ly in point with the case at bar. Judge Wallace, speaking for the circuit court of appeals for the Second circuit, referring to chairs attached to the floor by screws and nails, as these were, said: "The auditorium chairs were turn-over chairs, upholstered in plush, and of the mechanical construction adapting ther to be placed in rows and secured to the floor. They were placed over the carpets in rows, and fastened to the floor by screws. It would seem that chairs attached and arranged substantially as these were are essential to the uses to which an auditorium is appropriated. We think he should have instructed them [the jury] that, attached as they were, if they were, as to size, upholstering, mechanical construction, and general arrangement, adapted to conform to the auditorium, that fact would indicate an intention that they were to be regarded as fixtures. If they were arranged as they generally are in such rooms, occupying the whole area of the auditorium when divided into the necessary aisles, we think, in view of the other evidence, that it should have been ruled as a matter of law that they were fixtures. An auditorium without seating capacity would be incomplete, and the chairs as generally arranged and constructed in such a room are essential to the use to which that part of the building is appropriated." ** See, also, Oliver v. Lansing (Neb.) 80 N. W. 829. The stage, stage fixtures, and drop curtain attached thereto fall within the same rule. They are fixtures. In regard to the scenery, however, it does not appear that it was substantially affixed to the building, or that it was specially designed, constructed, and fitted for the building. It appears from the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Maguire that this scenery might be used in any other theater, and that he had at times used portions thereof in other playhouses in the state of Montana. Mr. McFarland testified that this scenery, when used, was lashed to or on the stage in some way. The precise manner in which this was done is not disclosed. Taking the general knowledge possessed by the court of stage scenery, it must infer that it was only lashed temporarily, and not permanently affixed to the building. Under this evidence the court cannot hold that it is a part of the building. This view is also supported by the circuit court of appeals in Insurance Co. v. Allison, supra. In the case of Oliver v. Lansing (Neb.) Ɛo N. W. 829, it was held that certain theatrical scenery used in a building was a part of the same. In that case the evidence showed that the scenery was specially constructed for and fitted to this building. In that particular the case differs from the one at bar. While the court finds that this theatrical scenery is not a part of the building in question, I do not recall any evidence that would justify the court in holding that the defendant Murray is the owner of the same. It is not necessary to decide who is the owner thereof. As far as the pianos are concerned, these certainly cannot be classed as a part of the building. From their very nature they are personal property, and cannot pass to the complainant under a deed to the realty. It is therefore ordered that a decree be entered in this cause requiring defendant Silas F. King to convey to the complainant, John O. Bender, all his right, title, and interest of, in, and to the real property described in the bill, with the appurtenances. Among these are embraced the stage, stage fixtures, and appliances attached to the stage, the drop curtain attached thereto, and the chairs, attached and fastened to the floor by screws and nails. The court also finds that said complainant is entitled to the rents, issues, and profits derived from the property described in the bill from the 11th day of March, 1899, the date on which said complainant was entitled to a sheriff's deed thereof, and that, defendant Murray having received said rents, issues, and profits with full knowledge and notice of the complainant's rights in the premises from said date down to the Ist day of February, 1900, he is required to account to the complainant therefor, and make restitution thereof and pay the same, with legal interest. Complainant is also entitled to his proper costs incurred in this suit. CENTRAL PAC. RY. CO. v. EVANS et al. 1. EQUITY JURISDICTION-ENJOINING ILLEGAL ASSESSMENT-ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW. A court of equity has jurisdiction of a suit to enjoin the assessment of complainant's property for taxation in a manner not authorized by the laws of the state, such remedy being the only one which affords adequate and appropriate relief by requiring the assessment to be made in a lawful manner. 2. TAXATION-LEGALITY OF ASSESSMENT-POWERS OF SPECIAL TRIBUNAL. Const. Nev. art. 10, § 1, requires the legislature to provide by law "for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation," and the statute enacted in pursuance of such requirement (Cutting's Comp. Laws, § 1084) provides that each county assessor shall ascertain by diligent inquiry and examination all property in his county, real and personal, subject to taxation, and shall "determine the true cash value of all such property." By Act March 16, 1901, it was provided that the county assessors of the state shall meet at the capital each year, “and shall at such meetings establish throughout the state a uniform valuation of all classes of property which, by their character, will admit of such uniform valuation." Such act requires each county assessor to fix the valuation of property assessed by him at the valuation "placed on the same class of property" at the annual meeting, and imposes a penalty for a violation of such requirement, but provides that property not designated at the annual meeting shall be valued under the existing provisions of law. Held, that the board of assessors so created was a special tribunal, whose powers were