* * steamer navigating the same is subject to the laws of the United States with regard to the enrollment and license of vessels, and is liable to be proceeded against in admiralty for non-compliance with such laws. In Ex parte Boyer it was decided that the admiralty jurisdiction extends to a steam canal-boat in case of collision between her and another canal-boat, while the two boats were navigating the Illinois and Lake Michigan canal, although the libellant's boat was bound from one place in Illinois to another place in the same State. Mr. Justice Blatchford, delivering the opinion of the court in that case, said: "Within the principles laid down by this court in the cases of The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, and The Montello, 20 id. 430, which extended the salutary views of admiralty jurisdiction applied in The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, and The Eagle, 8 id. 15 — we have no doubt of the jurisdiction of the District Court in this case. Navigable water, situated as this canal is, used for the purposes for which it is used, a highway for commerce between ports and places in different States, carried on by vessels such as those in question here, is public water of the United States, and within the legitimate scope of the admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, even though the canal is wholly artificial, and is wholly within the body of a State, and subject to its ownership and control; and it makes no difference as to the jurisdiction of the District Court that one or the other of the vessels was at the time of the collision on a voyage from one place in the State of Illinois, to another place in that State. The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624." In view of the principles laid down in the cases now referred to, we have no hesitation in saying that the Savannah river, from its mouth to the highest point to which it is navigable, is subject to the maritime law and the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States. It follows, as a matter of course, that Congress, having already, by the act of 1851, amended the maritime law by giving the benefit of a limited liability to the owners of all vessels navigating the oceans and great lakes of the country, and withholding it from the owners of vessels used in rivers or inland navigation, was perfectly competent to abolish that restriction in 1886, and extend the same beneficent rule to the latter class also. We think that the act in question, namely, the fourth section of the act of 1886, is a constitutional and valid law. As regards the steamboat itself, and the business in which she was engaged, in view of the authorities already referred to, there is not the slightest doubt that the case was one within the admiralty jurisdiction. The steamboat was a regularly enrolled and licensed vessel of the United States, and was engaged in maritime commerce on the Savannah river, one of the navigable rivers of the United States. a single State. Mr. Justice Clifford, in the opinion of the court in The Belfast, said: "Principal subjects of admiralty jurisdiction are maritime contracts and maritime torts, including captures jure belli, and seizures on water for municipal and revenue forfeitures. (1) Contracts, claims or service, purely maritime and touching rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation, are cognizable in the admiralty. (2) Torts or injuries committed on the navigable waters, of a civil nature, are also cognizable in the admiralty courts. Jurisdiction in the former case depends upon the nature of the contract, but in the latter depends entirely upon locality. ** Navigable rivers which empty into the sea, or into the bays and gulfs which form a part of the sea, are but arms of the sea, and are as much within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States as the sea itself. Difficulties attend every attempt to define the exact limits of admiralty jurisdiction, but it cannot be made to depend upon the power of Congress to regulate commerce, as conferred in the Constitution. They are entirely distinct things, having no necessary connection with one another, and are conferred, in the Constitution, by separate and distinct grants." Jack son v. The Magnolia was a case of collision between two steamboats on the Alabama river, far above tidewater, and within the jurisdiction of a county. A libel in admiralty was filed by one of the parties in the District Court of the United States, which was dismissed on the ground of want of jurisdiction. This court reversed the decree and maintained the admiralty jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Grier, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "Before the adoption of the present Constitution, each State, in the exercise of its sovereign power, had its own court of admiralty, having jurisdiction over the harbors, creeks, inlets and public navigable waters connected with the sea. This jurisdiction was exercised not only over rivers, creeks and inlets, which were boundaries to or passed through other States, but also where they were wholly within the State. Such a distinction was unknown, nor (as it appears from the decision of this court in the case of Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441) had these courts been driven from the exercise of jurisdiction over torts committed on navigable water within the body of a county, by the jealousy of the common-law courts. When therefore the exercise of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction over its public rivers, ports and havens was surrendered by