the worfe for it. What notion can a man have of himself, who acts thus what notion of his maker, to hope it can ever end well? We are accuftomed to it indeed; and therefore may be tempted to look on it as a flight matter. But our Maker will determine at last, not according to the prejudices of men, but the truth of things. We are difpofed to entertain very favourable opinions of our own behaviour: and even when we fee it to be wrong, if we are of low degree, we hope to be paffed over as inconfiderable; if of high, to be treated hereafter with fome peculiar tenderness and deference. But God is no refpecter of perfons*: the meaneft is not beneath his notice; the greatest is not above his power; the difference between them is as nothing in his eyes; and both shall be punished or rewarded according to their deeds. May he therefore grant us all to take immediately the only method of fhunning his wrath, and fecuring his favour, by confidering our ways impartially, for else we may believe things to be allowable, nay commendable, which are highly criminal: by holding faft our integrity, fo far as we have hithertó preferved it by ceafing to do evil and learning to do well, in whatever respects we are faulty or deficient by faith in his mercy for pardon, and his grace. for ftrength, through the merits and mediation of our bleffed redeemer to whom, &c. • As x. 34. 1 SER Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do do ye even fo to them: for this is the law and the to you, prophets. THE largest number of particular directions can never poffibly equal the infinite variety of circumftances, in which human creatures are concerned to act: nor can the memories of moft retain any confiderable part of these, which might be given. And therefore, though the utmost care were taken to fpecify to us our feveral obligations, we must be left after all to find out many of them ourselves, by deducing them from general rules, and thefe, (when they carry in them the evidence of their own truth and rightness) at the fame time that they extend our knowledge to cafes, which have not been distinctly mentioned to us, afford us alfo a clearer conviction of our duty in such as have: by fhewing us, that the different commands, to which we are subjected, flow from the fame fource, and carry the fame reasonablenefs along with them. Our bleffed Saviour, therefore, after delivering feparately, in his fermon on the mount, all the chief precepts of the most exalted and refined morality, takes care, juft before the conclu fion of it, to comprehend the whole, both of what he had faid and what he had omitted, concerning the ties of men to cach other, in one univerfal law of life. Whatfoever ye would that men should do unto you, even fo do ye unto them. Not that he was the first who made any use of this admirable maxim. God forbid the world fhould have been ignorant of fo neceffary and fo plain a direction for their behaviour, till that time. Both Jews and heathens had feen its equity, and felt its force, in VOL. I. L fome fome degree. But ftill more was wanting to complete its ufefulness and that our Lord fupplied. Moft, if not all, other teachers, had expreffed it in the negative form: as Tobit, for inftance, do that to no man, which thou hateft*. And fo it ferved only to restrain mutual injuries. But he laid it down in the affirmative, as an injunction also of proper kindneffes. They fpoke of it no otherwise than incidentally, and without afcribing any fingular prerogative to it. But he recommended it, as taking in the entire compass of social virtue. They could fupport it only by argument: but he hath added the fanction of divine authority. In these respects therefore it is peculiarly the law of our gracious Redeemer. But whether we confider it as a precept of his religion, or as one of the primitive dictates of reafon and nature; in either view we are bound to pay it a cor fcientious regard. And the right manner of fhewing this regard is, I. To form a juft notion of its meaning. II. To fix in our hearts a due fenfe of its obligation. III. To confider its importance well. IV. To regulate our practice by it in the various relations and occurrences of life. On the three former of these points I fhall difcourfe now: on the laft, God willing, the next opportunity. : I. I shall endeavour to affift you in forming a juft notion of this rule. Not that it wants explanation, as being obfcure and difficult but that mankind, in order to excufe their difobedience to it, are very apt to put falfe interpretations upon it; and fo either pervert it into a wrong direction, or perplex it till it becomes none at all. Some men, if we may judge by their conduct, apprehend themselves bound only to behave towards others, as they are willing others fhould behave towards them in their prefent condition. The rich and great, for example, have perhaps no favours to ask of a confiderable part of their inferiors: and therefore too often seem to think, they need not beftow any favours upon them. They agree, they fay, to the reafonableness of doing as they would be done by: and therefore, if they defire no