extend to the entire lot or land owned by the lienee upon which the building or improvement was situated, whether actually occupied thereby or not. Section 4204. Read in the light of this statute, this description comprises all of blocks 18 and 23 except the strip on block 18 which constitutes the right of way of the railroad company.

It is said that there was no "four (4) story and basement brick, stone, and frame packing house building," and therefore it was impossible to identify the property intended to be claimed by the appellant. But this contention rests upon a too exact and technical interpretation of the description, and upon the fact that the improvement which the lienor thus described consisted of three adjoining buildings separated only by fire walls, one of which was a four-story brick without a basement, one of which was a five-story brick, and one of which was a four-story brick and stone building with a basement, and with a frame covered platform around it. There was no other brick and stone building on the two blocks, and the description was plainly intended to point out the block or improvement which comprised these three buildings, which together formed a solid block, and which was not inaptly, although perhaps it was inaccurately, called a four-story and basement brick, stone, and frame packing house building. This isolated portion of the description, however, is not all the means of identification supplied by the claim of lien. It not only points out this building in the words which have been quoted, but it also adds, "and all other buildings and improvements connected therewith, or adjacent, or adjoining, and used and operated by Jacob Dold Packing Company as a packing house plant, and situated on" blocks 18 and 23. This description certainly points to some building on the lot of land comprised in blocks 18 and 23, and all the buildings on those blocks were adjoining or adjacent to each other, and were used as a part of the packing house plant; so that, whatever building was intended to be first named, they are all equally included in the claim. Any description which will enable one familiar with the locality to identify the property on which the lien is claimed with reasonable certainty, is sufficient to sustain it. De Witt v. Smith, 63 Mo. 263; Bradish v. James, 83 Mo. 313, 318; Drexel v. Richards (Neb.) 70 N. W. 23, 24. When the entire description in the claim is fairly read and construed in the light of the statute and of these decisions, it identifies all the buildings and all the land on blocks 18 and 23 owned and used by the Dold Company as a part of its packing plant as the property upon which the lien was intended to apply so clearly that no one seeking to find it, whether familiar or unacquainted with the locality, could fail to clearly identify it by the description in the claim.

Counsel for respondent maintain, however, that, if this be the true construction of the description, the lien is void, because it is not restricted to the specific building in which the engine was placed and to the lot of land on which it stands; and section 4227, Rev. St. Mo. 1899; Matlack v. Lare, 32 Mo. 262; Fitzgerald v. Thomas, 61 Mo. 499; Fitzpatrick v. Thomas, Id. 512; Lemly v. Steel Co., 65

Mo. 545; and Ranson v. Sheehan, 78 Mo. 668,-are cited in support of this view. In Fitzpatrick v. Thomas, 61 Mo. 512, the supreme court of Missouri held that, where separate and unconnected houses were built on separate city lots respectively, a single lien could not be maintained against all the houses and lots for the aggregate expense of their construction. In Ranson v. Sheehan, 78 Mo. 668, that court decided that a claim of a lien upon 15 acres of land in the country, where the land subject to lien is limited to a tract one acre in extent, was invalid because it did not in any way identify the acre to which the lien was intended to apply. These are, perhaps, the strongest cases cited in support of the contention of the respondent. They illustrate the earlier disposition of the Missouri court to construe the mechanic's lien law strictly as in derogation of the common law,-a disposition happily abandoned in its subsequent opinions, and contrary to the public policy of the state as it is evidenced by its legislation and by the later decisions of its courts. Statutes securing upon buildings and improvements the wages of labor and the value of materials bestowed upon them ought to be liberally construed. The labor and material, once bestowed, lose all their value to the laborer or material man. He cannot take them back. They enhance the value of the property upon which they are placed, and its owner, and those who take under him, receive all the benefits of the labor and of the material. In such circumstances the lien of the laborer or material man, should be maintained to the full extent to which the statutes give it. Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Robinson & Cary Co., 68 Fed. 778, 780, 15 C. C. A. 668, 670, 32 U. S. App. 435, 439. This policy has been adopted by the legislature of the state of Missouri. After the supreme court had rendered its decision in Fitzpatrick v. Thomas, that legislature expressly provided that, whenever another case of that character arose in that state, the lien of the claimant should be sustained. It gave a single lien upon all the buildings when the improvement consisted of two or more separate constructions erected under one general contract upon contiguous lots. Section 4227. The case at bar does not fall under the terms of this statute, because the buildings constituting that part of the packing plant on blocks 18 and 23 were not erected under one general contract. The respondent accordingly contends that this case must be governed by the decision. in Fitzpatrick v. Thomas. Its counsel argues that, if this is not so, section 4227 was futile, and a single lien upon many buildings on separate lots could have been maintained without it. But this argument overlooks the broad distinction between the facts of this case and those which conditioned the Fitzpatrick Case and others of like character. The statute gives a lien upon "the building, erectian or improvements and the lot or land upon which the same are situated." Section 4203. In the Fitzgerald Case each buildingeach improvement-was situated on a separate city lot according to the plat, was a separate improvement, and was intended to be used and capable of being used for a separate purpose. In this case the lines between the original city lots in blocks 18 and 23, the alleys through them, and the street between them have been disre