strictly limited to those expressly conferred by the act, which were to fix the valuation of property by classification upon some reasonable basis, where it admitted of such classification; that such board had no power, without making a classification of railroad property, to designate a railroad company by name, and by a vote of its members fix the valuation per mile of its railroad throughout the state; and that its action in so doing was void, and did not affect the right and duty of each county assessor to determine for himself the "true cash value" of the property of such railroad company within his county. In Equity. Suit for injunction. W. F. Herrin, John Garber, and M. A. Murphy, for complainant. William Woodburn, Atty. Gen., James R. Judge, Alfred Chartz, and Trenmor Coffin, for defendants. A. E. Cheney, for defendants Alphonso A. Evans and Joseph W. Guthrie. HAWLEY, District Judge. This is a suit in equity, brought by complainant, who is the owner of a franchise for a railroad, granted by the laws of the United States, extending from the city of Oakland, in the state of California, to the city of Ogden, in the state of Utah, known as and called the Central Pacific Railroad, which extends across the state of Nevada, and through the counties of Washoe, Lyon, Churchill, Humboldt, Lander, Eureka, and Elko, and is not situate in any other county in this state, against all the county assessors in this state, to enjoin and restrain the assessors of the particular counties through which the Central Pacific Railroad is built "from adopting, or being controlled in their action by, the said valuation of said meeting of assessors, in valuing and assessing said Central Pacific Railroad in their respective counties, and from proceeding to value and assess such portion thereof as lies in the county of each, respectively, otherwise than in the exercise of his own official judgment and discretion, and according to the said laws of the state of Nevada for the assessment of railroads." Upon the filing of the bill an order was made requiring the defendants to show cause, if any they had, why the relief asked for should not be granted, and in the meantime a restraining order was issued. The rule to show cause was heard upon the complaint and answer, and upon various affidavits and documents presented by the respective parties. The real object of the suit is to test the validity of the law entitled "An act to provide for a more uniform valuation and assessment of property in this state," approved March 16, 1901 (St. 1901, p. 61), and the validity of the proceedings had thereunder by the state board of assessors at its meeting held in Carson City, Nev., from April 1 to 4, 1901, inclusive. These are the main questions involved herein, but,. as incidental thereto, it is alleged in the bill of complaint: "That the valuation so assumed to be fixed by the said majority of said assessors upon said Central Pacific Railroad was and is arbitrary, unjust, oppressive, and greatly disproportionate to the fair value thereof, and to the value fixed by said board of assessors upon other similar property, and to the systematic valuation of other real property in said state, which is systematically undervalued by the assessors defendants herein throughout said state of Nevada, and is valued by them at not more than one-half of the market value thereof; that the fair value of said Central Pacific Railroad in the state of Nevada for the purposes of assessment and taxation does not exceed an amount greater than from $8,000 to $12,000 per mile of said Central Pacific Railroad, in different parts of said state, in respect of its main road, and an amount not greater than $3,500 per mile in respect of its side tracks in said state: that the said valuation of said Central Pacific Railroad by said board of assessors at their said meeting held under said statute constituted, on the part of the majority of said board, a denial to this complainant of the equal protection of the law, and that such denial is in contravention of the 14th amendment to the constitution of the United States." * The affidavits and documents introduced upon this hearing principally relate to the value of the road. The answer was filed on behalf of each and all of the defendants, but at the hearing the defendant Evans, the assessor of Washoe county, and the defendant Guthrie, the assessor of Humboldt county, appeared separately, and took issue as to the value placed upon the railroad by the state board of assessors. Defendants claim that they are entitled to have the re straining order dissolved upon the principles announced by the supreme court of this state in Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Dayton, II Nev. 161. In that case it was held that the complainant was not entitled to an injunction, because it had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. It was stated by counsel for defendants that the case is identical with the one under consideration. That case was brought to enjoin the collection of a tax upon personal property. It was averred, among other things, in the complaint, that the defendant, who was the county assessor, "threatens to sell, and, unless restrained and enjoined, will sell, the office fixtures of complainant for the taxes assessed and levied by him to complainant ; * that complainant has no speedy or adequate remedy at law; that, should defendant sell said fixtures, complainant will be greatly and irreparably damaged and injured; and that said defendant is wholly unable to respond in damages." It appeared in that case that the assessor, in assessing and attempting to enforce the payment of the taxes, was pursuing the identical course indicated by the statutes of this state, and all his acts were within the line of his official duties as prescribed by law. Upon those facts the chief justice, speaking for the court, said: * * "There must, in every case, be