by mistake, either of law or fact, should be reinstated in his security by the court of bankruptcy, if the estate will be left by the reinstatement no worse off than if the security had been originally retained. In re Condon, 9 Ch. App. 609; Oil Co. v. Hawkins, 20 C. C. A. 468, 74 Fed. 395, 33 L. R. A. 739; Bank v. McKey, 42 C. C. A. 583, 102 Fed. 662. In Re Condon, it is true, the money was paid directly to the trustee by the party held to be equitably entitled, and was recovered directly from the trustee as paid under a mistake of law. Here the transaction was not quite so simple. Wilcox released to the trustee his lien on the seat in the stock exchange, believing that his claim against the bankrupt had been settled under the attachment. This belief was the mistake of law. He released his security, believing that he was no longer the bankrupt's creditor. Proof of a debt as unsecured ordinarily releases any security for the debt held by the creditor making proof. If a secured creditor believes he is unsecured, and proves accordingly, thus releasing his security, even though his mistake be caused by pretty stupid ignorance of the law, yet it is held that his proof can be recalled, and his release thereby avoided, "when all parties can be placed in the same situation they would have been in if the error had not occurred." In re Parkes, 10 N. B. R. 82, 83, Fed. Cas. No. 10,754. If the release of a security can be avoided because the release was caused by a mistaken belief that the debt was unsecured (Oil Co. v. Hawkins, 20 C. C. A. 468, 74 Fed. 395, 33 L. R. A. 739), there should be possibility of avoidance where the release was caused by a mistaken belief that the debt secured had ceased to exist. The trustee argued that, as he did not and could not recover from Wilcox the money paid Wilcox by Post & Flagg, the bankrupt's debt to Wilcox remains satisfied by the satisfaction obtained of the judgment recovered against the bankrupt. He contended that the bond given by Wilcox to Post & Flagg is not to be taken as part of the transaction, but as something with which the trustee has no concern. But it is not clear that the trustee was without remedy directly against Wilcox, and, moreover, considering the bond of indemnity in connection with the negotiations between Wilcox and the trustee, and with the settlement they both entered into, it appears to me that equity will treat the payment to the trustee by Wilcox as a restitution made by Wilcox of money belonging to the bankrupt's estate which had come into Wilcox's hands, thus reviving Wilcox's claim. In the Condon Case, above cited, the creditor took the proceeds of goods of the bankrupt sold on execution. These proceeds he subsequently paid over to the trustee, believing himself bound in law to do so. If his belief had been correct, can it be supposed that his claim against the bankrupt would have been satisfied by the levy of execution? It was suggested that in this case Wilcox sought to secure an unfair advantage by realizing under his garnishment. If he did so,-if he sought to evade the bankrupt act, he cannot now appeal to the equitable consideration of this court; but the agreed facts state expressly that he received payment from Post & Flagg in the belief that the money had been duly recovered from them under a valid attachment. He knew of the bank ruptcy, but he may not have known when it took place. For many purposes the adjudication may give notice to all the world, but it does not give such notice as to make a person who fails to govern his conduct by it guilty of so willful an attack upon the law that he should be deprived of a security to which he is otherwise equitably entitled. That ignorance of the law excuses no one is not a maxim of universal application. Against some mistakes of law a court of bankruptcy will relieve. Actual knowledge that bankruptcy proceedings were pending, and constructive knowledge of their date, of all the language of the act, and of the correct interpretation thereof, will not turn an otherwise innocent mistake of law into a guilty one. Again, Wilcox knew that the trustee claimed to recover from Post & Flagg, but, as he also believed that his own attachment was valid, he was under a mistake of law or of fact. That the mistake was unreasonable, that he ought to have known better, even if true, does not appear to me material, so long as he acted in good faith, as the agreed facts declare. It was urged further that Wilcox cannot now get the benefit of his lien, because that lien can be established only according to the rules of the stock exchange, out of whose hands the money had passed. But the rules of the stock exchange do not establish any method of formal proof as a condition precedent to the existence of the lien. They establish the lien generally, and then provide for the ascertainment of the amount of the debt. As that amount is found in the agreed statement of facts, Wilcox should be permitted to prove therefor, and to receive satisfaction out of the proceeds of the seat, as