garded, and practically obliterated, by the respondent. The city lots are no longer capable of separate use. The buildings on the blocks were not intended, and are not adapted, for independent. service, but they are all parts of a single improvement, constructed and used for a single purpose, the carrying on of the packing business of the respondent. Why should not the land on which this improvement stands be held to be a single tract of land, and lienable as such under the terms of the statute? There is nothing in the words of the law to forbid it. The lien may attach to the "improvements" and to "the lot or land" on which they are situated. By the very terms of the statute it extends to all the land upon which they are situated held by the owner of the improvements, whether occupied by it or not. Section 4204. Why do not all of blocks 18 and 23 upon which these improvements are situated, which is owned by the Dold Company, constitute a single tract of land? Any other construction of the statute and the lien is illiberal, strict, and injurious to both the debtor and the creditor. It would be as disastrous to the interests of the owner of such a plant as this and to the claimant of the lien to segregate and sell a single building in which an engine or a piece of machinery happened to be placed, thus disrupting the plant, as it would be to sell a few miles of a great railroad, or a small part of any manufactory. The portion sold would bring but a modicum of its value, while its segregation from the plant would entail much greater damage than all it was worth upon the owner. The broad terms of the statute themselves, the liberality with which a sound public policy requires that they should be construed, and the later decisions of the supreme court of Missouri, which are cited below, point unerringly to this conclusion. Where one has constructed an improvement consisting of several buildings on adjoining city lots or blocks, regardless of the lines, streets, and alleys among them, has intended that these improvements should be used and is actually operating them as a part of a single plant, so that neither the city lots nor the buildings are adapted to separate uses, all the buildings so constructed may constitute a single improvement, and the tract on which they stand may be a single lot of land, and subject to a single lien under the mechanic's lien law of Missouri (sections 4203, 4204, 4207, Rev. St. 1899). Progress Press Brick & Machine Co. v. Gratiot Brick & Quarry Co., 151 Mo. 501, 519, 52 S. W. 401, 74 Am. St. Rep. 557; Pullis v. Iron Co., 157 Mo. 565, 593, 57 S. W. 1095; Kelley v. City Mills, 126 Mass. 148; Phil. Mech. Liens, § 376. The description in the claim of lien must, therefore, be held to be sufficient to sustain a lien on all that part of blocks 18 and 23 which constitutes a part of the packing plant of the respondent.

Another error specified is that the circuit court held the lien invalid because the appellant inserted in its claim an item of $74.35 for two rocker plates, which were furnished under another and different contract from that which provided for the engine. Under the practice in Missouri, a lien may not be secured for the aggregate amount of materials furnished under distinct contracts between different parties and mingled in one account. O'Connor v.

Railroad Co., III Mo. 185, 194, 20 S. W. 16; Lumber Co. v. Stepp, 157 Mo. 366, 384, 57 S. W. 1059. But neither the statute, the decisions of the courts of Missouri, nor the reason of the case call for more than one notice or statement of lien for materials supplied to the same property under different contracts between the same parties. Kearney v. Wurdeman, 33 Mo. App. 447, 456; Kern v. Pfaff, 44 Mo. App. 29, 35; Grace v. Nesbitt, 109 Mo. 9, 16, 18 S. W. 1118; Minneapolis Trust Co. v. Great Northern R. Co. (Minn.) 76 N. W. 953. Nor does the fact that a lienor demands a larger amount in his claim for a lien under a single contract than he is entitled to receive, or the fact that he demands compensation for materials that were furnished under another contract, invalidate his lien for the amount justly due him under the contract specified, if that amount is capable of ascertainment and segregation. Ittner v. Hughes, 133 Mo. 679, 690, 34 S. W. 1110; Allen v. Smelting Co., 73 Mo. 688, 692; Johnson v. Building Co., 23 Mo. App. 546; Lumber Co. v. Strimple, 33 Mo. App. 154; Bambrick v. Association, 53 Mo. App. 225, 239. The appellant brought this suit to enforce its lien for the amount due it under its contract to furnish the engine, and alleged that the machinery and appliances for which it sought a lien were delivered between January 17, 1898, and April 20, 1898. The item which raises the question under discussion appears in the claim of lien under date of July 13, 1898, as two rocker plates, $74.35, and stands entirely separate from the items furnished under the contract for the engine prior to April 21st of that year. At the trial no claim for this item was urged. Indeed, a stipulation was made that, if a delivery of the engine was completed on April 19, 1898, the claim of lien which was filed on August 20, 1898, was too late by one day; but that, if its delivery was on April 20, 1898, the claim was filed in' time. This was, in effect, a withdrawal of all claim to enforce the lien for $74.35. The result is that the appellant simply claimed a lien for $74.35 more than it was entitled to enforce a lien for under the particular contract counted upon in its petition, although it was really entitled to a lien for this excess under another contract, which it failed to plead. There is no more reason why its claim for this excess should destroy its lien for the $4,501.38, which was justly due it under the contract it pleaded, than there is why any litigant should lose his right to recover the amount justly due him because he claims more. The demand of this excess in the claim of lien did not invalidate it, and the holding of the court below to the contrary was erroneous.