each State to the government of the United States, without an exception as to subjects or places, this court cannot interpolate one into the Constitution, or introduce an arbitrary distinction which has no foundation in reason or precedeut." In Nelson v. Leland the same conclusion was reached, and the same doctrine maintained. That was also a case of collision between a steamer and a flatboat on the Yazoo river, which lies wholly in the State of Mississippi, and empties into the Mississippi river. In the case of The Commerce it was held, that in order to bring a case of collision within the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts, it is not necessary to show that either of the vessels was engaged in foreign commerce, or commerce between the States. Maritime torts, such as collision, etc., committed on navigable waters above tide-water, are cognizable in the admiralty, without reference to the voyage or destination of either vessel. In the case of The Belfast it was decided, that on an ordinary contract of affreightment, the shipper has a maritime lien which may be enforced in the admiralty courts, although the contract be for transportation between ports and places within the same State, provided it be upon navigable waters, to which the general jurisdiction of the admiralty extends. In the case of The Montello it was held that Fox river, in Wisconsin, is a navigable river, although made such by artificial improvements, and that a The writ of prohibition is denied. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOREIGN EXPRESS LICENSE FEES UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, MAY 25, 1891. CRUTCHER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY. A State statute required the agent of a foreign express com pany doing business in th. State to pay a licens fee of $5 and deposit with the auditor a statement of the company's assets and liabilities, showing that it has an actual capital of at least $150.000, held unconstitutional, as an interference with inter-State commerce, in so far as it applies to companies transporting goods between points in the State and points in other States, though the company may also transport between points within the State. ING error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Ken- W. W. MacFarland, for plaintiff in error. J. P. Helm, for the Commonwealth. BRADLEY, J. This case arose at Frankfort, Franklin county, Ky., upon au indictment found against Crutcher, the plaintiff in error, in the Franklin Circuit Court, for acting and doing business as agent for the United States Express Company, alleged to be an express company not incorporated by the laws of Kentucky, but trading and doing business as a common carrier by express of goods, merchandise, money and other things of value in and through the county and State aforesaid, without having any license so to do either for himself or the company. Crutcher, being arrested and brought before the court, tendered a special plea setting forth the facts with regard to his employment and the business of the company, and among other things that said company was a jointstock company, incorporated and having its principal office in the city of New York in the State of New York, which plea was refused. He then pleaded "not guilty," and the parties filed an agreed statement of facts; and by consent the matters of law and fact were submitted to the court, and the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of $100 and the costs of prosecution. The agreed statement of facts was as follows: "It is agreed that the defendant is agent of the United States Express Company, a foreign corporation doing the business ordinarily done by express companies in this country, of carrying goods and freight for hire, not only from points in this State to other points in this State, but also of carrying same character of freight from points within this State to points without this State, in divers parts of the United States, and vice versa. And defendant, agent at Frankfort, Ky., never obtained any license to do such business, nor did said express company obtain any license from the State of Kentucky. The proportion of business done by the said company within and without this State for the month of November, 1888, is showu by a statement herewith filed marked 'X,' and the same proportion of business within and without this State, approximately, is generally done by said company." The detailed statement marked 'X,' showed the total amount of business referred to, done by the company at the Frankfort office in November, 1888, to have been $226.71, of which $56.14, or not quite one-fourth of the whole, was business done entirely within the State; and the remainder, $170.57, was done partly within and partly without the State; that is, the goods were brought into the State from places without the State, or were carried from the State to places without the State. Of course the latter or largest portion was comprised within the category of inter-State commerce. The defendant upon these facts moved for a new trial, which was refused, and also for an arrest of judgment, which was denied, and a bill of exceptions was taken. The case was then appealed to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, and the judgment was affirmed. The ground taken for reversing the judgment was that the statute of Kentucky under which the indictment was found was repugnant to the power given to Congress by the Constitution of the United States, to regulate commerce among the several States. The law in question was passed in 1860, and is as follows: "An act to regulate