« AnteriorContinuar »
a single State. Mr. Justice Clifford, in the opinion of the steamer navigating the same is subject to the laws of court in The Belfast, said: “Principal subjects of ad- the United States with regard to the enrollment and miralty jurisdiction are maritime contracts and mari- license of vessels, and is liable to be proceeded against time torts, iucluding captures jure belli, and seizures in admiralty for non-compliance with such laws. Iu on water for municipal and revenue forfeitures. (1) Ex parte Boyer it was decided that the admiralty juContracts, claims or service, purely maritime and risdiction extends to a steam canal-boat in case of touching rights and duties appertainiug to commerce collision between her and another canal-boat, while aud navigation, are cognizable in the admiralty. (2) the two boats were navigating the Ilinois and Lake Torts or injuries committed on the navigable waters, Michigan canal, although the libellant's boat was of a civil nature, are also cognizable in the admiralty bound from one place in Illinois to another place in courts. Jurisdiotion in the former case depends upon the same State. Mr. Justice Blatohford, delivering the the nature of the contract, but in the latter depends opinion of the court in tbat case, said: “Within the entirely upon locality.
Navigable rivers principles laid down by this court in tbe cases of The which empty into the sea, or into the bays and gulfs Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, and The Montello, 20 id. 430, which form a part of the sea, are but arms of the sea, which extended the salutary views of admiralty jurisand are as much within the admiralty and maritime diction applied in The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443; The jurisdiction of the United States as the sea itself. Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, and The Eagle, 8 id. 15 — Difficulties attend every attempt to define the exact we have no doubt of the jurisdiction of the District limits of admiralty jurisdiction, but it cannot be made Court in this case. Navigable water, situated as this to depend upon the power of Congress to regulate canal is, used for the purposes for whioh it is used, a commerce, as conferred in the Constitution. Tbey highway for commerce between ports and places in are entirely distinct things, having no necessary con- different States, carried on by vessels such as those in nection with oue another, and are conferred, in the question here, is public water of the United States, Constitution, by separate and distinct grants." Jack- and within the legitimate scope of the admiralty juson v. The Magnolia was a case of collision between risdiction conferred by the Constitution and statutes two steamboats on the Alabama river, far above tide- of the United States, even though the canal is wholly water, and within the jurisdiction of a county. A artificial, and is wholly within the body of a State, libel in admiralty was filed by one of the parties in the and subject to its ownership and control; and it makes District Court of the United States, which was dis- no difference as to the jurisdiction of the District missed on the ground of want of jurisdiction. This Court that ove or the other of the vessels was at the court reversed the decree aud maintained the admi- time of the collisiou on a voyage from one place in the ralty jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Grier, delivering the State of Illinois, to another place in that State. The opinion of the court, said: “Before the adoption of Belfast, 7 Wall. 624.” In view of the principles laid the present Constitution, each State, in the exercise of down in the cases now referred to, we have no hesitaits sovereign power, bad its own court of admiralty, tion in saying that the Savannah river, from its mouth having jurisdiction over the harbors, creeks, inlets to the higbest point to which it is navigable, is subject and public navigable waters connected with the sea. to the maritime law and the adipiralty jurisdiction of This jurisdiction was exercised not only over rivers, the United States. It follows, as a matter of course, creeks and inlets, which were boundaries to or passed that Congress, having already, by the act of 1851, through other States, but also where they were wholly | amended the maritime law by giving the benefit of a within the State. Such a distinction was unknown, limited liability to the owners of all vessels navigat. nor (as it appears from the decision of this court in
ing tbe voeans and great lakes of the country, and the case of Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441) bad these withholding it from the owners of vessels used in courts been driven from the exercise of jurisdiction rivers or inland navigation, was perfectly competent over torts committed on navigable water within the to abolish that restriction in 1886, and extend the same body of a county, by the jealousy of the common-law beneficent rule to the latter class also. We think that courts. When therefore the exercise of admiralty and the act in question, namely, the fourth section of the maritime jurisdiction over its public rivers, ports and act of 1886, is a constitutional and valid law. As rehavens was surrendered by each State to the govern. gards the steamboat itself, and the business in which ment of the United States, without an exception as to she was engaged, in view of the authorities already resubjects or places, this court cannot interpolate one ferred to, there is not the slightest doubt that the case into the Coustitution, or introduce an arbitrary dis- was one within the admiralty jurisdiction. The steamtinction which has no foundation in reason or prece- boat was a regularly enrolled and licensed vessel of deut.” In Nelson v. Leland the same conclusion was the United States, and was engaged in maritime comreached, and the same doctrine maintained. That was