Counsel for the respondent are not content to rest their case solely upon their contention that the rulings of the court below were right. They insist that, even if those rulings were erroneous, the decree below must be sustained: (1) Because the engine was personalty, and could not form the basis of a lien; (2) because the claim of lien was not filed in time; and (3) because the building in which it was placed was burned. The contention that the engine could not be the foundation of a lien because it was personalty is untenable for two reasons. In the first place, the statutes of Missouri expressly give to the vendor the right to a lien for the

purchase price of an engine, boiler, or machinery provided for any building, erection, or improvement under a contract with the owner or his contractor. Rev. St. Mo. 1899, § 4203. In the second place, this engine was placed in one of the brick buildings constituting part of the packing plant of the respondent, and it was connected with other machinery therein for the purpose of permanently furnishing power to operate the refrigerator and to cool the air in the buildings. While it was capable of removal without disturbing any part of the building in which it was placed, and while it was secured. to its foundation by taps screwed upon anchor bolts, and could be removed by simply unscrewing the taps, it was intended to be and it was permanently incorporated into, and habitually used as a part of, the packing house. The line of demarcation between realty and personalty in cases between landlord and tenant is by no means the same as in cases between vendor and vendee, mortgagor and mortgagee, and lienor and lienee, and this for the very sound reason that the relation of landlord and tenant is transitory, the use of the property is by one who is to stay for a limited time, and many articles are placed upon the realty by the tenant which both parties intend to have removed at the end of the term; while the things placed upon the realty by the vendor, the mortgagor, and the lienee are put there by one whose term of occupancy is unlimited, generally with the intention that they shall become a part of the real estate, and that they shall be perpetually and habitually used with it. In cases of the latter class, and especially where ponderous machinery, whose weight alone is sufficient to hold it in place, is in question, permanent attachment to the realty is by no means an indispensable attribute of a fixture. The true test is the intent to permanently incorporate the article with the plant or property, and the permanent and habitual use of it as a part of the real estate. And the true rule is that in a controversy between the claimant of a mechanic's lien and the owner of real estate upon which the property of the lienor has been placed, or between vendor and vendee, or between mortgagor and mortgagee, engines, machinery, houses, buildings, and every other thing which is essential to the particular use to which the realty is applied, or between which and the balance of the realty there is a manifest and necessary dependence, or which is intended to be and is permanently and habitually used as a part of the property constituting the real estate of the owner upon which it was placed, becomes a part of that realty, whether it can be removed without physical injury to the realty or not, however slight its physical connection with the real estate, and even when there is no actual fastening of the one to the other. Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 Watts & S. 116, 37 Am. Dec. 490; Oves v. Oglesby, 7 Watts, 106; Winslow v. Insurance Co., 4 Metc. (Mass.) 306, 38 Am. Dec. 368; Richardson v. Koch, 81 Mo. 264, 273; Thomas v. Davis, 76 Mo. 72, 79, 43 Am. Rep. 756; Machine Co. v. Cole, 130 Mo. 1, 31 S. W. 922; Progress Press Brick & Machine Co. v. Gratiot Brick & Quarry Co., 151 Mo. 501, 52 S. W. 401, 74 Am. St. Rep. 557; Christian v. Dripps, 28 Pa. 271; Farrar v. Stackpole, 6 Greenl. 154, 157, 19 Am. Dec. 201; Walmsley v. Milne, 7 C. B.