agencies of foreign express companies: Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, that it shall not be lawful, after the first day of May, 1860, for any agent of any express company, not incorporated by the laws of this Commonwealth, to set up, establish or carry on the business of transportation in this State without first obtaining a license from the auditor of public accounts to carry on such business. Sec. 2. Before the auditor shall issue such license to any agent of any company incorporated by any State of the United States, there shall be filed in his office a copy under oath of its president or secretary, showing its of the charter of such company, and a statement made assets and liabilities, and distinctly showing the paid, and of what the assets of the company consist, amount of its capital stock, and how the same has been the amount of losses due and unpaid by said company, if any, and all other claims against said company or other indebtedness, due or not due, and such statement shall show that the company is possessed of an actual capital of at least $150,000, either in cash or in safe investment, exclusive of stock notes. Upon the filing of the statement above provided, and furnishing the auditor with satisfactory evidence of such capital, it shall be his duty to issue license to such agent or agents as expressing or transportation in this State. Sec. 3. Bethe company may direct to carry on the business of fore the auditor shall issue license to any agent of any express or transportation company incorporated by any foreign government, or any association or partnership acting under the laws of any foreign government, there shall be filed in his office a statement setting forth the act of incorporation or charter, or the act, and setting forth the matters required by the prearticles of association, or by-laws under which they ceding section of this act to be specified; and satisfactory evidence 'shall be furnished to the auditor that such company has on deposit in the United States, or has invested in the stock of some one or more of the United States, or in some safe dividend-paying stocks in the United States, the sum of $150,000, which statesuch company, its general agent in the United States, ment shall be verified by the oath of the president of or the agent applying for such license; and upon the due filing of such statement and furnishing the auditor ment, it shall be his duty to issue such license to the with satisfactory evidence of such deposit or investagent or agents applying for the same. Sec. 4. The statements required by the foregoing sections shall be renewed in each year thereafter, either in the months of January or July; and the auditor, on being satisfied that the capital or deposit, consisting of cash securities or investments as provided in this act, remain secure to the amount of $150,000, shall renew such liceuse." "Sec. 8. Any person who shall set up, establish, carry on or transact any business for any transportation or express company not incorporated by the by this act required, or who shall in any way violate law of this State, without having obtained license as the provisions of this act, shall be fined for every such offense not less than $100 nor more than $500, at the discretion of a jury, to be recovered as like fines in other cases. Sec. 9. For any license issued by the auditor under this act, and for each renewal thereof, he shall be allowed the sum of $2.50, to be paid by the agent or company taking out such license." An amendatory act passed in 1866 raised the license fee to $5, and imposed a fee of $5 for filing copy of ment. The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in disposing charter, and $10 for filing an original or annual stateCommonwealth, 12 S. W. Rep. 141): of the case, gave the following opinion (Crutcher v. "It seems to us that the case of Woodward v. Com., 7 S. W. Rep. 613, in which the statute appears in full (decided by this court at its last term), determines the question now presented. Counsel for the appellant now claims that the statute of this State is invalid, as its effect is to The regulate commerce among the several States. ship firm of individuals should undertake to carry on the business of inter-State commerce between Keutucky and other States, it would not be within the province of the State Legislature to exact conditions on which they should carry on their business, nor to require them to take out a license therefor. To carry on inter-State commerce is not a franchise or a privilege granted by the State; it is a right which every citizen of the United States is entitled to exercise under the Constitution and laws of the United States; and the accession of mere corporate facilities, as a matter of convenience in carrying on their business, cannot have the effect of depriving them of such right unless Congress should see fit to interpose some contrary regulation on the subject. 