far as those proceeds will go. The judgment of the referee is modified accordingly, but the creditor will recover no costs of this proceeding. He must pay the costs of the suit against Post & Flagg, taxed as between solicitor and client. In re CLAFF. (District Court, D. Massachusetts. November 1, 1901.) No. 3,543. BANKRUPTCY-DISCHARGE-NEW PROCEEDINGS AFTER REFUSAL OF DISCHARGE. A bankrupt who has been refused a discharge is not debarred from filing a second petition, and obtaining a discharge thereunder, and such discharge, when granted, will be made general, leaving its effect as to debts proved under the first petition, but not under the second, to be determined whenever the occasion may arise. In Bankruptcy. Philip Tworoger, for bankrupt. LOWELL, District Judge. Claff was adjudicated bankrupt in 1899 upon a voluntary petition. His discharge was refused for fraudulent concealment of assets. In 1900 he filed a second petition, and seeks a discharge thereunder. That his discharge under the second petition, if obtained, will be no bar to a suit upon a debt sched uled under the first commission, and not proved under the second, seems clear. Gilbert v. Hebard, 8 Metc. (Mass.) 129; In re Drisko, 2 Low. 430, Fed. Cas. No. 4,090. See Dean v. Justices, 173 Mass. 453, 53 N. E. 893. But this fact does not prevent the bankrupt from filing a second petition, or from getting a discharge thereunder, for whatever the discharge may be worth. In re Drisko, above cited. The discharge is granted, and no exception will be made therein of debts scheduled under the earlier commission. It is more convenient to make the discharge a general one, and to leave its effect to be determined by subsequent proceedings. In re Marshall Paper Co., 43 C. C. A. 38, 102 Fed. 872, and cases cited; In re Black (D. C.) 97 Fed. 493. In re GROSSMAN. (District Court, E. D. Michigan, N. D. July 11, 1901.) 1. BANKRUPTCY-DISCHARGE-CONCEALMENT OF ASSETS AND FALSE OATH, A bankrupt had been engaged in business as a retail merchant. On November 23d he gave a chattel mortgage on his stock to a trustee for creditors, who took possession of and sold the same. The stock was inventoried by the trustee at $2,560. The evidence showed that on July 1st, preceding, the stock amounted to about $4,000, and between that date and the giving of the mortgage he had purchased additional stock to the value of $7,457 on credit, on which he had not paid to exceed $200. His bank book also showed deposits during that time of about $3,400, of which about $3,100 had been checked out. Neither the checks nor stubs were produced; nor did the bankrupt explain what use was made of the money, or what had become of the goods. There was also other evidence in the record which tended to discredit his testimony and his business integrity. Held, that such evidence, together with his failure to sustain the burden placed upon him by Bankr. Act 1898, § 7, subd. 9, of making a full and frank disclosure as to his business transactions, justified a finding that he had property at the time of his bankruptcy which he concealed, and that he knowingly and fraudulently made a false oath to his schedules, in which he stated that he had no property above his exemptions, and warranted the refusal of his discharge. 2. SAME-FEES OF REFEREE-HEARING ON APPLICATION FOR DISCHARGE. Where objections to a bankrupt's discharge are referred to a referee for hearing, he is entitled to a reasonable allowance for his services, in addition to the fees allowed him by the bankruptcy law. In Bankruptcy. On review of decision of referee holding bankrupt entitled to a discharge. Isaac A. Gilbert, for petitioner. Pierce & Kinnane, for opposing creditors. SWAN, District Judge. Specifications in opposition to the discharge of the bankrupt were filed by several of his creditors, and ou March 12, 1900, were referred to the referee. On April 2, 1901, on cause shown, the creditors were permitted to file amended specifications. These were as follows: (1) That said bankrupt, in his petition and schedule filed in this cause, and in his application for a discharge thereof, did knowingly and willfully make false oath and false oaths, in this: that the said bankrupt in said schedules and petitions filed herein did make oath that at the time of filing said petition in bankruptcy he had no assets, whereas in truth and in fact he, the said bankrupt, had and still has in his possession and ownership money and property to the value of $5,000. (2) That said bankrupt, in his schedules and petition filed herein, and in his sworn testimony taken before the referee, did knowingly and willfully make false oath, in declaring under oath that he had no assets or property, whereas in truth and in fact he had and still has, in money and property taken, received, and abstracted from his store and stock of goods and business owned and operated by him previous to filing said petition in bankruptcy, assets to the amount of $5,000, which the above-named objectors are not able to more particularly describe." The contest