merce on the Savannah river, one of the navigablo also a case of collision between a steamer and a flat- | rivers of the United States. bout on the Yazoo river, wbich lies wholly in the State The writ of prohibition is denied. of Mississippi, and empties into the Mississippi river. Iu the case of The Commerce it was held, that in order to bring a case of collision within the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts, it is not necessary to CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOREIGN EXPRESS show that either of the vessels was engaged in foreign
COMPANIES LICENSE FEES - INTERcommerce, or commerce between the States. Mari
STATE COMMERCE. time torts, such as collision, eto., committed on uavigable waters above tide-water, are cognizable in the
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, MAY 25, 1891. admiralty, without reference to the voyage or destination of either vessel. In the case of The Belfast it was decided, that on an ordinary contract of affreightment,
CRUTCHER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY. the shipper has a maritime lien which may be en- A State statute required the agent of a foreign express com forced in the admiralty courts, although the contract pany doing business in th State to pay a licens: fee of $5 be for transportation between ports and places within
and deposit with the auditoi a statement of the company's the same State, provided it be upon wavigable waters,
assets and liabilities, showing that it has an actual capi
tal of at least $150,000, held unconstitutional, as an interto which the general jurisdiction of the admiralty ex
ference with inter-State commerce, in so far as it applies tends. In the case of The Montello it was held that
to companies transporting goods between points in the Fox river, in Wisconsin, is a navigable river, although State and points in other States, though the company made such by artificial improvements, and that a may also transport between points within the State.
error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Keue without first obtaining a lioense from the auditor of tucky.
public accounts to carry on suoh business. Sec. 2. Be
fore the auditor shall issue such license to any agent W. W. MacFarland, for plaintiff in error.
of any company incorporated by any State of the J. P. Helm, for the Commonwealth.
United States, there shall be filed in his office a copy
of the charter of suob company, and a statement made BRADLEY, J. This case arose at Frankfort, Frank under oath of its president or secretary, showing its lin county, Ky., upon au indictment found against assets and liabilities, and distinctly showing the Crutcher, the plaintiff in error, in the Franklin Cir- amount of its capital stock, and how the same has been cuit Court, for acting and doing business as agent for | paid, and of what the assets of the company consist, the United States Express Company, alleged to be an the amount of losses due and unpaid by said company, express company not incorporated by the laws of Ken- if any, and all other claims against said company or tucky, but trading and doing business as a common other indebteduess, due or not due, and such statement carrier by express of goods, merchandise, money and shall show that the company is possessed of an actual other things of value in and through the county and capital of at least $150,000, either in cash or in safe inState aforesaid, without having any license so to dovestment, exclusive of stock notes. Upon the filing of either for himself or the company. Crutcher, being the statement above provided, and furnishing the aud. arrested and brought before the court, tendered a itor with satisfactory evidence of such capital, it shall special plea setting forth the facts with regard to be his duty to issue license to such agent or agents as his employment and the business of the company, and the company may direct to carry on the busiuess of among other things that said company was a joint- expressing or transportatiou in this State. Sec. 3. Be. stock company, incorporated and having its principal fore the auditor shall issue license to any agent of any office in the city of New York in the State of New express or transportation company incorporated by York, which plea was refuged. He then pleaded “not any foreign government, or any association or partguilty," and the parties filed an agreed statement of nership acting under the laws of any foreign governfacts; and by consent the matters of law and fact ment, there shall be filed in his office a statement setwere submitted to the court, and the defendaut was ting forth the act of incorporatiou or charter, or the found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of $100 and articles of association, or by-laws under which they the costs of prosecution. The agreed statement of facts act, and setting forth the matters required by the prewas as follows: "It is that the defendant is agent ding section of this act to be specified; and satisfacof the United States Express Company, a foreign cor- tory evidence 'shall be furnished to the auditor that poratiou doing the business ordinarily done by express such company has on deposit in the United States, or compavies in this country, of carrying goods and has invested in the stock of some one or more of the freight for bire, not only from points in this State to United States, or in some safe dividend-paying stocks other points in this