fervice from fuch and fuch perfons, they owe no fervice to them. But the rule is, (and they know it is) not, "Treat others as you would wish them to treat you, circumstances being *Tob. iv. 15: "being what they are"; but, " as you would wish them to “treat you, circumstances being changed on each fide." This makes a great alteration. Perhaps they will reply, that they are content, if circumftances ever fhould change, to receive the treatment, which they give. Therefore they will overlook the poor and needy now; and they allow the world to overlook them, when they become fuch. They will revenge themselves of their enemies, while they have power; and let them, if ever it comes to their turn, repay the vengeance. But here again, they know in their confciences the rule means, not, that they shall act as they may think, or rather fay, they fhall be willing to have others. act towards them, fuppofing circumstances should change, which they trust they never will: but as they would have them act, fuppofing circumftances were changed. And in that case they would wish for the very kindest behaviour, whatever they may beforehand either pretend or imagine. But even on the. fuppofition of an actual change, there are people, who can mifinterpret this rule in fuch a manner, as would make the application of it fometimes a moft pernicious thing. Every magiftrate, were he in the place of the criminal, who appears before him, would wish not to be punished. Every virtuous man, were he a vicious one, would wish to be indulged and affifted in his vices. Every one of us perhaps would be glad, if he could, to. have his will on all occafions. Ought we therefore to gratify all the inclinations of others, because we should like to have all our own gratified? Or if not, is not the rule an erroneous one, as implying this? Why according to their different ways of thinking, fome will be apt to prefer the former of thefe opinions, and fome the latter. But neither is well grounded. For though indeed a magistrate, were he in the place of the offender, would wish to escape with impunity, yet this is not the only fuppofition he hath to make. Let him fuppofe himself alfo in the place of fuch, as may be then or afterwards injured by the offender, if he escapes punishment or of fuch, as the precedent of his impunity may tempt others to injure let him reflect, how the rule before us enjoins him to act with regard to these innocent perfons, and he will never be misled by whatever tenderness it may seem to enjoin him with regard to the guilty. Again, though if we were in the place of any of our vicious acquaintance, we should be glad to be affifted in our vices; yet fuppofe we were in the place of these L 2 t those whom their vices corrupt, or impoverish, or grieve, or make any way miferable; fhould we then be glad, that other people fhould affift in bringing this mifery upon us? if not, the precept of doing as we would be done by, far from requiring us to give fuch affiftance ourselves, abfolutely prohibits it. Serving our friends, when they ought not to be ferved; and raifing those in the world, from partial fondnefs, who ought not to be raised, paffes, I am afraid, too commonly for great good-nature and is defended, or excused, because it is treating them as we should defire to be treated by them. But then it is treating their worthier competitors, and all fuch as may fuffer by the faults or incapacity of these favourites, which perhaps many, perhaps the public may, it is treating them as we fhould abhor to be treated. We must therefore understand this rule to mean that we take into our confideration, not barely the parties who appear and prefs for the benefit of it, but whoever elfe is concerned, if any be: and do, not to one or fome only, but to all men, as we would that they should do to us. But here it may poffibly be objected again, that if we imagine ourselves to be fucceffively in the fituation of different perfons, we fhall of confequence defire different and contrary things in reference to the fame affair: fo that behaving towards every one interested in it, as we fhould, in their circumftances, defire, that they would behave towards us, is impracticable: that therefore on fuch occafions, which are not rare, the rule is in effect no rule: and that farther, on feveral others it is a But very bad one. For fuppofe any one to defire of us, what would be hurtful to no third perfon, but to himself, or to us: muft we comply with his defire, because if we were exactly in his stead, we should have the fame defire? Certainly not. then, fuch cafes as thefe, not only happen in comparison, but feldom, and therefore cannot miflead, or even perplex us often: but when they do happen, instead of overturning the rule, they point out to us a very important limitation of it, which was doubtlefs originally intended in it, and will secure it from ever being overturned. And this is, that the phrafe, whatsoever ye would, muft not be extended to mean whatever we can poffibly wish, but whatever we can equitably and allowably wish. It is to be understood of proper, not of unfit inclinations; for what |