1860, and amended by the act of 1866. That the company of which the appellant is agent is a corporation created by the laws of New York, doing business in this State as a carrier of goods, wares and merchandise is conceded; and that it transports goods, etc., out of the State into other States, and all other species of property usually incident to such transportation, is admitted, both into the State and out of it. It appears that at least fifty per cent of the business done by this agent consists in the carrying of goods from the place of his agency, Frankfort, to other States. That the carrying and transportation of goods from one State to another is a branch of inter-State commerce is not controverted, but it is claimed that there is nothing in the legislation imposing on those who desire to act as the agents of this foreign corporation the burden of paying to the auditor the fee of $5 for recording his agency, or rather for issuing him his license to act as such. The statute was enacted for the benefit of the citizens of the State, under which the auditor is required to have satisfactory evidence of the ability and solvency of the corporation to do that which it has undertaken to do by virtue of its act of incorporation. Those who intrust to its custody the transportation of their property are entitled to some security that its undertaking will be performed, and we find no law of Congress or any constitutional provision that would deny to the State the right to impose such a burden upon those who undertake the discharge of such responsible duties. There is no discrimination made between corporations doing a like business, and the State,❘ although the appellant's company is a foreign corporation, has the same right to license the business and calling of this agent as it would that of the lawyer or merchant whose business is confined to the State alone." The court then referred to the cases of Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, and to Railway Co. v. Alabama, 128 id. 96, and concluded as follows: "We cannot perceive how any burden has been placed by the State upon inter-State commerce by the provisions of the enactment in question, and must therefore affirm the judgment." We regret that we are unable to concur with the learned Court of Appeals of Kentucky in its views on this subject. The law of Kentucky which is brought in question by the case requires from the agent of every express company not incorporated by the laws of Kentucky a license from the auditor of public accounts before he can carry on any business This of course emfor said company in the State. braces inter-State business as well as business confined wholly within the State. It is a prohibition against the carrying on of such business without a compliance with the State law. And not only is license required to be obtained by the agent, but a statement must be made and filed in the auditor's office, showing that the company is possessed of au actual capital of $150,000, either in cash or in safe investments, exclusive of stock notes. If the subject was one which appertained to the jurisdiction of the State Legislature, it may be that the requirements and conditions of doing business within the State would be promotive of the public good. It is clear however that it would be a regulation of inter-State commerce in its application to corporations or associations engaged in that business; and that is a subject which belongs to the jurisdiction of the National and not the State Legislature. gress would undoubtedly have the right to exact from associations of that kind any guaranties it might deem necessary for the public security, and for the faithful transaction of business; and as it is within the province of Congress it is to be presumed that Congress has done or will do all that is necessary and proper in that regard. Besides it is not to be presumed that the State We do not think that the difficulty is at all obviated of its origin bas neglected to require from any such by the fact that the express company, as incidental to corporation proper guaranties as to capital and other its main business (which is to carry goods between difsecurities necessary for the public safety. If a partner-ferent States) does also some local business by carry Con It has frequently been laid down by this court that the power of Congress over inter-State commerce is as absolute as it is over foreign commerce. Would any one pretend that a State Legislature could prohibit a foreign corporation-an English or a French transportation company for example-from coming into its borders and landing goods and passengers at its wharves, and soliciting goods and passengers for a return voyage, without first obtaining a license from some State officer, and filing a sworn statement as to the amount of its capital stock paid in? And why not? Evidently because the matter is not within the province of State legislation, but within that of National legislation. Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U. S. 238. The prerogative, the responsibility and the duty of providing for the security of the citizens and the people of the United States in relation to foreign corporate bodies or foreign individuals with whom they may have relations of foreign commerce, belong to the government of the United States, and not to the governments of the several States; and confidence in that regard may be reposed in the National Legislature without any anxiety or apprehension arising from the fact that the subject-matter is not within the province or jurisdiction of the State Legislatures. And the same thing is exactly as true with regard to inter-State commerce as it is with regard to foreign commerce. No difference is perceivable between the two. Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460; Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 id. 196, 205, 211; Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 id. 326, 342; McCall v. California, 136 id. 104, 110; Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 id. 114, 118. As was said by Mr. Justice Lamar, in the case last cited: "It is well settled by numerous decisions of this court that a State cannot, under the guise of a license tax, exclude from its jurisdiction a foreign corporation engaged in inter-State commerce, or impose any burdens upon such commerce within its limits." We have repeatedly decided that a State law is unconstitutional and void which requires a party to take out a license for carrying on inter-State commerce, no matter how specious the pretext may be for imposing it. Pickard v. Car Co., 117 U. S. 34; Robbins v. Taxing Dist., 120 id. 489; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 id. 640; Asher v. Texas, 128 id. 129; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 id. 141; McCall v. California, 136 id. 104; Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 id. 114. As a summation of the whole matter it was aptly said by the present chief justice in Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161, 166: "We have repeatedly held that no State has the right to lay a tax on inter-State commerce in any form, whether by way of duties laid on the transportation of the subjects of that commerce, or on the receipts derived from that transportation, or on the occupation or business of carrying it on, for the reason that taxation is a burden on that commerce, and amounts to a regulation of it, which belongs solely to Congress." ing goods from one point to another within the State of Kentucky. This is probably quite as much for the accommodation of the people of that State as for the advantage of the company. But whether so or not, it does not obviate the objection that the regulation as to license and capital stock are imposed as conditions on the company's carrying on the business of interState commerce, which was manifestly the principal object of its organization. These regulations are clearly a burden and a restriction upon that commerce. Whether intended as such or not, they operate as such. But taxes or license fees, in good faith imposed exclusively on express business carried on wholly within the State, would be open to no such objection. The case is entirely different from that of foreign corporations seeking to do a business which does not belong to the regulating power of Congress. The insurance business, for example, cannot be carried on in a State by a foreign corporation without complying with all the conditions imposed by the legislation of that State. So with regard to manufacturing corporatious and all other corporations whose business is of a local and domestic nature, which would include express companies whose business is confined to points and places wholly within the State. The cases to this effect are numerous. Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 id. 566; Manufacturing Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727; Fire Ass'n v. People, 119 id. 110. But the main argument in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals is that the act in question is essentially a regulation made in the fair exercise of the police power of the State. But it does not follow that every thing which the Legislature of a State may deem essential for the good order of society and the well-being of its citizens can be set up against the exclusive power of Congress to regulate the operations of foreign and inter-State commerce. We have lately expressly decided in the case of Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, that a State law prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors is void when it comes in conflict with the express or implied regulation of inter-State commerce by Cougress, declaring that the traffic in such liquors as articles of merchandise between the States shall be free. There are undoubtedly many things which in their nature are so deleterious or injurious to the lives and health of the people as to lose all benefit of protection as articles or things of commerce, or to be able to claim it only in a modified way. Such things are properly subject to the police power of the State. Chief Justice Marshall, in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 443, instances gunpowder as clearly subject to the exercise of the police power in regard to its removal and the place of its storage, and he adds: "The removal or destruction of infectious or unsound articles is undoubtedly an exercise of that power, and forms an express exception to the prohibition we are considering. Indeed the laws of the United States expressly sanction the health laws of a State." Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases, 5 How. 504, 576, took the same distinction when he said: "It has indeed been suggested that, if a State deems the traffic in ardent spirits to be injurious to its citizens, and calculated to introduce immorality, vice and pauperism into the State, it may constitutionally refuse to permit its importation, notwithstanding the laws of Congress; and that a State may do this upon the same principles that it may resist and prevent the introduction of disease, pestilence and pauperism from abroad. But it must be remembered that disease, pestilence and pauperism are not subjects of commerce, although some times among its attendant evils. They are not things to be regulated and trafficked in, but to be prevented as far as human foresight or human means can guard against them. But spirits and distilled liquors are universally admitted to be subjects of ownership and property, and are therefore subjects of exchange, barter and traffic, like any other commodity in which a right of property exists." But while it is only such things as are clearly injurious to the lives and health of the people that are placed beyond the protection of the commercial power of Congress, yet when that power, or some other exclusive power of the Federal governmeut, is not in