State, but also of carrying same in the United States, the sum of $150,000, which statecharacter of freight from points within this State to ment shall be verified by the oath of the president of points without this State, in divers parts of the United such company, its general agent in the United States, States, and vice versa. And defendant, agent at or the agent applying for such license; and upon the Frankfort, Ky., never obtained any license to do such due filing of such statemeut and furnishing the auditor business, nor did said express company obtain any li- with satisfactory evidence of such deposit or investcense from the State of Kentucky. The proportion of ment, it shall be bis duty to issue such license to the business done by the said company within and with agent or agents applying for the same. Sec. 4. The out this State for the mouth of November, 1888, is statements required by the foregoing sections shall be showu by a statement herewith filed marked 'X,' and renewed in each year thereafter, either in the months the same proportion of business within and without of January or July; and the auditor, on being satisthis State, approximately, is generally done by said fied that the capital or deposit, consisting of cash secompany." The detailed statement referred to, curities or investments as provided in this act, remain marked “X,' showed the total amount of business secure to the amount of $150,000, shall renew such lidone by the company at the Frankfort office in No. ceuse. “Sec. 8. Any person who shall set up, estabvember, 1888, to have been $226.71, of which $56.14, or lisb, carry on or transact any business for any transnot quite one-fourth of the whole, was business done portation or express company not incorporated by the entirely within the State; and the remainder, $170.57, law of this State, without having obtained licerise as was done partly within and partly without the State; | by this act required, or who shall in any way violate that is, the goods were brought into the State from the provisions of this act, shall be fined for every such places without the State, or were carried from the offense not less than $100 mor more tban $500, at the State to places without the State. Of course the lat- discretion of a jury, to be recovered as like fines in ter or largest portion was comprised within the cate- other cases. Sec. 9. For any license issued by the augory of inter-State commerce. The defendant upon ditor under this act, and for each renewal thereof, he these facts moved for a new trial, which was refused, shall be allowed the sum of $2.50, to be paid by the and also for an arrest of judgment, which was denied, agent or company taking out such license.” and a bill of exceptions was taken. The case was then An amendatory act passed in 1866 raised the license appealed to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, and the fee to $5, and imposed a fee of $5 for filing copy of judgment was affirmed. The ground taken for revers- charter, and $10 for filing an original or annual state. ing the judgment was that the statute of Kentucky ment. The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in disposing under wbich the indictment was found was repugnant of the case, gave the following opinion (Crutcher v. to the power given to Congress by the Constitution of Commonwealth, 12 S. W. Rep. 141): “ It seems to us the United States, to regulate commerce among the that the case of Woodward v. Com., 7 S. W. Rep. 613, several States,
in which the statute appears in full (decided by this The law in question was passed in 1860, and is as fol
court at its last term), determines the question now lows: "An act to regulate agencies of foreign express
preseuted. Counsel for the appellant now claims that companies: Section 1. Be it enacted by the General the statute of this State is invalid, as its effect is to Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, that it regulate commerce among the several States, The sball not be lawful, after the first day of May, 1860, for agent of the express company was fined for not paying any agent of any express company, not incorporated
to the auditor a fee of $5, or rather for failing to take by the laws of this Commonwealth, to set up, establish
out a license required by the act regulating the agen. or carry on the business of transportation in this State
cies of foreign express companies, passed in March,
" We can
1860, and amended by the act of 1866. That the com- ship firm of individuals should undertake to carry on
without any anxiety or apprehension arising from the not perceive how auy burden has been placed by the fact that the subject-matter is uot within the province State upon inter-State commerce by the provisious of or jurisdiction of the State Legislatures. And the the enactment in question, and must therefore affirm
same thing is exactly as true witb regard to inter-State the judgment.” We regret that we are unable to con- commerce as it is with regard to foreign commerce. cur with the learned Court of Appeals of Kentucky in No difference is perceivable between the two.
Teleits views on this subject. The law of Kentucky which graph Co. v. Tecas, 105 U. S. 460; Ferry Co. v. Pennis brought in question by the case requires from the sylvania, 114 id. 196, 205, 211; Steamship Co.v. Pennsylagent of every express company not incorporated by vania, 122 id. 326, 342; McCall v. California, 136 id. 104, the laws of Kentucky a license from the auditor of 110; Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 id. 114, 118. publio accounts before he can carry on any business As was said by Mr. Justice Lamar, in the case last for said company in the State.