some special circumstances attending a threatened injury of this kind, which distinguishes it from a common trespass, and brings the case under some recognized head of equity jurisdiction, before the extraordinary and preventive remedy of injunction can be invoked. The necessity of strictly adhering to this rule is obvious. The legislature is invested with the sole power of providing the modes by which state and county taxes shall be levied, assessed, and collected, and it is essential that the modes prescribed, if within constitutional limits, should be faithfully carried out by the officers to whom is intrusted the duty of their enforcement. The state and county government are dependent for their support upon the taxes imposed upon the property of their citizens, and experience and observation teaches us that the payment of taxes has very often to be enforced by summary and stringent means against the adverse sentiment and persistent resistance of the taxpayer. * With such collections courts of equity ought never to interfere, unless the bill clearly shows that complainant is likely to suffer some great or irreparable injury from the acts of the officer, and further shows that he has no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law." See, also, Dows v. City of Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 20 L. Ed. 65; Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Board of Public Works of West Virginia, 172 U. S. 32, 37, 19 Sup. Ct. 90, 43 L. Ed. 354, and authorities there cited.. The present suit is not brought to enjoin the collection of a tax. It is not brought to enjoin or restrain defendants, or either of them, from assessing the property of the complainant under the laws of this state; but is brought to compel the defendants to proceed according to law in making the assessments, the contention of the complainant being that by the law of the state of Nevada, regulating the assessment of railroads in said state, it is made the official duty of each of said assessors that he shall value and assess that portion of the Central Pacific Railroad which lies in the county of which he is the assessor according to his official judgment, and that in ascertaining, assessing, and fixing the value of said portion of the railroad for taxation he shall assess it the same as other property, and shall consider, treat, and assess such portion thereof at its value within his county as an integral part of a complete, continuous, and operated line of railroad, and not as so much land covered by the right of way merely, nor as so many miles of track consisting of iron rails, ties, and couplings, as prescribed by section 1238, Cutting's Comp. Laws. The injunction is asked for to prevent any assessor from assessing the property in any other manner. If the contention of complainant as to the law is correct, irreparable injury might follow, not only to the complainant, but also to the state and counties which are entitled to the tax to be collected from the complainant by a legal assessment of its property. If the contemplated and threatened assessment by the various county assessors is, as claimed by complainant, without authority of law, it would necessarily follow that complainant has no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law; and in this respect the case in hand stands entirely upon a different footing from the facts presented in the case of Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Dayton. Where there is an unlawful departure from the provisions of the law. relating to assessment, or any violation of the fundamental law, it is the duty of the court to enjoin the proposed invalid assessment. Railroad & Telephone Cos. v. Board of Equalizers of Tennessee (C. C.) 85 Fed. 302, 308; Crim v. Town of Philippi, 38 W. Va. 122, 18 S. E. 466. In Cooley, Tax'n, 760, the author says: "There are certain cases with which the courts of law cannot adequately deal. Their preventive remedies are few, and of narrow scope; and where the case is such that, if threatened action is allowed to be taken, the mischief will be irremediable, equity, under old and well-established principles, will interfere, because equity alone can do complete justice under such circumstances. # * The available remedy in equity, when any is admissible, is commonly that by injunction." This principle was recognized and clearly stated in Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Dayton, supra. See, also, City of Ogden City v. Armstrong, 168 U. S. 224, 237, 18 Sup. Ct. 98, 42 L. Ed. 444; Wilson v. Lambert, 168 U. S. 611, 18 Sup. Ct. 217, 42 L. Ed. 599. It is contended by complainant that the act of the legislature is invalid for many reasons: (1) That the act embraces more than one subject, and that but one subject is embraced in the title, contrary to and in violation of section 17, art. 4, of the constitution; (2) that it is a local or special law "for the assessment and collection of taxes" for state and county purposes, and violates section 20, art. 4, of the constitution; (3) that it discriminates against the complainant, and deprives it of its right, under the existing laws of the state of Nevada, to have its property equalized before the county commissioners of each county sitting as a board of equalization; (4) that it improperly delegates to the annual meeting of the various county assessors the power of the state of Nevada, to classify property for the purpose of taxation, and improperly authorizes said assessors to establish a law throughout the state of Nevada; (5) that the proceedings had by the state board of assessors, in so far as they relate to the valuation of the Central Pacific Railroad, are absolutely null and void for want. of jurisdiction, power, or authority. Can these contentions, or either of them, be sustained? Article 10, § 1, of the constitution of the state of Nevada, provides that "the legislature shall provide by law |