question, the police power of the State extends to almost every thing within its borders; to the suppression of nuisances; to the prohibition of manufactures deemed injurious to the public health; to the prohibition of intoxicating drinks, their manufacture or sale; to the prohibition of lotteries, gambling, horse-racing or any thing else that the Legislature may deem opposed to the public welfare. Bartemeyer v. lowa, 18 Wall. 129; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Purk, id. 659; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 id. 814; Foster v. Kansas, 112 id. 201; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 id. 623; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 id. 678; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 id. 1; Kimmish v. Ball, 129 id. 217. It is also within the undoubted province of the State Legislature to make regulations with regard to the speed of railroad trains in the neighborhood of cities and towns; with regard to the precautions to be taken in the approach of such trains to bridges, tunnels, deep cuts and sharp curves, and generally with regard to all operations in which the lives and health of people may be endangered, even though such regulations affect to some extent the operations of inter-State commerce. Such regulations are eminently local in their character, and in the absence of congressional regulations over the same subject, are free from all constitutional objections, and unquestionably valid. In view of the foregoing considerations, and of the well-considered distinctions that have been drawn between those things that are and those things that are not within the scope of commercial regulation and protection, it is not difficult to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion on the question now presented to us. The character of police regulation, claimed for the requirements of the statute in question, is certainly not such as to give them a controlling force over the regulations of inter-State commerce which may have been expressly or impliedly adopted by Congress, or such as to exempt them from nullity when repuguaut to the exclusive power given to Congress in relation to that commerce. This is abundantly shown by the decisions to which we have already referred, which are clear to the effect that neither licenses nor direct taxation of any kind, nor any system of State regulation, can be imposed upon inter-State any more than upon foreign commerce; and that all acts of legislation producing any such 'result are, to that extent, unconstitutional and void. And as in our judgment the law of Kentucky now under consideration, as applied to the case of the plaintiff in error, is open to this objection, it necessarily follows that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. The judgment is reversed accordingly, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. FULLER, C. J., and GRAY, J., dissent. BROWN, J., not having been a member of the court when the case was argued, took no part in the decision. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AB- CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTER-STATE COMMERCEINSPECTION LAWS.-Act of Virginia, March, 1867, requiring all flour brought into the State to be inspected, the owner to pay therefor, and providing a penalty for any person selling such flour without inspection, is making it unlawful to sell within the State any fresh meats (beef, veal or mutton) slaughtered one hundred miles or over from the place at which it might be offered for sale, until it had been inspected and approved as provided in the act. Mr. Justice Harlan, delivering the opinion of the court in that case, said: “Undoubtedly a State may establish regulations for the protection of its people against the sale of unwholesome meats, provided such regulations do not conflict with the powers conferred by the Constitution upon Con discriminating, no such inspection being required for flour manufactured in the State, and is therefore unconstitutional as imposing a direct burden on commerce among the States. The State of Virginia has had a system of inspection laws from an early period, but they have related to articles produced in the State, and the main purpose of the inspection required has been to prepare the articles for exportation, in order to preserve the credit of the exports of the State in foreign markets, as well as to certify their genuineness and purity for the benefit of purchasers generally.gress, or infringe rights granted or secured by that inChief Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden, said: strument. But it may not under the guise of exerting "The object of inspection laws is to improve the its police powers, or of enacting inspection laws, make quality of articles produced by the labor of a country, discriminations against the products and industries to fit them for exportation, or it may be for domestic of some of the States in favor of the products and inuse." 9 Wheat. 203. In Brown v. Maryland, speaking dustries of its own or of other States. The owner of of the time when inspection is made, he adds: "In the meats here in question, although they were from spection laws, so far as they act upon articles for expor- animals slaughtered in Illinois, had the right, under tation, are generally executed on land before the arti- the Constitution, to compete in the markets of Vircle is put on board a vessel; so far as they act upon ginia upon terms of equality with the owners of like importations, they are generally executed upon arti- | meats from animals slaughtered in Virginia or elsecles which are landed. The tax or duty of inspection where within one hundred miles from the place of is a tax which is frequently if not always paid for ser- sale. Any local regulation which in terms or by its vice performed on land." 12 Wheat. 