This of course em- cited: “It is well settled by numerous decisions of braces iuter-State business as well as business confined this court that a State cannot, under the guise of a liwholly within the State. It is a prohibitiou against the ceuse tax, exclude from its jurisdiction a foreigu corcarrying on of such business without a compliance poration engaged in inter-State commerce, or impose with the State law. And not only is liceuse required any burdens upon such commerce within its limits." to be obtained by the ageut, but a statement must be We have repeatedly deoided that a State law is uuconmade and filed in the auditor's office, showing that the stitutional and void which requires a party to take out company is possessed of au actual capital of $150,000,
a license for carrying on inter-State commerce, no mateither iu cash or in safe investments, exclusive of ter how specious the pretext may be for imposing it. stock notes. If the subject was one which appertained Pickard v. Car Co., 117 U. S, 34; Robbins v. Taxing to the jurisdiction of the State Legislature, it may be Dist., 120 id. 489; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 id. 040; that the requirements and conditions of doing busi- Asher v. Texus, 128 id. 129; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, ness within the State would be promotive of the pub. 129 id. 141; McCall v. California, 136 id. 104; Railroad lic good. It is clear however that it would be a regu. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 id. 114. As a summation of the lation of inter-State commerce in its applicatiou to whole matter it was aptly said by the present chief juscorporations or associations engaged in that business; tice iu Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161, 166: “We havo and tbat is a subject which belongs to the jurisdiction repeatedly held that no State has the right to lay a tax of the National and not the State Legislature. Con- on inter-State commerce in any form, whether by way gress would uudoubtedly bave the right to exact from of duties laid on the transportation of the subjects of associations of that kind any guaranties it might deem that commerce, or on the receipts derived from that necessary for the public security, and for the faithful transportation, or on the occupation or buswess of transaction of business; and as it is within the province carrying it on, for the reason that taxation is a burden of Cougress it is to be presumed that Congress has on that commerce, and amounts to a regulation of it, done or will do all that is necessary and proper iu that which belongs solely to Congress.” regard. Besides it is not to be presumed that the State We do not think that the difficulty is at all obviated of its origin bas neglected to require from any such by the fact that the express company, as incidental to corporation proper guaranties as to capital and other its main business (which is to carry goods between difsecurities vecessary for the public safety. If a partner- ! ferent States) does also some local business by carry
ing goods from one point to another within the State property, and are therefore subjects of exchange, barof Keutucky. This is probably quite as much for the ter and traffic, like any other commodity in which a accommodation of the people of that State as for the right of property exists." But while it is only such advantage of the company. But whether so or not, it things as are clearly injurious to the lives and health does not obviate the objection that the regulatiou as of the people that are placed beyoud the protection of to license and capital stock are imposed as conditions the commercial power of Congress, yet when that ou the company's carryiug on the business of inter- power, or some other exclusive power of the Federal State commerce, which was manifestly the principal government, is not in question, the police power of object of its organizatiou. These regulations are the State exteuds to almost every thing within its clearly a burden and a restriction upon that com- borders; to the suppressiou of nuisances; to the promerce. Whether intended as such or uot, they oper-hibitiou of manufactures deemed injurious to the pubate as such. But taxes ur license fees, io good faith lic health; to the prohibitiou of intoxicating drinks, imposed exclusively on express business carried on their manufacture or sale; to the prohibition of lotwholly within the State, would be open to no such ob- teries, gambling, horse-racing or any thing else that jection. The case is entirely different from that of the Legislature may deem opposed to the public welforeign corporations seeking to do a business which fare. Burtemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129; Beer Co. v. does not belong to the regulating power of Congress. Massachusetts, 97 U. 8. 25; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde The insurance business, for example, cannot be car- Purk, id. 659; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 id. 814; Foster ried on in a State by a foreign corporatiou without v. Kansas, 112 id. 201; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 id. 623; complying with all the conditions imposed by the leg- Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 id. 678; Kidd v. Pearson, islation of that State. So with regard to manufactur- 128 id. 1; Kimmish v. Ball, 129 id. 217. It is also within ing corporatious and all other corporations whose busi- the undoubted province of the State Legislature to ness is of a local and domestio nature, which would in- make regulations with regard to the speed of railroad clude express companies whose business is confined to trains in the neighborhood of cities and tow118; with points and places wholly within the State. The cases regard to the precautions to be taken iu the approach to this effect are numerous. Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; of such trains to bridges, tunuels, deep cuts and sharp Paul P. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Insurance Co. v. Massa- curves, and generally with regard to all operations in chusetts, 10 id. 566; Manufacturing Co. v. Ferguson, which the lives and health of people may be endau. 