecting our object. There is no sentiment about the dynamo, but its efficiency has been very effectually demonstrated, and this is the important thing after all. Moreover, if the adoption of this new and unusual mode of inflicting the death penalty shall have the effect of showing ourselves and the world what a cold-blooded, brutal and demoralizing spectacle our humanity presents, when, in the dawn of the twentieth century, it deliberately puts one of its own members out of existence, it will not have been in vain. that of Virginia — is Another bar association port of the special committee on that subject, to be wrestling with the problem of law reform. The resubmitted at the annual meeting of the association the latter part of this month, is before us. It is a conservative document, the result, apparently, of considerable study of the subject as well as observation of the experience of other States, and recomtheir wisdom and practicability by their successful mends no changes which have not demonstrated operation elsewhere. Virginia still adheres, more closely than any other State, excepting New Jersey, to the old distinction between law and equity procedure, and the bill proposed by the committee (avowedly modeled after the English Judicature Act of 1873, and the Connecticut Practice Act) begins by abolishing this distinction. The spectre of codification seems to haunt our committee however, and they hasten to exorcise the evil spirit and propitiate the association by making the gratuitous assertion that "the consolidation of law and equity procedure does not even tend toward codification." You are mistaken, brethren; every thing tends toward that blessed consummation which simplifies Virginia Bar Association that the venerable fabric your cumbrous procedure, or which teaches the of the common law is susceptible of improvement. Indeed, the law reformers of this committee, in spite of the conservative character of their recommendations, seem to be dangerous heretics in the common law fold, as witness the words with which they sub mit their work to the association: "The bill offered for the consideration of the association is of course merely tentative. The members of the committee who have signed this report are in earnest in their efforts to put Virginia in line with the rest of the civilized world, and while they are convinced that the reform of the pleading so as to consolidate law and equity procedure is absolutely necessary to her progress as a great State, they do not mean to say that the bill offered by them is the best possible form it could assume. But this bill contains all of the principal features of the reformed procedure. The Codes of Procedure have met with the most violent and unreasoning opposition, but they have overcome all prejudice wherever they have been adopted. No State has ever tried the Code system and then returned to the common-law and equity pleadings which emanated from the wisdom of our ancestors.' Whatever is established is sacred with those who do not think. A close and careful investigation of the origin of ancient laws and customs causes any one to turn with a |