419. While, necessary operation denies this equality in the mar from the remark of the chief justice last cited, it would kets of a State is, when applied to the people and proappear that inspection may be made of imported goods ducts or industries of other States, a direct burden as well as goods intended for export, yet in what man- upon commerce among the States, and therefore void. ner and to what extent this may be done without com- Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 281; Railroad Co. v. ing in collusion with the power of Congress to regulate Husen, 95 id. 465; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 id. 313, foreign and inter-State commerce may be somewhat 319." The case of Brimmer v. Rebman was decided in difficult to explain with precision. In the case of Peo- accordance with these views, the law in question beple v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 107 U. S. ing held to be unconstitutional and void. The decision 59, it was held by this court that a law of the State of in that case is so directly opposite to the present that it New York imposing a tax upon alien passengers com- is unnecessary to prolong the discussion or to cite furing by vessel from a foreign country to the port of New ther authorities. The judgment of the Corporation York is a regulation of foreign commerce and void, al- Court of the city of Norfolk is reversed, and the cause though it was declared by the title of the law to be remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent "An act to raise money for the execution of the in- with this opinion. U. S. Sup. Ct., May 25, 1891. Voight spection laws of the State," which laws authorized v. Wright. Opinion by Bradley, J. passengers to be inspected in order to determine who were criminals, paupers, lunatics, orphans or infirm persons, without means or capacity to support themselves, and subject to become a public charge. It is true that the law was held to be not an inspection law, because such laws have reference only to personal property, and not to persons. But the question is still open as to the mode and extent in which State inspection laws can constitutionally be applied to personal property imported from abroad, or from another Statewhether such laws can go beyond the identification and regulation of such things as are directly injurious to the health and lives of the people, and therefore not entitled to the protection of the commercial power of the government, as explained and distinguished in the case of Crutcher v. Kentucky, ante, 851 (just decided). It may be remarked in passing that in the notes to Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38, 51, 53, prepared by Mr. Justice Blatchford, in which is contained a list of the various inspection laws of the different States, we do not observe any laws which seem to provide for the inspection of articles other than those which are the produce of the State, and this generally with a view to preparing them for exportation. But be this as it may, and without attempting to lay down any specific proposition on this somewhat difficult subject, there is enough in the case before us to decide it on satisfactory grounds, without passing upon the general right of the State to inspect imports or the qualifications to which it must necessarily be subject. The law in question is a discriminating law, and requires the inspection of flour brought from other States, when such inspection is not required for flour manufactured in Virginia. This aspect of the case brings it directly within the principle of Brimmer v. Rebman 138 U. S. 78, ante, 213 (decided at the present term). The law in question in that case was another statute of Virginia. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS AB- CANALS-LANDS TAKEN FOR-LIMITATION OF ACTION FOR SUCH TAKING-1 R. S., CHAP. 9, TITLE 9, ART. 3, $ 49. The year within which a claimant by section 49, article 1, title 9, chapter 9 of 1 Revised Statutes is required to file his claim or be forever barred from recovering compensation, does not begin to run, as to lands permanently appropriated, until the quantity has been determined by the officers of the State and its boundary lines described on maps which they are authorized to make and file, or marked on the ground by monuments in such a manner that the owner had the means of ascertaining the quantity and boundaries of the land to be taken. The case does not show that the State described the lands which it proposed to appropriate, or that it described the boundaries on the ground a year before the claimant filed his claim. As before stated, it appears that the exterior or blue lines were not all established until some time in 1870, there is nothing in the evidence warranting the board in inferring that such work was completed before January 30 of that year. As to the land temporarily taken the statute did not begin to run against the claimant until the State had ceased to use it; for until that time the claimant could not ascertain the extent of his damages, or the length of time which he would be deprived of its use. There is nothing in the case justifying the conclusion that the State had ceased to occupy the lands temporarily taken for more than a year prior to the date of filing the claim; on the contrary, the undisputed evidence is that the work of construction was not completed until long after the |