over the bankrupt's discharge was had over these two. specifications, the prior objections being practically abandoned. Prior to January 1, 1898, the bankrupt had been in business in Bay City for upward of five years as a retail dealer in clothing, boots and shoes, and men's furnishing goods. He testifies that he can neither read nor write, except to write his name, and there is no showing to the contrary. His principal business man, the bookkeeper, was one Simon Grabowski, who apparently continued with him until about January 1, 1899. On or about January 31, 1898, the bankrupt made a statement of his financial condition to R. G. Dun & Co. This statement was made out by Grabowski, but signed and delivered by the bankrupt to Dun & Co. It reads as follows: "M. Grossman, Dealer in Clothing, Hats and Caps, Gent's Furnishing Goods, Boots and Shoes, 906 Water Street, Bay City, Mich., Jan. 4, 1898. Stock on hand... Cash on hand and in bank. Accounts Fixtures Resources Liabilities Balance $5,467 34 1,011 72 175 00 80 00 $6,734 06 2,075 29 "[Signed] $4,658 77 M. Grossman.” Upon his examination his bank book was put in evidence, from which it appears that on January 1, 1898, his balance in the bank was $481.92. On the 1st day of November, 1898, according to the bank book, his balance was $273.23, and his monthly payments from said. bank account in 1898 to November 1st were as follows: Between July I and November 23, 1898, the proofs show that he received new goods to the amount of $7,457 at invoice prices, and that his payments on account of such goods were less than $200. November 23, 1898, he filed a chattel mortgage running to one Orr as trustee, purporting to cover all of his property and to secure all of his debts. In this chattel mortgage his indebtedness is scheduled at $11,505.83, including $1,250 to his wife and $2,230 to his mother-in-law, Mrs. Kate Roth. The trustee, Mr. Orr, took immediate possession of his property, inventoried and appraised it at once, and the value of the stock and fixtures was appraised at $2,560. The trustee sold under the mortgage, and realized from the stock and fixtures the sum of $1,985. The chattel mortgage sale was held December 23, 1898, and the property was purchased by the bankrupt's mother-in-law. The business has been carried on in the same store from that time until the present, with the bankrupt in full charge and management. The testimony shows that the stock of the bankrupt in January, 1898, and in July, 1898, amounted to about $4,000 in value, The bankrupt filed his voluntary petition in October, 1899, in which he declared that he had no property except such as was exempt by law. In his schedules he sets forth his liabilities as $10,386.14. These were almost entirely for goods purchased after July 1, 1898, excepting the sums of $1,095.05 and $1,986.48, which he alleged were loans from his wife and mother-in-law, respectively, made in 1895 and in 1897. The only book of account sent up with the testimony by the referee is the bankrupt's bank book, from which the following facts appear: July 1, 1898, he had a balance of $124.74, and his total deposits during the month were $895.98. At the end of the month the balance to his credit in the bank was $98.80. In August, 1898, he deposited $1,370.46. Of this sum he paid out in August all but $234.84. He deposited during September $772.31, of which in that month he paid out all but $53.73. In October, 1898, he deposited $729.23, of which he paid out in that month $273.23. November 8th he deposited $50; November 14th, $39.65. At this date his bank book transactions seem to have been closed. From the foregoing it will be seen that he received and deposited from July 1 to November 14, 1898, $3.409.86; that he paid out during the same time $3,097.42. Not a dollar of the latter amount seems to have been paid for goods purchased during the period mentioned, nor does it appear that the funds in the bank were used to pay creditors, or for what purpose the sums drawn were paid. Grabowski, his bookkeeper, testifies, from the merchandise accounts which were produced before the referee, to the substantial correctness of the indebtedness for merchandise purchased and delivered to the bankrupt after July 1, 1898. The bankrupt does not deny the correctness of any of these claims, or pretend to have paid any of his creditors except the Peerless Manufacturing Company, which seems to have received about $143 for goods sold and delivered to the bankrupt after July 1, 1898. No attempt is made by the bankrupt to account for the disposition of the moneys, the payment of which is evidenced by his bank books, or to explain the disappearance from his assets of the difference between his stock on hand July 1, 1898, with his subsequent purchases. of $7,457, and that covered by the chattel mortgage, which was inventoried at $2,560, as stated. If, as the referee finds, he had his stock of $4,000 worth of goods July 1, 1898, and added thereto by purchases of goods of the value of $7,457, it is obvious that he must |