113 U. $. 727; Fire Ass'n v. People, 119 id. 110. But the gered, even though such regulations affect to some exmain argument in support of the decision of the Court tent the operations of inter-State commerce. Such of Appeals is that the act in question is essentially a regulations are eminently local in their character, and regulation made in the fair exercise of the police in the absence of congressional regulations over the power of the State. But it does not follow that every same subject, are free from all constitutional objecthing which the Legislature of a State may deem es- tions, and unquestionably valid. sential for the good order of society and the well-being In view of the foregoing considerations, and of the of its citizens can be set up against the exclusive power well-cousidered distinctions that have been drawn beof Congress to regulate the operations of foreign and tween those things that are and those things that are inter-State commerce. We have lately expressly de- not within the scope of commercial regulation and procided in the case of Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, that tection, it is not difficult to arrive at a satisfactory cona State law prohibiting the sale of intoxicatiug liquors clusion ou the question now presented to us. The cbaris void when it comes in conflict with the express or acter of police regulation, claimed for the requirements implied regulation of inter-State commerce by Con- of the statute in question, is oertainly not such as to gress, declaring that the traffic in such liquors as ar- give them a controlling force over the regulations of ticles of merchandise betweeu the States shall be free. inter-State commerce which may have been expressly There are undoubtedly many things which in their or impliedly adopted by Congress, or such as to exnature are so deleterious or injurious to the lives and empt them from nullity when repuguaut to the excluhealth of the people as to lose all benefit of protection sive power given to Congress in relation to that comas articles or things of commerce, or to be able to merce. This is abundantly shown by the decisions to claim it only in a modified way. Such things are prop- wbich we have already referred, which are clear to the erly subject to the police power of the State. Chief effect that neither licenses nor direct taxation of any Justice Marshall, iu Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. kind, nor any system of State regulation, can be im419, 443, instances gunpowder as clearly subject to the posed upon inter-State any more than upon foreign exercise of the police power in regard to its removal commerce; and that all acts of legislation producing and the place of its storage, and he adds: “The re- any such 'result are, to that extent, unconstitutional moval or destruction of infectious or unsound articles and void. And as in our judgment the law of Kenis undoubtedly an exercise of that power, and forms an tucky now under consideration, as applied to the case express exception to the prohibition we are consider of the plaintiff in error, is open to this objection, it necing. Indeed the laws of the United States expressly essarily follows that the judgment of the Court of ApBanction the health laws of a State." Chief Justice | peals must be reversed. Tauey in the License Cases, 5 How. 504, 576, took the The judgment is reversed accordingly, and the cause same distinction when he said: "It has indeed beep remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent suggested that, if a State deems the traffic in ardent with this opinion. spirits to be injurious to its citizens, and calculated to FULLER, C. J., aud GRAY, J., disseut. introduce immorality, vice and pauperism into the BROWN, J., not having been a member of the court State, it may constitutionally refuse to permit its
when the case was argued, took uo part in the de. importation, notwithstanding the laws of Congress ;
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABmust be remembered that disease, pestilence and pau
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTER-STATE COMMERCEto be regulated and trafficked in, but to be prevented INSPECTION LAWS.-Act of Virginia, March, 1867, reas far as human foresight or human means can guard quiring all flour brought into the State to be inspected, against them. But spirits and distilled liquors are uni- the owner to pay therefor, and providing a penalty for versally admitted to be subjects of ownership and I any person selling such flour without inspection, is
discriminating, no such inspection being required for making it unlawful to sell within the State any fresh
may, were not all established until some time in 1870, there and without attempting to lay down any specific prop- is nothing in the evidence warranting the board in inosition on this somewhat difficult subject, there is ferring that such work was completed before January enough in the case before us to decide it on satisfac. 30 of that year. As to the land temporarily taken the tory grounds, without passing upon the general right statute did not begin to run against the claimant ullof the State to inspect imports or the qualifications to til the State had ceased to use it; for until that time which it must necessarily be subject. The law in ques- the claimant could not ascertain the extent of his tion is a discriminating law, and requires the inspec- damages, or the length of time which he would be detion of flour brought from other States, when such in- prived of its use. There is nothing in the case justify; spection is not required for flour mauufactured in Vir- | ing the conclusion that the State had ceased to occupy ginia. This aspect of the case brings it directly within the lands temporarily taken for more than a year prior the principle of Brimmer v. Rebman 138 U. S. 78, to the date of filing the claim; on the contrary, ante, 213 (decided at the present term). The law in the undisputed evidence is that the work of conquestion in that case was anotber statute of Virginia. struction was not completed uutil long after the